United States of America v. Nelson Santiago-Colon Child Sexual Predator

Boston, MA - Criminal defense lawyer represented defendant with three counts of transporting a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity charges.

We recount only those facts necessary to understand the

issues on appeal. Santiago-Colon was the pastor of a Pentecostal

church in Puerto Rico. Between 2004 and 2011, Santiago-Colon

sexually abused at least five young boys between the ages of twelve

and sixteen, including over twenty incidents with one victim.

The instances of abuse followed a pattern. SantiagoColon met the victims and their families through the church. He

would obtain the parents' permission to drive the victims to his

house and have them spend the night, under the guise of innocent

activities such as his mentoring of them or their washing of the

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church van. The visits usually started with the victims eating

meals with Santiago-Colon's family, watching television, and

sometimes playing with Santiago-Colon's young son. Usually,

Santiago-Colon then took the victims to his bedroom, where they

would sit on his bed (the only seating option) to watch television.

Afterward, Santiago-Colon would send his then-wife and child out

of the room if they were present (he and his then-wife had separate

bedrooms). He would then sexually abuse the victims, whether they

were asleep or awake.

The victims were forced to spend the night with SantiagoColon, usually sleeping in the same bed as Santiago-Colon, before

he drove the victims home the next day. Santiago-Colon also at

times sexually abused the victims in other locations, including in

his private car.

Santiago-Colon was able to continue his predations

because he instructed the victims not to tell anyone about the

sexual abuse. The victims did not tell their families about the

abuse until years later; several of them explained that they were

afraid of Santiago-Colon, or thought no one would believe that

Santiago-Colon had abused them because he was a pastor. SantiagoColon's former wife, who divorced him in June 2013, testified at

trial that when she asked him why young boys were sleeping in his

bedroom, he would respond that he was giving them "words of

advice." Santiago-Colon's former wife said she believed him

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because he was a pastor. Four of the victims, including one who

was not listed in the indictment, testified at trial.

We bypass a description of the overwhelming evidence of

guilt at trial to get to the sentencing issues. The PSR calculated

a base offense level of twenty-eight for each of the three counts

of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a).

It applied three two-level enhancements: one because each minor

was in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant,

id. § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B); one because the defendant unduly influenced

a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, id.

§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B); and one because the offense involved the

commission of a sex act or sexual contact, id. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A).

The PSR calculated that each count had an adjusted total

offense level of thirty-four, and added three additional levels

because there were multiple counts, for a combined adjusted offense

level of thirty-seven. The PSR also added a five-level enhancement

because the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving

prohibited sexual conduct, for a total offense level of forty-two.

Id. § 4B1.5(b)(1). Santiago-Colon's criminal history category

was I. The PSR determined Santiago-Colon's guideline imprisonment

range to be 360 months to life.

At the sentencing hearing, Santiago-Colon requested that

the court impose the statutory minimum sentence of ten years'

imprisonment. The government did not provide a specific sentencing

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recommendation, but argued that nothing less than ten years per

victim would be appropriate.

The district court agreed with the guidelines

calculations in the PSR. The court also considered the specific

characteristics of the defendant, including his use of his position

of trust and influence in the community. The court noted that

four victims testified at trial, and that one other victim, John

Doe 4, refused to testify because he "didn't want to go through

the same agony to testify here." (The count in the indictment

relating to John Doe 4 had been dismissed prior to trial because

he did not want to testify).

The court overruled Santiago-Colon's objection to the

information in the PSR about John Doe 4, stating that the

information in the PSR "does not . . . mean that the defendant was

convicted on such count," but that "the information is still

relevant conduct as to which sufficient information was gathered,

the witness was interviewed, the information was made available in

discovery." The court also rejected Santiago-Colon's generalized

objection that the sentence was excessive and greater than

necessary, stating that Santiago-Colon had not shown any

guidelines calculation error and the sentence was appropriate.

The court sentenced Santiago-Colon, then age fifty, to

a term of forty years' imprisonment on each count, to be served

concurrently. The court had discretion to order that the terms of

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imprisonment run consecutively, but chose not to do so. See 18

U.S.C. § 3584. Santiago-Colon timely appealed his sentence.

II.

"Preserved claims of sentencing error are typically

reviewed for reasonableness, under an abuse of discretion rubric."

United States v. Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445, 448 (1st Cir. 2017).

