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On February 22, 2016, Mikhaeilpoor sued BMW and

Finchey Corporation of California (erroneously named in

the complaint as Pacific BMW), an auto dealership, asserting

causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act stemming from

her September 13, 2014 lease of the 2013 BMW 328i for

which BMW had issued a warranty. Mikhaeilpoor alleged

that defendants: (1) failed to promptly replace her car or make

restitution, in violation of section 1793.2, subdivisions (a)(2)

and (d)(1); (2) failed to commence repairs aimed at conforming the

car to its warranty, in violation of section 1793.2, subdivision (b);

(3) failed to make available service and repair facilities (including

parts and literature) sufficient to effectuate repairs, in violation

of section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breached the express

warranty, as defined in section 1791.2, subdivision (a); and

(5) breached the implied warranty of merchantability, as defined

in section 1791.1. Plaintiff ’s complaint sought restitution, an

award of actual damages, a civil penalty of two times actual

damages and attorney fees and costs.



1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory references

are to the Civil Code.

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B. The Trial

The trial commenced on February 21, 2018, and spanned

six days. On February 28, 2018, the jury returned a special verdict

in favor of Mikhaeilpoor. The jury awarded $35,805.08, comprised

of $17,902.54 in compensatory damages and $17,902.54 in civil

penalties.

C. Mikhaeilpoor’s Motion for Attorney Fees

On June 8, 2018, Mikhaeilpoor filed a motion for

attorney fees pursuant to section 1794, subdivision (d), seeking

$344,639. This figure consisted of $226,426, plus a 0.5 multiplier

enhancement (totaling $113,213), and $5,000 for addressing the

attorney fee resolution process.

The fee motion was accompanied by declarations from

Payam Shahian, the managing attorney for Mikhaeilpoor’s

trial counsel, and Christine Haw, lead trial counsel. Shahian’s

declaration contained a bevy of information about his credentials

and experience in unrelated Song-Beverly Act cases where his

clients were awarded fees. Shahian’s declaration also included

18 exhibits comprised of minute orders and notices of rulings on

fee motions in unrelated cases; this despite the fact that no fees

were billed for services by Shahian. Shahian’s declaration also

identified 10 attorneys who worked on this case along with their

proffered billing information: Gregory Yu ($495 per hour), Jacob

Cutler ($385 per hour in 2016, $395 per hour in 2017, and $410

per hour in 2018), Benjamin Beck ($400 per hour), Christine Haw

($365 per hour in 2017 and $375 per hour in 2018), Eleazar Kim

($350 per hour in 2017 and $370 hour in 2018), Yoon Kim (former

attorney) ($365 per hour), Michael Robinson (former attorney)

($595 per hour), Heather Rodriguez (former attorney) ($325 per

hour), Carey Wood ($370 per hour in 2017 and $375 per hour in

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2018), Armig Khodanian (former attorney) ($325 per hour).

Shahian’s declaration also attached a copy of the billing records

for Mikhaeilpoor’s trial counsel.

The fee motion was opposed because: the billing records

vastly overstated the work performed; the hourly rates were

excessive; and an 0.5 multiplier adjustment was unwarranted.

The defense argued that fees should be reduced by at least

$83,206.05, and the proffered hourly billing rates of $325 to $595

were not based on market value.

Mikhaeilpoor replied, defending the amounts claimed.

Before hearing the motion, the trial court issued a tentative ruling

awarding $94,864 in attorney fees: $95,900 less an offsetting

amount owed to defendants.

The court heard the motion on July 31, 2018. During

argument, Judge Hammock explained that he “went through all

the bills” and was “aghast” that counsel sought $343,000 in fees.

He “saw the motions, the discovery motion,” and “the motion for

terminating sanctions, which was much ado about nothing.” He

found before him “a very simple case, straightforward trial,” and

“not a complicated case.”

In assessing fees, the court “looked at all the bills”

and then “calculated what [it] thought was reasonable.” The

court understood that it had the “ability to exercise [its] sound

discretion,” but could not “do it arbitrarily.” The court emphasized

that its analysis was not based on limiting plaintiff ’s fees to a

proportion of the trial recovery; the court “recognize[d] that even

though [the recovery] was [$]17,000, doubled to 34, this could

justify a large attorney fee award.” Also, the court did not take

into account whether plaintiff should have accepted a Code of Civil

Procedure section 998 offer.

