UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. PHILIP LAYFIELD

San Francisco, California criminal defense lawyer represented the Defendant charged with wire fraud, mail fraud, and various tax offenses. .

Affirming Philip James Layfield's convictions for wire

fraud, mail fraud, and various tax offenses, the panel rejected

Layfield's argument that that the twenty-one days it took the

U.S. Marshals Service to transport him from the District of

New Jersey (where agents arrested him) to the Central

District of California (CDCA) (where the grand jury indicted

him) should have triggered a Speedy Trial Act violation.

Layfield argued that, properly accounting for the

transportation delay, the government did not bring him to

trial within the seventy-day limit set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(c)(1).

Section 3161(c)(1) provides that the seventy-day clock

is triggered by the public filing of the indictment or the first

appearance before a judge of the court in which the charge

is pending, whichever date last occurs.

Layfield's first appearance before a judge in the CDCA,

which occurred fourteen days after the public filing of his

indictment, triggered the seventy-day clock. The panel held

that a plain reading of § 3161(c)(1) dictates that the twentyone-day delay between Layfield's detention in New Jersey

and his first appearance before a judge in the CDCA was

immaterial to the Speedy Trial Act analysis.

The panel rejected Layfield's argument that because he

was detained, a different provision becomes

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD 3

relevant. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) provides that, in calculating

the seventy days, a "delay resulting from transportation of

any defendant from another district . . . in excess of ten days

. . . shall be presumed to be unreasonable.” The panel

explained that this provision applies to prisoners travelling

between jurisdictions for court proceedings once the

seventy-day clock has started—not to a pre-indictment or

pre-appearance transfer.

The panel addressed Layfield's other challenges to some

of his convictions in a concurrently filed memorandum

disposition.

COUNSEL

Katherine K. Windsor (argued), Law Office of Katherine

Kimball Windsor, Pasadena, California, for DefendantAppellant.

Mark Aveis (argued), Ian V. Yanniello, and Carolyn S.

Small, Assistant United States Attorneys; Bram M. Alden,

Assistant United States Attorney, Criminal Appeals Section

Chief; E. Martin Estrada, United States Attorney; United

States Attorney's Office, Central District of California, Los

Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

4 UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Philip James Layfield appeals from his convictions for

wire fraud, mail fraud, and various tax offenses. He argues

that the twenty-one days it took the U.S. Marshals Service to

transport him from the District of New Jersey (where agents

arrested him) to the Central District of California (where the

grand jury indicted him) should have triggered a Speedy

Trial Act violation and requires this court to overturn all of

his convictions. Consistent with our own precedent and that

of the First and Second Circuits, we reject his challenge and

affirm.1

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Crime and Court Appearances

To make a long story short, Layfield was a crooked

plaintiff's lawyer and certified public accountant with

operations in Los Angeles and elsewhere. He routinely (and

illegally) used client settlements to cover his personal

expenses as well as his firm's operating expenses to the tune

of millions of dollars commingled and stolen, and eventually

moved to Costa Rica—at which point his client trust account

was down to $134.

Speedy Trial Act cases often turn on specific dates, so

the key events are listed in bullet form below for ease of the

reader.

1 Layfield also individually challenges some of his wire fraud and tax

convictions. We address those claims in a concurrently filed

memorandum disposition, in which we also affirm.

UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD 5

• February 23, 2018: A complaint in the Central District

of California (CDCA) charged Layfield with one count

of mail fraud for defrauding a client and misusing the

client's settlement funds.

• February 24, 2018: Agents arrested Layfield on the Los

Angeles arrest warrant at the Newark International

Airport while he was boarding a flight to Costa Rica.

• February 26, 2018: Layfield made his first appearance

in the District of New Jersey, and the magistrate judge

continued his bail hearing.

• March 2, 2018: The magistrate judge denied bail and

ordered Layfield removed to the CDCA.

• March 9, 2018: A CDCA grand jury returned an

indictment against Layfield.2

• March 23, 2018: Layfield made his first appearance

before a judge in the CDCA.

