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California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Karen Smith

Date: 07-23-2019

Case Number: A147987

Judge: Streeter, J.

Court: California Court of Appeals First Appellate District, Division Four on appeal from the Superior Court, County of Alameda

Plaintiff's Attorney: Amitai Schwartz

Defendant's Attorney: Mark Emerson Reagan, Joshua N. Sondheimer and Cassidy Elizabeth Cole

Description:
Health and Safety Code section 1418.8 (section 1418.8) sets forth procedures to be

followed for nursing home residents who lack capacity to make their own health care

decisions. Most of the affected residents are elderly, many are poor, and all may be

described as “unbefriended” in the sense they are without family members, friends or

other legal surrogates to make health care decisions for them. The statute requires an

interdisciplinary team (IDT) approach to decision making for these residents.

California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (CANHR), a nonprofit entity

advocating for the rights of nursing home patients, together with a nursing home resident

and a taxpayer (collectively, petitioners), challenged the constitutionality of section

1418.8 under the California Constitution by a petition for writ of mandate against the

Director of the Department of Public Health (Department), a position now held by Dr.

Karen Smith (Director).

The superior court issued an order holding section 1418.8 unconstitutional in three

respects, one on its face and two as applied: It held the statute (1) on its face, violates

due process under the California Constitution by failing to require notice to residents of a

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physician’s predicate determinations that the patient lacks capacity, has no surrogate

decisionmaker, needs a recommended medical intervention, and has a right to judicial

review; (2) was never intended to authorize IDT decisionmaking for administration of

antipsychotic medication, and it violates due process, as applied, when used to authorize

such drugs; and (3) violates the patient’s privacy rights and is unconstitutional as applied

to decisions regarding end of life withdrawal of care.

The court entered judgment accordingly, issuing a writ of mandate that prohibited

enforcement of the statute in the absence of notice to the affected resident; prohibited use

of the statute to administer antipsychotics; and prohibited use of the statute in end of life

decisions, subject to several exceptions, including an exception for transfer to hospice

care.

Both parties appealed. The Director claims the statute is constitutional in all

respects, and petitioners argue it is unconstitutional in additional particulars beyond those

enjoined. Petitioners take the position, ultimately, that the statute should be declared

unconstitutional in its entirety and that we should forbid its enforcement categorically,

leaving the Legislature to begin again trying to solve the problem of how to provide for

the medical needs of incapacitated, unbefriended nursing home residents.

We see merit to much of the superior court’s analysis concluding that section

1418.8 is constitutionally deficient, but agree with enough of the Director’s position to

convince us that the proper course is to construe the statute to uphold its constitutionality

rather than enjoin its enforcement and use. We shall therefore reverse and remand with

directions to enter a modified judgment requiring nursing homes utilizing section 1418.8

to adopt and adhere to additional procedures we have concluded are necessary to preserve

its constitutionality.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. History and Purpose of Section 1418.8

When it was enacted in 1992, section 1418.8 was intended to give skilled nursing

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facilities and intermediate care facilities1 a means of decisionmaking for incapacitated

residents without someone “with legal authority to make” health care decisions on his or

her “behalf” (§ 1418.8, subd. (a)), including “day-to-day medical treatment decisions . . .

on an on-going basis,” which were difficult to secure using the pre-existing legal

methods. (Stats. 1992, ch. 1303, § 1(b), p. 6327.) A decision by Division Five of this

district, which we will discuss in detail below, also observed that section 1418.8 “applies

only to the relatively nonintrusive and routine, ongoing medical intervention[.]” (Rains

v. Belshé (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 157, 186 (Rains).)

Before the statute’s enactment, capacity decisions were made in superior court on

a petition to determine capacity to make health care decisions. (Prob. Code, § 3200 et

seq.) “A petition may be filed to determine that a patient lacks the capacity to make a

health care decision concerning specified treatment for an existing or continuing

condition, and further for an order authorizing a designated person to make a health care

decision on behalf of the patient.” (Prob. Code, § 3201, subd. (b).) A petition may also

seek a finding by the court that the patient has such capacity. (Id., subds. (a), (c).)

