United States of America v. Arriba W. Lewis

Officer Sweeney pulled Arriba

Lewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a

warning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in

the squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised

release for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drugsniffing

dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop.

2 No. 17‐3592

About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over,

Sweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a

drug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car.

The dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found

heroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distribute

heroin. The district court denied his motion to suppress.

He appeals, arguing the officer lacked lawful grounds

to initiate the traffic stop and arguing the officer prolonged

the stop without independent reasonable suspicion for the

dog to sniff. But we disagree on both fronts, and affirm.

I. Facts

Officer Sweeney sat in an unmarked Ford SUV with an exterior

spotlight in the median of Interstate 55 in McLean

County, Illinois, watching traffic. He saw a man later identified

as Arriba Lewis driving a Dodge Charger southbound in

“a pack of vehicles traveling in close proximity to each other.”

He “was traveling right behind another vehicle in very close

proximity,” gripping the wheel at 10:00 and 2:00, and appearing

to push himself behind the side pillar in a rigid posture.

Sweeney pursued Lewis. Sweeney testified he wanted “to

see if I can observe a traffic violation and confirm [Lewis’s]

following distance which I initially saw.” But first he passed

Lewis to assist another officer. Sweeney’s dashboard camera

began recording after he passed Lewis because Sweeney triggered

his emergency lights as he approached the other officer.

Triggering these lights activated the dashcam, which was programed

to capture footage beginning 1 minute earlier. After

passing Lewis, Sweeney pulled over to the right shoulder behind

the other officer. Video recorded by Sweeney’s dashcam

shows a truck followed by Lewis pass to the left of Sweeney.

The other officer declined assistance, so Sweeney pulled out

No. 17‐3592 3

and accelerated. Several vehicles moved to the right lane to let

him pass. He saw Lewis ahead in the left lane “at the preliminary

stages of passing” a truck in the right lane. Then Lewis

changed to the right lane behind the truck. As Lewis followed

the truck, Sweeney calculated the time‐distance. He activated

a stopwatch function to record the time between the truck’s

rear passing a milepost and the Charger’s front passing the

same object. He clocked this at 1.2 seconds, meaning Lewis

followed 1.2 seconds behind the truck according to this calculation.

Lewis stayed close behind the truck for about 45 seconds

despite the lack of traffic immediately behind him.

Sweeney pulled into the right lane. He testified he activated

his emergency lights.1 He pulled Lewis over. Lewis

stopped on the right shoulder, and Sweeney pulled behind

him, at about 3 minutes, 41 seconds into the video. The video

shows Lewis made a movement to his right inside his car seconds

later. Sweeney walked to the Charger’s passenger side

and saw Lewis’s hands trembling. At about 4 minutes into the

video, Sweeney reached the front window.2 He made contact

with Lewis and asked for his license. Sweeney said:

1 The parties dispute the timing of Sweeney’s activation of his emergency

lights. Sweeney testified he activated his lights sometime after clocking

the following‐distance at 1.2 seconds. But Lewis argues Sweeney activated

his lights when he pulled over to offer assistance to the other officer, well

before clocking the following‐distance, and nothing in the record shows

he turned the lights off. This issue’s potential relevance concerns the reason

Lewis pulled into the right lane behind the truck.

2 The dashcam video (presented at the suppression hearing and submitted

to us) begins at 0 minutes, 0 seconds. The video runs for about 3 minutes,

41 seconds before showing Lewis stop on the shoulder. It then shows

Sweeney reach the front passenger‐side window of the Charger at about 4

minutes into the video. Sweeney said “Here you go. Here’s your warning,

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The reason I stopped you was your following distance.

You need to leave at least 3 seconds

here in Illinois. You were less than 2 behind that

semi. Ok. And that’s why I originally pulled out

on you back, way back there, too. You had another

car you were following.3

Sweeney testified Lewis’s hands trembled and his breathing

seemed heavy and labored. Sweeney told Lewis he would

just get a warning, not a ticket, and told him to sit in the squad

car during preparation of the warning. After “hem‐haw[ing]”

and failing to exit his car expeditiously, when he finally began

to exit he reached back in his car. Then he put his hands up as

he walked. Sweeney said, “You’re fine man. Relax.”

In the squad car, Sweeney typed information into a computer

and talked with Lewis. The first step of completing the

warning was ensuring, via computer, he had a valid license.

