Brigid A. Ford v. Marion County Sheriff's Office

Plaintiff Brigid Ford worked as a

deputy in the Marion County Sheriff’s Office until her hand

was seriously injured in a car accident while on duty. After

assigning Ford to light duty for about a year, the Sheriff’s Office

told Ford that she must either transfer to a permanent position

with a cut in pay or be terminated. After some back and

forth, Ford accepted a civilian job as a jail visitation clerk. In

the following years, Ford alleges, she suffered disability2

No. 18-3217

based harassment by co-workers, refusals to accommodate

her scheduling needs, and several discriminatory promotion

denials. Ford sued the Sheriff’s Office for discriminatory employment

practices in violation of the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

The district court granted summary judgment on most of

Ford’s claims. Two claims were tried to a jury, which rendered

a verdict for the defense. Ford has appealed and raised a host

of issues. We affirm. The district court correctly granted summary

judgment on numerous claims and committed no reversible

error in the trial.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Ford had worked at the Sheriff’s Office for almost a dozen

years when, in April 2012, another driver ran a red light and

crashed into her patrol vehicle. Since 2008, Ford had worked

as a sworn deputy sheriff in the warrants unit, locating and

arresting people with outstanding warrants. The crash severely

injured Ford’s dominant right hand. Despite extensive

treatment, she has not recovered full use of her hand. She suffers

ongoing and sometimes debilitating pain in her lower

arm.

In the wake of the accident, the Sheriff’s Office placed Ford

on various light duty tasks for about a year while she pursued

treatment. It became clear that Ford physically could not resume

her work as a deputy sheriff, in the warrants unit or otherwise.

A. Demotion to Visitation Clerk

In June 2013, Angela Grider, the Sheriff’s Office’s director

of human resources, and Eva Talley-Sanders, the chief deputy,

held a meeting with Ford that she calls the “three choices”

No. 18-3217 3

meeting. Ford’s claims based on the ensuing events were resolved

on summary judgment, so we recount the facts in the

light most favorable to her. See Brown v. Milwaukee Board of

School Directors, 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017). Grider and

Talley-Sanders told Ford that she could either (a) accept a civilian

clerk position in the Main Control office with a cut in

pay, (b) resign, or (c) be fired.

The day after the meeting, Ford sent Grider an email requesting

accommodation under the ADA. Ford said that she

wanted to work and believed she could do so with reasonable

accommodations for her complex regional pain syndrome.

She asked for the “ADA form” for her doctor to fill out. Over

the following weeks, Ford and Grider emailed back and forth

concerning Ford’s request for accommodation and whether

the clerk position would suit her needs and abilities.

In a July 12 letter, Ford described accommodations that

she believed might enable her to perform the main control

clerk job. She requested a hands-free telephone, voice-activated

software for her computer, an ergonomic work station,

the ability to take breaks when needed to alleviate her pain,

and training for her supervisors. Two months later, Grider responded

in a letter granting each of these requests except the

voice-activated software.

The final exchanges concerning Ford’s ultimate placement

occurred in late September. Ford sent an email to Grider on

September 20, 2013 asking if the Main Control clerk was the

only open civilian position. Grider responded that it was the

“only position where we are able to meet the limitations of

your request.” Ford persisted, asking if Grider could provide

her with a list of open civilian positions. Grider did not respond

to this request. Three days later, Ford emailed again to

4 No. 18-3217

accept the position as a Main Control clerk. Only then did

Grider respond. She described Ford’s pending requests about

other possible assignments as “now a moot issue.” Ford then

shadowed other workers in various clerk roles, including

“basement control,” “book-out,” and jail visitation. She ultimately

accepted a position in the Visitation Office starting on

October 3, 2013.

B. Conflict with Co-Workers in the Visitation Office

Ford alleges that in her work in the Visitation Office, she

suffered almost three years of disability harassment. She

clashed repeatedly with her co-workers, first Carol Ladd and

Eva Watts, who worked in the Visitation Office from October

2013 to December 2014, and later with Vashni Hendricks, who

worked there from January 2015 to July 2016. Ford contends

that these conflicted relationships and the Sheriff’s Office’s

failure to address them created a hostile work environment

based on her disability.

Before turning to the facts of the alleged disability harassment,

we note the split procedural posture of this claim. On

summary judgment, the district court found that no reasonable

jury could impose liability on the Sheriff’s Office based on

the evidence of harassment by Hendricks from January 2015

to July 2016, primarily because Ford did not alert supervisors

that the friction stemmed from Hendricks’s hostility to her

disability. The court denied summary judgment, however,

based on the evidence of the earlier harassment by Ladd and

Watts. The jury ruled for the Sheriff’s Office. Section II of this

opinion addresses the propriety of dividing Ford’s hostile

work environment claim. For now, we summarize both the

facts that were before the jury and Ford’s account of Hendricks’s

conduct.

No. 18-3217 5

Ford and Ladd had disputes from the start. On October 3,

2013, Ford’s first day in the Visitation Office, Ford went to

Grider and “broke down in tears” describing Ladd’s alleged

bullying, unhelpfulness, and insensitivity to Ford’s disability.

At trial, Grider testified that she discounted this allegation because

Ladd did not “even know about [Ford’s] disability at

that moment.” Ladd testified and denied that she had made

any disparaging remarks to Ford on that date. Over the next

four months, Ford did not make any written complaints, but

she testified at trial that Ladd was harassing her constantly

during that time. Ford testified that Ladd mocked Ford’s

workstation accommodations, adjusted Ford’s chair into uncomfortable

positions, and disrupted work with loud speakerphone

conversations.

At the start of February 2014, Ford sent the first of many

written complaints to one of her supervisors, Lieutenant

James Walterman, regarding Ladd’s behavior. Watts began

working with Ford and Ladd in the Visitation Office soon after

that, and Ford testified that Watts began harassing her as

well. Ford relied on a tally of her emails and memos to Walterman

as proof of the disability harassment and the failure of

the Sheriff’s Office to address it. Lieutenant Walterman

acknowledged at trial that he received three memos from

Ford reporting, among other things, that Ford used more pain

medicine because of Ladd’s animosity, that Ford overheard

Ladd disparaging her disability, and that Ladd pushed Ford

physically with her chair. Ford offered as evidence a total of

fifteen memos and emails to Lieutenant Walterman during

this time with similar allegations.

