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Prior to trial, the State gave notice of its intent to introduce

out-of-court statements made by the child victims. The State

intended to introduce the hearsay through two witnesses, a case

worker with the Child Protection Team, and the paternal

grandmother of the children. The defense objected, and a hearing

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was held to determine the admissibility of the evidence under

section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2018). After receiving

argument and the proffered testimony, the trial court made oral

findings in support of its determination that the hearsay was

admissible. The trial court indicated it would enter a written order

at a later time, but no written order appears in the record.

Young suggests on appeal that the trial court erred in not

entering the written order. However, section 90.803(23) does not

mandate that a trial court enter written findings. Instead, the

statute provides only that the trial court “shall make specific

findings of fact, on the record, as to the basis for its ruling under

this subsection.” Id. Young made no objection to the sufficiency of

the oral findings. As for the possibility that Young did not object

to the sufficiency of the oral findings because he was anticipating

entry of written findings, he cannot now seek reversal of his

conviction when he failed to inquire below as to the lack of written

findings. See Cowan v. State, 165 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015);

Elwell v. State, 954 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Young also argued below, and renews the argument here, that

the probative value of the child victim hearsay was outweighed by

unfair prejudice. We find no abuse of discretion. See Jenkins v.

State, 242 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (applying the abuse of

discretion standard to review the admission of hearsay statements

of a child victim of sexual abuse).

“‘Relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; however it is

only unfair prejudice, substantially outweighing probative value,

which permits exclusion of relevant matters.’” State v. Blackwell,

787 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (quoting State v. Andres,

552 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)). “‘Section 90.403 ... is

directed at evidence which inflames the jury or appeals improperly

to the jur[ors’] emotions.’” Steverson v. State, 695 So. 2d 687, 688–

89 (Fla. 1997) (quoting C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 403.1 at

100–03 (2d ed. 1984)).

Given the dearth of physical evidence, the statements of the

children to their grandmother and then to the Child Protection

Team interviewer were quite probative, especially given that

statements were made in temporal proximity to the alleged

commission of charged offenses. Given the lack of corroborating

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evidence, the hearsay certainly was not cumulative or repetitive.

While testimony about child sexual abuse is by its nature

unsettling, the hearsay introduced below was not unnecessarily

inflammatory or improperly directed to the jury’s emotions.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting

the assertion that the hearsay was unfairly prejudicial. Young’s

convictions are affirmed.*

AFFIRMED