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The People of the State of Illinois v. Danie Harris
Date: 12-31-2003
Case Number:
Judge: Nicholas Ford
Court: Circuit court, Cook County, Illinois
Plaintiff's Attorney: Cook County Illinois State's Attorney
Defendant's Attorney: Not Available
Click Here For The Best Chicago Criminal Defense Lawyer Directory
Description:
Justice went to hell in Chicago, Illinois when a criminal defense lawyer unsuccessfully defended the Defendant charged in Cook County circuit court with several offenses following a
shooting at a Chicago gas station. At defendant's bench trial, Ronald Moore testified that he
was riding in the backseat of a car driven by his younger brother, Rondell Moore. A person
identified as Marcus Diggs was also in the car. When the car began to overheat, Rondell drove
into a gas station parking lot and parked the car, and Rondell and Marcus Diggs went into the
store to buy antifreeze. A local mechanic Ronald knew as "Red,†later identified as Quincy
Woulard, arrived on his bicycle and began looking under the hood of the car. Rondell came
back to the car and was standing outside talking to Woulard.
¶ 4 Ronald stayed in the backseat of the car and saw a black Lexus turn into the gas station
parking lot. Ronald testified that he had seen the Lexus previously and recognized the driver,
but he did not know the driver's name. The Lexus went to the other side of the gas station
building where Ronald could no longer see it. A short time later, Ronald heard gunshots,
looked out the rear driver's-side window, and saw defendant two feet away shooting a chrome
handgun at Rondell. Ronald stated he heard more than five gunshots and testified that
defendant was "standing on the side†of the rear driver's-side door. Ronald recognized
defendant but did not know his name. Defendant kept shooting as Rondell ran, jumped over a
fence, and continued running toward a nearby Chase Bank parking lot.
¶ 5 Marcus Diggs jumped out of the car and ran toward a nearby McDonald's restaurant. As
Ronald slid over to the driver's side of the backseat, defendant pointed the gun at him and
pulled the trigger. The gun clicked but did not fire.
¶ 6 When defendant began running away, Ronald got out of the car and chased him for 5 to 10
feet. Ronald then turned to look for his brother and found him lying in the Chase Bank parking
- 3 -
lot one-half block away. Ronald saw the black Lexus drive through the Chase Bank parking lot
with only the driver inside. Police officers later arrived, and Ronald overheard a message on a
police radio that a Lexus had been stopped at a Walgreens store across the street from the bank.
Ronald ran to the Walgreens store, recognized the Lexus, and yelled that the driver had killed
his brother. Ronald testified at trial, however, that the driver was not the shooter and he did not
see defendant in the Lexus when it was stopped at the Walgreens store.
¶ 7 Ronald further testified that a person from his neighborhood showed him a YouTube video
a couple days after the shooting. Ronald recognized the black Lexus, the driver, and the
shooter in the video, but he did not know their names. Ronald alerted the police to the video,
and he subsequently identified defendant as the shooter from a lineup conducted eight days
after the shooting. Ronald also identified defendant in court as the shooter.
¶ 8 Dexter Saffold testified that he was riding his scooter on the street in front of the gas station
on the night of the shooting. He testified it was early evening and still light out. As he
approached the gas station, he heard gunshots, stopped, and saw the shooter from about 18 feet
away. Saffold identified defendant in court as the shooter. Saffold testified that defendant was
holding a dark-colored handgun, he could see flashes coming from the muzzle, and he heard
more than two gunshots. Defendant was pointing the gun at a person by a car with the hood up
and another man on a bicycle near the car. After firing the handgun, defendant ran toward
Saffold and bumped into him, almost dropping the gun while trying to put it in his pocket.
Defendant ran behind Chase Bank and out of Saffold's view. Saffold also saw another person
running "behind, you know, the alley, a fence or somewhere.†As he went into the gas station
to call 911, Saffold saw a man lying in the parking lot by the car and the bicycle. Eight days
after the shooting, Saffold viewed a lineup and identified defendant as the shooter.
¶ 9 Quincy Woulard testified that he often helped people with car repairs at the gas station. He
saw his friend Rondell Moore, known by his nickname "Blink,†at the gas station with his car
that was overheating. Woulard was looking under the hood of the car when he heard three
gunshots and fell to the ground. He heard someone say, "he runnin [sic] down the alley,†and
he saw someone running there. Woulard was shot three times but testified he did not see who
shot him.
