Dennis C. Brue v. Al Shabaab

Los Angeles, CA - Wrongful Death











Dennis C. Brue as administrator of the estate of Angela

Nyokabi Githakwa, Raphael Githakwa Kimata, Regina

Nyambura Githakwa, Caroline Njeri Githakwa and Samuel

Kimata Githakwa (collectively Githakwa parties), individually

and on behalf of all others similarly situated, appeal the order

denying their request for entry of a default judgment and

dismissing their wrongful death action against the terrorist

organization Al Shabaab, contending the trial court erred in

determining sua sponte it lacked personal jurisdiction over

Al Shabaab and dismissing the lawsuit without first holding a

hearing on that issue. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Githakwa Parties’ Initial Complaint and Request

for Entry of a Default Judgment

Over the course of 15 hours on April 2, 2015, militants

affiliated with Al Shabaab,1 a terrorist organization with roots in

Somalia, murdered 148 students in their dormitories at

Garissa University in Kenya, including 21-year-old Angela

Nyokabi Githakwa. Angela’s four surviving parents and siblings,

all residents and citizens of Kenya, as was Angela, along with the

special administrator of her estate in California,2 sued

Al Shabaab and 20 unnamed defendants seeking more than

$100 million in emotional, psychological and economic damages

resulting from her death.

1 Al Shabaab means “the youth” in Arabic.

2 The operative second amended complaint explained Brue, a

California lawyer, was appointed as special administrator for the

purpose of pursuing claims against Al Shabaab under California

and Kenyan law.

3

In their original complaint filed April 4, 2016, the

Githakwa parties alleged a state law cause of action for wrongful

death on behalf of Angela’s family members, a survival claim on

behalf of her estate and a cause of action for intentional infliction

of emotional distress on behalf of all of them. The complaint also

asserted multiple federal causes of action against Al Shabaab for

extrajudicial killing in the course of war crimes, crimes against

humanity and civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

Between July and August 2016 the Githakwa parties

served Al Shabaab by mailing or personally serving four

Al Shabaab members incarcerated in federal prison in California,

Illinois, Kansas and Louisiana. On August 5, 2016 the Githakwa

parties moved for an order deeming service effective under

Corporations Code section 18220 and Code of Civil Procedure

section 416.40, subdivision (c). The trial court granted their

motion on October 4, 2016. After Al Shabaab failed to respond to

the complaint, the Githakwa parties on January 17, 2017

requested entry of default. The clerk entered the default the

same day.

On April 4, 2017 the Githakwa parties filed an application

for default judgment supported by multiple declarations. On

June 14, 2017 the trial court dismissed with prejudice all federal

claims alleged in the complaint3 and dismissed without prejudice

the Githakwa parties’ three state causes of action, granting them

leave to allege additional facts, including those absent from their

3 The court ruled state courts lack jurisdiction over claims

brought under the law of nations and the Githakwa parties had

failed to allege an “identifiable injury to the domestic commerce

of the United States” as required for their RICO claims.

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original pleading but presented by declaration with their

application for default judgment, to support personal jurisdiction

over Al Shabaab. However, the court cautioned, even with

additional facts pleaded with particularity, it was unclear

whether they “would be sufficient to show that Defendant has

purposefully availed itself under California law.”

2. The Githakwa Parties’ Operative Second Amended

Complaint and Request for Default Judgment

The Githakwa parties filed a first amended complaint on

September 5, 2017 and the operative seconded amended

complaint on October 6, 2017 as a putative class action on behalf

of themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging the

three state law causes of action that had been dismissed without

prejudice. Unlike the original complaint, which had alleged both

general and specific personal jurisdiction over Al Shabaab, the

second amended complaint asserted only that the court had

general personal jurisdiction over Al Shabaab.

In 42 paragraphs over eight pages the Githakwa parties

attempted to allege facts demonstrating Al Shabaab’s “systematic

and continuous terrorist activities in and through California.”