The Sheriff’s Office argued at trial that these memos reported

only ordinary disputes about how to do the work of a

6 No. 18-3217

visitation clerk rather than complaints of disability harassment.

Walterman testified that he believed Ford took issue

with how Ladd did her work. Two other co-workers—not

otherwise involved in the suit—testified that Ford, Ladd, and

Watts argued a lot about how to do the work correctly. Walterman

also testified that he believed any bumps between coworkers

in the cramped Visitation Office were inadvertent.

Ford’s memos themselves lent some support to the Sheriff’s

Office defense. Ford complained that Ladd was too permissive

with inmates’ visitors, that she made personal calls at

work, that she criticized Ford’s leaving callers on hold, and

that she did not say good morning. Ford complained that

Watts left early and took work documents home, and that she

told Ladd to ignore Ford.

The Sheriff’s Office ultimately decided to transfer Ladd

and Watts out of the Visitation Office effective December 27,

2014 and January 3, 2015, respectively. At trial, Ford said that

Ladd and Watts’s departure “remedied” their conflict.

The jury concluded in a special verdict that Ford was “subjected

to negative comments and behavior by Ladd and

Watts,” and that “this conduct by Ladd and Watts was unwelcome.”

But the jury then found that Ford had failed to prove

that the unwelcome conduct “occurred because of the Plaintiff’s

disability,” thus ruling for the Sheriff’s Office on Ford’s

claim of a hostile work environment. Neither party objected

to the use of the special verdict form.

After Ladd and Watts left the Visitation Office, Vashni

Hendricks began working there with Ford. Ford alleges that

Hendricks immediately began harassing her because of her

disability. As noted, the district court granted summary

No. 18-3217 7

judgment on this portion of her claim, primarily on the

ground that Ford did not alert supervisors that friction with

Hendricks had anything to do with Ford’s disability. Ford

sent two complaints to Lieutenant Walterman, on January 20

and February 13, 2015, shortly after Hendricks arrived. Neither

memo mentioned Ford’s disability or asserted that Hendricks

subjected her to disability harassment. Then, sometime

in March 2015, Lieutenant Walterman was replaced by Lieutenant

Teri Nesbitt.

Ford cites a few later incidents that also have no apparent

link to her disability. On June 19, 2015, Ford wrote an email

describing disagreements with Hendricks on visitation policies

and asserting that Hendricks’s hand lotion made her sick.

That same day, Ford told her sergeant, Marvin Johnson, that

Hendricks had made a comment “about getting a gun and

blowing [Ford]’s brains out.” The Sheriff’s Office investigated

this claim. Hendricks’s written response explained that she

was describing a mass shooting in the news, not talking about

Ford. After reviewing this incident, along with the ongoing

animosity between Ford and Hendricks, the Sheriff’s Office

issued written discipline to both employees.1 Months later, in

February 2016, Hendricks stated that “it’s a good thing I don’t

have a gun,” but Ford does not describe much else about this

comment.

Ford’s disability surfaced during a January 2016 disagreement

about whether visitors to the Marion County Jail may

1 Ford received a “letter of reprimand,” while Hendricks received only

a “letter of caution,” because Ford unlike Hendricks had prior disciplinary

history. Specifically, Ford had been reprimanded for an incident on January

7, 2013 not otherwise relevant to this case.

8 No. 18-3217

use passports as a form of identification. Ford thought not;

Sergeant Johnson disagreed. Our accounts of the confrontation

come from Ford’s complaint to Lieutenant Tia Shanklin,2

Hendricks’s memo to Major Tanesha Crear, and the trial testimony

of Crear. Crediting Ford’s account, as we must, Ford

refused to let a visitor use a passport as identification, but

Johnson overruled her. After the visitor had left, Ford began

expressing her disagreement to Johnson. At this point Hendricks

arrived and berated Ford for “yelling” at her supervisor

in front of visitors. In none of the accounts did Hendricks

mention Ford’s disability. But Ford’s disability became an issue

when Major Crear intervened in the dispute, saying to

Ford that “anyone who was supposedly in as much pain as

[Ford] was claiming to be in would not have the energy to be

up in front of the Supervisor’s desk, waving [her] arms

around.” Crear reproached Ford for her behavior.

Ford has offered evidence of two instances of alleged harassment

where Hendricks mentioned Ford’s disability. Both

apparently stemmed from Hendricks’s resentment that she

had to work shifts in both the Visitation Office and the Main

Control Office; Ford’s disability excused her from the Main

Control shifts. First, Ford testified that, in September 2015,

Hendricks told her that she should have to prove she was disabled

to avoid Main Control duty. Shanklin witnessed this

event but told Ford that Hendricks was “just kidding” or “just

joking.” Second, on June 22, 2016, Hendricks told Ford that

she needed to go to Main Control to see just how hard it was.

Hendricks also joked that she “caught” carpal tunnel

2 It appears that at some point in July or August 2015, Shanklin replaced

Nesbitt as lieutenant for the visitation clerks. The parties do not

discuss this second change in supervisors.

No. 18-3217 9

syndrome from working over there. Ford described the latter

incident in a complaint to Lieutenant Shanklin. The next

month, the Sheriff’s Office transferred Hendricks out of the

Visitation Office as a result of the ongoing conflict between

Ford and Hendricks.

C. Change to a Rotating Schedule

The second claim at trial arose from the Sheriff’s Office’s

refusal to adjust Ford’s schedule as a reasonable accommodation

under the ADA. On January 3, 2015—the same day that

Hendricks replaced Ladd and Watts—the Sheriff’s Office

switched Ford from a fixed to a rotating schedule. Ford requested

later that month to be returned to a fixed schedule,

saying that the rotating schedule exacerbated her complex regional

pain syndrome. Ford attached a physician’s note from

her doctor to that effect. Grider replied in an email two weeks

later denying Ford’s request because “it [was] not a reasonable

accommodation.”

The district court denied the Sheriff’s Office’s motion for

summary judgment on this claim, finding that the Office had

not shown an undue hardship as a matter of law under

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Ford’s arguments on appeal do not

dwell on the details of the schedule issue, and we need not do

so either. Suffice it to say that the evidence about the positive

and negative effects of the schedule change was in conflict,

and the jury found for the defense on the ground that Ford

had failed to prove that she needed the accommodation of the

fixed schedule. The jury did not reach the undue hardship

question.