¶ 10 Aaron Jones testified that he was driving the black Lexus and selling marijuana when
defendant, known by Jones as "Slim†or "Chucky,†asked him for a ride to the gas station.
Jones drove defendant to the gas station and dropped him off. Jones testified that he then drove
to his home six blocks away but came back to buy cigarettes at the Walgreens store across the
street from Chase Bank. Jones testified he was stopped and arrested by police officers before
he reached the Walgreens store. Later in his testimony, however, Jones recanted and stated
defendant was never in his car, that police officers told him to identify defendant, and that the
officers threatened him with life imprisonment if he did not testify as they wished.
¶ 11 Chicago police officer Richard Mostowski testified he received a call that a person had
been shot and a black Lexus was leaving the scene. He stopped a black Lexus approximately
two blocks from the gas station. After he stopped the car, a man approached and yelled "you
killed my brother.†The driver, later identified as Aaron Jones, was arrested and a search of his
person revealed 11 small, plastic bags. The parties stipulated that the plastic bags contained a
total of 10.6 grams of cannabis. There were no passengers in the car when it was stopped.
- 4 -
¶ 12 A surveillance video of the gas station parking lot showed a black male with what appears
to be a blue towel around his neck walking into the store. During his testimony, Ronald Moore
identified that person as his brother, Rondell Moore. The video shows Rondell Moore inside
the store and then walking out of the store back to his car. The video later shows a black car
entering the lot, a person getting out of the passenger side, and the car driving away. The
passenger walked out of view of the camera toward the gas station store. A few seconds later,
the video shows a person running through the parking lot and another person chasing him for a
few feet before turning around and running in the opposite direction.
¶ 13 The parties stipulated that the medical examiner would have testified that Rondell Moore
was shot three times in the back. There were two exit wounds, including one from a bullet that
pierced Rondell's right lung and pulmonary artery. The third bullet lodged in his abdominal
wall. The medical examiner determined the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.
¶ 14 The parties also stipulated that five fired bullets were recovered in the investigation.
Forensic scientist Tracy Konier would have testified that two of the bullets were .380/.38-class
caliber and were fired from the same firearm. Two of the bullets were 9 millimeter, .38-class
caliber. They could not be identified or eliminated as having been fired from the same firearm
as each other or as the .380/.38-class caliber bullets. The fifth bullet was a .22 caliber. The
parties stipulated that four of the bullets were recovered from the gas station crime scene. The
other one was recovered from Rondell Moore's abdominal wall.
¶ 15 The trial court relied heavily on Saffold's testimony in finding defendant guilty of murder,
three counts of attempted murder, and aggravated battery. The trial judge stated "this case
begins and ends with Mr. Saffold†and "[a]mong all the witnesses that I heard from, his
testimony was unblemished by any of the cross-examination.†The trial court observed that
Saffold's testimony was also corroborated by the testimony of Ronald Moore and Jones and
stated any minor inconsistencies in the testimony did not raise a doubt of defendant's guilt. The
court concluded that this case "was not a particularly close one.â€
¶ 16 At sentencing, defendant offered evidence in mitigation, including that he did not have a
prior criminal history, he obtained his general education diploma (GED) and several
educational achievement certificates while in pretrial custody for these offenses, and he has a
stable and supportive family. In sentencing defendant, the trial judge stated he had considered
all the statutory sentencing factors and remarked, "This is a serious case. I am sorry that the
sentencing parameters are such that my options are somewhat limited. Although, I do feel you
should be treated seriously.†The trial judge then sentenced defendant to 45 years'
imprisonment for first degree murder (20 years for the offense plus 25 years for the mandatory
firearm enhancement), 26 years for one count of attempted murder (6 years for the offense plus
20 years for the mandatory firearm enhancement), 31 years for each of the other two attempted
murder convictions (6 years for the offense plus 25 years for the mandatory firearm
enhancement), and 20 years for aggravated battery with a firearm. The attempted murder and
aggravated battery sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other, but the
attempted murder sentences were required to be served consecutively to the murder sentence
for an aggregate sentence of 76 years' imprisonment.
¶ 17 On appeal, defendant contended the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of either first degree murder or attempted first degree murder. Defendant also
challenged his aggregate 76-year prison sentence under both the eighth amendment to the
- 5 -
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and article I, section 11, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), commonly referred to as the proportionate penalties
clause.
