Danny Farley v. Jacob Koepp

At 4:15 p.m. on Friday, March 8,

2013, the plaintiff's attorney in this civil-rights case opened

an electronic case file in the Southern District of Illinois by

e-mailing the complaint and civil cover sheet to the clerk's

office as required by the local court rules. The clerk received

the e-mail, opened a new case file in the Case Management/

Electronic Case Filing system ("CM/ECF”), and at 5:11 p.m.

notified the attorney that the electronic file was available to

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receive uploads. On the next business day—Monday,

March 11—the attorney's assistant tried to upload the complaint

but encountered problems with the electronic payment

system. It was not until Tuesday, March 12, that she

successfully paid the filing fee and uploaded the complaint.

But the deadline to sue under the two-year statute of limitations

was Monday, March 11, and under the local rules, the

complaint was not deemed "filed” until it was uploaded into

CM/ECF. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely.

We vacate the judgment and remand for reinstatement of

the complaint. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

"[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the

court,” FED. R. CIV. P. 3, and a paper is "filed” simply by

"delivering it ... to the clerk,” FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(2)(A). The

clerk may not "refuse to file a paper solely because it is not

in the form prescribed by these rules or by a local rule or

practice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(4). Here, counsel e-mailed the

complaint to the clerk, as required to open a new electronic

case file in the Southern District of Illinois. Although the

filing process was not complete under the local rules until

the complaint was uploaded, transmitting the complaint via

e-mail effectively "delivered” it to the clerk for purposes of

Rule 5(d)(2). The delay in uploading the complaint was

merely a defect in form (in the electronic sense) and did not

prevent the e-mailed complaint from tolling the statute of

limitations.

I. Background

Danny Farley alleges that on March 9, 2011, police officers

in Granite City, Illinois, violated his Fourth Amendment

No. 14-1695 3

rights when they arrested him in his hotel room at the Econo

Lodge Inn & Suites. According to the complaint, Farley

called the police to report a disturbance in an adjacent room.

When officers responded, they inexplicably arrested him and

used excessive force in the course of the arrest. Farley named

as defendants the arresting officers (Jacob Koepp and

Jonathan Hadley); a hotel employee (Vinit Jitendra Tailor);

the owner of the hotel (Granite City Motel & Resort LLC);

and Granite City.1 The complaint sought damages for civilrights

violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for wrongful

eviction under state law.

On March 8, 2013, Farley's attorney began the process of

filing the complaint in the Southern District of Illinois. As a

general matter, the local rules require that documents be

filed electronically through the CM/ECF system; attorneys

are required to use the system unless they've obtained a

specific exemption. See SDIL-LR 5.1(c) (Dec. 2009) ("All

parties must file documents by electronic means that comply

with procedures established by the Court unless specifically

exempted for good cause shown.”); SDIL Electronic Case

Filing R. 1 (Nov. 2012) ("Attorneys must utilize the ECF

system, unless specifically exempted by the court for good

cause shown.”). Under the rules in place at the time, however,

e-filers could not open a new case in CM/ECF on their

own. Instead, according to the user manual then in effect,

"[a]ttorneys must [first] submit civil cases by e-mail,” and

"[w]hen filing a new case by e-mail, [the] complaint/notice of

removal MUST be sent in PDF to the proper divisional

mailbox.” SDIL CM/ECF User Manual § 4.0 (Sept. 2009). The



1 Pramukh, Inc., also a named defendant, was dismissed in the district

court by stipulation.

4 No. 14-1695

manual also explained that upon receipt of the e-mailed

complaint or notice of removal, "[t]he Clerk will open your

case in ECF and notify you via the CM/ECF system that the

case is opened and available for you to electronically file the

complaint/notice of removal [using the ECF web interface].”

Id.

At 4:15 p.m. on March 8, an assistant to Farley's attorney

e-mailed the complaint and civil cover sheet to the proper

e-mail address. The clerk's office responded at 5:11 p.m. with

a notice stating that "a new civil case has been opened” but

that "the complaint ... is not deemed 'filed' with the clerk

until it is transmitted to the ECF system.” The assistant

attempted to upload the complaint the next business day—

Monday, March 11—but she avers that "complications arose

concerning the electronic payment of the filing fee.” On

Tuesday, March 12, she clarified the payment issue and

successfully uploaded the complaint to CM/ECF.