The court found the requested fee amount “was just not

reasonable.” The court “went through the bill and [it] decided what

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[it] felt was a reasonable amount of hours for a reasonably

experienced attorney, in similar circumstances, to do the tasks

that [plaintiff ’s trial counsel] claim to have done. . . . [I]t added up

to 225 hours.” The court decided that $350 “is a reasonable hourly

rate for the services that were done.”

During argument, plaintiff ’s counsel made two main

arguments. First, counsel argued the court could not reduce

plaintiff ’s requested fee amount by more than the $83,206.05

reduction because that would constitute entertaining “objections

not raised by [defendants].” Second, counsel argued that

defendants had the burden to prove grounds for a fee reduction.

The court took the matter under submission in order to review

the billing records again. Ultimately, the court found that $95,900

was the reasonable amount of attorney fees for work performed on

behalf of Mikhaeilpoor. After offsetting certain fees and costs that

had been awarded to defendants, the net amount of awarded fees

totaled $94,864.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An award of attorney fees under the Song-Beverly Act

is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Goglin v. BMW of North

America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 470 (Goglin).) The

reviewing court presumes that the trial court’s award is correct

and infers that a request for fees is inflated when the trial court

substantially reduces the requested amount. (Etcheson v. FCA

US LLC (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 831, 840.) These rules apply

because the experienced trial judge is best positioned to evaluate

the professional services rendered in his or her courtroom. (Ibid.,

citing Goglin, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 470–471.) The trial

court’s decision must not be disturbed “ ‘unless [the Court of

Appeal is] convinced that it is clearly wrong, meaning that it is

an abuse of discretion.’ ” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.

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(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 148 (Graciano), citing In re Vitamin

Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052.) Accordingly, this

court’s review of an order awarding attorney fees “must be highly

deferential to the views of the trial court.” (Nichols v. City of Taft

(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1239.) “ ‘The only proper basis of

reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount

awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and

suggests that passion or prejudice influenced the determination.’ ”

(In re Tobacco Cases I (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 570, 587.)

In particular, “the lodestar method vests the trial court

with the discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the

attorneys were ‘reasonably spent’ on the litigation” (Meister v.

Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437,

449 (Meister)), and to determine the hourly rates that should

be used in the lodestar calculus. (569 E. County Boulevard LLC

v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th

426, 436-437.) The methodology embodied in this language

is consistent with California’s lodestar adjustment method of

calculating attorney fees. (See Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel

Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818

(Robertson).) As the plain wording of section 1794, subdivision (d)

makes clear, the trial court is “to base the fee award upon actual

time expended on the case, as long as such fees are reasonably

incurred—both from the standpoint of time spent and the amount

charged.” (Robertson, supra, at p. 817.) In the case of contingency

fee arrangements, “a prevailing buyer . . . is entitled to an award

of reasonable attorney fees for time reasonably expended by his

or her attorneys.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994)

31 Cal.App.4th 99, 105, fn. 6 (Nightingale), italics added.)

Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court

must initially determine the actual time expended and then

“ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the

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amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being

made for the time expended are reasonable.” (Nightingale, supra,

31 Cal.App.4th at p. 104.) Factors to be considered include, but are

not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands,

the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. (Ibid.) The

prevailing party and fee applicant bears “the burden of showing

that the fees incurred were . . . ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct

of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’ ” (Levy v. Toyota

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816; see Corbett

v. Hayward Dodge, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 915, 926 [“[c]ourts

have uniformly held that the party moving for statutory attorney

fees or sanctions has the burden of proof”].) It follows that if the

prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the

time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the

circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and

award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale, supra,

31 Cal.App.4th at p. 104.)

The amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to the

lodestar adjustment method may be increased or decreased. Such

an adjustment is commonly referred to as a “fee enhancement”

or “multiplier.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132

(Ketchum).) The trial court is neither foreclosed from, nor required

to, award a multiplier. (See Montgomery v. Bio-Med Specialties,

Inc. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1297 [“That figure may then be

increased or reduced by the application of a multiplier after the

court has taken into consideration other factors concerning the

lawsuit”], citing Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311,

321–324 (Press); see also Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012)

203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1242 [“the trial court is not required to

include a fee enhancement for exceptional skill, novelty of the

questions involved, or other factors. Rather, applying a multiplier

is discretionary.”].) The Supreme Court has “set forth a number of

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factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar figure.