¶ 18 The appellate court held the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the offenses proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶¶ 17-29. The appellate court also rejected
defendant's claim that his aggregate sentence violated the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶¶ 55-56. On the Illinois
constitutional claim, however, the appellate court held defendant's aggregate sentence was
contrary to the "rehabilitation clause†of article I, section 11, providing that penalties must be
determined with " 'the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.' †2016 IL App
(1st) 141744, ¶ 64 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). The appellate court stated that
"[w]hile we do not minimize the seriousness of [defendant's] crimes, we believe that it shocks
the moral sense of the community to send this young adult to prison for the remainder of his
life, with no chance to rehabilitate himself into a useful member of society.†2016 IL App (1st)
141744, ¶ 69. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated defendant's sentences. 2016 IL App
(1st) 141744, ¶ 76. On the State's concession, the appellate court also directed the clerk to
correct the mittimus to reflect only one conviction of attempted first degree murder because
convictions for three separate counts violated the "one act, one crime†rule. 2016 IL App (1st)
141744, ¶¶ 74-75. Defendant's remaining convictions were affirmed, and the case was
remanded for resentencing. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 76.
¶ 19 Justice Mason dissented from the portion of the decision holding defendant's aggregate
76-year sentence unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 79 (Mason, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Relying on this court's decision in People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 37-39, the
partial dissent maintained that defendant's as-applied challenge must be rejected because he
failed to introduce evidence or develop the record necessary to support his claim in the trial
court. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 80 (Mason, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The partial dissent would have also rejected defendant's claim based on the Illinois
Constitution on the merits. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶¶ 81-87 (Mason, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
¶ 20 We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal as a matter of right (Ill. S. Ct. R. 317
(eff. July 1, 2006)). We also allowed the Children and Family Justice Center, Chicago
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, Civitas ChildLaw Clinic, Criminal and Juvenile Justice
Project Clinic, Juvenile Justice Initiative of Illinois, Juvenile Law Center, Law Office of the
Cook County Public Defender, and the James B. Moran Center for Youth Advocacy to file a
joint amicus curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
shooting at a Chicago gas station. At defendant's bench trial, Ronald Moore testified that he
was riding in the backseat of a car driven by his younger brother, Rondell Moore. A person
identified as Marcus Diggs was also in the car. When the car began to overheat, Rondell drove
into a gas station parking lot and parked the car, and Rondell and Marcus Diggs went into the
store to buy antifreeze. A local mechanic Ronald knew as "Red,†later identified as Quincy
Woulard, arrived on his bicycle and began looking under the hood of the car. Rondell came
back to the car and was standing outside talking to Woulard.
¶ 4 Ronald stayed in the backseat of the car and saw a black Lexus turn into the gas station
parking lot. Ronald testified that he had seen the Lexus previously and recognized the driver,
but he did not know the driver's name. The Lexus went to the other side of the gas station
building where Ronald could no longer see it. A short time later, Ronald heard gunshots,
looked out the rear driver's-side window, and saw defendant two feet away shooting a chrome
handgun at Rondell. Ronald stated he heard more than five gunshots and testified that
defendant was "standing on the side†of the rear driver's-side door. Ronald recognized
defendant but did not know his name. Defendant kept shooting as Rondell ran, jumped over a
fence, and continued running toward a nearby Chase Bank parking lot.
¶ 5 Marcus Diggs jumped out of the car and ran toward a nearby McDonald's restaurant. As
Ronald slid over to the driver's side of the backseat, defendant pointed the gun at him and
pulled the trigger. The gun clicked but did not fire.
¶ 6 When defendant began running away, Ronald got out of the car and chased him for 5 to 10
feet. Ronald then turned to look for his brother and found him lying in the Chase Bank parking
- 3 -
lot one-half block away. Ronald saw the black Lexus drive through the Chase Bank parking lot
with only the driver inside. Police officers later arrived, and Ronald overheard a message on a
police radio that a Lexus had been stopped at a Walgreens store across the street from the bank.
Ronald ran to the Walgreens store, recognized the Lexus, and yelled that the driver had killed
his brother. Ronald testified at trial, however, that the driver was not the shooter and he did not
see defendant in the Lexus when it was stopped at the Walgreens store.
¶ 7 Ronald further testified that a person from his neighborhood showed him a YouTube video
a couple days after the shooting. Ronald recognized the black Lexus, the driver, and the
shooter in the video, but he did not know their names. Ronald alerted the police to the video,
and he subsequently identified defendant as the shooter from a lineup conducted eight days
after the shooting. Ronald also identified defendant in court as the shooter.