They alleged Al Shabaab had sent agents to live in California,

attempted to recruit and radicalize California residents and to

communicate with those already radicalized, and received

financial support from individuals living in California.

Specifically, the Githakwa parties asserted that residents of

California and the United States (without distinguishing between

the two) donated approximately $70-$100 million annually to

Al Shabaab. They further alleged that Basaaly Moalin, a man

who lived in San Diego, was “one of the significant individual

monetary contributors to Al Shabaab.” Moalin, they averred, had

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been arrested in San Diego in late October 2010 based on

1,800 intercepted phone calls from or to San Diego. Among these

calls were conversations between Moalin and Al Shabaab leaders.

In total, the Githakwa parties’ pleading implicated

six Southern California residents by name as Al Shabaab

affiliates: Moalin; Moalin’s accomplice Issa Doreh, who had also

been arrested in San Diego the day after Moalin’s arrest; another

San Diego man, Mohamed Khadar, who was arrested and

convicted for “using his influence to solicit funds from others”; a

fourth San Diego resident, Jehad Serwan Mostafa, indicted for

joining Al Shabaab and conspiring to provide material support to

the organization; a San Diego woman, Nima Ali Yusuf, who

admitted to providing support to Al Shabaab through funding

and personnel; and an Anaheim resident, Ahmed Nasir Taalil

Mohamud, who was “convicted in 2013 of providing material

support to Al Shabaab and money laundering.”

Further, the Githakwa parties suggested California

residents had been targets of Al Shabaab intimidation: Multiple

individuals with connections to Al Shabaab had threatened

Los Angeles residents Trey Parker and Matt Stone, the creators

of the television show South Park. In addition, in a February

2015 video Al Shabaab had threatened to attack shopping malls

in the United States, including “Jewish-owned shopping malls in

California.” The videos’ purported purpose was to inspire lone

wolf attacks by radicalized individuals in the United States and

California.

Finally, the Githakwa parties alleged California residents

had been victims of Al Shabaab attacks: A San Diego-based

nonprofit’s volunteer was killed in an Al Shabaab suicide

bombing, and a former San Diego high school student was

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wounded during an attack on a mall in Kenya. The Githakwa

parties also described the December 2, 2015 terrorist attack at

the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, which had killed

14 people and wounded 22 others. They alleged evidence

suggesting Syed Rizwan Farook, one of the two perpetrators, had

contact with Al Shabaab prior to the attack.

During October 2017 the Githakwa parties served the

four imprisoned Al Shabaab members with the second amended

complaint in the same manner the trial court had found effective

for the initial complaint. The Githakwa parties filed proofs of

service with the trial court on November 2, 2017. Again,

Al Shabaab did not respond to the second amended complaint or

to the statement of damages served on May 10, 2018. On

June 27, 2018, at the Githakwa parties’ request, the clerk

entered Al Shabaab’s default.

On August 31, 2018 the Githakwa parties submitted their

application for entry of a default judgment against Al Shabaab.

With their application the Githakwa parties included

declarations by two expert witnesses on terrorism and

counterterrorism, Evan Kohlmann and Kaj Larsen. Kohlmann’s

declaration stated that many of Al Shabaab’s foreign fighters

from the United States and some of its American financial

support came from San Diego. Larsen’s declaration detailed FBI

disruption of domestic terror plans by “homegrown” jihadis from

Somali-American communities in San Diego. He described the

Somali-American communities in San Diego, and in California

generally, as the origin of a portion of Al Shabaab’s funding.

Larsen also suggested, should the court be permitted to view

classified information, it would strengthen and confirm his

conclusions. The Githakwa parties also included a legal

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memorandum describing the procedural history of the case,

restating the ties between Al Shabaab and California and

detailing their damage claims.

3. The Court’s Dismissal of the Case

On November 9, 2018 the trial court denied the Githakwa

parties’ request for entry of a default judgment, ruling the court

lacked personal jurisdiction over Al Shabaab. In its order

dismissing the action, the court explained fundraising alone was

insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over an organization.