10 No. 18-3217

D. Ford’s Applications for Promotions

A final set of claims arose from Ford’s four unsuccessful

applications to be transferred or promoted within the Sheriff’s

Office between March 2016 and February 2017. Ford argues

that all these rejections were illegally based on her disability

and/or amounted to retaliation for her earlier protected activity

under the ADA. The district judge granted summary judgment

for the Sheriff’s Office on the failure-to-promote claims,

finding that Ford had simply not supported these claims with

evidence that would support a reasonable inference of unlawful

motive. In August 2017, Ford secured a transfer to the sexand

violent-offender registry unit, where she continued to

work for the Sheriff’s Office at the time of trial.

II. The District Court’s Use of Partial Summary Judgment

Ford’s principal argument on appeal is that the district

court improperly divided the issues presented in her case. She

argues the court erred by granting partial summary judgment

on an indivisible claim for a hostile work environment. The

Supreme Court’s ruling in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), instructs courts to evaluate each

unlawful employment practice as a distinct but indivisible

claim, but it did not prohibit the district court’s actions in this

case. The district court had sound reasons, permitted under

Morgan, to treat differently the alleged disability harassment

by Watts and Ladd, on one hand, and Hendricks, on the other.

A. Principles Governing Partial Summary Judgment

As a general matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 has

long authorized partial grants of summary judgment. See,

e.g., American Nurses’ Ass’n v. State of Ill., 783 F.2d 716, 729 (7th

Cir. 1986) (“[M]otions for partial summary judgment are

No. 18-3217 11

permitted.”). The 2010 revisions to Rule 56 make this unmistakably

clear. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), cmt. 2010 Amendment

(“The first sentence is added to make clear at the beginning

that summary judgment may be requested not only as to an

entire case but also as to a claim, defense, or part of a claim or

defense.”). A district court also may enter an order stating any

material fact that is not genuinely in dispute for trial.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). In short, “[r]equests for (and grants of)

partial summary judgment, including summary judgment as

to fewer than all parties and claims, are nothing new.” Hotel

71 Mezz Lender LLC v. National Retirement Fund, 778 F.3d 593,

606 (7th Cir. 2015).

In the employment discrimination context, however, the

enforcement provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, have been construed to impose limits

on the use of partial summary judgment.3 Title VII authorizes

suit based specifically on an “unlawful employment practice.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). In Morgan, the Supreme Court

considered whether events that took place outside the relevant

statute of limitations period could support a plaintiff’s

claim of discrimination. 536 U.S. at 108–09. Morgan held that

courts must consider all events that belong to a “single unlawful

employment practice,” no more and no less, regardless

of whether they fell within the statutory time period. Id. at

117–18.

In our cases applying Morgan, we have ruled that district

courts may not splinter a single employment practice even if

3 The ADA incorporates by reference the enforcement provisions of

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), so Morgan guides our decision on Ford’s

ADA claims.

12 No. 18-3217

claims based on some of the underlying conduct would no

longer be timely on their own. In Isaacs v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition,

Inc., 485 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2007), we reversed a grant of summary

judgment on plaintiff’s hostile environment claim under

Title VII. The plaintiff offered evidence that she had been

sexually harassed while on two different teams in the factory

where she worked. The district court had divided the claim in

two based on the identities of the harassers, finding that

claims based on the conduct of the first team were time-barred

and that the conduct of the second team was not severe

enough to amount to unlawful harassment. We rejected the

division, noting that Title VII makes the employer liable for

complying with the law, and the evidence showed that the

plaintiff had suffered a continuous course of harassment coordinated

between the two teams of co-workers. 485 F.3d at

385–86. We emphasized that all of the conduct occurred under

the same management, that the plaintiff had complained repeatedly

about harassment by both teams, and that management

had failed to respond. Id.

We followed up on that point in Bright v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition,

Inc., 510 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2007), which involved the same

factory as Isaacs. We ordered a new trial in Bright because the

district judge had unduly restricted the evidence of earlier

sexual harassment that occurred outside the limitations period

and before the employer took disciplinary action against

one form of sexual harassment. We explained: “Employers

may not turn a practice that Morgan deems unitary into two

or more distinct practices by calling each subdivision of the

workplace a separate ‘team.’” Id. at 768.

It would be odd if this principle restricted a district court’s

power to grant partial summary judgment against untimely

No. 18-3217 13

claims but allowed a district court to slice apart timely claims.4

Whether or not timeliness is at issue, courts may grant partial

summary judgment as to different unlawful employment

practices in one lawsuit, but not as to part of a single unlawful

employment practice. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 118 (“The statute

does not separate individual acts that are part of the hostile

environment claim from the whole for the purposes of

timely filing and liability.”).

That principle is easier to state than to apply. How should

a district court tell the difference, and was the court’s partial

grant of summary judgment lawful in this case? We first consider

Ford’s argument that the court improperly separated

different types of ADA claims, and then her argument that the

court improperly divided her evidence about Hendricks’s

harassment from that of Ladd and Watts.

B. Separating Different Types of ADA Claims

For purposes of summary judgment, a district court may

properly separate from each other claims based on specific

adverse employment actions, retaliation, denial of reasonable

accommodation, and hostile work environment. These claims

require proof of different factual circumstances under different

legal tests. A summary of the relevant law demonstrates

why courts must treat them as distinct “unlawful employment

practices.”

The ADA prohibits employment discrimination on the basis

of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Like other employment

discrimination statutes, the ADA also prohibits retaliating

4 The Sheriff’s Office does not contend that any part of Ford’s lawsuit

was time-barred. Ford filed her first of two charges of discrimination with

the EEOC in March 2015.

14 No. 18-3217

against employees for asserting their rights. See § 12203(a);

see also § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII). The duty to accommodate an

employee’s disability is specific to the ADA. See § 12112(b)(5).

A plaintiff must first show that the requested accommodation

is reasonable on its face. That shifts the burden to the employer

to prove that the accommodation would impose on the

employer an undue hardship as defined by the ADA. See Majors

v. General Electric Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013);

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)–(10).

In Morgan, the Supreme Court drew a sharp line between

claims for “discrete” acts of discrimination and hostile work

environment claims. See 536 U.S. at 115. A hostile work environment

“occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and,

in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment

may not be actionable on its own.” Id. Hostile work environment

claims have their legal basis in the phrase “terms, conditions,

and privileges of employment” present in the ADA

and other employment discrimination statutes. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a); see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).