These include: ‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions

involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent

to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment

by the attorneys; [and] (3) the contingent nature of the fee award,

both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and

the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award.’ ” (Press,

supra, at p. 322, fn. 12, italics omitted.)

Mikhaeilpoor argues that the trial court’s ruling must be

reversed because the court acted arbitrarily and failed to utilize the

lodestar adjustment method to calculate reasonable attorney fees.

The record belies this assertion.

In finding that $95,900 was the reasonable amount of

attorney fees in this case, the trial court expressly invoked the

lodestar method. Despite the trial court’s clarity, Mikhaeilpoor

mischaracterizes the analysis the court employed in order to create

the illusion of error where there is none.

Mikhaeilpoor claims that the trial court improperly applied

“across-the-board” percentage reductions in the fees claimed

because it found that only 274 of plaintiff ’s claimed 595 hours

of work were reasonably incurred and that a reasonable hourly

rate for these reduced hours was $350 per hour. But the record,

viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision,

does not show that the court made any “across-the-board”

percentage reductions. Thus, plaintiff ’s reliance on the decision

in Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88 (Kerkeles)

and Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th

266 (Mountjoy) is misplaced.

Kerkeles concerned an appeal from an order awarding a

plaintiff a fraction of the fees he requested following the settlement

of his civil rights case. (See Kerkeles, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at

p. 92.) The plaintiff filed a motion seeking $1,448,397 in fees and

9

$75,255 in costs under section 1988 of title 42 of the United States

Code and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (Kerkeles, supra,

at p. 94.) This figure was based on 2,419.9 in attorney hours, with

billable rates ranging from $425 to $650 per hour. (Ibid.) Plaintiff

also requested a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount. (Ibid.)

The total amount requested was $2,350,848. (Ibid.) In response,

defense counsel urged “a 50 percent reduction of the total lodestar

amount.” (Id. at pp. 95–96.) The trial court calculated the lodestar

amount by multiplying the hourly rates by the full number of hours

claimed, reaching a total of $873,615. The court then reduced the

total lodestar by 50 percent, yielding $436,807.50 in attorney fees.

(Id. at p. 97.)

In reversing, the appellate court deemed inadequate the

trial court’s explanation for its fee reduction. (Kerkeles, supra,

243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 101–102.) The Court of Appeal noted that

while trial courts may make “ ‘across-the-board percentage cuts

either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar

figure,’ ” they must set forth a “ ‘concise but clear’ explanation of

reasons for choosing a given percentage reduction.” (Id. at p. 102.)

In lieu of that, the trial court in Kerkeles had simply explained that

the plaintiff ’s attorneys “expended far more time than a reasonable

attorney could ever bill a paying client for.” (Id. at p. 101.) Such

reasoning did “not meet the federal criterion of a clear and specific

explanation sufficient for meaningful appellate review.” (Id. at

p. 104.)

Similarly, in Mountjoy, the trial court awarded $59,334.60 in

fees after the moving party sought $308,425, based on 760.70 hours

of work billed at hourly rates ranging from $200 to $450. (Mountjoy,

supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 269.) In reducing the fees sought,

the trial court explained: “ ‘Approximately half of [the Mountjoys’]

pleading[s] amounted to unnecessary general legal argument

warranting a reduction in the time it took to prepare that filing.

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Approximately half of [the] “facts” [the Mountjoys] crafted in

[o]pposition to the summary judgment motion . . . were improper.

Perhaps most critically, well over 70% of the billing entries fall

into one or more of the following categories: prohibitively vague

“block billing,” excessive time spent on the stated task (including

but not limited to drafting the complaint and opposition to

summary judgment motion and document review tasks discussed

above), double billing where two attorneys completed the same

task, attorney fees for non-attorney work, fees for filings that did

not actually occur in this case, and fees for otherwise unreasonable

tasks. [¶] In light of the foregoing and the other various reasons

stated in [d]efendants’ [o]pposition, the [c]ourt in its discretion

reduces [the Mountjoys’] requested “hours worked” by 70% . . .

to a more reasonable total of 228.21.’ ” (Id. at pp. 270–271.)

