LUCILA MURPHY vs LENIS OSORIO AND VELIA POUSO

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Lenis Osorio and Velia Pouso (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) filed an action against Lucila and Melissa Murphy1 (collectively, “the Defendants”), seeking to

quiet title to real property located in Miami, Florida. It is undisputed that the

following warranty deed and quitclaim deeds relating to the subject property have been recorded2: 1. A warranty deed dated August 31, 1989, and recorded on September 8, 1989, from Miami Land Development Corp. to Mario Pena [Mario Sr.]3 and Manuela Pena, his wife.

2 A quitclaim deed dated August 4, 1994, and recorded on August 10, 1994, from Mario Sr. and Manuela Pena, his wife, to Mario Sr., Manuela Pena, his wife, and Lucila Murphy, a married woman.

3. A quitclaim deed dated March 10, 1995, and recorded on June 15, 1998, from Mario Sr. and Manuela Pena, his wife, and Lucila Murphy, a single woman, to Melissa Murphy, a single woman.

4. A quitclaim deed dated October 26, 1998, and recorded on December 6, 1998, from Manuela Pena, an unremarried widow, to Lucila Murphy.

5. A quitclaim deed dated November 30, 2002, and recorded on August 7, 2003, from Lucila Murphy and Manuela Pena to Lucila Murphy, Lenes



1 The notice of appeal was not filed on Melissa’s behalf. 2 For ease of reference, the recorded deed and quitclaim deeds are referred to as “first deed,” “second deed,” etc. 3 The “Mario Pena” referenced in the first, second, and third deeds, will be referred to as “Mario Sr.”

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Osorio4, Mario Pena5, Armando Pena, Victor Pena, Belia Pouzo,6 and Marcos Pena [collectively, “the siblings” or “seven siblings”].7



In the complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that their parents, Mario Sr. and Manuela,

did not sign the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed), and therefore,

the quitclaim deed must be canceled and title to the property should be quieted in

the Plaintiffs’ favor and against all other persons claiming under the Defendants.

The Defendants answered the complaint and denied, among other things,

that the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed) was not signed by Mario

Sr. and Manuela. Despite raising several affirmative defenses, the Defendants did

not raise any homestead defense relating to Lucila’s husband’s failure to execute

the quitclaim deed recorded in August 2003 (fifth deed).

The Defendants also filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiffs and a third

party complaint against the remaining siblings, Mario Jr., Armando, Victor, and

Marcos (“third-party defendants”). The Plaintiffs asserted that they were joining

the third-party defendants because their legal rights will be affected as the

Defendants were seeking to void the quitclaim deed recorded in 2003 (fifth deed)

in which they are listed as grantees. In the counterclaim, the Defendants sought to

quiet title to the property in favor of Melissa pursuant to the quitclaim deed



4 Lenes is referred to as Lenis in the pleadings and the final judgment. 5 The “Mario Pena” referenced in the fifth deed will be referred to as “Mario Jr.”. 6 Belia Pouzo is referred to as Velia Pouso in the pleadings and the final judgment. 7 This quitclaim deed was executed by all of the seven siblings.

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recorded in June 1998 (third deed), asserting that this quitclaim deed is superior to

any subsequently recorded quitclaim deed. The Defendants also asserted that

Lucila did not know what she was signing when she signed the quitclaim deed

recorded in 2003 (fifth deed) because she was told that she was signing something

relating to her mother’s (Manuela) will, not a quitclaim deed transferring title of

the subject property to herself and her siblings.

In June 2018, a jury trial was conducted. Although there is no transcript of

the jury trial, it is undisputed that the trial court ruled that there was a lack of

evidence to support the Defendants’ counterclaim and that the counterclaim was

also time-barred. Further, the verdict form reflects that the only issue presented to

the jury was whether Mario Sr. executed the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998

(third deed). The jury found that he did not.