A hostile work environment exists “[w]hen the workplace is

permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult

that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions

of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Id. (citations omitted). “A hostile work environment

claim is composed of a series of separate acts that

collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’”

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117.

Thus, certain facts may support one type of claim but not

another. Our decisions have distinguished among the foregoing

categories of claims. See, e.g., Passananti v. Cook Cnty.,

689 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2012) (reinstating jury verdict for

No. 18-3217 15

plaintiff on hostile work environment but not discriminatory

termination); Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 751–52

(7th Cir. 2002) (upholding summary judgment as to discrimination

accompanied by plaintiff’s verdict on retaliation);

Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1013–14 (7th Cir. 2000)

(affirming summary judgment as to reasonable accommodation

but not as to discrimination). Distinct legal theories denote

independent unlawful employment practices that may

be addressed separately.5

C. Dividing the Hostile Work Environment Allegations

A more difficult question is whether and when a plaintiff’s

hostile work environment claim comprises more than one unlawful

employment practice under the rule in Morgan. If the

alleged disability harassment by Ladd and Watts, as well as

that by Hendricks, all belonged to the same employment

practice, then it would have been improper for the district

court to grant partial summary judgment as to only Hendricks’s

conduct. We conclude, however, that Ford’s suit presented

not one but two disability harassment employment

5 Ford relies on a statement from the unpublished second ruling in

Bright to discount these rulings: “A hostile work environment is actionable

as sex discrimination; there are not distinct ‘claims’ for hostile work environment

and sex discrimination.” 342 F. App’x 208, 209 (7th Cir. 2009).

Quoted out of context, this statement seems to contradict the Supreme

Court’s holding in Morgan that “[h]ostile environment claims are different

in kind from discrete acts.” 536 U.S. at 115. But the second ruling in Bright

dealt with an unusual circumstance where the district court had narrowly

limited the issues for retrial. Our non-precedential order did not declare,

and could not have declared, that all employment discrimination claims

must succeed or fail as one at summary judgment.

16 No. 18-3217

practices, and that Bright and Isaacs are distinguishable in this

regard.

As a threshold matter, we hold that hostile work environment

claims are cognizable under the ADA. The district court

followed the decisions of this court that have assumed they

are. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594, 603 (7th

Cir. 2009); Mannie v. Potter, 394 F.3d 977, 982 (7th Cir. 2005).

At some point, however, extended hypothetical analysis

should end. Every other circuit to decide the question has

held that it is possible to bring an ADA claim for a hostile environment.

We agree with our colleagues in other circuits that a plaintiff

may assert a claim for an illegal hostile work environment

on the basis of disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The

claim’s legal basis is simple: Congress wrote the ADA using

the language of Title VII, and Title VII recognizes hostile work

environment claims. See, e.g., Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,

918 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2019) (detailing this argument). Five

circuits have held that such claims are permitted under the

ADA. See id.; Fox v. General Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 175–76

(4th Cir. 2001); Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services

Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001); Shaver v. Indep. Stave Co.,

350 F.3d 716, 719–20 (8th Cir. 2003); Lanman v. Johnson Cty.,

393 F.3d 1151, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2004). No circuit has held to

the contrary. We adopt the position of our colleagues who

have recognized hostile-environment claims under the ADA.6

6 The First, Third, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have assumed

without deciding that such claims are possible. See Murray v. Warren

Pumps, Inc., 821 F.3d 77, 86 n.1 (1st Cir. 2016); Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n

of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661, 666–67 (3d Cir. 1999); Brown v.

City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003); Cooper v. CLP Corp.,

No. 18-3217 17

We turn to whether the district court improperly divided

a single unlawful employment practice in this case. Morgan

taught that, in general, “the entire hostile work environment

encompasses a single unlawful employment practice,” but

cautioned that acts bearing “no relation” to one another

would belong to separate employment practices. 536 U.S. at

117–18. Morgan also said that “certain intervening action by

the employer” could sever a hostile work environment claim.

Id. at 118. It also quoted favorably the Ninth Circuit’s reasons

to find a single practice in Morgan itself: “the pre- and postlimitations

period incidents involve[d] the same type of employment

actions, occurred relatively frequently, and were

perpetrated by the same managers.” Id. at 120, quoting Morgan

v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir.

2000) (alteration in original). Morgan thus signaled that hostile

work environments can sometimes be broken apart for legal

analysis but did not specify when.

Based on the Court’s guidance, our cases interpreting Morgan,

and cases from other circuits, we can identify “various

factors that should guide the Morgan ‘relatedness’ inquiry.”

McGullam v. Cedar Graphics, Inc., 609 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2010)

(Calabresi, J., concurring). The simplest factor is time: A significant

gap between alleged incidents of discriminatory harassment

can sever the hostile work environment claim. See

Milligan-Grimstad v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir. 2017)

(finding separate employment practices where spans “as

large as two or three years” separated the incidents); Lucas v.

679 F. App’x 851, 852–53 (11th Cir. 2017); Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ.,

Inc., 897 F.3d 232, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The Sixth Circuit has recognized

the claim, but in a non-precedential decision, Trepka v. Bd. of Educ., 28 F.

App’x 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2002).

18 No. 18-3217

Chicago Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 727 (7th Cir. 2004) (more

than three years). There is no magic number; the question is

whether “the series of allegations describe continuous conduct

rather than isolated incidents.” Milligan-Grimstad,

877 F.3d at 713. In this case, a gap of eighteen months separated

Ladd and Watts’s departure and the date in June 2016

when Ford put the Sheriff’s Office on notice of disability harassment

by Hendricks. In saying this, we must acknowledge

that, according to Ford’s testimony, she was subjected to a

continuous pattern of harassment, first by Ladd and Watts

and then by Hendricks. But from the perspective of the employer

that she seeks to hold liable, there was a significant

gap. Ford complained about conflict with Hendricks, but it

was not until June 2016, eighteen months after Hendricks

joined the Visitation Office, that Ford complained to her supervisors

that Hendricks was harassing her because of her disability.

That fact distinguishes this case from Bright and Isaacs,

where the sexual harassment and the plaintiffs’ complaints

about sexual harassment were essentially continuous.7

On the other hand, our cases make clear that “the harassers’

identities, whether they acted in concert or isolation,

and whether they harassed in distinct or similar fashions” do

not bear on the inquiry. Milligan-Grimstad, 877 F.3d at 712.

