In Re Ryan G.

[¶1] The mother and father of Ryan G. appeal from a judgment of the

District Court (Biddeford, Foster, J.) terminating their parental rights to

Ryan G. pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii), (iv)

(2016). They challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

judgment and the court’s discretionary determination of the child’s best

interest. The father also contends that his right to counsel was violated and

that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for amended or

additional findings of facts and conclusions of law.1 Because the evidence

1 Although the father attempts to challenge the temporary denial of court appointed legal

counsel and the denial of his motion for amended or additional findings of fact and conclusions of

law, pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4006 those decisions were interlocutory and not appealable, and we

will not consider them. See 22 M.R.S. § 4005(2) (2016); 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2016); In re L.R., 2014 ME

95, ¶ 9, 97 A.3d 602 (“Section 4006 unequivocally provides that in child-protective cases orders

other than termination orders, jeopardy orders, or orders authorizing medical treatment are not

appealable. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature.”) (citations omitted)

(quotation marks omitted). We note, however, that the stripping of counsel from a parent involved

in a child protection proceeding should occur rarely, if ever. At a minimum, the parent’s assigned

counsel should be permitted to assist his or her client in having a financial screener, employed by

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supports the court’s findings and discretionary determinations, we affirm the

judgment.

[¶2] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by

clear and convincing evidence, (1) that the parents are unwilling or unable to

protect the child from jeopardy and that those circumstances are unlikely to

change within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs,

(2) that they are unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within

a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, (3) that the

mother has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with

the child pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041 (2016), and (4) that termination of

their parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055; In re

Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 27, 159 A.3d 345. The court based these

determinations on the following findings of fact.

[¶3] In the fall of 2014, the mother and father engaged in a sexual

relationship that involved the use of drugs, including crack cocaine. The

mother became pregnant and the child was born drug affected due to the

mother’s continued abuse of drugs up until his birth, including an injection of

heroin into her breast three hours before the child’s delivery. The

the Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, review the parent’s financial affidavit before the

court takes such an extreme step.

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Department of Health and Human Services filed the present action pursuant

to the terms of the Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act,

22 M.R.S. §§ 4001-4099-H (2016), and obtained temporary custody of the

child. The court’s termination order states:

Reunification efforts with [the mother] have been stymied

by her repeated incarcerations over the last year and one half.

The caseworker made every attempt to maintain contact with [the

mother], including conducting several Family Team Meetings in

jail as well as telephone contact when that was available. The

reunification services for [the mother] have been consistent

throughout the case – mental health and substance abuse

treatment, safe and stable housing, and regular visitation. [The

mother] has been unable to comply with any of those obligations.

She was unable to complete the [Intensive Outpatient Program] at

Key3West due to continued abuse of substances. At one point

during the case, [the mother] had an intake appointment to attend

Crossroads for Women, a residential substance abuse treatment

program. . . . However, [she was] unable to find the facility and

missed the appointment. [The mother] insisted she had been

unable to reschedule another intake.

Although difficulties with transportation and

communication may have complicated the reunification effort, the

hard fact is that [the mother’s] continued use and repeated

incarcerations are the real reasons for her failure in this matter.

Even if she is able to re-engage in treatment when released from

jail, it will take an extended period of time to address a problem

with which [the mother] has struggled for years and to persuade

the [c]ourt that she has been truly successful at that endeavor.

[¶4] Three months after the child was born and the Department

obtained temporary custody, paternity testing confirmed the father’s

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relationship to the child. After the father’s initial rejection of the child, his

wife encouraged him to change his position, and he expressed an interest in

having contact with the child. In discussing the father, the court stated:

On one level, [the father] has been extremely cooperative

with this process. As the [caseworker] acknowledged, he has

expressed a willingness to do almost everything the Department

has requested. He went to the initial appointment for an

evaluation at Maine Behavioral Health, completed a [Families

Affected by Substance Abuse evaluation] at Day One, participated

in a daylong appointment for a [Court Ordered Diagnostic

Evaluation], and ultimately connected with [a Violence No More

counselor] for individual counseling. He has visited faithfully with

his son and remained in touch with the Department. . . .

[The father] and [his wife] have never accepted [the trial

court’s] findings as outlined in the Jeopardy Order. . . . At trial,

[the father] repeatedly rejected the [c]ourt’s findings, both in

general terms and specific points. He referred to them as “twisted

lies and stories.”2 In challenging the positive hair test for cocaine,

[the father] insisted there had been no test for that substance and

suggested it might have been the Adderall someone gave him at

work. He asserted that the caseworker had never mentioned

concerns about domestic violence and never asked that he engage

in counseling on that subject. He continues to alternately control

and ignore his wife, who will be the primary caretaker for [the

child]. Throughout the case he has demonstrated an inability to

appropriately deal with others with whom he disagrees, most

notably the caseworker and the Guardian, often behaving in an

aggressive and bullying manner.

. . . .

2 In the transcript, the father’s exact words were “twisted stories and lies.”

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The issue as to [the father] is the time frame necessary for

him to address the jeopardy defined by the Court. At the time of

trial he had just begun counseling with [a Violence No More

counselor]. Even if he continues to attend on a regular basis, a

proposition for which there is some doubt, [the father] has a

significant amount of work to do before he alleviates jeopardy.

Despite his assertions to the contrary, his wife also has work to

do, as she would be responsible for [the child], by herself, for

extended periods of time. For a child who has been in foster care

essentially since birth, the time required to complete those efforts

is not reasonably calculated to meet his needs.

[¶5] The father’s wife is diagnosed with bipolar affective disorder,

depression, and chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and has a history of

self-injurious and uncontrollable behavior. Although the court acknowledged

that neither it nor the Department had any authority to insist that the father’s

wife engage in services, the court noted:

If a parent’s partner is a source of jeopardy to the child, the parent

may have to make a difficult election. He may attempt to

encourage the partner to correct the behavior that presents a risk

of harm, or, if the partner is unwilling, he may have to ensure the

partner does not have access to or responsibility for the child. In

this case, [the wife], both as an individual and as a partner to [the

father], presents jeopardy to [the child] and will be his primary

caretaker for extended periods of time. Unless [the wife]

alleviates that jeopardy, [the child] would remain at risk even if

[the father] addressed the concerns the [c]ourt raised about him.

[¶6] Given these findings and the court’s other specific findings of fact

that are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court adequately

explained how the deficits of the parents render each parent unwilling or

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unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child in

time to meet his needs, and adequately explained how the mother failed to

make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the child. See In re

Thomas D., 2004 ME 104, ¶ 21, 854 A.2d 195. The court also found that the

father failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify, but this

finding was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. “Where the

court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the

alternative bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re K.M.,

2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (quotation marks omitted); see 22 M.R.S.

§ 4005(1)(B). The court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that

termination of the parents’ parental rights, with a permanency plan of

adoption, is in the child’s best interest. In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123,

¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.