In enacting section 1418.8, the Legislature sought to provide a decisionmaking

alternative when recommended medical procedures require informed consent. (See

Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 244-245 [informed consent required when there is a

known risk of death or serious bodily harm as a result of a recommended treatment].) As

described in Rains, section 1418.8 addresses a “very difficult and perplexing problem:

how to provide nonemergency but necessary and appropriate medical treatment,

1 Skilled nursing facilities provide 24-hour skilled nursing and supportive care to

resident individuals whose primary need is for the availability of skilled nursing care on

an extended basis. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 1250, subd. (c)(1).) Intermediate care

facilities provide 24-hour inpatient care to individuals who are developmentally disabled

or who otherwise do not require continuous skilled nursing care, but have recurring need

for skilled nursing supervision and require supportive care. (See id., § 1250, subds. (d),

(g) & (h).) We will refer to skilled nursing facilities and intermediate care facilities

collectively and generically as nursing homes through the remainder of the opinion. We

use “patient” and “resident” interchangeably, in each case referring to one who lives in a

nursing home.

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frequently of an ongoing nature, to nursing home patients who lack capacity to consent

thereto because of incompetence, and who have no surrogate or substitute decision maker

with legal authority to consent for them.” (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 166, fn.

omitted; see id. at p. 178 [“continuing and significant dilemma”].)

To address this “legal conundrum of long standing” (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th

at p. 166), section 1418.8—utilizing what is described as a “team approach to assessment

and care planning”—authorizes an IDT composed of health professionals and other

skilled staff from the nursing home, along with a “patient representative,” “where

practicable,” to review and authorize medical treatment. (§ 1418.8, subd. (e); see id.,

subds. (e) [“[t]he interdisciplinary team shall oversee the care of the resident”], (e)(3)

[“[t]o determine the desires of the resident, the interdisciplinary team shall interview the

patient, review the patient’s medical records, and consult with family members or

friends”], (g) [required reviews by “interdisciplinary team” of prescribed medical

intervention], (h) [review by “interdisciplinary team” within a week of any emergency

intervention resulting in “physical or chemical restraints”].)

In establishing a “team” decisionmaking approach, the Legislature recognized that

the existing mechanisms for court authorization of medical treatments for such patients

under provisions of the Probate Code were slow and inadequate, and therefore could

interfere with residents’ ability to receive timely medical care: “(b) The current system is

not adequate to deal with the legal, ethical, and practical issues that are involved in

making health care decisions for incapacitated skilled nursing facility or intermediate

care facility residents who lack surrogate decisionmakers. Existing Probate Code

procedures, including public conservatorship, are inconsistently interpreted and applied,

cumbersome, and sometimes unavailable for use in situations in which day-to-day

medical treatment decisions must be made on an on-going basis. [¶] (c) Therefore, it is

the intent of the Legislature to identify a procedure to secure, to the greatest extent

possible, health care decisionmakers for skilled nursing facility or intermediate care

facility residents who lack the capacity to make these decisions and who also lack a

surrogate health care decisionmaker.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 1303, § 1, pp. 6326-6327.)

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Indeed, Rains spoke of a “delay of two to six months frequently necessary to secure a

ruling on a petition authorizing treatment under Probate Code section 3201.” (Rains,

supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 166.)

B. Summary of the Provisions of Section 1418.8

Under section 1418.8, if a resident’s “attending physician and surgeon” determines

that a resident lacks capacity to provide informed consent to a proposed treatment, and

determines there is no person with legal authority to make the treatment decision on the

resident’s behalf, the physician is then required to inform the facility of these

determinations, and an IDT must be convened to review and authorize the proposed

treatment. (§ 1418.8, subds. (a)-(e).)