Further, the court ruled, jurisdiction over individual criminal

defendants affiliated with Al Shabaab did not create jurisdiction

over the organization as a whole. Finally, although the Githakwa

parties had only alleged the court’s general jurisdiction over

Al Shabaab, the court ruled it could not assert specific

jurisdiction over Al Shabaab arising out of the Garissa University

attack. The court explained, “There is no ‘black hat’ exception in

our law of civil jurisdiction which permits the court to sanction

the wicked, no matter how weak the punishment appears next to

the crime or how richly their victims deserve what comfort and

closure a recovery can bring.”

The Githakwa parties filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. The Trial Court Did Not Violate the Githakwa Parties’

Due Process Rights by Determining It Lacked

Jurisdiction over Al Shabaab

a. A court may determine its jurisdiction before entering

a default judgment

Because Al Shabaab failed to appear, the Githakwa parties

argue, it forfeited its right to challenge the trial court’s exercise of

jurisdiction over it and the court erred in evaluating that issue on

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its own. The first aspect of this two-pronged argument is

fundamentally wrong. Although a defendant may waive an

objection to the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction, for example

by making a general appearance (In re Marriage of Obrecht

(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [“[b]y generally appearing, a

defendant relinquishes all objections based on lack of personal

jurisdiction or defective process or service of process”];

see Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites

de Guinee (1982) 456 U.S. 694, 703-704 [a party may,

intentionally or unintentionally, waive an objection to the lack of

personal jurisdiction by contract, appearance in court or failure to

raise the defense in an answer or responsive pleading];

Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou

SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 139), a

defendant’s failure to appear does not forfeit an objection the

court has no personal jurisdiction over it. To the contrary, a trial

court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense when it lacks

personal jurisdiction over a party. (Albelleira v. District Court of

Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288.) As such, any ensuing

judgment is void and “‘vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at

any time.’” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004)

33 Cal.4th 653, 660; accord, Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976)

15 Cal.3d 942, 950 [“[c]ollateral attack is proper to contest lack of

personal or subject matter jurisdiction”]; Strathvale Holdings v.

E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 [attack on judgment

for lack of personal jurisdiction may be brought at any time]; see

Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 564 [default judgment

entered by court that lacked personal jurisdiction can be set aside

as void].)

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The second aspect of the Githakwa parties’ argument—the

propriety of the trial court reviewing sua sponte the issue of

personal jurisdiction before entering a default judgment—has not

been directly addressed by California courts, but federal courts

have uniformly upheld the district court’s authority to do so.

(E.g., Mwani v. Osama Bin Laden (D.C. Cir. 2005) 417 F.3d 1, 6

[“a court should satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction

before entering judgment against an absent defendant”]; System

Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy (5th Cir. 2001)

242 F.3d 322, 324 [district court did not err in assessing personal

jurisdiction sua sponte prior to entering default judgment]; Tuli

v. Republic of Iraq (In re Tuli) (9th Cir.1999) 172 F.3d 707, 712

[court may sua sponte dismiss an action for lack of personal

jurisdiction before entering a default judgment]; Dennis Garberg

& Assocs. v. Pack-Tech Internat. Corp. (10th Cir. 1997) 115 F.3d

767, 772 [“district court must determine whether it has

jurisdiction over the defendant before entering judgment by

default against a party who has not appeared”].)4 Determining

whether personal jurisdiction exists, the federal courts reason,

4 The Githakwa parties’ description of a split in federal

authority on this question is illusory. The cases they cite

illustrate only that sua sponte review is treated differently in

different circumstances. Where a party has appeared, raised a

defense and abandoned it, sua sponte review of personal

jurisdiction before entering a default judgment is permissible, but

not mandatory. (City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC

(2011) 645 F.3d 114, 135; e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project

(2007) 500 F.3d 594, 599-600.) In contrast, when a defendant has

failed to appear, the federal circuit courts have unanimously held

an affirmative duty exists to determine personal jurisdiction

before entering a default judgment.

