STATE OF IOWA vs. TERENCE LONDON WALKER

Walker appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence,

arguing counsel was ineffective in not ensuring Walker had the benefit of a

hearing on his motion and that denial of his motion without an evidentiary hearing

was a denial of due process.1 See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 784

(Iowa 2006) (“Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are not bound by

traditional error-preservation rules.”). Our supreme court treated his appeal as a

petition for writ of certiorari and granted the petition. See State v. Propps, ___

N.W.2d ___, ___, 2017 WL 2291380, at *3 (Iowa 2017) (“[I]f a case is initiated by

a notice of appeal, but another form of review is proper, we may choose to

proceed as though the proper form of review was requested by the defendant

rather than dismiss the action.”). Walker argues that at an evidentiary hearing he

1 “Normally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are considered in postconviction relief proceedings.” State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 785 (Iowa 2010). When, as here, the record is sufficient to address an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, we resolve the claim on direct appeal. Id.

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would have had the opportunity to develop facts to support his motion. But his

brief on appeal does not identify any facts that would have or should have been

presented and cites no legal authority that the legislature’s adoption of robbery in

the third degree requires reduction of his robbery conviction or reduction of his

sentence. His argument that he was denied due process requires—at the very

least—he assert that provision of a greater process would have the potential to

benefit him in obtaining his requested relief.