¶ 8 Dexter Saffold testified that he was riding his scooter on the street in front of the gas station
on the night of the shooting. He testified it was early evening and still light out. As he
approached the gas station, he heard gunshots, stopped, and saw the shooter from about 18 feet
away. Saffold identified defendant in court as the shooter. Saffold testified that defendant was
holding a dark-colored handgun, he could see flashes coming from the muzzle, and he heard
more than two gunshots. Defendant was pointing the gun at a person by a car with the hood up
and another man on a bicycle near the car. After firing the handgun, defendant ran toward
Saffold and bumped into him, almost dropping the gun while trying to put it in his pocket.
Defendant ran behind Chase Bank and out of Saffold's view. Saffold also saw another person
running "behind, you know, the alley, a fence or somewhere.†As he went into the gas station
to call 911, Saffold saw a man lying in the parking lot by the car and the bicycle. Eight days
after the shooting, Saffold viewed a lineup and identified defendant as the shooter.
¶ 9 Quincy Woulard testified that he often helped people with car repairs at the gas station. He
saw his friend Rondell Moore, known by his nickname "Blink,†at the gas station with his car
that was overheating. Woulard was looking under the hood of the car when he heard three
gunshots and fell to the ground. He heard someone say, "he runnin [sic] down the alley,†and
he saw someone running there. Woulard was shot three times but testified he did not see who
shot him.
¶ 10 Aaron Jones testified that he was driving the black Lexus and selling marijuana when
defendant, known by Jones as "Slim†or "Chucky,†asked him for a ride to the gas station.
Jones drove defendant to the gas station and dropped him off. Jones testified that he then drove
to his home six blocks away but came back to buy cigarettes at the Walgreens store across the
street from Chase Bank. Jones testified he was stopped and arrested by police officers before
he reached the Walgreens store. Later in his testimony, however, Jones recanted and stated
defendant was never in his car, that police officers told him to identify defendant, and that the
officers threatened him with life imprisonment if he did not testify as they wished.
¶ 11 Chicago police officer Richard Mostowski testified he received a call that a person had
been shot and a black Lexus was leaving the scene. He stopped a black Lexus approximately
two blocks from the gas station. After he stopped the car, a man approached and yelled "you
killed my brother.†The driver, later identified as Aaron Jones, was arrested and a search of his
person revealed 11 small, plastic bags. The parties stipulated that the plastic bags contained a
total of 10.6 grams of cannabis. There were no passengers in the car when it was stopped.
- 4 -
¶ 12 A surveillance video of the gas station parking lot showed a black male with what appears
to be a blue towel around his neck walking into the store. During his testimony, Ronald Moore
identified that person as his brother, Rondell Moore. The video shows Rondell Moore inside
the store and then walking out of the store back to his car. The video later shows a black car
entering the lot, a person getting out of the passenger side, and the car driving away. The
passenger walked out of view of the camera toward the gas station store. A few seconds later,
the video shows a person running through the parking lot and another person chasing him for a
few feet before turning around and running in the opposite direction.
¶ 13 The parties stipulated that the medical examiner would have testified that Rondell Moore
was shot three times in the back. There were two exit wounds, including one from a bullet that
pierced Rondell's right lung and pulmonary artery. The third bullet lodged in his abdominal
wall. The medical examiner determined the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.
¶ 14 The parties also stipulated that five fired bullets were recovered in the investigation.
Forensic scientist Tracy Konier would have testified that two of the bullets were .380/.38-class
caliber and were fired from the same firearm. Two of the bullets were 9 millimeter, .38-class
caliber. They could not be identified or eliminated as having been fired from the same firearm
as each other or as the .380/.38-class caliber bullets. The fifth bullet was a .22 caliber. The
parties stipulated that four of the bullets were recovered from the gas station crime scene. The
other one was recovered from Rondell Moore's abdominal wall.