The Court of Appeal reversed, explaining that the trial

court “determined that because well over 70 percent of the billing

entries suffered from one or more flaws, it was appropriate to

simply reduce the total hours claimed by 70 percent.” (Mountjoy,

supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.) This approach was flawed

because there did not appear to be any “reasonable basis for the

conclusion that the total hours included in the 70 percent-plus time

entries that were flawed in one or more ways was even reasonably

close to 70 percent of the total time claimed.” (Ibid.) For example,

the flawed time entries may have only amounted to 50 percent

of the total hours claimed; it was unclear whether the number

of flawed billing entries were equivalent to the number of flawed

hours. (Ibid.)

In contrast to Kerkeles and Mountjoy, the court here did not

make an “across-the-board” percentage reduction of the attorney

fees claimed. Rather, the court explained that its reduction

resulted because the fees claimed “include[ed] dual billing of

attorneys when the work of only one (at times) was reasonably

11

required” and trial counsel spent time on tasks that “should

not have required anything more than [a] slight factual

modification to [an] existing boilerplate.” Plaintiff ’s counsel

spent an unreasonably excessive amount of time dealing with

this non-complex case. Thus, the trial court did not apply an

arbitrary percentage (as in Kerkeles) or use flawed logic (as

in Mountjoy). To the contrary, the court “went through the

bill” multiple times and “decided what [it] felt was a reasonable

amount of hours for a reasonably experienced attorney, in similar

circumstances, to do the tasks that they claim to have done. . . .

[I]t added up to 225 hours.”

Dissatisfied with this explanation, Mikhaeilpoor

questions how the trial court decided on the billing entries

subject to reduction. Plaintiff would impose on the trial court

the requirement of detailed explanatory orders. But this very

same argument was rejected in Mountjoy, where the plaintiff

faulted the court’s explanation of its fee reduction because it

“ ‘did not break out how many hours it thought were devoted

to double billing the same tasks, work on non-attorney tasks,

excessive billing for working on the complaint or summary

judgment opposition, or work on documents that were not filed.’ ”

(Mountjoy, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.)

Mikhaeilpoor also relies on Moreno v. City of Sacramento

(9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106 (Moreno) to support her claim that

the trial court inadequately explained “which tasks were cut

or reduced and why.” Moreno, however, is not binding on this

court and it is distinguishable. (Wagner v. Apex Marine Ship

Management Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451 [indicating

that federal decisions are persuasive rather than binding

authority].) In Moreno, the plaintiff prevailed in a federal

civil rights action and the district court imposed percentage

reductions on plaintiff ’s requested fees. (Moreno, supra, 534 F.3d

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at pp. 1112-1116.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

The federal district court did not identify those fees it thought

duplicative or why it cut the costs claimed for trial preparation.

(Ibid.) But Moreno is not based on principles applied in California,

where trial courts are not required to state “each charge they find

to be reasonable or unreasonable, necessary or unnecessary. . . .

A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation

that an attorney over[-]litigated a case.” (Gorman v. Tassajara

Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101; see also

Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140 [“The superior court was

not required to issue a statement of decision with regard to the fee

award.”].) This view was recently reaffirmed in Morris v. Hyundai

Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 37, footnote 6 (Morris),

where the court explained that such a heightened standard of

requiring courts to explain fee determinations is not appropriate

“for appellate review of fee awards under the Song-Beverly Act.”

(Ibid.)

Mikhaeilpoor claims the trial court improperly tied the fee

award to plaintiff ’s modest amount of recovered damages. But the

trial court disclaimed tying the amount of fees to the damages and

the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, does

not show that the court tied “the fee award to some proportion” of

the damages award. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018)

30 Cal.App.5th 24, 37 (Warren).)

“[I]t is inappropriate and an abuse of a trial court’s discretion

to tie an attorney fee award to the amount of the prevailing

[buyer’s] damages or recovery in a Song-Beverly Act action, or

pursuant to another consumer protection statute with a mandatory

fee-shifting provision.” (Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 37.) If

the reasons for the reduction “include tying the fee award to some

proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery, the court abuses its

discretion.” (Ibid.) But the two cases plaintiff invokes, Graciano,

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supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at page 140 and Warren, supra,

30 Cal.App.5th at page 37, help demonstrate that the court

here committed no error.