Section 1418.8 sets out standards by which the attending physician must determine

a resident’s decisionmaking capacity and the absence of any authorized surrogate

decisionmaker. To make such determinations, the physician must interview the resident,

review the resident’s medical records, and consult with facility staff and family members

and friends of the resident, if identified. (§ 1418.8, subds. (b) & (c).) A resident lacks

health care decisionmaking capacity if he or she “is unable to understand the nature and

consequences of the proposed medical intervention, including its risks and benefits, or is

unable to express a preference regarding the intervention.” (Id., subd. (b); see also Prob.

Code, § 4609.) The absence of any person with legal authority to make treatment

decisions on a resident’s behalf may be found if there is no “person designated under a

valid Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, a guardian, a conservator,” or any

“next of kin” (§ 1418.8, subd. (c)) available and willing to “take full responsibility” for

such decisions. (Id., subd. (f).) The physician’s determinations regarding incapacity and

the lack of a surrogate decisionmaker, and the “basis for those determinations,” must be

documented in the resident’s medical record. (Id., subd. (l).)

An IDT at the facility must then “conduct [a] . . . review of the prescribed medical

intervention prior to the administration of the medical intervention.” (§ 1418.8,

subd. (e).) The IDT must include “the resident’s attending physician, a registered

professional nurse with responsibility for the resident, other appropriate staff in

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disciplines as determined by the resident’s needs, and, where practicable, a patient

representative.” (Ibid.) We note, however, the only required participants are the

attending physician (who is often the medical director of the nursing home) and a nurse

(employed by the nursing home). (Ibid.) The patient representative may be a “family

member or friend of the resident who is unable to take full responsibility for the health

care decisions of the resident,” or any “other person authorized by state or federal law.”2

(§ 1418.8, subd. (f).) The medical records documenting the attending physician’s

determinations that the resident lacks capacity to provide informed consent and lacks a

surrogate decisionmaker must be made available to the patient representative, if the

resident has one. (Id., subd. (l).) There is no requirement that the same records be made

available to the resident. For patients without a representative, as is often the case, no

one receives the information intended for the resident.

The IDT, in reviewing a proposed treatment decision, must consider each of the

following: (1) The “physician’s assessment of the resident’s condition”; (2) “The reason

for the proposed use of the medical intervention”; (3) The “desires of the resident,” based

on a patient interview, medical records review, and consultation with any identified

family or friends; (4) The “type of medical intervention to be used in the resident’s care”;

2 “Persons who may act as the patient’s representative include a conservator, as

authorized by Parts 3 and 4 of Division 4 of the Probate Code (commencing with Section

1800), a person designated as attorney in fact in the patient’s valid Durable Power of

Attorney for Health Care, patient’s next of kin, other appropriate surrogate decisionmaker

designated consistent with statutory and case law, a person appointed by a court

authorizing treatment pursuant to Part 7 (commencing with Section 3200) of Division 4

of the Probate Code, or, if the patient is a minor, a person lawfully authorized to represent

the minor.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 72527, subd. (d).) When read within the context

of the overall statutory scheme, this open-ended definition of surrogacy contemplates

that, in some circumstances (i.e., a conservator, an attorney in fact, next of kin), a “patient

representative” might also be an agent in the sense of someone legally authorized to act

on behalf of the patient for certain purposes, but since definitionally a patient

representative serves only where there is no one available to “to take full responsibility

for the health care decisions of the resident,” the “patient representative” is not the

patient’s legal delegate for health care decisionmaking. (§ 1418.8, subd. (f); see post

pp. 31-32.)