¶ 15 The trial court relied heavily on Saffold's testimony in finding defendant guilty of murder,
three counts of attempted murder, and aggravated battery. The trial judge stated "this case
begins and ends with Mr. Saffold†and "[a]mong all the witnesses that I heard from, his
testimony was unblemished by any of the cross-examination.†The trial court observed that
Saffold's testimony was also corroborated by the testimony of Ronald Moore and Jones and
stated any minor inconsistencies in the testimony did not raise a doubt of defendant's guilt. The
court concluded that this case "was not a particularly close one.â€
¶ 16 At sentencing, defendant offered evidence in mitigation, including that he did not have a
prior criminal history, he obtained his general education diploma (GED) and several
educational achievement certificates while in pretrial custody for these offenses, and he has a
stable and supportive family. In sentencing defendant, the trial judge stated he had considered
all the statutory sentencing factors and remarked, "This is a serious case. I am sorry that the
sentencing parameters are such that my options are somewhat limited. Although, I do feel you
should be treated seriously.†The trial judge then sentenced defendant to 45 years'
imprisonment for first degree murder (20 years for the offense plus 25 years for the mandatory
firearm enhancement), 26 years for one count of attempted murder (6 years for the offense plus
20 years for the mandatory firearm enhancement), 31 years for each of the other two attempted
murder convictions (6 years for the offense plus 25 years for the mandatory firearm
enhancement), and 20 years for aggravated battery with a firearm. The attempted murder and
aggravated battery sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other, but the
attempted murder sentences were required to be served consecutively to the murder sentence
for an aggregate sentence of 76 years' imprisonment.
¶ 17 On appeal, defendant contended the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of either first degree murder or attempted first degree murder. Defendant also
challenged his aggregate 76-year prison sentence under both the eighth amendment to the
- 5 -
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and article I, section 11, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), commonly referred to as the proportionate penalties
clause.
¶ 18 The appellate court held the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the offenses proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶¶ 17-29. The appellate court also rejected
defendant's claim that his aggregate sentence violated the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶¶ 55-56. On the Illinois
constitutional claim, however, the appellate court held defendant's aggregate sentence was
contrary to the "rehabilitation clause†of article I, section 11, providing that penalties must be
determined with " 'the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.' †2016 IL App
(1st) 141744, ¶ 64 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). The appellate court stated that
"[w]hile we do not minimize the seriousness of [defendant's] crimes, we believe that it shocks
the moral sense of the community to send this young adult to prison for the remainder of his
life, with no chance to rehabilitate himself into a useful member of society.†2016 IL App (1st)
141744, ¶ 69. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated defendant's sentences. 2016 IL App
(1st) 141744, ¶ 76. On the State's concession, the appellate court also directed the clerk to
correct the mittimus to reflect only one conviction of attempted first degree murder because
convictions for three separate counts violated the "one act, one crime†rule. 2016 IL App (1st)
141744, ¶¶ 74-75. Defendant's remaining convictions were affirmed, and the case was
remanded for resentencing. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 76.
¶ 19 Justice Mason dissented from the portion of the decision holding defendant's aggregate
76-year sentence unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 79 (Mason, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Relying on this court's decision in People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 37-39, the
partial dissent maintained that defendant's as-applied challenge must be rejected because he
failed to introduce evidence or develop the record necessary to support his claim in the trial
court. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 80 (Mason, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The partial dissent would have also rejected defendant's claim based on the Illinois
Constitution on the merits. 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶¶ 81-87 (Mason, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
¶ 20 We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal as a matter of right (Ill. S. Ct. R. 317
(eff. July 1, 2006)). We also allowed the Children and Family Justice Center, Chicago
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, Civitas ChildLaw Clinic, Criminal and Juvenile Justice
Project Clinic, Juvenile Justice Initiative of Illinois, Juvenile Law Center, Law Office of the
Cook County Public Defender, and the James B. Moran Center for Youth Advocacy to file a
joint amicus curiae brief. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
Outcome:
Defendant was convicted.
Defendant's conviction was affirmed.
Defendant was exoneated.
Defendant's conviction was affirmed.
Defendant was exoneated.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:
About This Case
What was the outcome of The People of the State of Illinois v. Danie Harris?
The outcome was: Defendant was convicted. Defendant's conviction was affirmed. Defendant was exoneated.
Which court heard The People of the State of Illinois v. Danie Harris?
This case was heard in Circuit court, Cook County, Illinois, IL. The presiding judge was Nicholas Ford.
Who were the attorneys in The People of the State of Illinois v. Danie Harris?
Plaintiff's attorney: Cook County Illinois State's Attorney. Defendant's attorney: Not Available Click Here For The Best Chicago Criminal Defense Lawyer Directory.
When was The People of the State of Illinois v. Danie Harris decided?
This case was decided on December 31, 2003.