Graciano concerned a plaintiff ’s appeal from an order

awarding her attorney fees following her post-verdict settlement

with the defendant. (Graciano, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 145.)

The trial court awarded $27,570; $235,000 in fees had been

requested. (Ibid.) The trial court set the reasonable hourly rate

at $250 per hour, which was based on a local rule setting hourly

rates for expert witnesses, and applied that rate to the 367.6 hours

of legal services expended by the plaintiff ’s attorneys. (Id. at

p. 148.) After calculating the lodestar at $91,900, the court applied

several multipliers, including a .3 negative multiplier “ ‘ “to ensure

the fee awarded is within the range of fees freely negotiated in

the legal market place.” ’ ” (Ibid.) As relevant here, the trial court

explicitly tied its fee award to the plaintiff ’s damages recovery,

reasoning: “ ‘[T]he settlement amount for the [p]laintiff was

$45,000 plus whatever fees, if any, the court might award. It is

not uncommon for contingent fee agreements to require [p]laintiff

to pay forty percent (more or less) of the recovery through trial

to his/her counsel. If $45,000 represents [p]laintiff ’s sixty percent

portion of the total settlement, then the forty percent fee portion,

would be $30,000 ($75,000 x .40). In order to adjust the lodestar

amount of $91,900 “to ensure the fee awarded is within the range

of fees freely negotiated in the legal market place[,”] a “.30” factor

should be applied. $91,900 times 3 yields $27,570, which amount

is within the market place range of fees.’ ” (Id. at p. 162.) Under

this rationale, the Court of Appeal perceived an improper

downward adjustment based on the trial court’s notion of an

appropriate contingent fee percentage. (Id. at p. 164.)

In Warren, the trial court applied a 33 percent negative

multiplier to plaintiff ’s requested lodestar fees. (Warren, supra,

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30 Cal.App.5th at p. 24.) The court noted “ ‘a disconnect’ between

the verdict amount of ‘$17,000’ and the over $500,000 in requested

attorney fees.” (Id. at p. 33.) The appellate court concluded that

the negative multiplier was applied “with at least the partial goal

of arriving at an attorney fee award that was roughly proportional

to or more in line with [the plaintiff ’s] modest $17,455.57 damages

award.” (Id. at p. 39.)

Here by contrast, the trial court did not expressly or implicitly

base any portion of its fee calculation on plaintiff ’s damage

recovery. Unlike the situation in Graciano, the trial court here did

not calculate the amount of fees using a methodology that ensured

the fee and damages awards were proportional; accorded with a

market-rate contingency agreement, or created a relationship to the

damages awarded. Instead, the trial court “went through the bill

and [it] decided what [it] felt was a reasonable amount of hours for

a reasonably experienced attorney, in similar circumstances, to do

the tasks that [plaintiff ’s trial counsel] claim to have done. . . . [I]t

added up to 225 hours.”

Warren is similarly distinguishable. Here, unlike in Warren,

the trial court was concerned because the $344,639 was shockingly

unreasonable, irrespective of the damages awarded. And, of course,

the court here unequivocally disclaimed tying the fee award to

the verdict amount because it “recognize[d] that even though [the

recovery] was [$]17,000 doubled to 34, this could justify a large

attorney fee award.”

Also, instructive here is Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at

page 24, where the court affirmed an order reducing requested

fees by more than 40 percent in a Song-Beverly Act case. In

Morris, the trial court reduced plaintiff ’s requested fees by

42 percent—from $191,688.75 to $73,864. On appeal, plaintiff

argued—as Mikhaeilpoor does here—that the “trial court engaged

in a prohibited proportionality analysis in setting the attorney fee

15

award.” (Id. at p. 35.) To support that claim, the plaintiff relied

on selective portions of the hearing transcript where the trial

judge stated, “ ‘So this is [a request for] $192,000 for a case that

you settled for $85,000 and didn’t go to trial. Don’t you think

that just on its face, that’s a little much.’ ” (Ibid.) According to

the plaintiff, the trial court “slashed the requested award by more

than 42 percent, to $73,864, to render the award ‘more in proportion

to the $85,000 damages.’ ” (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal disagreed, explaining that the trial

court “did not suggest in any respect that the court reduced the

attorney fee award based on the size of the settlement award.”

(Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 37.) To the contrary, the

court “indicated a fee reduction was warranted because it was

unreasonable to have so many lawyers staffing a [Song-Beverly

Act] case that did not present complex or unique issues, did not

involve discovery motions, and did not go to trial.” (Ibid.)

Here, as in Morris, there is no indication that the trial

court reduced fees based on the amount of damages awarded to

plaintiff. Rather, the court said a reduction of the requested fees

was warranted because: Plaintiff sought fees that “include[d]

dual billing of attorneys when the work of only one (at times)

was reasonably required”; her trial counsel spent time working on

tasks that “should not have required anything more than [a] slight

factual modification to [an] existing boilerplate”; and—overall—an

unreasonably excessive amount of time was spent on a noncomplex

matter. Additionally, the trial court “went through the bill and

[it] decided what [it] felt was a reasonable amount of hours for a

reasonably experienced attorney, in similar circumstances, to do

the tasks that [plaintiff ’s trial counsel] claim to have done. . . .

[I]t added up to 225 hours.” The court did not engage in any

proportionality analysis when it determined that $95,900 was

the reasonable amount of attorney fees for the work performed.

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Mikhaeilpoor claims the trial court based its fee award on an

improper impressionistic basis.

In Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at page 37, the trial court

stated during a fee motion hearing that the total proposed fee

sought by the plaintiff was “ ‘a little much’ considering the case

settled for $85,000 and did not go to trial.” (Ibid.) On appeal,

plaintiff argued the court’s statement “betrayed that at least one

of the court’s intentions in reducing the fee award was to bring it

more in line with the settlement amount.” (Ibid.) Morris rejected

the plaintiff ’s argument that such trial court statements disclosed

an alternate, prohibited motive for reducing plaintiff ’s proposed

attorney fees.

Morris contends that, as in Warren, the trial court’s

comments during the hearing—suggesting that the total proposed

fee was “a little much” considering the case settled for $85,000

and did not go to trial—betrayed that at least one of the court’s

intentions in reducing the fee award was to bring it more in line

with the settlement amount. Given the court’s clear expression

in its final order of its reasons for the reductions, we will not

speculate, based on a stray remark the court made at the hearing,

that it had other, prohibited reasons that would require reversal.

(See Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505, 539, fn. 16 [holding

the court’s “oral comments were not final findings and cannot

impeach the court’s subsequent written ruling”]; Jespersen v.

Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 633 [“a judge’s

comments in oral argument may never be used to impeach the final

order, however valuable to illustrate the court’s theory they might

be under some circumstances”].)

Mikhaeilpoor contends that the trial court impermissibly

reduced fees below the level defendants proposed. Plaintiff argues

“[a]ny objections to the fees and rates requested not made by BMW

17

should have been deemed waived by the trial court.” This argument

is meritless.

At the outset, defense counsel did not limit its request

to reduce plaintiff ’s requested fees by only $83,206.05 as

Mikhaeilpoor erroneously represents. Rather, defendants argued

that plaintiff ’s fees should be reduced by at least $83,206.05. As

such, Mikhaeilpoor’s argument that the trial court reduced her fees

below the level defendants proposed is based on a false premise.

To support its position that the trial court cannot reduce fees

absent—or below the non-moving party’s specific objection, plaintiff

cites Blum v. Stenson (1984) 465 U.S. 886, 892, fn. 5, a federal

case concerning fees in a federal civil rights action. In Blum, the

defendant waived its challenge to a district court determination

of reasonable hours billed by failing to submit any evidence

challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged.

(Ibid.) In contrast to Blum, defendants here are not challenging the

trial court’s decision but showing it was not an abuse of discretion.

And defendants did not waive any challenge to the fee award.

Rather, defendants challenged fees in the trial court on grounds the

trial court found applicable.

The extent of a court’s discretion to unilaterally reduce

fees is also apparent in Morris. There, appellant argued that fees

were arbitrarily reduced in those circumstances where particular

fee amounts claimed were not the subject of defense objections.

(Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 38–39.) Notwithstanding

this argument, Morris was “satisfied that the trial court did not

abuse its broad discretion to determine the reasonable value of

the professional services performed by the [appellant’s] attorneys.”

(Id. at p. 40.)

