State of Idaho v. Desiree Elaine Karst

Coeuir d'Alene, Idaho criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with drug possession.

Karst was a passenger in a car during a traffic stop in Kootenai County. The officer

initiating the traffic stop radioed for a drug dog, which arrived and alerted. Karst admitted to having

drugs in the car, and additional drugs and paraphernalia were found on Karst when she was taken2

to jail. Karst was charged with possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana,

possession of drug paraphernalia, and introducing major contraband into a correctional facility.

Karst moved to suppress the drug and paraphernalia evidence, arguing that the officer

impermissibly extended the traffic stop. The district court partially denied the motion, after which

Karst entered conditional guilty pleas reserving her right to appeal.

As part of its judgment of conviction, the district court ordered Karst to pay $285.50 in

"court costs,” $200.00 in "Idaho State Police Lab Fees,” and a "$2.00 handling fee . . . on each

installment/partial payment.” According to the "Case Transaction Summary” for Karst's case, she

ultimately paid $569.50 in fees:

• $220.00 to the Idaho State Police for toxicology testing

• $10.00 in administrative surcharges

• $17.50 in court costs and fees

• $10.00 in court technology fees

• $75.00 for crime victims compensation

• $30.00 in domestic violence court fees

• $10.00 in drug violations hotline fees

• $100.00 in emergency surcharge fees

• $3.00 in peace officer and detention officer disability fees

• $15.00 in peace officer standards and training fees

• $15.00 in victim notification fund fees

• $60.00 in community service fees

• $4.00 in transactional fees

Karst contends that the fees were mandated by various state laws. The State does not dispute this

contention. Karst paid the fees to the clerk of the district court, who is required by statute to remit

the monies to the county auditor. I.C. § 31-3201I. The county auditor is then required by statute to

distribute the funds to various governmental entities. Id. The distribution of the monies appears to

have been done according to the dictates of state law. See id.



Karst appealed the district court's partial denial of her motion to suppress. This Court

concluded that the officer impermissibly extended the traffic stop, reversed the district court's

denial of Karst's motion to suppress, and remanded the case for further proceedings. State v. Karst,

170 Idaho 219, 228, 509 P.3d 1148, 1157 (2022).3



On remand, the prosecutor moved to dismiss all charges against Karst and the district court

entered an order dismissing the case. One day later, Karst filed a "motion to reimburse,” seeking

reimbursement of the $569.50 she had paid in court-ordered fines because her conviction had been

invalidated and the charges against her had been dismissed. Attached to the motion was Karst's

"Case Transactions Summary,” which showed a breakdown of the fees that Karst had paid in the

case. Karst argued that the State's retention of her funds after her conviction had been overturned

violated her due process rights under the United States Constitution. In opposition, the State argued

that the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 157, 280 P.3d 184 (Ct.

App. 2012), held that the district court does not have jurisdiction to return funds to a defendant

whose conviction had been vacated. The State argued that Karst's remedy was to file a civil action

against each governmental entity that received her money. In her brief in support of her motion to

reimburse, Karst acknowledged Peterson, but argued that the United States Supreme Court

implicitly overruled Peterson in Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1258 (2017).



The district court held a hearing on the motion, at which Karst argued that because her

conviction had been overturned, the State had no lawful basis to retain her funds and continuing

to do so was a violation of her due process rights. Karst contended that the district court had

jurisdiction to order the payment of fees, so the district court should also have jurisdiction to order

that her monies be returned. The district court, ruling orally from the bench, denied the motion.

The district court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Nelson did not overrule

Peterson, that it was bound by Peterson, and therefore it lacked jurisdiction to consider Karst's

motion. The district court also concluded that there was no due process violation because Karst

could file civil suits against each agency that had received a portion of her funds.

Karst timely appealed the denial of her motion for reimbursement.

Defendant was convicted but her conviction was invalidated by the Supreme Court of Idaho.



Defendant sought reimbursement of the $569.50 she paid in court-ordered fees following her conditional guilty plea.



The District Court denied Defendant's motion.



Reversed