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(5) “The probable impact on the resident’s condition, with and without the use of the

medical intervention”; (6) “Reasonable alternative medical interventions considered or

utilized and reasons for their discontinuance or inappropriateness.” (§ 1418.8,

subd. (e)(1)-(6).) Any treatment initiated pursuant to section 1418.8 must be done “in

accordance with acceptable standards of practice.” (Id., subd. (d).) The IDT must

reevaluate the treatment “at least quarterly or upon a significant change in the resident’s

medical condition.” (Id., subd. (g).) Though the statute makes no mention of the IDT

reviewing capacity determinations, the Department presented evidence at trial that IDT’s

can and do review capacity determinations made by attending physicians. Petitioners

argue section 1418.8 does not authorize such in-house review of capacity and surrogacy

decisions, and they claim the superior court erred in adopting the Department’s

interpretation that the statute allows the IDT to review those predicate decisions.

In the event of an emergency, the facility may administer treatment ordered by a

physician for the resident, including applying “physical or chemical restraints,” without

prior IDT approval. (§ 1418.8, subd. (h).) Generally speaking, “chemical restraints” are

antipsychotic medications. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 72018 [a chemical restraint is

“a drug used to control behavior and used in a manner not required to treat the patient’s

medical symptoms”].) If physical or chemical restraints are applied, the IDT must meet

“within one week of the emergency for an evaluation of the medical intervention.”

(§ 1418.8, subd. (h).)

Section 1418.8 preserves the right of a resident “to seek appropriate judicial relief

to review the decision to provide the medical intervention.” (§ 1418.8, subd. (j).) Under

that provision, “affected persons or their representatives, such as a friend, public

guardian, or other concerned person or entity, are afforded an avenue by which they may

obtain ‘appropriate judicial relief,’ including a temporary restraining order and other

injunctive relief prior to treatment, thereby satisfying due process principles.” (Rains,

supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 185.) Judicial review “may encompass review of the initial

medical determination that the patient lacks capacity to give informed consent[.]” (Id. at

p. 185, fn. 7.)

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C. The History of This Lawsuit

CANHR is, and has been since 1983, a statewide nonprofit organization dedicated

to improving the choices, care and quality of life for California’s long-term care

consumers. Through direct advocacy, community education, legislation and litigation,

CANHR has sought to educate and support nursing home residents and their advocates

regarding their legal rights and remedies and to create a united voice for long-term care

reform and humane alternatives to institutionalization. The superior court found CANHR

had public interest standing to pursue the causes of action raised in this case, and we

agree. (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach (2011) 52 Cal.4th

155, 167.)

Petitioner Gloria A. was a 63-year-old truck driver who ended up in a nursing

home and was declared incapacitated by her treating physician upon entry into the

facility. Just 20 days later, she was examined by another physician who found: “This

resident has the capacity to understand and make decisions.” Nevertheless, the incapacity

determination remained in effect for nine months. Gloria A. never received notice of the

physician’s determination, of his finding that she had no surrogate to make health care

decisions for her, of the treatment and restrictions he recommended, or of her right to

judicial review of his decisions.

Nothing in section 1418.8 expressly requires such notice. Gloria A. learned she

had been declared incapacitated only because she tried to go on a picnic with another

resident and her sister, and she was not allowed to leave the facility based on her doctor’s

orders and his finding of incapacity. Gloria A. believed she was competent and was told

by her social worker she was competent. Gloria A. was later given antipsychotic

medication, though she hated it and never consented to it, at the decision of an IDT.

Because of her supposed incapacity, she also lost control over her finances. Gloria A.

died four months after the petition was filed in superior court.

Petitioner Anthony Chicotel is a taxpayer who challenges the expenditure of tax

money in enforcing section 1418.8, which he claims is unconstitutional. (See Vasquez v.

State of California (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 849, 854.)

