United States of America v. Tedric Deshun Ratcliff

Shreveport, Louisiana criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with felony possession of firearms.



Tedric Deshun Ratcliff appeals his sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), arguing that there is insufficient factual support to show that his possession of a firearm facilitated his possession of a stolen vehicle. In the light of this court's recent decision in United States v. Henry, 119 F.4th 429 (5th Cir. 2024), we agree, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.



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Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) imposes a four-level increase to the defendant's offense level if the defendant "used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” The corresponding application note to § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) explains that the offense-level increase applies if "the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of

facilitating, another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.14(A). "Thus, to obtain an enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6), the Government must establish by a preponderance of evidence that the firearm 'facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating' another felony offense and that the defendant used or possessed the firearm in connection with that ffense.” United States v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699, 708 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 2009)).



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The district court's finding that Ratcliff "had the potential for facilitating his illegal possession of the stolen vehicle by the fact of having the firearms on board with him in a stolen vehicle” cannot by itself justify application of the enhancement. The court's conclusion that "[Ratcliff's] possession of the firearms bolstered his illegal possession of the stolen vehicle” appears to rest on mere proximity of firearms and vehicle, which both Henry and Jeffries instruct is insufficient. The district court did not explain, based on evidence, "how the firearm[s] plausibly facilitated the ossession of the [stolen car].” Id.



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On the record before us, no evidence shows that any of the recovered firearms were used when the vehicle was initially stolen. And other than proximity, the district court did not address whether Ratcliff used the firearms to maintain possession of the vehicle. Cf. Jeffries, 587 F.3d at 693 (requiring evidence that the defendant had a "reason to protect the body armor” beyond mere proximity of the firearm and the body armor). Though the Government relies on the initial call about multiple, visibly-armed individuals in the complex to suggest that Ratcliff needed the firearms to maintain his possession of the Jeep, the only individuals with firearms identified in the PSR were Ratcliff and his companions. Cf. Henry, 119 F.4th at 429 (quoting United States v. Pimpton, 589 F. App'x 692, 696 (5th Cir. 2014)) (noting lack of evidence that defendant "planned to use his firearm to protect the [vehicle]”). As noted in the initial PSR, and carried forward in the probation officer's addendum response to Ratcliff's objection, there was a "lack of strong evidence to definitively establish that Ratcliff possessed the firearms to facilitate his illegal possession of the stolen vehicle.” Without evidence that Ratcliff used or possessed a firearm to facilitate his possession of the stolen vehicle, the offense-level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) is not sustainable in view of Jeffries and Henry.

Sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.