Upon this check, the computer automatically showed he was

on federal probation4 for a cocaine conviction. Sweeney

ok,” and handed it to Lewis at about 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the video.

Thus, the total time from Lewis pulling over to Sweeney handing him the

warning is about 10 minutes, 50 seconds. The dog sniff began about 10

seconds later and took about 1 minute, 8 seconds. References to the video’s

time during the stop include about 4 minutes before Sweeney reached

Lewis’s window. The video’s length does not equal the duration of the

stop. As we show below, Lewis sometimes conflates the video’s length

with the duration of the stop. But they are not the same.



3 We base our quotations of Sweeney and Lewis during the stop on the

video. Any deviations are immaterial.

4 Sweeney used the word “probation,” apparently because his computer

did not distinguish between this and supervised release. Actually, Lewis

was on the latter. But the distinction is immaterial here.

No. 17‐3592 5

testified the computer returned information based on the license

within 1 minute of sitting in the squad car.

About 2 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked

where he was headed. Lewis said he was going to pick his son

up. Sweeney asked where. Lewis said, “School … St. Louis.”

Sweeney asked how old the son was. Lewis said, “26.” He explained

his son wanted to return to Chicago. Sweeney asked

where the son went to school. Lewis replied his son worked

in a warehouse. Lewis added his son “got into it” with his

girlfriend. This exchange lasted slightly less than a minute.

Sweeney thought the story seemed suspiciously inconsistent.

About 3.5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, he asked about

the 3‐second guideline Sweeney mentioned:

Lewis: So you got to be how many feet back?

Sweeney: It’s not feet. It’s seconds. You need to

be at least 3 seconds.

Lewis: Oh. Ok.

Sweeney: Ok. You were 1.2.

Lewis: How you measure that?

Sweeney: It’s just a stopwatch function on here.

So when the, with the semi, when it goes by a

stationary object which was the milepost back

there is what I used. When the back of that goes

past that stationary object I start it. When the

front of your vehicle goes past that same object

I stop it.

About 5 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney asked

him what he does for work, and he said he drove a truck.

Roughly 5 minutes after first making contact with Lewis at his

window, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog via a

6 No. 17‐3592

messaging system. Lewis concedes Sweeney requested the

dog after hearing Lewis’s answers regarding his travel plans

and after learning via computer he had a prior drug conviction

for which he was on supervised release.

About 6 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said

something was taking a minute to update. Then he asked

Lewis how long his son had been in St. Louis, how often

Lewis visited, and whether Lewis drove a truck “over the

road.” Sweeney testified Lewis’s breathing continued to appear

labored in the squad car, even after hearing he would

only get a warning. Nearly 8 minutes after Lewis pulled over,

Sweeney said Illinois barred the air freshener hanging from

Lewis’s mirror because it obstructed the view. Sweeney asked

Lewis what part of St. Louis he was going to. Sweeney testified

Lewis never asked if he was free to go.

Sweeney then said, “in correlation with our safety detail

today … we do have a canine dog working with us.” Sweeney

asked if Lewis was responsible for everything in the car.

About 10 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney said, “I’m

gonna print this off. I’m gonna have the dog walk around the

exterior of the vehicle, ok.” About 20 seconds later, the dashcam

records the sound of the warning printing. Then Sweeney

asked if Lewis was on probation. He responded in the affirmative.

Nearly 11 minutes after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney

said, “Here you go. Here’s your warning, ok.”5 Sweeney gave

the warning to Lewis, explained it, and said, “So you’re going

to St. Louis though.” At the word “though,” at about 14

minutes, 41 seconds into the video (about 10 seconds after

5 This comports with his testimony that he completed the “warning paperwork”

roughly 10 minutes, 40 seconds after initiating the stop.

No. 17‐3592 7

giving the written warning) a dog appeared on the video and

approached the rear passenger side of Lewis’s car. Lewis confirmed

he was going to St. Louis. Sweeney said that was outside

Illinois. They talked about Lewis’s probation and prior

incarceration while the dog circled his car.

About 12 minutes after Lewis pulled over (about 1 minute,

18 seconds after Sweeney gave the written warning to Lewis,

and about 1 minute, 8 seconds after the dog sniff began) the

handler told Sweeney the sniff was positive. Sweeney

searched Lewis’s car and quickly found 208 grams of heroin.

II. Procedural posture

Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distribute

heroin. The district court denied his motion to suppress.