The trouble is that the two-year statute of limitations for

the § 1983 claims expired on March 11.2 The defendants

moved to dismiss the § 1983 claims as untimely. A magistrate

judge granted the motion, dismissing the § 1983 claims with

prejudice and the state-law claim without prejudice. This

appeal followed.

2 The statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is

the limitations period for analogous personal-injury claims in the forum

state, Ray v. Maher, 662 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2011)—here, two years,

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202. Because the two-year mark of March 9 fell

on a Saturday, the time to commence the action was automatically

extended to Monday, March 11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6.

No. 14-1695 5

II. Discussion

Farley argues that e-mail delivery of his complaint to the

court clerk was sufficient under the federal rules to commence

the action and stop the running of the statute of

limitations. On these facts, we agree. When the local rules

require counsel to e-mail the complaint to the court clerk to

open an electronic case file, the e-mail submission of the

complaint "delivers” it to the clerk, as required to commence

a civil action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

This tolls the statute of limitations even if the local rules

require additional steps to complete the filing process.

The timeliness of an action based on federal-question jurisdiction

turns on the date the action was commenced in

accordance with Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

See, e.g., West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987); Farzana

K. v. Ind. Dep't of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2007). This

rule applies even where, as here, the limitations period must

be borrowed from state law because the federal statute lacks

its own statute of limitations. See Conrail, 481 U.S. at 39 & n.4

(noting that when the cause of action is based on state law,

the state's rules for arresting the statute of limitations are

applied out of respect for state substantive decisions, but

"[t]his requirement, naturally, does not apply to federalquestion

cases”).

Under Rule 3 "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a

complaint with the court.” Rule 5(d)(2), in turn, explains

what "filing” means: "A paper is filed by delivering it ... to

the clerk.” Rule 5 further provides that "[t]he clerk must not

refuse to file a paper solely because it is not in the form

prescribed by these rules or by a local rule or practice.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 5(d)(4). More broadly, under Rule 83(a)(2), "[a] local

6 No. 14-1695

rule imposing a requirement of form must not be enforced in

a way that causes a party to lose any right because of a

nonwillful failure to comply.” FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(2).

Read together, these provisions instruct us that to determine

when a "filing” has been made, "deliver[y] ... to the

clerk” is of paramount importance, and requirements of

form—whether in the federal or local rules—are insufficient

to disqualify a filing. Moreover, "local rules [and practice] ...

cannot defeat a right, which in this case is a right to arrest

the running of the statute of limitations by filing a complaint

in the district court, that is conferred by the national rules.”

Robinson v. Doe, 272 F.3d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 2001).

In Robinson, for example, the complaint was rejected by

the clerk for failure to include either a filing fee or a motion

to proceed in forma pauperis, yet we nonetheless treated it as

timely filed. Id. We held that "[t]he complaint is 'filed' for

purposes of [arresting a statute of limitations] when the

court clerk receives the complaint, not when it is formally

filed in compliance with all applicable rules involving filing

fees and the like ... .” Id. at 922–23. It is immaterial whether

the form requirements of the local rule are explicitly authorized

by federal law, as is the filing-fee requirement. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(c) ("Each district court by rule or standing

order may require advance payment of fees.”).

There is no question in this case that e-mailing the complaint

to the clerk was a proper way of delivering it. FED. R.

CIV. P. 5(d)(2). Farley's attorney did not simply drop the

complaint on the floor in the vicinity of the clerk's office or

send an unsolicited e-mail to a court clerk unequipped to

handle e-mailed complaints. To the contrary, the local procedures

required that the complaint be e-mailed to a specific

No. 14-1695 7

e-mail address in the clerk's office, subject to very limited

exceptions. SDIL CM/ECF User Manual § 4.0 (Sept. 2009).