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In October 2013, CANHR and Gloria A. filed a petition for writ of mandate,

declaratory relief, and an injunction, challenging section 1418.8 as unconstitutional on its

face and as applied, alleging eight respects in which the statute is unconstitutional or

otherwise unenforceable, as set forth in eight separate causes of action: (1) the absence

of prior notice and the opportunity for a meaningful hearing; (2) the absence of

representation for the resident at the incompetence and surrogate determinations; (3) the

absence of a requirement of an adjudication of incompetence; (4) the need for a neutral

person or body to decide all issues of incapacity, surrogacy and treatment; (5) the need

for neutrals to review and give consent to the treatment; (6) the need for and absence of

enforcement as to the purported statutory requirement of a patient representative at the

review and for the patient representative to consent to the treatment; (7) the need for full

due process rights in applying the statute to administer antipsychotic drugs; and (8) the

need for full due process rights in applying the statute to withdraw treatment and cause

death.

The first five causes of action were brought as facial challenges to the statute; the

last three were as-applied challenges. In January 2015, the petitioners filed the operative

first amended petition alleging the same causes of action, but adding Chicotel as a

petitioner.

D. The Superior Court’s Order and Judgment and the Issues on Appeal

In response to petitioners’ motion for writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and

injunction, the superior court issued its order in June 2015 granting, in part, and denying,

in part, a writ of mandate, and entered judgment accordingly on January 27, 2016. The

superior court ruled that section 1418.8 is facially unconstitutional under the state due

process clause (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7) and enjoined its use on grounds that the statute

does not require adequate notification in writing to a nursing home resident regarding (1)

the physician’s determination of incapacity; (2) the physician’s determination that there is

no surrogate decisionmaker; (3) the medical intervention prescribed by the physician and

the referral to the IDT for decisionmaking regarding the treatment; and (4) the

availability of judicial review of any such decisions made by the physician or the IDT.

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The superior court did not hold such notice was required prior to an incapacity decision

being made by the physician, but presumably notice would be required before the IDT

made a decision on the recommended treatment. The superior court did not specify that

the medical intervention could not be implemented until after the capacity decision was

reviewed by the court if the resident sought judicial review, but that requirement is

implicit in the “ ‘opportunity to be heard’ ” at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner. (Armstrong v. Manzo (1965) 380 U.S. 545, 552.)

The Director insists the due process clause of the state Constitution does not

require such notice to be embedded in the statute, in part because other statutes and

regulations, both state and federal, virtually ensure the patient will be notified of the

matters specified by the superior court. Petitioners, on the other hand, claim the superior

court did not go far enough; they contend in their cross-appeal that notice should be

required before an incapacity decision is made. The Director suggests, even if we find

the statute constitutionally wanting, we should not declare it unenforceable, but rather

should read into it a notice requirement.

The superior court also held that section 1418.8, as applied, violates residents’

state constitutional autonomy privacy rights without due process insofar as it has been

used to authorize administration of antipsychotic medications without notice and an

opportunity to be heard, and without a judicial determination of incapacity or any form of

review by a neutral decisionmaker. Petitioners presented evidence, amplified by their

supporting amici curiae, suggesting that antipsychotics are administered to nursing home

residents for off-label use far too often, not to treat patients’ mental health problems, but

to make patients more compliant. To avoid an interpretation that it deemed

unconstitutional, the superior court held the statute was never meant to apply and does

not apply to the administration of antipsychotics. The Director contends the statute is not

constitutionally infirm, and claims its text and legislative history support its application to

the administration of antipsychotic drugs.

The superior court also held the statute violates the patient’s constitutional privacy

rights when applied to decisions to withdraw life-sustaining treatment and end life. The

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Director argues the superior court should not even have reached this issue based on lack

of state action and because the issue is not ripe and any opinion on the subject is merely

advisory.