"The review process is bifurcated: we first determine whether the

sentence imposed is procedurally reasonable and then determine

whether it is substantively reasonable." United States v.

Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 590 (1st Cir. 2011).

A. Procedural Reasonableness

Santiago-Colon first argues that information in the PSR

about John Doe 4, related to the count that was dismissed before

trial, was unreliable, because there was "no official

documentation in the record" about John Doe 4, who did not testify

at trial and for whom there was no written declaration or police

report.

There are two responses, each of which disposes of the

argument. First, the court could easily have concluded that the

information was not unreliable and was relevant conduct. In

drafting the PSR's statements concerning John Doe 4, the probation

officer relied on the official reports of the government's case

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agent who interviewed John Doe 4 during the criminal investigation

of Santiago-Colon.

Second, "[t]he defendant may object to facts in the PSR,

but 'if [his] objections to the PSR are merely rhetorical and

unsupported by countervailing proof, the district court is

entitled to rely on the facts in the PSR.'" United States v.

Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 66 (1st Cir. 2005) (second alteration in

original) (quoting United States v. Cyr, 337 F.3d 96, 100 (1st

Cir. 2003)). Santiago-Colon did not provide any countervailing

evidence about the challenged information. Santiago-Colon argues

that the government only provided John Doe 4's initials, and would

not give defense counsel John Doe 4's full name. But SantiagoColon never asked the district court to order the government to

release John Doe 4's name, and only argued that the information in

the PSR about John Doe 4 was unreliable. Santiago-Colon takes the

same all-or-nothing approach on appeal.1

Next, Santiago-Colon argues that the district court

committed a Kimbrough error when it did not "adequately consider"

1 Santiago-Colon's reliance on United States v. Hinkley,

803 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2015), is misplaced. In that case, the

district court applied a five-level enhancement for a pattern of

activity involving prohibited sexual contact between the defendant

and a minor, based on police reports and the testimony of the agent

that investigated the minor's complaint. See id. at 92. Hinkley

affirmed that "[t]he sentencing court has broad discretion to

accept relevant information without regard to its admissibility

under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, as long as it

concludes that the information has sufficient indicia of

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his policy argument about the alleged lack of empirical basis for

these particular guidelines. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552

U.S. 85, 109 (2007). Not so. The district court expressly stated

that it had reviewed Santiago-Colon's memorandum about "the lack

of empirical data for the guidelines as drafted." The court

rejected the argument, which was within the court's discretion.

United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[T]he

district court's broad discretion obviously includes the power to

agree with the guidelines.").

Further, "[e]ven though a guideline is affected by

congressional adjustment, a sentencing court may rely on it." Id.

at 93. As we said in Stone, "[w]e see no reason why it would be

somehow invalid for a district court, in its broad sentencing

discretion, to conclude that its reason for rejecting a Kimbrough

variance is that it values congressional input."2 Id.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

Santiago-Colon argues that his sentence was "in

practical terms, a life sentence," and was excessive because it



reliability." Id. "Even conduct that did not lead to a conviction

may be considered." Id. at 92-93 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 cmt.

4(B)(ii)).

2 Santiago-Colon argues in passing that the district court

relied on Santiago-Colon's former wife's testimony that "other

boys stayed at his house, insinuating that they also were victims."

He argues that "[t]he record did not support the ominous meaning

given to that statement." The district court stated that the

victims who testified at trial were "among the individuals or

youngsters that use[d] to stay at the house," and that Santiago-

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did not give him an opportunity to prove to the court that he is

capable of rehabilitating himself.

The district court considered the factors outlined in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), including Santiago-Colon's abuse of his position

of trust and power in the community, the duration of the sexual

abuse, the long-term harm to the victims and their families, the

risk Santiago-Colon posed to society in general, the need to

promote respect for the law, and the need to provide just

punishment. Moreover, despite the evidence of guilt, SantiagoColon throughout maintained he was innocent of the charges --

hardly an indication of intent to rehabilitate.

"To undermine the substantive reasonableness of a

within-the-range sentence, a defendant must 'adduce fairly

powerful mitigating reasons and persuade us that the district judge

was unreasonable in balancing pros and cons despite the latitude

implicit in saying that a sentence must be "reasonable."'" United

States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting

United States v. Navedo–Concepción, 450 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir.

2006). Santiago-Colon has not done so here.

Affirmed.