Although the local rules also required counsel to upload the

complaint to CM/ECF to complete the filing process, the

two-day delay in doing so was merely a defect in the form of

filing under the local rules. See United States v. Harvey, 516

F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that submitting a

document electronically instead of on paper as required by

local rules was a "mere error of form”); Farzana K., 473 F.3d

at 707 (holding that filing a complaint electronically under

the wrong docket number was a defect in form). And under

Rules 5(d)(4) and 83(a)(2), that defect in form did not prevent

the e-mail delivery of the complaint from being effective to

stop the running of the statute of limitations.

The defendants argue that Rule 5(d)(4) doesn't apply

when the clerk or an electronic filing system has not actually

refused or rejected a tendered filing. In this case, the clerk

received the tendered complaint on March 8, opened an

electronic case file in CM/ECF, and instructed Farley's attorney

to file his complaint electronically by uploading it into

the system. That is, the clerk didn't refuse to accept the

complaint. But a formal rejection of the tendered document

isn't necessary for the substantive protection of Rule 5(d)(4)

to be effective. The rule prevents litigants from inadvertently

forfeiting their legal rights by mistakes in form regardless of

whether the clerk has actually refused or rejected the tendered

filing.

Indeed, we've applied the predecessor to Rule 5(d)(4) in a

case in which the clerk did not reject the nonconforming

filing. See Harvey, 516 F.3d at 556. The local rule at issue in

Harvey required that a notice of appeal be filed "convention-

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ally on paper.” Id. The appellant submitted his appeal notice

electronically; the clerk advised the appellant's counsel to file

a paper copy, but he didn't do so until well after the appeal

deadline had passed. Id. The electronic notice of appeal

wasn't formally rejected, yet we applied then-Rule 5(e) (the

predecessor to Rule 5(d)(4)) and held that the notice of

appeal was timely. We also relied on Rule 83(a)(2), noting

that dismissing the appeal would deprive the appellant of a

substantive right based solely on a defect in form. Id. The

same reasoning applies here.3

Finally, the defendants argue that Rule 5(d)(3) authorizes

clerks to treat noncomplying electronic filings as invalid.

Rule 5(d)(3) states, in pertinent part, that "[a] local rule may

require electronic filing,” although it may do so "only if

reasonable exceptions are allowed.” The defendants argue,

in essence, that this rule confers on local rulemakers the

authority to permit clerks to invalidate filings based on

defects in form, overriding Rules 5(d)(4) and 83(a)(2). That's

not a sound reading of the rule, which simply authorizes the

creation of mandatory e-filing systems by local rule. Nothing

in Rule 5(d)(3) alters substantive rights or displaces

Rule 5(d)(4) or Rule 83(a)(2).

In holding that Farley's complaint was timely, we do not

suggest that litigants are excused from following local

e-filing rules. If Farley had not promptly come into compliance

with the local requirements, the complaint could have

been dismissed for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

3 Harvey was a criminal case, but the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

expressly incorporate the civil rules pertaining to filing and service.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 49(b), (d).

No. 14-1695 9

We hold only that under Rule 5(d) a complaint is "filed” on

the date it is delivered to the clerk, regardless of defects in

form (including electronic defects), and under Rule 3 the

action is "commenced” on that date, which tolls the running

of the statute of limitations. Farzana K., 473 F.3d at 706–08.

Here, the CM/ECF rules in effect at the time required

Farley's counsel to e-mail the complaint to the clerk as the

first step in the electronic-filing process.4 Accordingly, the

complaint was filed (i.e., "delivered”) on the date it was

transmitted to the clerk via e-mail. That occurred on

March 8, 2013, so the complaint was timely filed.





4 As of early 2015, new civil cases filed by attorneys in the Southern

District of Illinois must be opened directly on the CM/ECF system and

cannot be opened by e-mailing the clerk. See SDIL CM/ECF User Manual

§ 4.0 (Jan. 2015). This is a step forward, eliminating the requirement that

a complaint be submitted to the clerk twice. We note, however, that the

protections of Rules 5(d)(4) and 83(a)(2) apply to the new e-filing regime.

We've held as a general matter that these rules apply with equal force

both to e-filing systems and human clerks. See Farzana K. v. Ind. Dep't of

Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2007) ("An e-filing system ... must

accept every document tendered for filing; it cannot reject any paper that

the clerk must accept.”).

VACATED AND REMANDED