Isaacs and Bright emphasized this point. Both cases involved

alleged harassment by multiple groups of the plaintiffs’ male

co-workers. We explained that which co-workers were involved

and how they harassed did not matter because the employer,

not the co-workers, is the party that is legally obliged

7 Ford also alleges a possible incident in September 2015, but the Sheriff’s

Office did not have notice of it, as we discuss below regarding the

merits of the summary judgment order.

No. 18-3217 19

to comply with Title VII. Isaacs, 485 F.3d at 386; Bright,

510 F.3d at 769–70.

A change in managers can affect whether incidents are related.

Unlike the actions of co-workers, the actions of supervisors

impart vicarious liability to the employer for discriminatory

harassment. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,

524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). As a result, we observed in Isaacs: “An

employee moved from one plant to another, where a different

set of managers made decisions about working conditions,

might well experience different hostile environments for the

purpose of Morgan.” 485 F.3d at 386; see Morgan, 536 U.S. at

120 (citing “perpetrat[ion] by the same managers” as a reason

to find a single employment practice). That said, “routine personnel

actions” not taken to alleviate the harassment are less

significant. See Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 186, 199 (D.C. Cir.

2007). Here, Ford’s supervisor changed in between the two

periods of harassment. Lieutenant Walterman left his post not

long after Ladd and Watts’s departures. Lieutenant Nesbitt

and later Lieutenant Shanklin had direct control over the

Sheriff’s Office’s response to possible disability harassment of

Ford from March 2015 forward, during the alleged harassment

by Hendricks.

Finally, as noted, “certain intervening action by the employer”

can interrupt a hostile work environment claim. Morgan,

536 U.S. at 118. Although the Supreme Court did not say

which intervening actions qualify, we have held that “prompt

and appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to prevent

the harassment from recurring” defeats employer liability for

co-worker harassment. Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 576 F.3d

629, 636 (7th Cir. 2009). The same standard can determine

whether an action suffices to sever a hostile work

20 No. 18-3217

environment claim. Bright held that a two-week suspension of

the harassers, with no evident effect on their sexist behavior,

did not alter the duration of the unlawful employment practice.

510 F.3d at 769–70. A case from the Fifth Circuit, by comparison,

found that a transfer made to separate the plaintiff

and the harasser did sever the hostile work environment

claim. See Stewart v. Mississippi Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321,

329 (5th Cir. 2009).

We agree that removing alleged harassers permanently, as

the Sheriff’s Office did with Ladd and Watts, can bring an end

to the unlawful employment practice at issue. Cf. Saxton v.

Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that

transfer of the harasser was “a sufficient safeguard against

any recurrence of the harassment” to defeat employer liability).

As explained above, however, an incidental rotation of

co-workers not calculated to address the harassment does not

necessarily affect a hostile work environment claim against

the employer. See Isaacs, 485 F.3d at 385–86. Only a transfer

that amounts to “intervening action by the employer” can

close out a distinct unlawful employment practice. Morgan,

536 U.S. at 118.

We are not suggesting there is a hard and fast rule to apply

here. At least for now, we are applying a standard implied in

Morgan to determine when different episodes of unlawful

harassment, whether based on disability, race, sex, or any

other protected category, may be treated separately by a district

court. The following factors—all present in Ford’s case—

support a finding that alleged incidents of harassment have

“no relation” to each other under Morgan: a substantial passage

of time without incident known to the employer, a

change in the employee’s supervisors, and an intervening

No. 18-3217 21

remedial action by the employer. The district court here incorrectly

divided the harassment claim based on the identities of

the harassers rather than the “intervening action” of the Sheriff’s

Office, but the court reached the right result. We affirm

based on the eighteen-month gap, the departure of Lieutenant

Walterman, and the transfer of Ladd and Watts calculated to

end their alleged harassment. On the facts of Ford’s case, the

court did not err in independently evaluating two distinct

claims for a hostile work environment.

III. Ford’s Substantive Arguments for Reversal

Turning to the merits of Ford’s claims, she challenges on

appeal the partial grant of summary judgment on some

claims. She also argues that several evidentiary rulings and a

jury instruction require a new trial on the claims that were

tried. We consider these arguments in turn.

A. Summary Judgment Ruling

Ford appeals the grant of summary judgment on: (1) her

claim that the demotion to visitation clerk was not a reasonable

accommodation, but in fact was discriminatory and retaliatory;

(2) the part of her hostile work environment claim

based on Hendricks’s actions from January 2015 forward, as

discussed above; and (3) her discrimination and retaliation

claims stemming from the four decisions not to promote her

after March 2016. We review de novo a district court’s grant of

summary judgment. Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.

1. Demotion to Visitation Clerk

Ford argues that, although the Sheriff’s Office found a new

position for her after the accident, the visitation clerk job was

not a reasonable accommodation because better vacancies

were available at the time. The ADA required the Sheriff’s

22 No. 18-3217

Office to canvass available positions and, if a vacant job existed

that Ford was qualified to perform with or without reasonable

accommodations, to offer it to her. See Hendricks-Robinson

v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 694–95 (7th Cir. 1998). Ford’s

simple statement that she “want[ed] to work” was enough to

trigger this duty to accommodate. Id. at 694. The Sheriff’s Office

asserts that it satisfied its duty by reassigning Ford to the

visitation clerk position, which it admits was a demotion from

her prior post as a warrants deputy.

A demotion can be a reasonable accommodation when the

employer cannot accommodate the disabled employee in her

current or prior jobs or an equivalent position. See Gile v.

United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 374 (7th Cir. 2000); Hendricks-

Robinson, 154 F.3d at 694–95. But if Ford could show

that she qualified for a vacant position that more closely

matched her previous job, the ADA would have obliged the

Sheriff’s Office to offer it to her. The EEOC’s interpretive guidance

on this point states: “An employer may reassign an individual

to a lower graded position if … there are no vacant

equivalent positions for which the individual is qualified with

or without reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630,

App. § 1630.2(o) (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit has examined

this issue, along with the EEOC’s guidance, and concluded

that an employer “should first consider lateral moves

to positions that are regarded as equivalent.” Smith v. Midland

Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). We agree.8

8 Although EEOC interpretive guidance does not receive deference

under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467

U.S. 837 (1984), it does “reflect a body of experience and informed judgment

to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance” and

is therefore “entitled to a measure of respect.” Richardson v. Chicago Transit

No. 18-3217 23

To take advantage of this principle, however, Ford needed

to come forward with evidence that a more equivalent position

for which she was qualified was vacant at the relevant

time. See Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc., 807 F.3d 849, 856

(7th Cir. 2015). Ford’s complaints about terse, unhelpful responses

from Grider, the director of human resources, do not

control this question. We have repeatedly explained that a

problem in the “interactive process” to reach an accommodation

is not itself actionable; the ADA looks to ends, not means.