Mikhaeilpoor also claims that the trial court abused its

discretion by failing to award a multiplier. The argument rests

on some of the same unmeritorious arguments advanced with

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regard to the trial court’s reduced lodestar award. There was no

abuse of discretion.

While the court’s rationale for the lodestar reduction also

influenced the denial of a multiplier, the court went further as to

the multiplier issue, emphasizing that this was “not a complicated

case,” and the “request for a multiplier was specious.” These

findings weigh on the issue of the “ ‘novelty and difficulty of the

questions involved,’ ” which is a factor that trial courts may

consider when a multiplier is requested. (Press, supra, 34 Cal.3d

at p. 322, fn. 12.) This factor is separate from the trial court’s

finding that plaintiff ’s counsel litigated the case inefficiently.

Moreover, even though the trial court did not specifically mention

other factors open to consideration when a multiplier is under

consideration, this court must presume that the trial court

considered all factors in reaching its decision, “even though the

court may not have mentioned or discussed them in its written

ruling.” (Mountjoy, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)

Mikhaeilpoor argues that the attorney fee award is not

supported by the evidence. This claim has no merit. The court has

no authority to disturb the trial court’s factual findings if they are

supported by substantial evidence. (Meister, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th

at p. 453.) Here, substantial evidence amply supports the trial

court’s fee award because the record demonstrates the relative

simplicity of plaintiff ’s lawsuit and the inefficiency of her counsel’s

litigation activities.

The case concerned the simple issue of a purported engine

defect in plaintiff ’s vehicle that was—in plaintiff ’s view—not fixed

after multiple attempts. To prevail, plaintiff ’s attorneys were only

required to establish that their client purchased the vehicle, that

it had a written warranty, that the vehicle had a defect, and that

the vehicle was not repaired or replaced after the manufacturer

had a reasonable opportunity to do so. (CACI No. 3201.) Plaintiff

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was under no obligation to establish the cause of the purported

defect. (Ibid.; see Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001)

90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102, fn. 8 [rejecting manufacturer’s claim

that plaintiff buyer was required to prove cause of leak to establish

remedy under the Song-Beverly Act].) What follows is the trial

court’s altogether warranted conclusion that this was a noncomplex

case. The record shows that Mikhaeilpoor filed one discovery

motion, propounded a single set of discovery, took three depositions

(Jose Conde, defendants’ person most qualified; and Luis Holguin,

defendants’ expert), and retained the services of a single expert,

Dan Calef. These were modest litigation efforts.

Additionally, the record demonstrates the highly inefficient

manner in which plaintiff litigated her case. Plaintiff ’s trial

counsel claims “extensive experience with claims brought under the

Song-Beverly [Act].” Payam Shahian, the senior attorney among

plaintiff ’s trial counsel, supervises the other attorneys in his firm,

but does not “materially” get involved “unless they involve complex

legal issues, reach significant stages of litigation, or require [his]

assistance.” (Italics added.) Shahian did not bill time to this case,

confirming the case did not involve complex legal issues. Yet,

despite counsel’s experience litigating “hundreds of automotive

defect cases involving California’s consumer protection statutes,

including Song-Beverly,” an astonishing array of 10 different

attorneys litigated this case, with multiple attorneys staffed at

different times. Further, counsel’s billing entries demonstrate a

lack of efficiency in litigating the case and a lack of clarity in tasks

performed. This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that

plaintiff ’s counsel failed to act efficiently.

Similarly, plaintiff ’s lead counsel, Christine Haw, had

experience with Song-Beverly Act claims. Plaintiff sought hourly

rates of $365 and $375 for Haw, but acknowledged that similar or

more experienced attorneys had previously been awarded hourly

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billable rates of $345 and $350. As such, the trial court’s award

of a $350 hourly billable rate is supported by substantial evidence.

Additionally, at the time of the hearing on the fee motion, Haw

had been an attorney for approximately five years and had litigated

“hundreds of automotive defect cases involving [the] Song-Beverly

[Act].” Notwithstanding, the court reasonably found that Haw did

not leverage her experience to produce efficient litigation. Haw

personally billed more than 240 hours, and required the help of

nine other attorneys at various points in the litigation.

Ultimately, the trial court was in the best position to

evaluate the professional services rendered before it. (Ketchum,

supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) The court’s decision is supported

by substantial evidence. There was no abuse of discretion.

The order awarding fees is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.