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Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows

that on the night of December 7, 1996, Upshaw met Walton at a gas station in

Columbus. Walton agreed to provide sexual services to Upshaw in exchange for

drugs, and she got into a car with Upshaw, Corey Franks, and Tim Turman.

Franks, who was the driver of the car, heard Upshaw arguing with Walton in the

back seat. Upshaw then asked Franks to pull over to the side of the road,

Upshaw and Walton got out of the car, and Upshaw shot Walton in the head

with a .38 caliber Taurus revolver. When Upshaw returned to the car, he asked

his friends if they were still going to a nightclub, and he threatened Franks about

what would happen to his family if he told anyone what he had seen. Walton’s

body was found later that night on the side of the road. Upshaw hid the revolver

in his mother’s house, but it was eventually found — and sold — by Upshaw’s

mother and her boyfriend. Soon after the sale, the revolver was recovered by

police, determined to be the firearm used in Walton’s murder, and traced back

to Upshaw.

Upshaw does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to sustain his

convictions. Nevertheless, we have independently reviewed the record with an

eye toward the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude that the evidence

adduced at trial was legally sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Upshaw was guilty of malice murder and

unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979). And while the jury was authorized to find Upshaw guilty of felony

murder as well, he cannot be convicted and sentenced for both malice murder

and felony murder because there was only one killing. As a result, the judgment

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of conviction for felony murder must be vacated as surplusage. See Hendrix v.

State, 298 Ga. 60, 67 (4) (779 SE2d 322) (2015).2

2. Franks was called by the State to testify, and Upshaw sought to

impeach Franks by asking him about the circumstances that led to his prior

arrest (and conviction) for aggravated assault. The trial court sustained the

State’s objection to this line of questioning, a ruling that Upshaw now asserts

was error. While Upshaw was entitled to “thorough and sifting

cross-examination” of the State’s witnesses, a witness may be cross-examined

“only as to relevant matter.” Former OCGA §§ 24-9-62 and 24-9-64.3 And

where, as here, a defendant seeks to impeach a witness with a prior conviction,

“the specific facts underlying the crime are irrelevant unless the witness

attempts to rehabilitate himself by explaining the circumstances of his

conviction.” Brown v. State, 276 Ga. 192, 193 (3) (576 SE2d 870) (2003)

(citations and punctuation omitted). Here, Franks explained that he was on

parole for aggravated assault, and he made no effort to rehabilitate himself by

explaining the circumstances that led to his conviction. As a result, the trial

court did not err when it prevented Upshaw from interrogating Franks about the

specific facts of that offense.

3. Upshaw also contends that the trial court erred when it refused to grant

a mistrial after another prosecution witness — a man named Mark Price —

refused to be cross-examined. The State had referred to this witness in its

opening statement, saying that the evidence would show that Upshaw made “a

confession” to Price. Later, the boyfriend of Upshaw’s mother testified and

made a vague reference to a jailhouse statement made by Price that involved

Walton’s murder (although he did not describe what was said), and a police

detective testified that Upshaw “supposedly” told Price about the murder. When

Price was called as a witness by the State, he did not testify that Upshaw

confessed to him, but he admitted that he made a jailhouse statement to the

police in 2008. The contents of the statement were not entered into evidence,

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and Price distanced himself from the statement, claiming that a detective told

him to sign off on the statement or the detective would “see to it that [he] never

g[o]t out of [the] chain gang.” But when the State asked Price about his prior

convictions, he invoked his right to remain silent and provided no additional

testimony on direct examination. Price refused to answer any questions at all on

cross-examination.

In response to Price’s silence, Upshaw requested a mistrial, which was

denied by the trial court. He also requested that Price be held in contempt, and

the trial court granted that request. The trial court then instructed the jury that

it should “disregard any statements that may have been made by any witness

concerning a statement by [Upshaw] to . . . Price.” The trial court also offered

to instruct the jury to disregard Price’s testimony in its entirety, but Upshaw

declined the offer.

Upshaw now asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was

violated when the trial court refused to grant his motion for mistrial. But “when

a witness declines to answer on cross examination certain pertinent questions

relevant to a matter testified about by the witness on direct examination,” the

trial court may be able to cure this inequity by striking “all of the witness’

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testimony on the same subject matter.” Soto v. State, 285 Ga. 367, 368-369 (2)

(677 SE2d 95) (2009) (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted). Here,

Upshaw declined the court’s offer to strike Price’s testimony, likely because the

little testimony that Price gave was favorable to him. And the trial court acted

within its discretion when it provided a curative instruction for the jury to

disregard any testimony about a statement made by Upshaw to Price. See Miller

v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 860 (4) (717 SE2d 179) (2011) (“[w]hether a trial court

grants a defendant’s motion for mistrial or uses a curative jury instruction to

correct improper evidence that comes before a jury is a matter of judicial

discretion”). No mistrial was required.

4. Finally, Upshaw claims that the trial court erred when it excepted the

lead detective from the rule of sequestration so that he could assist the

prosecution with the orderly presentation of evidence. But as Upshaw

acknowledges, it is well established that a trial court does not abuse its

discretion when it permits a witness to remain in the courtroom to assist the

prosecution with the orderly presentation of evidence. See Moore v. State, 297

Ga. 773, 774 (2) (778 SE2d 210) (2015) (“in the situation in which the State

maintains that it needs the presence of the primary investigator for the orderly

presentation of the case, excepting the investigator from the rule of sequestration

is within the discretion of the trial court”) (citation and punctuation omitted).