See, e.g., Bunn v. Khoury Enterprises, Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 683 (7th

Cir. 2014); Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015–16

(7th Cir. 2000). “It is well-established that an employer is obligated

to provide a qualified individual with a reasonable accommodation,

not the accommodation he would prefer.” Id.

at 1014.

To survive summary judgment, Ford needed to present

evidence that some vacant position existed closer to her original

job, rendering the visitation clerk demotion unreasonable.

She failed to do so. The relevant time period for possible

vacancies began in June 2013, when Ford requested accommodation

under the ADA. See EEOC, Enforcement Guidance:

Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the

Americans With Disabilities Act (2002), reprinted in 2 EEO

Compl. Man. (BNA) at 902:151 (“’Vacant’ means that the position

is available when the employee asks for reasonable accommodation,

or that the employer knows that it will become available

within a reasonable amount of time.” (emphasis added)).

Until Ford requested accommodation, the Sheriff’s Office was

Auth., 926 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Federal Express Corp. v.

Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008).

24 No. 18-3217

not on notice of the need to consider her for potential reassignment

to vacancies that arose.

Ford identified only two possible vacancies. First, she provided

some evidence that civilian vacancies opened in the

warrants division between February and May 2013. The district

court correctly found that any such vacancies fell outside

the relevant period. Second, Ford argued that dispatcher positions

were available “constantly” but that she was never

given an opportunity to train for one. Yet the record also contains

uncontradicted evidence that dispatcher positions involved

duties that Ford could not perform even with accommodation.

In short, Ford failed to introduce evidence suggesting

that the visitation clerk reassignment was not a reasonable

accommodation.

Ford also argues that the demotion to visitation clerk was

an adverse action that can support additional claims for disability

discrimination and retaliation. We do not see how the

reassignment could be simultaneously a reasonable accommodation

and an adverse employment action. Where both

sides agreed that Ford could no longer serve as a sheriff’s deputy,

reasonable accommodation standards provide the better

framework. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (defining “reasonable

accommodation” to include “reassignment to a vacant position”).

We have trouble imagining how a demotion that qualifies

as a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA can,

at the same time, constitute disability discrimination or retaliation

prohibited by the ADA. The district court properly

granted summary judgment on the claims arising from Ford’s

transfer to the Visitation Office.

No. 18-3217 25

2. Hostile Work Environment After January 2015

As explained, the district court properly considered two

separate periods of alleged hostile work environment based

on disability harassment. The district court correctly awarded

summary judgment for the later period from January 2015 to

July 2016, involving Hendricks. The same standard governs

hostile work environment claims under the ADA as under

other employment discrimination laws.9 To survive summary

judgment, plaintiffs must present evidence that: “(1) they

were subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment

was based on their [disability]; (3) the harassment was so severe

or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and

create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there

is a basis for employer liability.” Johnson v. Advocate Health &

Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 900 (7th Cir. 2018) (racially hostile

environment claim). On the final prong, employers are strictly

liable for harassment committed by supervisors, but liable for

harassment by co-workers only if the employer was “negligent

either in discovering or remedying the harassment.” Nischan

v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922, 930 (7th Cir.

2017).10

The district court correctly held that Ford failed to show a

genuine issue of material fact under this standard. She offered

9 See Mannie v. Potter, 394 F.3d at 982; Fox v. General Motors, 247 F.3d

at 177; see also 1 Janet Arterton & Gary Phelan, Disability Discrimination

in the Workplace § 2:18 n.8 (2019) (surveying circuits).

10 An employer can still avoid strict liability for a supervisor’s harassment

if it did not involve a “tangible employment action” and the employer

can prove an affirmative defense. See Jackson v. County of Racine,

474 F.3d 493, 501 (7th Cir. 2007), citing Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,

524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).

26 No. 18-3217

evidence of three incidents involving Hendricks where the

employer arguably should have known they related to Ford’s

disability. In September 2015, Hendricks told Ford that she

should be required to prove her disability in order to avoid

shifts in the Main Control Office, and Lieutenant Shanklin

overheard this comment. The second comment was from Major

Crear, who questioned during the January 2016 passport

incident whether Ford was really “in as much pain as [she]

was claiming to be.” Finally, in June 2016, Hendricks insinuated

that Ford was faking her disability to avoid the difficult

work in the Main Control Office. Ford reported this final comment

in a written complaint to Shanklin. This was her fifth

written complaint regarding Hendricks, but the first to mention

Ford’s disability.

As a matter of law, the first two incidents simply do not

show conduct “sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered

the conditions of her employment such that it created an abusive

working environment.” Passananti v. Cook Cty., 689 F.3d

655, 667 (7th Cir. 2012). At worst they amount to “[o]ffhand

comments, isolated incidents, and simple teasing.” Id. Regarding

the employer liability prong, the overheard remark

in September 2015 was not “sufficiently obvious” harassment

to give the Sheriff’s Office constructive notice of disability harassment.

Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d 473, 478

(7th Cir. 2004). Not until the written complaint in June 2016

was the Sheriff’s Office on notice that Ford believed Hendricks

was harassing her based on her disability. The Office

then took prompt action, transferring Hendricks out of the

Visitation Office the next month. This transfer defeats any

claim that the Office was negligent in addressing any known

disability harassment by Hendricks. See Muhammad v. Caterpillar,

Inc., 767 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Title VII requires

No. 18-3217 27

only that employers take action reasonably calculated to stop

unlawful harassment … .”); Saxton, 10 F.3d at 535–36 (holding

that transfer of the harasser is such an action). The district

court did not err by granting summary judgment on the claim

that the Sheriff’s Office should be held liable for a hostile work

environment created by Hendricks on the basis of disability.