In addition to supporting the superior court’s conclusions about the aspects of the

statute deemed unconstitutional or unenforceable except on specified conditions,

petitioners, in their cross-appeal, argue section 1418.8 is unconstitutional in the following

additional ways, which were rejected by the superior court: (1) the notice required by the

superior court must be given prior to the incapacity determination, with a meaningful

opportunity to oppose that determination separately from or instead of the after-the-fact

judicial review provided by the statute; (2) the capacity decision must be made by a

judicial officer, rather than a doctor; (3) an attending physician must not be allowed to act

as decisionmaker for capacity determinations (and must not be allowed to serve on the

IDT) because he or she is non-neutral; (4) legal counsel or a counsel substitute must be

afforded the resident as a matter of due process; and (5) the statute cannot be read as

allowing the IDT to review capacity and surrogacy decisions, which leaves patients

without recourse except by filing in superior court, which their poor health prevents them

from doing.

Finally, the superior court’s determination that section 1418.8 could not be used

for end of life decisions was subject to four exceptions, each of which petitioners claim is

inconsistent with the statute and the state Constitution, namely (a) decisions

implementing a patient’s wish to end life; (b) decisions carrying out a patient’s

instructions; (c) decisions to decline patient instructions for ineffective care or care

contrary to generally accepted medical standards; and (d) decisions to initiate hospice

care. Petitioners contend those exceptions are too expansive and unconstitutionally

undermine the superior court’s broader conclusion that section 1418.8 may not be used

for end of life decisions. The judgment has been stayed pending this appeal. In addition

to the parties’ briefing, we have received amicus curiae briefs from various organizations

12

supporting the positions of either petitioners or the Department.3

We shall discuss the

points raised by those briefs as we deem them relevant to our decision.

III. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

A. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard

Employing independent review, we conclude, as did the superior court, that the

statute would be unconstitutional on its face under the due process clause of article I,

section 7 of the California Constitution if it failed to require notice to the nursing home

resident that he or she has been found to lack decisionmaking capacity and that a

surrogate decisionmaker is unavailable—the two findings which serve to take

decisionmaking authority out of the hands of the resident—before a recommended

medical intervention may be initiated. But to preserve section 1418.8’s constitutionality,

we construe the statute to require such notice rather than prohibit its enforcement, as the

superior court did. We also conclude that the requisite notice may be given immediately

after the incapacity and lack-of-surrogacy determinations are made but must be given

before a recommended medical intervention may be initiated. The notice must be given

both orally and in writing to ensure its effectiveness, and the written notice must be given

not only to the affected nursing home resident but to at least one other competent person

whose interests are aligned with those of the resident.

We agree with the superior court that, as a matter of due process, before treatment

is begun a resident is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard in opposition to the

determinations of incapacity and unavailability of a surrogate, as well as to a

3 Amicus curiae briefs on behalf of petitioners were filed by California Long Term

Care Ombudsman Association (CLTCOA), Disability Rights California (DRC), the

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Disability Rights Program and American

Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (collectively, ACLU), and AARP, AARP

Foundation, the National Consumer Voice for Quality Long-Term Care, and Justice in

Aging (collectively, AARP). Amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Department were

filed by the California Medical Association, California Dental Association, and

California Hospital Association (collectively, CMA), and California Association of

Health Facilities (CAHF).

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recommended medical intervention. Thus, the required notice must advise the resident of

the fact that determinations of incapacity and absence of a surrogate have been made, of

any proposed treatment decided upon by the IDT, and of his or her right to seek judicial

review. The statute already provides for judicial review (§ 1418.8, subd. (j)), which

allows for a neutral judge’s decision, representation by counsel (Prob. Code, § 3205), and

a full evidentiary hearing for those patients aggrieved by the incapacity or lack-ofsurrogacy

decisions or who object to the treatment recommendation. Because medical

urgency may not allow for judicial review before a treatment decision must be

undertaken, we conclude, in those exigent circumstances—so long as pretreatment notice

is given—the statute complies with minimal due process demands by giving the patient

an opportunity to be heard during the IDT process itself. The full accoutrements of

judicial process, with a right to counsel, are not constitutionally mandated.