He entered a conditional guilty plea. A career offender at

criminal history category VI, he received a sentence of 20

years incarceration. He appeals the denial of suppression,

raising two main issues. First, he challenges the traffic stop’s

initiation. Second, he challenges the sniff’s initiation. “We employ

a mixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing

the district court’s factual determinations for clear error

and de novo its ultimate determination about whether the

police had sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”

United States v. Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th

Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

A. Traffic stop

1. Law

Lewis argues Sweeney did not have legal grounds to start

the traffic stop. If Lewis is right, then the court should have

8 No. 17‐3592

suppressed the heroin as fruit of the poisonous tree. The

Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches

and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a vehicle, the stop must meet the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness

requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663

(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,

a court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States

v. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).

The district court determined probable cause justified initiating

the stop.6 Generally, “the decision to stop an automobile

is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe

that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United

States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). “Probable cause exists when

‘the circumstances confronting a police officer support the

reasonable belief that a driver has committed even a minor

traffic offense.’” United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th

Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586

(7th Cir. 2000)). Probable cause is an objective standard, based

on the totality of the circumstances. If an officer reasonably

thinks he sees a driver commit a traffic violation, that is sufficient

grounds to pull him over without offending the Constitution.

Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724. The officer is not the judge.

Whether the driver actually committed a traffic infraction is

irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes so long as there

was an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did. Cashman,

216 F.3d at 587.



6 The lower standard of reasonable suspicion is enough to justify some

traffic stops. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014); Prouse, 440 U.S.

at 663; Rodriguez‐Escalera, 884 F.3d at 667–68. But we need not apply this

standard here because the district court did not err in finding probable

cause.



No. 17‐3592 9



2. Analysis



Here, Sweeney had more than ample grounds to pull

Lewis over. As Sweeney sat in the median, he thought he saw

Lewis following another vehicle too closely. That initial observation

alone probably satisfied the Constitution, but we

need not decide that because Sweeney pursued Lewis and

conducted a time‐distance calculation to confirm he followed

a vehicle too closely. Sweeney calculated Lewis’s followingtime‐

distance at 1.2 seconds. Whether Lewis actually followed

by 1.2 seconds exactly is irrelevant for purposes of the

Fourth Amendment. It is enough that this calculation supported

a reasonable belief Lewis was breaking the law.



Lewis mainly argues the 3‐second rule mentioned by

Sweeney during the traffic stop is merely the Illinois Secretary

of State’s recommendation, not the actual law. But this is a red

herring because the standard for probable cause is objective.

See Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern

with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken

in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”);

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“[T]hat the officer

does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated

by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s

action does not invalidate the action taken as long as

the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”).

The objective circumstances support probable cause to pull

Lewis over based on the two observations of him following

too closely, in violation of the law:



The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow

another vehicle more closely than is reasonable

and prudent, having due regard for the speed of



10 No. 17‐3592



such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition

of the highway. 625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a). Here, it does not matter

whether the Secretary’s recommendation comports with the statute.

Nor does it matter that Sweeney referenced the recommendation during

the stop. Regardless, Sweeney objectively had grounds for

a reasonable belief Lewis was following too closely based on

the two observations (and based on the clocked observation

alone).7



And this brings us to Lewis’s next argument. He faults the

court for not giving effect to the statutory language requiring

a driver to act based on the “condition of the highway.” He

argues the major highway condition was Sweeney’s squad car

approaching Lewis from behind. Lewis argues Illinois law required

him to pull immediately into the right lane when he

saw the squad car approaching. He argues he had a legal duty

not to obstruct it. He argues he chose the least of the available

evils when he pulled from the left lane into the right lane behind

the truck to yield to Sweeney. Lewis goes so far as to



7 Lewis argues: “For the Government to have met its burden of establishing

probable cause for a 625 ILCS 5/11‐710(a) violation, it had to prove Mr.

Lewis was driving in a way that was not ‘reasonable or prudent’ given the

‘speed of [other] vehicles’ and the ‘condition of the highway.’” (Appellant’s

Reply at 9–10.) That is wrong. To show the constitutionality of the

traffic stop’s start, the government merely needed to show an objective

basis for a reasonable belief Lewis followed too closely, not that he actually

followed too closely. Whether Lewis actually followed at 1.2 seconds

and whether 1.2 seconds was actually too close, given all the conditions of

the highway, are irrelevant to whether there was probable cause sufficient

to initiate the stop, and ultimately would have been for a traffic court to

decide (if Sweeney issued a ticket instead of a warning).