3. Failures to Promote

The final category of claims resolved at summary judgment

arose from four applications for promotion between

March 2016 and February 2017. The district court assumed

that the four positions would have been promotions for Ford,

and we assume so as well.11

11 The Sheriff’s Office argues that Ford exhausted her administrative

remedies only as to the first of the four denied promotions, which was the

only one that preceded her second EEOC charge, filed March 15, 2016. The

three later denials occurred after she filed that second EEOC charge. We

disagree with this defense. Ford alleged the three later denials were in part

retaliation against her earlier ADA-protected activity. We have long held

that an employment-discrimination plaintiff can include in her court complaint

allegations of discrimination that are “like or reasonably related to”

the allegations in her EEOC charge, which typically means the new claims

must describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals as

those in the charge. E.g., Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d

497, 501 (7th Cir. 1994). More specifically, we have long held that a plaintiff

need not file a new charge alleging post-charge retaliation by the employer.

E.g., Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989)

(“we join the other circuits that have spoken to the question in adopting

the rule that a separate administrative charge is not prerequisite to a suit

complaining about retaliation for filing the first charge”), superseded by

statute on other grounds; McKenzie v. Illinois Dep’t of Transportation, 92

F.3d 473, 482–83 (7th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases); Luevano v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1030 (7th Cir. 2013) (“to avoid futile procedural

technicalities and endless loops of charge/retaliation/charge/retaliation,

28 No. 18-3217

A failure to promote is a discrete act under employment

discrimination laws, so each denied promotion can amount to

a “separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Morgan,

536 U.S. at 114. One way to prove a claim for a discriminatory

failure to promote is for the plaintiff to show: (1) she

belongs to a protected class, (2) she applied for and was qualified

for the position sought, (3) she was rejected for that position,

and (4) the employer granted the promotion to someone

outside of the protected group who was not better qualified

than the plaintiff. E.g., Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d

745, 748 (7th Cir. 2003). Ford attempted this approach to

proof, but that required her to compare herself to the successful

applicant for each job. Only then would the burden of production

shift to the Sheriff’s Office to give non-discriminatory

reasons for the promotion decisions, which Ford could rebut

with evidence of pretext. See id.; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973); see generally St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1993) (describing the

mechanics of burden-shifting in discrimination law).

Nearly all of Ford’s purported evidence of discrimination

is irrelevant under these standards. Ford argues that the Sheriff’s

Office treated Ladd, Watts, Hendricks, and Johnson better

etc., … a plaintiff who alleges retaliation for having filed a charge with the

EEOC need not file a second EEOC charge to sue for that retaliation”); see

also Haugerud v. Amery School Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 690 (7th Cir. 2001) (considering

merits of claims stemming from months after EEOC charge

where “one would reasonably expect [the incidents] to be discovered during

the course of an EEOC investigation into the allegations in the

charge”). In this case, an investigation of the first denied promotion could

reasonably be expected to have delved into the later denials that occurred

in the next few months. There was no need for Ford to have filed a third

EEOC charge alleging the later denials were also retaliatory.

No. 18-3217 29

than it treated her in various ways. But none of these individuals

competed for the specific promotions that Ford sought.

Ford also discusses at length deficiencies she identified in the

Office’s ADA policies. An employer’s “general policy and

practice with respect to minority employment” can be relevant

evidence of pretext or discrimination, see McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804–05; McCluney v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing

Co., 728 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1984), and the same is true for

disability discrimination. Yet such evidence must undercut

the specific justifications given by the employer. General allegations

of an “ongoing history of discrimination” are not

enough to impugn a particular employment decision. Sublett

v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2006).

Ford identified four specific rejections. In March 2016, she

applied to become a clerk for the sex- and violent-offender

registry. Grider told Ford she was not selected because the division

commander wanted someone without disciplinary history

within the past year, which meant that Ford’s August

2015 reprimand disqualified her. In the summer of 2016, Ford

applied for an “HR Generalist” position. She received an interview

but was denied the position. In October 2016, she applied

for an intelligence analyst position; she was denied an

interview because of her “attendance history and/or discipline

history.” In February 2017, Ford interviewed for two

open analyst positions but was not hired.

The district court correctly found no material disputes of

fact as to any of the promotion decisions. The record discloses

little about any of the people who were named to the jobs.

Ford identifies no specific person who filled the March 2016

opening. Ford identified the people chosen for the three later

jobs but presented little evidence about them beyond their

30 No. 18-3217

names. All that we know comes from a single page of Ford’s

declaration in opposition to summary judgment, which contains

conclusory statements regarding the other applicants’

lack of merit. We agree with the district court that Ford did

not present enough evidence about the jobs or how she compared

to the other candidates to support an inference of discrimination.

The Sheriff’s Office also presented unrebutted, non-discriminatory

reasons for each decision. Ford’s disciplinary history

precluded her consideration for the March 2016 and October

2016 positions, per Sheriff’s Office policy. Ford argues

that this policy did not disqualify her, but she provided no

evidence to substantiate the point. Cf. Hill v. Potter, 625 F.3d

998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a plaintiff “must do

more than simply deny that the [neutral] Policy exists”). The

HR Generalist position went to a candidate with superior Microsoft

Office and Excel skills, a justification that Ford has not

contested. Finally, the February 2017 analyst position simply

went to a better qualified candidate, again according to unrebutted

testimony from the Sheriff’s Office. None of the alleged

pretext evidence that Ford identified bore upon these specific

hiring decisions.

Ford argues that the promotion denials were also unlawful

retaliation, which as explained above is a separate theory

for relief. Yet Ford has not shown, in the district court or on

appeal, how her retaliation claims stand apart from her discrimination

claims. She relies on the same evidence to support

both. The district court treated the retaliation and discrimination

claims as co-extensive. It did not err by granting summary

judgment on each of the promotion claims.

No. 18-3217 31

B. Alleged Errors at Trial

Ford argues that we must remand for a new trial on her

remaining claims because of evidentiary rulings by the district

judge and an unnecessary jury instruction. Neither argument

is persuasive.

1. Excluded Background Evidence

Ford argues that the district court denied her a fair trial on

the two claims that went to trial—the alleged hostile environment

created by Ladd and Watts, and the scheduling accommodation

she sought—by refusing to admit more background

evidence about her disability-related disputes with

the Sheriff’s Office. We review evidentiary rulings for an

abuse of discretion. E.g., Thompson v. City of Chicago, 722 F.3d

963, 971 (7th Cir. 2013). Even if we found such an abuse of

discretion, we would order a new trial only if there were a

significant chance that the ruling affected the outcome of the

trial. E.g., Smith v. Hunt, 707 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2013).