B. The District Court Rejected Layfield's Speedy

Trial Act Argument

Before the district court Layfield contended that the

transportation delay between his detention in the District of

New Jersey and his initial appearance in the CDCA should

have counted towards the seventy-day limit of the Speedy

Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (providing that a trial

"shall commence within seventy days from” certain

specified dates). Layfield argued that, properly accounting

for that transportation delay, the government did not bring

him to trial within the seventy-day limit and, therefore,

2 In November 2018, a grand jury returned a twenty-eight-count

superseding indictment.

6 UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD

dismissal of the indictment was required. Ruling from the

bench, the district court relied on cases cited by the

government—United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456 (9th

Cir. 1994), and United States v. Munoz-Amado, 182 F.3d 57

(1st Cir. 1999), among others. The district court explained

that there are "no cases that say that the remedy for this

violation is to shove that time into the 70 days.” Layfield's

argument, moreover, ignored the "universal

understanding . . . of when the 70 days began to run,” which

"is supported by Ninth Circuit law,” holding that the

triggering date is the date of the defendant's initial

appearance in the charging district.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Jurisdiction

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review a district court's interpretation of the Speedy Trial

Act de novo. United States v. Orozco-Barron, 72 F.4th 945,

954 (9th Cir. 2023).

B. There Was No Speedy Trial Act Violation

The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.,

provides:

In any case in which a plea of not guilty

is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in

an information or indictment with the

commission of an offense shall commence

within seventy days from the filing date (and

making public) of the information or

indictment, or from the date the defendant

has appeared before a judicial officer of the

UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD 7

court in which such charge is pending,

whichever date last occurs.

§ 3161(c)(1). In calculating that seventy-day period, the

Speedy Trial Act excludes certain "periods of delay” listed

in § 3161(h). "If a defendant is not brought to trial within

the time limit required by section 3161(c) as extended by

section 3161(h),” then the indictment must be dismissed. Id.

§ 3162(a)(2).

Under the clear language of § 3161(c)(1), only two

events could trigger Layfield's seventy-day speedy trial

clock: (1) the March 9, 2018 public filing of the indictment

or (2) his March 23, 2018 first appearance before a judge in

the CDCA. And because his CDCA appearance was the

latter date, it triggered the seventy-day clock. This plain

reading of § 3161(c)(1) dictates that the twenty-one-day

delay between his detention in New Jersey and his first

appearance in the CDCA was immaterial to the Speedy Trial

Act analysis.

On multiple occasions, the Ninth Circuit has confirmed

that this straightforward interpretation of § 3161(c)(1) is

correct. For example, in Palomba, the defendant argued that

his initial appearance in the CDCA should have triggered the

seventy-day period under the Speedy Trial Act, even though

he faced charges in the Northern District of California. 31

F.3d at 1462. We rejected that argument, as it "overlooks

the fact that the 70-day period commences only on the date

when the defendant is brought before a 'judicial officer of

the court in which the matter is pending.'” Id. (quoting

§ 3161(c)); see also United States v. Wilson, 720 F.2d 608,

609 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting identical argument as

"difficult to square with the language of Section

3161(c)(1)”).

8 UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD

Layfield does not fight the clear holdings of Palomba

and Wilson. Instead, he contends that those cases featured

defendants out on bond, and not detained like he was after

his initial New Jersey appearance. Because he was detained,

the argument goes, a different provision becomes relevant—

§ 3161(h)(1)(F), which provides that, in calculating the

seventy days, a "delay resulting from transportation of any

defendant from another district . . . in excess of ten days . . .

shall be presumed to be unreasonable.”3 And because the

delay between his detention in New Jersey and his first

appearance in the CDCA was twenty-one days—exceeding

the ten days referenced above—presumably eleven of those

days should count against the seventy-day period.4

This is not a new argument, nor is it a winning one. For

example, in United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir.

