James F. Jordan III v. Diana M. Jordan

In this marital dissolution action, the defendant, Diana M. Jordan, claims that she is entitled to a new trial because the trial court impermissibly rendered its judgment more than 120 days after trial by issuing two corrected memoranda of decision.1 See General Statutes § 51-183b.2 The defendant's claim, however, is governed by General Statutes § 52-212a,3 which permits a trial court to open and to correct its judgment within four months. See State v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417, 437, 513 A.2d 620 (1986). We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.



The plaintiff, James F. Jordan III, commenced this action to dissolve the parties' twenty year marriage in 2007. Following a trial to the court over several days in April, 2009, the defendant filed revised proposed orders on April 28, 2009. The court rendered judgment in a nine page memorandum of decision, with attachments, on August 21, 2009. In its memorandum of decision, the court dissolved the parties' marriage and issued numerous orders concerning the parties' minor children, finances and property. From page one through the middle of page five of the court's memorandum of decision, the court referred to the plaintiff as the ''plaintiff husband,'' using a masculine pronoun, and to the defendant, using a feminine pronoun. On page five, the court transposed the designation of plaintiff and defendant but continued to refer to the parties by the gender appropriate pronouns, e.g., ''[t]he defendant shall continue his present medical and dental insurance . . . .''



On September 4, 2009, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that the court had failed to issue its decision within 120 days of the completion of trial as required by § 51-183b.4 On that same date, the defendant also filed an appeal grounded in the transposition of the party designations in the court's memorandum of decision. On September 8, 2009, the court sua sponte issued a corrected memorandum of decision in which it corrected some, but not all, of the transposition errors.



On September 21, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation, in which he identified six sections of the first corrected memorandum of decision that needed to be clarified ''to ensure that the court's intended orders are followed . . . .'' The court heard arguments from counsel on October 15, 2009, regarding the defendant's motion for a new trial and the plaintiff's motion for articulation. During the proceeding, the court described the mistakes in its memorandum of decision as ''what clearly [are] scrivener's errors.'' The court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and granted the plaintiff's motion for articulation.



On October 20, 2009, the court issued a second corrected memorandum of decision. The defendant objected, claiming that the second corrected memorandum of decision was a new judgment because it materially changed the court's orders and was untimely because it was issued more than 120 days from the date that she filed her revised proposed orders. Moreover, she argued, her motion for a new trial filed on September 4, 2009, constituted an objection to the filing of a late judgment pursuant to § 51-183b, and, therefore, the judgment rendered by the second corrected memorandum is void ab initio. On October 30, 2009, the defendant filed a second motion for a new trial5 and an amended appeal. The court overruled the defendant's objection to the second corrected memorandum of decision, and the defendant filed this appeal. The defendant claims that she is entitled to a new trial because the court's first and second corrected memoranda each represent a separate judgment improperly issued more than 120 days after trial.6 ''The construction of a judgment is a question of law for the court.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Munson v. Munson, 98 Conn. App. 869, 872, 911 A.2d 1158 (2006).



It is well established that a court's ability to modify a prior ruling ordinarily is limited by § 52-212a. See Rocque v. Light Sources, Inc., 275 Conn. 420, 432, 881 A.2d 230 (2005); see also General Statutes § 52-212a; Practice Book § 17-4; Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 277 Conn. 696, 706, 894 A.2d 259 (2006). ''Where judicial error exists . . . § 52-212a imposes a time limit so that a judgment may not be modified in matters of substance beyond a period of four months after the judgment has become final. State v. Wilson, [supra, 199 Conn. 437].'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rome v. Album, 73 Conn. App. 103, 107 n.3, 807 A.2d 1017 (2002). Our Supreme Court has recognized, however, that it is within the equitable powers of the trial court to fashion whatever orders [are] required to protect the integrity of [its original] judgment.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocque v. Light Sources, Inc., supra, 433. ''A trial court possesses the power to modify substantively its own judgment within four months succeeding the date on which it was rendered or passed. . . . A court may correct a clerical error at any time, even after the expiration of the four month period.'' (Citation omitted.) Cioffoletti v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 34 Conn. App. 685, 689, 642 A.2d 1220, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 916, 645 A.2d 1018 (1994). ''It is axiomatic that a judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Munson v. Munson, supra, 98 Conn. App. 874. ''A clerical error does not challenge the court's ability to reach the conclusion that it did reach, but involves the failure to preserve or correctly represent in the record the actual decision of the court.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.



In this case, the court issued its first corrected memorandum of decision on September 8, 2009, just weeks after it rendered a judgment of dissolution. The second corrected memorandum of decision was issued on October 20, 2009, approximately six weeks after the first corrected memorandum of decision was issued. The court, therefore, permissibly opened its August 21, 2009 judgment and issued corrected memoranda of decision within the four month time frame permitted by § 52-212a.7



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See: http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP125/125ap74.pdf

The judgment is affirmed.

Diana Jordan suggested: One should look at the "transcript of 09-16-2010 to add much needed clarification for the argument at hand. The Appellate court refused to look at something called a waiver of the 120 day extension or define what a final judgment is meant to do for the parties involved. Furthermore, it refused to address the issue of "clerical" vs substanative."