In July 2018, the Plaintiffs and the third-party defendants moved for the

entry of a final judgment “in accordance with the jury verdict and the law,”

attaching a proposed final judgment. The proposed final judgment provides,

among other things, that the falsified quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third

deed) is void ab initio, title is quieted in the names of the seven siblings, and Lucila

and Melissa take nothing in their counterclaim and third-party complaint. There

was no legal support for the argument that title should be quieted in the names of

the seven siblings pursuant to the fifth deed.

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In response, the Defendants asserted that, at the conclusion of the jury trial,

the trial court instructed the Plaintiffs’ counsel to contact the Defendants’ counsel

to see if they could agree who are the titleholders of the property in light of the

jury’s factual finding that the quitclaim deed (third deed) was falsified. However,

prior to discussing the matter with the Defendants’ counsel, the Plaintiffs filed the

motion for entry of final judgment. In their response, the Defendants agreed that,

based on the jury’s finding, the final judgment should reflect that the quitclaim

deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed) is void, but asserted that the trial court had

not yet made a legal determination as to who are the owners of the property in light

of the jury’s finding.

The trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion for entry of final

judgment. At the hearing, the Plaintiffs’ counsel informed the trial judge that the

Plaintiffs prevailed at the jury trial, with the jury determining that the quitclaim

deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed) was not signed by Mario Sr. and that the

operative deed was the quitclaim deed to the seven siblings (fifth deed). In

response, the Defendants’ counsel acknowledged that the quitclaim deed recorded

in June 1998 (third deed) is void based on the jury’s finding, but that the jury made

no finding as to which deed title should be quieted. The trial judge noted there is

no transcript of the jury trial, but she remembers asking the parties to brief the

issue of which deed is operative as a matter of law. In addition, the Defendants’

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counsel acknowledged there is no indication in the record whether the subject

property was Lucila’s husband’s homestead. Further, the trial judge stated that she

has no recollection that testimony was presented during the jury trial indicating

that the property was Lucila’s husband’s homestead. At the conclusion of the

parties’ arguments, the trial judge executed the proposed final judgment, making

one change not relevant to this appeal, which names the seven siblings as the

owners of the property.

Lucila moved for rehearing, arguing, in part, that the quitclaim deed

recorded in 2003 (fifth deed) was defective because Lucila’s husband did not join

in the conveyance of his homestead property. The trial court denied the motion for

rehearing, stating that “Defendants’ attempt to create a post-trial record, by

alleging ‘facts,’ arguments and issues in a Motion for Rehearing that were not

addressed, presented or established at trial, must be denied without a trial transcript

for failure to demonstrate reversible error.” Lucila’s appeal followed.

Lucila argues that the trial court abused its discretion in the exercise of its

chancery jurisdiction by failing to determine in which deed title should be quieted

in light of the facts, applicable law, and the jury’s determination that the quitclaim

deed recorded in June 1998 was void. We agree.

Based on our review of the final judgment and the transcript of the hearing

on the motion for entry of final judgment, it appears that the trial court

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misconstrued the effect of the jury’s verdict. The only issue decided by the jury

was that Mario Sr. did not sign the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third

deed). The jury did not determine, and could not have determined, the ultimate

issues of (1) whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to legal or equitable title, free of any cloud, see Hill v. Da Costa, 61 So. 750, 751 (Fla. 1913) (“In proceedings to

remove a cloud upon title to real estate, the complainant must show with clearness,

accuracy, and certainty the validity of his own title, and the invalidity of the title of

the opposing parties.”), or (2) which deed was the operative deed in light of the

jury’s factual determination that the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third

deed) was forged. As such, we reverse the final judgment and the order denying

rehearing and remand with directions for the trial court to make these

determinations. Further, we encourage the trial court to allow the parties to file

memoranda on the issues. As stated earlier, during the hearing on the motion for

entry of final judgment, the trial judge stated that she remembers asking the parties

to brief the issue of which deed is operative as a matter of law. A review of the

parties’ submissions do not indicate that they adequately briefed this legal issue.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.