1998), the First Circuit rejected an identical contention: "The

pre-indictment or pre-appearance transfer of a defendant is

not explicitly listed as one of the only two triggering events

in section 3161(c)(1), and we decline to read into that

provision what was not expressly included by Congress.

Accordingly, . . . [the delay in transfer] does not start the 70-

day speedy trial clock.” See also Munoz-Amado, 182 F.3d

at 60 (applying Barnes to a defendant held in custody during

transport to the charging district); United States v. Lynch,

726 F.3d 346, 353 (2nd Cir. 2013) (rejecting the view that

"the limitation on the exclusion of travel time of a defendant

3 Prior to 2008, § 3161(h)(1)(F) was numbered as (h)(1)(H). See Judicial

Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.

110-406, § 13, 122 Stat. 4291, 4294.

4 In United States v. Greene, 783 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986), we

appear to have faced this very issue—the interaction between

§ 3161(c)(1) and (h)(1)(F) [then (H)]—but we ultimately did not need to

resolve it.

UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD 9

in § 3161(h)(1)(F) applies to the seventy-day period of

§ 3161(c)(1)”); cf. United States v. Wickham, 30 F.3d 1252,

1254-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (adhering to the statute's "plain

meaning” in rejecting the argument that § 3161(i)

"replace[s] section 3161(c)(1) when a defendant withdraws

a guilty plea”).

According to Layfield, this interpretation effectively

reads § 3161(h)(1)(F) out of the criminal code. Not so. That

subsection readily applies when a prisoner, after

§ 3161(c)(1) is triggered, is transferred between districts for

separate trial proceedings. For example, the defendant may

be subject to detainers lodged by other districts where

charges are also pending against them. The first ten days of

that travel are deemed reasonable. Days exceeding those ten

are not. See Barnes, 159 F.3d at 10 (describing

§ 3161(h)(1)(F) [then (H)] as "a tolling provision, not one

that sets forth the events that trigger the start of the 70-day

period”). Courts apply this provision to prisoners travelling

between different jurisdictions for court proceedings once

the seventy-day clock has started—not to defendants in

Layfield's procedural posture. See, e.g., United States v.

Nash, 946 F.2d 679, 680 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying section

(h)(1)(F) [then (H)] to transportation between state

institution and federal custody); United States v. Collins, 90

F.3d 1420, 1427 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying section (h)(1)(F)

[then (H)] to travel to and from state court proceedings);

United States v. Robertson, 810 F.2d 254, 259-60 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (applying section (h)(1)(F) [then (H)] to travel from

Wisconsin to the District of Columbia for trial and back).

That section (h)(1)(F) does not apply to Layfield does not

render it meaningless to others.

Layfield cites one out-of-circuit district court case—

United States v. Thompson, No. 6:06-CR-228-ORL-18KRS,

10 UNITED STATES V. LAYFIELD

2007 WL 1222573, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2007)—to

buttress his argument. The judge in that case, apparently

frustrated that the government made no effort to explain a

three-month delay in transporting the defendant, ruled that

the speedy trial clock began with the order of removal. Id.

The court neither cited nor distinguished any authority but

reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would render the relevant

tolling provision, § 3161(h)(1)([F]), largely useless in

situations such as this one, where the Order of Removal . . .

was either ignored or forgotten about.” Id. at *2. Thompson

holds limited, if any, value: no court has ever relied on it,

and, by contrast, Layfield's order of removal was not

ignored.

Layfield also argues that the prevailing reading of

§ 3161(c)(1) means that a defendant could spend months or

even years awaiting transport to the charging district without

any avenue of relief. Again, not so. The Supreme Court

outlined the procedure for challenging pretrial delay more

than fifty years ago in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530

(1972) (explaining that speedy trial cases require a balancing

test applied "on an ad hoc basis”). And while the facts of

this case do not merit such relief, the more egregious

hypothetical scenarios that Layfield outlines might.

Based on the clear language of § 3161(c)(1) and

consistent with our own precedent and that of the First and Second Circuits, we reject Layfield’s Speedy Trial Act challenge.



AFFIRMED.