No. 17‐3592 11



argue Sweeney “impermissibly created the grounds for the

stop,” manufacturing a “police‐created exigency.”



The main problem with this argument is that it does nothing

to justify or explain why Lewis stayed in the right lane in

close proximity behind the truck for about 45 seconds after

pulling into the right lane behind the truck. As the video

demonstrates, no vehicles at this stage forced Lewis to tailgate

the truck. Regardless of the status of Sweeney’s emergency

lights, Lewis offers no reason why he could not have eased

back from the truck. Moreover, Lewis’s argument does nothing

to undermine Sweeney’s observation from the median.



The court properly relied on Muriel, where an officer’s “estimation

of the following distance amounted to probable

cause to believe that [the suspect’s] vehicle was ‘more close[ ]

than is reasonable and prudent.’” Muriel, 418 F.3d at 724

(quoting Ind. Code 9‐21‐8‐14). The court did not err in concluding

probable cause supported initiating the stop.



B. Dog sniff



1. Law



An officer who reasonably starts a traffic stop, however,

might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the scope or unreasonably

prolongs the stop. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful

if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required

to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez

v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). It is well‐established

a dog sniff of a vehicle’s exterior only for illegal drugs

during a lawful stop for a traffic violation does not infringe

Fourth Amendment rights, even absent reasonable suspicion

of drugs. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But it is also well12



No. 17‐3592



established a stop justified only by a traffic violation becomes

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required

to complete the stop’s original mission. Rodriguez, 135

S. Ct. at 1612. An officer may conduct “certain unrelated

checks”—including a dog sniff—during a lawful traffic stop,

but “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent

the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining

an individual.” Id. at 1615. Absent independent reasonable

suspicion to justify the sniff, the critical question is

not whether the sniff occurs before or after the officer issues

the warning, “but whether conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—

i.e., adds time to—‘the stop’ … .” Id. at 1616. But with independent

reasonable suspicion, the officer may detain the suspect

for the sniff even if the sniff adds time to the total stop.



Here, the district court concluded the stop (from its start

to the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the warning) was not

prolonged past the time reasonably required to complete the

mission of issuing a warning. And the district court determined

independent reasonable suspicion justified extending

the stop by about 1 minute for a canine unit to arrive.



2. Analysis



Lewis argues even if the stop started lawfully, the heroin

should be suppressed because the dog sniffed after a prolonged

detention without reasonable suspicion. But he leads

with a patent mistake. He claims Sweeney was completely finished

with the warning at 10 minutes, 40 seconds into the

video but did not print it until 14 minutes, 31 seconds into the

video, a claimed unjustified delay of nearly 4 minutes. But the

video and Sweeney’s testimony flatly contradict this. Lewis

mistakenly treats Sweeney’s testimony about the time on the

video’s clock when he printed the warning as testimony about



No. 17‐3592 13



the duration of the stop up to the point he printed it. Sweeney

testified he calculated the time it took him to complete the

warning paperwork after he initiated the traffic stop (not after

the video began) to be 10 minutes and 40 seconds. He testified

that at 14 minutes, 26 seconds into the video (not into the stop)

he said “Here you go” as he gave the warning to Lewis. The

bottom line is the video and testimony show there was no unreasonable

delay between finishing the warning and handing

it to Lewis. The claimed delay of about 4 minutes merely mirrors

the difference between the video’s clock and the duration

of the stop, because the stop begins about 4 minutes into the

video. The simple fact, shown by the video and testimony, is

Sweeney printed the warning between 10 and 11 minutes into

the stop and promptly gave it to Lewis. His false equivocation

infects some of his remaining arguments.



Lewis next argues Sweeney unlawfully prolonged the detention

by taking time to impermissibly confine and question

him about issues unrelated to the warning, and he raises several

detailed points. But each point fails.



Lewis argues switching cars took 1 minute. But he does

not explain why this delay was unlawful or why sitting in the

squad car was impermissible. We already determined the

court did not err in concluding the initiation of the traffic stop

was permissible. Lewis does not explain why moving him to

the squad car was not reasonably incidental. See United States

v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1244 (7th Cir. 1996) (During a valid traffic

stop, an officer may “legitimately ask [a driver] to step out

of his car, even without any particularized suspicion,” and

may ask the driver “to sit in his patrol car … .”). Nor does he

explain why, during the minute between Sweeney asking



14 No. 17‐3592



Lewis to exit his car and Lewis entering the squad car, he

spent about 40 seconds in his car after being asked to exit.