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safeguards against entry of a void judgment. (See, e.g., System

Pipe & Supply, Inc., at p. 324; Tuli, at p. 712; Williams v. Life

Sav. & Loan (10th Cir. 1986) 802 F.2d 1200, 1203.)

That compelling rationale applies equally in California’s

courts, and we adopt it as our own. The trial court did not err in

this case by evaluating its personal jurisdiction over Al Shabaab

before granting the Githakwa parties’ request for entry of a

default judgment.

b. The trial court provided the Githakwa parties

adequate notice and an opportunity to address

personal jurisdiction

The constitutional guarantee of due process requires a trial

court give a plaintiff notice and an opportunity to respond before

dismissing an action on its own motion. (In re Marriage of

Straczynski (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 531, 538-539 (Straczynski);

Bricker v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 634, 639; Moore

v. California Minerals Products Corp. (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 834,

835-837 (Moore).) Beyond that fundamental principle, however,

“the precise dictates of due process are flexible and vary

according to context.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles

County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212.) The right

to be heard does not necessarily require the court give a party the

opportunity for an oral presentation; due process may be satisfied

when the party has been able to present a written argument that

fully addresses the determinative issues. (See Lewis v. Superior

Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1247 [oral hearing not required

before court issues a peremptory writ in the first instance; “use of

the terms ‘heard’ or ‘hearing’ does not require an opportunity for

an oral presentation, unless the context or other language

indicates a contrary intent”]; Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015)

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237 Cal.App.4th 894, 909 [same]; see also Morris B. Silver M.D.,

Inc. v. International Longshore & Warehouse etc. (2016)

2 Cal.App.5th 793, 798 (Morris).)

Neither Straczynski, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th 531 nor Moore,

supra, 115 Cal.App.2d 834, cited by the Githakwa parties,

supports their contention the procedure used here by the trial

court violated their due process rights. In Straczynski the court

of appeal held the trial court violated due process when it

dismissed a petition for dissolution of marriage for reasons

introduced for the first time at the hearing. (Straczynski, at

p. 538.) In Moore the trial court granted judgment on the

pleadings sua sponte. The court of appeal reversed because the

plaintiff had not been given the opportunity to defend his

pleading or “a chance to request the privilege of amending.”

(Moore, at p. 836.)

Unlike in Straczynski and Moore the trial court gave the

Githakwa parties specific notice that it questioned its jurisdiction

over Al Shabaab and expressly invited them to address that

issue: The court’s June 14, 2017 dismissal order explained that

the allegations in the original complaint were insufficient to

establish personal jurisdiction over Al Shabaab and gave the

Githakwa parties the opportunity to amend their complaint to

include additional facts to cure that deficiency.

As this court indicated in Morris, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th 793,

when a party has had the opportunity to brief a determinative

legal issue, the court may decide that issue in a different

procedural context and without an additional oral hearing

without violating due process. (Id. at p. 798 [because plaintiff’s

responsive brief addressed the determinative legal issue in

opposing a demurrer, trial court did not violate due process by

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resolving the issue and dismissing the action sua sponte].) The

Githakwa parties took full advantage of the trial court’s

invitation, thoroughly addressing the personal jurisdiction issue

in their second amended complaint and subsequent application

for a default judgment, which included supporting declarations

and a memorandum of points and authorities. The procedures

used satisfied due process.

In any event, the Githakwa parties fail to suggest what

additional information concerning personal jurisdiction—factual

or legal—they could have provided with additional notice, more

briefing or an in-person hearing, or how a further hearing would

have changed the outcome of the case. Absent any showing of

prejudice, we cannot reverse the trial court’s order. (See

Thornbrough v. Western Placer Unified School Dist. (2013)

223 Cal.App.4th 169, 200 [“‘procedural due process violations,

even if proved, are subject to a harmless error analysis’”];

Hinrichs v. County of Orange (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 921, 928

[same]; see generally Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th

780, 802 [for a trial court’s order to be overturned, appellant must

demonstrate an error was prejudicial; that except for the error, a

different outcome was probable].)

2. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded It Lacked Personal

Jurisdiction over Al Shabaab

a. Governing law and standard of review

California courts may exercise personal jurisdiction “on any

basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the

United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) The exercise of

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with these

Constitutions if the defendant has such minimum contacts with

California that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate

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traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. (Snowney

v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1061;

Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268;

Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th

434, 446 (Vons).)

Under the minimum contacts test personal jurisdiction may

be either general or specific. (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.

Superior Court (2017) 582 U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779-1780]

(Bristol-Myers); Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc., supra,

35 Cal.4th at p. 1062.) General jurisdiction exists when the

defendant’s contacts with the forum state are so “substantial” or

“continuous and systematic” as to make it consistent with

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to subject

the defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum even when the

cause of action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the

forum. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446; Daimler AG v.

Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 127.)

Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, requires some

nexus between the cause of action and the defendant’s activities

in the forum state. Under well-established case law specific

jurisdiction exists when (1) the defendant has “purposefully

availed” himself or herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy

is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the

forum; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction would

comport with “‘fair play and substantial justice.’” (Pavlovich v.

Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269; accord, Vons, supra,

14 Cal.4th at p. 446; Daimler AG v. Bauman, supra, 571 U.S. at

pp. 126-127; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462,

472-473.) There are no bright line rules for determining

jurisdiction. “‘[R]ather, the facts of each case must be weighed to

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determine whether the requisite “affiliating circumstances” are

present.’” (Pavlovich, at p. 268.)

The plaintiff bears the burden of showing the defendant

has sufficient minimum contacts with the state to justify

jurisdiction. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.) When the

evidence of jurisdictional facts is in conflict, we resolve that

conflict in favor of the trial court’s order, so long as it is supported

by substantial evidence. (Ibid.) If that evidence is not disputed,

the question of jurisdiction is one of law; and we independently

review the trial court’s decision. (Ibid.) Finally, we accept all

well-pleaded allegations as fact. (Steven M. Garber & Associates

v. Eskandarian (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 813, 823 [a defendant’s

failure to answer before a default judgment is considered an

admission of well-pleaded allegations in the complaint].)

b. Al Shabaab is not subject to the court’s general

jurisdiction

General jurisdiction over a corporation exists when that

corporation might be “fairly regarded as at home” in that state.

(Bristol-Myers, supra, 137 S.Ct. at p. 1780; Goodyear Dunlop

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 924

(Goodyear).) As the Githakwa parties note, a terrorist

organization is not a “corporation” in the traditional sense, but

rather a “loosely organized, amorphous entity.” However, as the

Second Circuit observed, “[T]here is no reason to invent a

different test for general personal jurisdiction depending on

whether the defendant is an individual, a corporation, or another

entity.” (Waldman v. PLO (2d Cir. 2016) 835 F.3d 317, 332

[unincorporated associations Palestinian Authority (PA) and

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are entities subject to

at-home test for general jurisdiction].)

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Traditionally, a corporation is “at home” in its place of

incorporation and its principal place of business. (Daimler AG v.

Bauman, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 137.) But in an exceptional case a

corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of

incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial

and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that

state. (Id. at p. 139, fn. 19.) To test that possibility, courts look

to a variety of factors, including maintenance of offices, the

presence of employees, use of bank accounts and marketing or

selling products in the forum state, to analyze whether a

corporation’s contacts render it effectively at home in that state.

(See F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005)

130 Cal.App.4th 782, 796; see also Waldman v. PLO, supra,

835 F.3d 317 at p. 334.)

The contacts between Al Shabaab and California described

by the Githakwa parties—six California residents allegedly

affiliated with the organization, attempts to radicalize others in

the state, receipt of material support from Californians and direct

threats and encouragement of terrorist attacks here—fall far

short of demonstrating Al Shabaab may fairly be regarded as at

home in this state.

In Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. (2019)

43 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1065 a Delaware corporation with a

principal place of business in Texas had 350 of its 42,000

employees working in California. That presence was held

insufficient to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction over

the company. (Id. at p. 1070.) In comparison, Al Shabaab is

reported to have thousands of fighters throughout the world with

only a handful of individuals alleged to be working with or for

Al Shabaab here.

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Similarly, in Waldman v. PLO, supra, 835 F.3d 317 the

court explained the PLO had two diplomatic offices in the

United States, employed more than a dozen individuals over a

period of two years, engaged in diplomatic activities and “‘had a

substantial commercial presence in the United States.’” (Id. at

p. 323.) Its mission to the United States in Washington D.C.

“used dozens of telephone numbers, purchased office supplies,

paid for certain living expenses for . . . the chief PLO and PA

representative in the United States, and engaged in other

transactions.” (Ibid.) Despite these ongoing connections to the

United States, the court determined the evidence demonstrated

the PA and PLO “are ‘at home’ in Palestine, where these entities

are headquartered, and from where they are directed.” (Id. at

p. 334.)

Like the PLO, Al Shabaab is headquartered outside the

United States and is “at home” far beyond our borders. Indeed,

the organization’s contacts with California are far less

substantial than the PLO’s contacts with the United States found

insufficient by the Second Circuit in Waldman. Al Shabaab

maintains no offices in California. The six California residents

affiliated with Al Shabaab are fewer in number and more

remotely connected with the organization than the 14 individuals

employed at the PLO’s mission in Washington D.C. In sum, the

limited and sporadic connections the Githakwa parties allege

Al Shabaab shares with California do not constitute the

“continuous and systematic” activities necessary to justify the

exercise of general jurisdiction over a party. (See Vons, supra,

14 Cal.4th at p. 445.)

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c. The court lacked specific jurisdiction over

Al Shabaab for the Garissa University attack

In their second amended complaint, and for the purposes of

this appeal, the Githakwa parties contend only that the trial

court may exercise general personal jurisdiction over Al Shabaab.

In not asserting the court has specific jurisdiction over

Al Shabaab for the Garissa University attack, the Githakwa

parties appear to recognize, when no relationship exists between

the defendant’s contacts with the forum state and the specific

claims at issue, the court may not exercise specific jurisdiction

“regardless of the extent of the defendant’s unconnected activities

in the State.” (Bristol-Meyer, supra, 137 S.Ct. at p. 1781;

accord, Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019)

31 Cal.App.5th 543, 558 [same]; see Gilmore Bank v. AsiaTrust

New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1568 [for the

court to exercise specific jurisdiction, the controversy must relate

to, or arise out of, the defendant’s contacts with California].)

In Waldman v. PLO, supra, 835 F.3d 317 the PLO and PA’s

purposeful availment of forum benefits through offices, employees

and a commercial presence in the United States did not establish

specific jurisdiction here because that activity was unconnected

to the “suit-related conduct”—terrorist attacks in Jerusalem.

(Id. at p. 341.) While some of the victims were American citizens,

that additional fact did not change the analysis. (Id. at p. 337.)

Here, the Githakwa parties allege no connection between the

Garissa University attack and the California individuals they

have implicated as Al Shabaab affiliates. They do not suggest

any donations originating in California were used to fund the

attack. None of victims is alleged to be a California, or even

United States, citizen. No matter how heinous the attack, “the

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defendants cannot be made to answer in this forum ‘with respect

to matters unrelated to the forum connections.’” (Id. at p. 341,

quoting Goodyear Dunlap Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, supra,

564 U.S. at p. 923.)

In sum, the Githakwa parties did not allege contacts

between Al Shabaab and California sufficient to warrant the

exercise of general or specific personal jurisdiction over the

defendant. The court did not err in dismissing the case for a lack

of personal jurisdiction.

The judgment is affirmed. The Githakwa parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.