B. Mandatory Inclusion of Independent Patient Representative on IDT

Patients subject to section 1418.8 presumably cannot competently speak for

themselves, to anyone, in making their desires and intentions known. The practical

reality, then, is that the Legislature has set up a process the objective of which is to

discern, by the best approximation possible, what those desires and intentions would be if

the patient could communicate effectively. No process designed to achieve that end

could be perfect, but we think the one the Legislature has chosen here—which is based

on a model of collaborative decisionmaking in which a number of different perspectives

are represented—satisfies due process. We believe an essential feature of the IDT

process that saves it from constitutional infirmity in non-emergency circumstances is the

inclusion on the IDT of a patient representative who is independent of the nursing home

staff.

Although the statute provides for a patient representative to participate on the IDT

“where practicable,” we give that phrase a narrow reading so that a patient representative

must be appointed for every nursing home resident determined to be decisionally

incapacitated and without a surrogate decisionmaker under section 1418.8,

subdivision (a). We view the role of the patient representative as so crucial to the

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functioning and constitutionality of the statute that if the patient has no family or friends

willing to serve on the IDT, the nursing home must find another person unaffiliated with

the nursing home to serve as patient representative for each person subject to the IDT

decisionmaking procedure. Only in the case of an urgent medical emergency may an

IDT act without the patient representative’s participation.

C. Administration of Antipsychotic Medication

We reject petitioners’ first as-applied challenge urging that section 1418.8 be

voided to the extent it allows, in non-emergency circumstances, the administration of

antipsychotic drugs to nursing home residents without judicial authorization. We

conclude, here too as a matter of statutory construction, that section 1418.8 may be

employed in making decisions relating to administration of antipsychotic medications,

and that, so construed, the statute does not violate the patient’s privacy or due process

rights.

Section 1418.8, subdivision (h), expressly authorizes “chemical restraints”—

which usually means antipsychotics—to be administered in emergency situations. We

see no reason why prescriptions for use of antipsychotics for an ongoing psychosis could

not also be prescribed through the IDT process in non-emergency circumstances. While

we condemn the use of antipsychotics for purposes of ongoing patient control, which we

are told has been a problem in the past in nursing homes, we believe the Department’s

strict enforcement of the network of federal and state statutes and regulations

constraining the prescription of such drugs in nursing homes is sufficient to prevent

continuing abuse. If the Department is failing to carry out its enforcement obligations in

policing the use of antipsychotic medications by nursing homes, that is a matter which

should be addressed in a case presenting the issue for decision on an appropriate record.

We do not have such a record here.

D. End of Life Decisionmaking

Finally, we reject petitioner’s second as-applied challenge that categorically, under

no circumstances, may section 1418.8 be applied to what the parties call end of life

decisionmaking, a phrase that, on the record presented here, we understand to mean any

15

decision to impose or change a physician order for life sustaining treatment (POLST) or

any decision to provide hospice care to a terminally ill patient. So long as

constitutionally required notice is given, as outlined above, and so long as the IDT

includes an independent patient representative, as further outlined above, we think that

use of the IDT decisionmaking process for these kinds of end of life decisions adequately

safeguards the constitutionally protected right of an incapacitated nursing home resident

to refuse medical treatment. The superior court appears to have recognized as much,

building into the injunction four exceptions designed to cover various aspects of end of

life decisionmaking. Because we conclude there is no constitutional infirmity with the

use of section 1418.8 for the specific kinds of end of life decisionmaking presented on

this record, we have no occasion to address the need for any of these exceptions or

whether it is even appropriate to characterize them as exceptions.

Although we hold that section 1418.8 passes constitutional muster when used for

some specific types of end of life decisionmaking, we emphasize what we do not hold.