Ford identifies four categories of excluded evidence that

she argues amount to reversible error: (1) the “three choices”

meeting in June 2013; (2) the details of the interactive process

to identify an accommodation for her disability between June

and September 2013; (3) the Sheriff’s Office’s “general animus”

against the ADA during the interactive process; and (4)

the Office’s broken promise to train Ford’s supervisors.

The first three categories underlie Ford’s claim that the visitation

clerk job was not a reasonable accommodation. To the

extent that Ford is just reiterating her objections to the grant

of summary judgment on that claim, we have already addressed

her objections. Ford also argues, however, that these

categories of evidence would have provided the jury context

32 No. 18-3217

or background for her disability harassment and scheduling

accommodation claims that did go to trial.

The Sheriff’s Office replies that Ford waived this argument

when she herself moved in limine to prohibit the Office from

“entering evidence relating to claims … on which the Court

granted summary judgment.” But the court’s order on the

motions in limine was “not a final ruling regarding the admissibility

of the evidence at issue” and, by its own terms, left

parties free to “request a sidebar conference during the appropriate

point in the trial.” Ford did not waive the issue; she did

raise her objections at trial.

Ford has not shown an abuse of discretion, however. The

district court evenhandedly enforced a rule that only conduct

after October 2013, when Ford began working with Ladd and

Watts in the Visitation Office, was relevant to the harassment

claim at trial. That was a reasonable way to keep the trial focused

on the disputes the jury would actually need to decide.

We doubt that evidence from before the alleged disability harassment

began could fairly sway the outcome of a hostile

work environment claim. In addition, Ford herself took advantage

of the district court’s time limit. Before trial, she objected

to exhibits concerning her disciplinary history and fitness

for duty from outside this time period, and the court sustained

those objections. Ford referred at trial to the “relevant

time period” and asked for evidence of earlier events to be

excluded. The first three categories of evidence that Ford argues

should have been admitted reflect the application of this

neutral time limit to her, and we find no abuse of discretion.12

12 We do not find persuasive Ford’s alternative argument that the

Sheriff’s Office opened the door to such evidence. The district judge still

No. 18-3217 33

Ford’s fourth category fares no better for a more basic reason.

Ford states that the district court excluded evidence that

the Sheriff’s Office “failed to abide by its own agreement to

provide ‘training to [Ford’s] supervisors regarding [Ford’s]

condition.’” But the district court admitted the evidence on this

subject. During Ford’s direct examination of Lieutenant Walterman,

the district court initially paused this line of questioning,

but later allowed it to go forward—over the objection of

the Sheriff’s Office. Another of Ford’s supervisors also testified

that he lacked much training on the ADA.

This case illustrates the challenges of managing a trial after

a partial grant of summary judgment. In a typical example

from employment discrimination law, a trial on a retaliation

claim might follow a grant of summary judgment on a distinct

claim for discrimination based on an earlier event. The court

must allow jurors to learn enough about the alleged discrimination

so that they can understand the retaliation claim. At the

same time, the court must keep the jurors focused on the claim

actually before them, avoiding a full trial-within-a-trial on the

underlying discrimination claim. For this reason, we allow

district judges to exclude extraneous evidence relevant only

to the discrimination claim. See, e.g., Abuelyaman v. Illinois

State Univ., 667 F.3d 800, 810 n.5 (7th Cir. 2011). More generally,

we afford trial judges “wide latitude” in making these

had a duty to keep out irrelevant evidence, notwithstanding passing references

to other accommodations Ford was receiving. See Houlihan v. City

of Chicago, 871 F.3d 540, 553 (7th Cir. 2017) (“the Rules of Evidence do not

simply evaporate when one party opens the door on an issue”). Even

where one party has “opened the door” to evidence that would otherwise

stay out, whether and to what degree to allow rebuttal are matters committed

to the trial judge’s discretion, which may consider the need to keep

the trial focused on relevant evidence and issues.

34 No. 18-3217

sorts of relevance determinations. Hasham v. California State

Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1050 (7th Cir. 2000). The district

court acted well within that discretion here.

2. Jury Instruction No. 20

Ford’s final argument relates to Jury Instruction 20, which

stated in full: “The ADA does not entitle a disabled employee

to the accommodation of her choice. Rather, the law entitles

her to a reasonable accommodation in view of her disability

and her employer’s needs.” Ford does not contend that this

instruction provided an inaccurate statement of law, nor

could she. See Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1014

(7th Cir. 2000); see also Seventh Circuit Pattern Civil Jury Instructions

4.07(a) (2017 rev.). Ford instead argues that the

presence of Jury Instruction 20 implied that she was given a

choice among different accommodations, when in fact the

Sheriff’s Office denied her request for a schedule accommodation,

full stop.

Ford argues, in other words, that Jury Instruction 20 was

extraneous and therefore prejudicial. It is true that “a jury

should not be instructed on a defense for which there is so

little evidentiary support that no rational jury could accept the

defense.” Eastern Trading Co. v. Refco, Inc., 229 F.3d 617, 621

(7th Cir. 2000). When a losing party complains of such surplusage

in the jury instructions, “reversal requires a showing

that the jury probably was confused.” Id. at 622. We have said

that “[t]he requirement of prejudice is critical” in such cases

because we must afford district judges discretion to submit

even marginal issues to the jury. Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports,

Inc., 758 F.3d 841, 849 (7th Cir. 2014).

No. 18-3217 35

Ford cannot show prejudice here. Her concerns bear on

the unreasonable hardship prong, under which the Sheriff’s

Office could refuse to provide an otherwise reasonable accommodation.

The jury’s special verdict found that Ford had

failed to show the schedule change was a reasonable accommodation

in the first place. Testimony that the rotating schedule

was actually more predictable and effective cross-examination

of Ford’s doctor provided evidence supporting the

jury’s verdict. The jury thus did not reach the undue hardship

issue, so we are confident that Instruction 20’s correct statement

of the law did not unfairly affect the outcome of the trial.

Conclusion

The district court properly granted partial summary judgment

as to some of plaintiff’s claims and then exercised its discretion

fairly to manage the trial on the remaining claims. The

judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.