MIMG CLXXII Retreat on 6th, LLC v. Mackenzie Miller and Parties in Possession

Cedar Rapids, Iowa consumer law lawyer represented the Defendant in a breach of residential lease vacation action.



" This case asks us to decide whether Congress enacted a nationwide permanent thirty-day pre-eviction notice requirement for many of our nation's rental units as a part of temporary COVID-19-related legislation. The legislation applies to all "covered dwelling[s]." 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1). This is a large category, which includes the substantial share of our nation's rental housing that is privately owned and serves tenants of varied income levels but that also happens to have federally backed mortgage financing.



Read in isolation, 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1) states that "[t]he lessor of a covered dwelling unit . . . may not require the tenant to vacate the covered dwelling unit before the date that is 30 days after the date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate." There is no expiration date. But no statutory provision is an island, and we conclude that section 9058(c)(1) must be read together with the time limits in the provisions that precede and follow it. This is especially true because section 9058(c)(1) intrudes on a traditional area of state and local control, namely, landlord-tenant law. Also, the insular reading of section 9058(c)(1) would lead unavoidably to the conclusion that a landlord has to give a thirty-day pre-eviction notice even for tenants engaged in criminal activity or other actions that threaten the safety of other tenants. Just as section 9058(c)(1), read alone, has no temporal limits, it also has no limits based on the grounds for eviction. In addition, as we explain herein, an insular reading of section 9058(c)(1) results in a bizarre legal regime under which landlords could have evicted tenants from covered dwellings during the moratorium on certain grounds but could not have served pre-eviction notices on them.



Accordingly, we conclude that section 9058(c)(1) must be read in conjunction with neighboring provisions. So read, it applies only to tenants who defaulted as to rent during the 120-day COVID-19-related moratorium on evictions. As we also discuss herein, this holistic interpretation is well-supported by relevant United States Supreme Court precedent. We therefore reverse the judgment below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."



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Legal issue Did Congress enact a permanent nationwide thirty-day pre-eviction notice requirement under the Federal CARES Act for rental units with federally backed mortgages?

Headnote



LANDLORD-TENANT LAW. FEDERAL CARES ACT NOTICE REQUIREMENT. The case examines whether the Federal CARES Act imposes a permanent thirty-day notice to vacate requirement for landlords before initiating eviction actions, or if this notice requirement is limited to the 120-day COVID-19-related moratorium period, addressing the interaction between federal legislation and state landlord-tenant laws.



STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. PREEMPTION AND TEMPORAL LIMITS. The court considers whether 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1) preempts state law by reading the provision in context with adjacent sections to determine the temporality and scope of its application, emphasizing the presumption against broad federal preemption in areas traditionally regulated by state law.



Key Phrases Forcible entry and detainer action. Federal CARES Act. COVID-19-related legislation. Iowa landlord-tenant law. Supreme Court precedent.

Reversed