Lewis next argues Sweeney spent 6 minutes and 15 seconds

asking about irrelevant travel matters and explaining

how a canine unit will arrive. Lewis cites two parts of the

video in support. There are several problems with Lewis’s argument

here. The first challenged part of the video begins

with Sweeney asking, “Where are we headed to today, sir?”



Officers across the country would be surprised if we countenanced

the characterization of this basic, routine question as

irrelevant to a traffic stop. Lewis’s initial response to this question

was not entirely forthcoming: “Pick my son up.” That response

naturally led to Sweeney’s next question: “Where’s

that at?” Again, Lewis’s response was not entirely forthcoming:



“School … St. Louis.” So Sweeney asked how old the son

was and where he went to school. Lewis gave the age, brought

up returning to Chicago, never answered about school,

brought up his son’s work in “some warehouse,” and brought

up a situation between his son and his son’s girlfriend.



The Constitution allows an officer to ask these questions

during a traffic stop, especially when the answers objectively

seem suspicious. See Muriel, 418 F.3d at 726 (Although questions

prolonging custody might affect the detention’s reasonableness,

police “may ask questions that do not concern the

purpose of the stop and that are not supported by any other

suspicion.”); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir.

2002) (“What the Constitution requires is that the entire process

remain reasonable. Questions that hold potential for detecting

crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn

reasonable detention into unreasonable detention.”) And

Lewis could have refused to answer at some point. But the



No. 17‐3592 15



biggest problem with Lewis’s argument here is he does not

show any reason these exchanges prolonged the process of issuing

the warning. The video and testimony both document

Sweeney worked on the warning while talking with Lewis.



The court did not err in determining the duration of the

stop (from its start to the moment Sweeney handed Lewis the

warning) was not prolonged past the time reasonably required

to complete the mission of issuing a warning.



The court turned to the issue of whether Sweeney obtained

enough information during the stop before issuing the

warning to have independent reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity to justify detaining Lewis further. Sweeney

handed Lewis the warning about 10 minutes, 50 seconds after

Lewis pulled over. The dog alerted roughly 1 minute later.



Even if the period between handing the warning and the dog

alerting could be called a delay of about 1 minute8 it was justified

by independent reasonable suspicion, as the court held.



Reasonable suspicion requires “‘specific and articulable

facts which, taken together with rational inferences from

those facts,’ suggest criminal activity.” United States v. Ruiz,

785 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard,

considering the totality of the circumstances. By the time



8 We question whether even this minute can be characterized as a delay to

wait for a dog, because immediately after handing Lewis the warning and

explaining in a quick and routine manner what it is, Sweeney brings up

the apt point that Lewis said he was going to St. Louis, but his terms likely

restrict his freedom to leave Illinois. But we need not explore this further

because we agree with the district court that Sweeney had independent

reasonable suspicion to detain Lewis after handing him the warning to

allow the dog time to sniff.



16 No. 17‐3592



Sweeney issued the warning, this is what he objectively had

reason to know. One, Lewis seemed unusually nervous even

after hearing he would only get a warning. His hands trembled.

His breathing was heavy and labored. Nervousness can

raise reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,

124 (2000). Two, he was on supervised release for a drug offense.

Criminal histories can support reasonable suspicion.

United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 959 (7th Cir. 2016).

(Sweeney had these objective grounds for reasonable suspicion

even without asking any questions Lewis now challenges.)

Three, his travel explanations seemed suspiciously

inconsistent, which can raise reasonable suspicion. Muriel, 418

F.3d at 726. These factors legitimately gave rise to objective

reasonable suspicion.



This is true even if Lewis always breathes heavily, with

constantly trembling hands. Even if he were actually innocent

of the prior drug charge and a judge planned to exonerate him

next morning. Even if his son actually studied and worked in

St. Louis, quarreled, and wanted to return to Chicago. Regardless,

objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

supported detaining Lewis to allow a dog to sniff. Perhaps we

could add his rigid posture, furtive movements, “hem‐hawing,”

and I‐55’s drug‐trafficking reputation. But we need not.



We conclude the district court did not err in determining

any delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to

sniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion.

IV. Conclusion

We considered all Lewis’s arguments and found none

availing. We AFFIRM the denial of suppression.