Robbin Vann v. The Town of Cheswold

Robbin Vann, appellant, challenges his termination as the Town of
Cheswold's police chief. A Superior Court judge determined that Cheswold
established "just cause" for Vann's removal as required under 11 Del. C. §
9301(a). Vann argues that the trial judge improperly interpreted "just cause" as a
"fair and honest cause or reason." Instead, he claims "just cause" under section
9301 means "a willful or wanton act in violation of either the employer's interest,
or of the employee's duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct."1
After reviewing the record including Cheswold's fifteen proffered reasons for
Vann's termination, we find "just cause" for his termination even if we were to
adopt Vann's interpretation of that term. Therefore, we AFFIRM the trial judge's
order. However, to provide guidance for section 9301(a), we decline to follow
Vann's and the trial judge's formulation of "just cause." Instead, we interpret "just
cause" as any legally sufficient reason supported by job-related factors that
rationally and logically touch upon the employee's competency and ability to
perform his or her duties.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Vann served as Cheswold's police chief. Cheswold terminated Vann's
employment after the Town Council held a due process public hearing ("Town
Council hearing") as required under section 9301. Vann appealed and a Superior
Court judge found that the Town Council hearing did not provide an unbiased due
process hearing. Cheswold appealed that decision. We reversed and remanded
holding that Vann's bias claim lacked sufficient evidence and that Vann waived
any bias claim.

On remand, the Superior Court judge reviewed the Town Council hearing
and Cheswold's decision to terminate Vann. The trial judge held that substantial
evidence supported the Town Council's finding "just cause" to terminate Vann. In
making the determination, the judge defined "just cause" as "a fair and honest
cause or reason." He further found that sufficient testimonial evidence supported
all fifteen proffered reasons for Vann's termination: (1) Vann permitted officers to
work overtime and disregarded a directive from the mayor and Town Council; (2)
Vann refused to meet with the mayor and town manager; (3) Vann procured three
mobile phones and allowed his wife and another officer to use them for personal
calls; (4) Vann violated a directive from the mayor and Town council and provided
another officer with a key to the police evidence room; (5) Vann was frequently
away from his office during work hours; (6) Vann left work without closing the
door to his office on one occasion; (7) Vann exhibited disrespect toward the mayor
in the presence of other Cheswold employees; (8) Vann made purchases without
following the Cheswold requisition and purchase order process; (9) Vann
insubordinately failed to follow the mayor's guidance; (10) Vann approached the
mayor with a closed fist, bumped the mayor's arm, and cause the mayor to fear for
his safety; (11) Vann scheduled officers to double coverage at some times while
leaving no coverage at other times; (12) Vann made false and derogatory
comments concerning the management of the Town of Cheswold; (13) Vann
refused to speak with the Town Manager; (14) Vann falsified information to the
mayor; (15) Vann refused to follow the mayor's written policies.
Vann has appealed the judge's determination.

DISCUSSION

11 Del. C. § 9301(b) provides a statutory right of appeal to terminated police
chiefs, but fails to include a standard of review for appeals. Accordingly, we apply
the same standard of review used for appeals from decisions of administrative
agencies. We determine "whether the factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence on the record before the agency."2 We review any statutory interpretation
de novo.3

On appeal, Vann does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead,
he argues that the Town Council and the judge misinterpreted "just cause" as that
term is used in section 9301(a). Vann argues that the General Assembly, when it
enacted section 9301(a), imported the definition of "just cause" from our
unemployment compensation jurisprudence. Thus, Vann contends that "just
cause" means "a willful or wanton act in violation of either the employer's interest,
or of the employee's duties, or of the employee's expected standard of conduct."4
After reviewing the proffered reasons for Vann's termination and the
testimony supporting it, we find that "just cause" existed even under Vann's more
stringent definition. Of the fifteen reasons for Vann's termination – all of which
are supported by testimonial evidence at the Town Council meeting – most
indicate "willful or wanton act[s]" against Cheswold's interests, Vann's duties, and
Vann's expected standard of conduct. We believe that each reason from #10
through #15 individually meet Vann's suggested definition of "just cause." Thus,
the Superior Court judge properly affirmed the Town Council's determination of
"just cause" for Vann's termination.

For guidance in further cases, we do not adopt Vann's proposed "just cause"
definition. "Just cause" has many different meanings even within the Delaware
Code. It is used in the employment context, in the unemployment compensation
context, and in a plethora of other sections.5 Although we recognize that Delaware
law applies a "just cause" standard in the unemployment compensation arena, that
definition is unsuitable in many other circumstances. "Just cause" for
unemployment compensation purposes refers to the reason why unemployment
compensation may be withheld from an employee.6 An employee earns a right to
unemployment compensation because his employer makes mandatory payments,
on the employee's behalf, into the unemployment compensation program.7 Thus,
employees accrue a property-like right to unemployment compensation, which
they may demand when unemployed. Where a former employer attempts to
withhold that accrued property-like right, we require an especially good reason and
demand heightened scrutiny of the proffered reason.

But the right to employment, itself, is based in contract. An employee does
not maintain a vested property-like interest in his continued employment. Thus,
even though his contract or a statute might require "just cause" for his dismissal,
that "just cause" does not impart the same definition as "just cause" in
unemployment compensation.

Del. C. § 2908(c)(2) (Local board of education may deny the transfer of a transportation contract
only for just cause, which is limited to, financial stability, insurability, and record of service); 19
Del. C. § 2301B(d) (Removal of hearing officer may be made for just cause, meaning, but not
limited to, reduction in force, inefficiency, or unsatisfactory performance).

Although "just cause" may not invariably require heightened scrutiny, that
does not imply no scrutiny. Rather, in the employment context and particularly
here in the employment of police chiefs, the more traditional notion of "just cause"
is appropriate. Black's Eighth Edition defines "just cause" and "good cause" as "a
legally sufficient reason" and specifically in the employment law context "[i]ssues
of ‘just cause' or ‘good cause' or simply ‘cause' arise when an employee claims
breach of the terms of an employment contract providing that discharge will be
only for just cause. Thus, just cause is a creature of contract."8 American
Jurisprudence, in the analogous area of civil service, describes "just cause" as:
Under a statute requiring ‘just cause' for the removal, discharge, or
demotion of an officer or employee in the civil service, ‘just cause'
has been said to mean cause sufficient in law, or any cause which is
detrimental to the public service; it does not require that the
employee's action must have disrupted agency operations. Just cause
for removal from civil service employment under a state civil service
act has been said to exists [sic] only if the factors supporting removal
are job-related and in some manner rationally and logically touch
upon the employee's competency and ability to perform his duties.9

Distilling these definitions, we hold that for purposes of section 9301, "just
cause" means a legally sufficient reason supported by job-related factors that
rationally and logically touch upon the employee's competency and ability to
perform his duties. This definition clarifies that the reason for termination must be
job-related and cannot simply be a trumped up pre-textual excuse for termination.
In section 9301 cases, police procedure manuals and other reference guides about
best practices will significantly help determine "legally sufficient reasons" for
termination related to job performance and competency.10 Finally, under our
definition of "just cause," the fifteen proffered reasons clearly demonstrate that the
Town Council had "just cause" to terminate Vann as police chief.

* * *

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.

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