Because, in some circumstances, a decision to cease life-sustaining care will require the

intervention of a neutral, judicial decisionmaker under either Conservatorship of

Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519 (Wendland) (conscious but incapacitated patients) or

Conservatorship of Drabick (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 185 (Drabick) (unconscious

patients)—cases which involve withdrawal of life support—we anticipate that,

somewhere, a line must be drawn between on the one hand cessation of curative care for

a decisionally incapacitated person without a surrogate (for whom the IDT may act), and

on the other hand, withdrawal of life support (for whom resort to the judicial process

would be necessary). But we have no occasion to address that issue here. Drawing the

appropriate line involves a myriad of medical and other circumstances that we cannot

begin to predict based on the limited record before us, so we simply note this outer

boundary to constitutionally proper use of the IDT process, without reaching it in this

case.

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Autonomy Privacy Protects Residents’ Rights to Make Medical Decisions

and Due Process Attaches to Deprivation of Those Rights

1. The Right of Autonomy Privacy

“[T]he explicit right of privacy protected under California Constitution, article I,

section 1, protects two classes of privacy interests: ‘(1) interests in precluding the

dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (“informational

privacy”); and (2) interests in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal

activities without observation, intrusion, or interference (“autonomy privacy”).’ (Hill v.

National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35[].)” (Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010)

50 Cal.4th 838, 850-851.) This case deals with autonomy privacy, which has been

recognized as bestowing upon a competent adult the right to refuse medical treatment,

even treatment necessary to sustain life. (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 530.) The

right of privacy guarantees an individual the freedom to choose to reject, or refuse to

consent to, intrusions of his or her bodily integrity. (Id. at pp. 531-532.) Under

California law a “competent, informed adult has a fundamental right of selfdetermination

to refuse or demand the withdrawal of medical treatment of any form

irrespective of the personal consequences.” (Thor v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th

725, 732.)

The question here, of course, is how the patient’s will can best be learned and

effectuated, and his or her rights adequately protected, when he or she lacks decisional

capacity, has no advance health care directive, and the attending physician is aware of no

next of kin or other person willing to serve as a legally authorized proxy decisionmaker.

(Cf. In re Conroy (N.J. 1985) 486 A.2d 1209, 1219-1220.) Section 1418.8 provides a

procedure for dealing with such circumstances, authorizing a treating physician to declare

the patient to lack capacity to make his or her own medical decisions, and thereby to

trigger convening of an IDT. (§ 1418.8, subds. (a) & (e).) Petitioners claim leaving the

capacity decision in the hands of an attending physician—or any physician—violates the

17

constitutionally-protected privacy rights of the patient. They contend a judge or judicial

officer must make that decision.

2. Due Process

The right to refuse necessary medical treatment is a fundamental liberty interest

protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Washington v. Harper

(1990) 494 U.S. 210, 221-222; Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health (1990) 497

U.S. 261, 278; People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417) and by the privacy

guarantee of the California Constitution and the common law (In re Qawi (2004) 32

Cal.4th 1, 17 (Qawi); K.G. v. Meredith (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 164, 170-171).

Petitioners contend various aspects of section 1418.8 violate residents’ due process rights

under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution.

B. Rains v. Belshé (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 157

In 1995, Division Five of this district was faced with a constitutional attack on

section 1418.8 much like the one now before us. Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th 157 held

section 1418.8 was constitutional against a challenge on state and federal due process

grounds and on privacy grounds under the state Constitution. (Id. at p. 171.) The Rains

court reasoned that a patient’s privacy interests were greatly attenuated by the fact that he

or she needed a medical intervention but lacked capacity to give informed consent. (Id.

at p. 172.) The court also found an overriding state interest in affording nursing homes

the means to provide timely ongoing care for their residents without being constrained by

cumbersome, time-consuming procedures and unwarranted judicial intervention. (Id. at

pp. 176-177.)

Though Rains held section 1418.8 was not unconstitutional under the due process

clause of the state or federal Constitution, it so held on the basis that (1) due process does

not require that capacity and surrogacy decisions be made by judges (Rains, supra, 32

Cal.App.4th at p. 184); (2) objective standards for determining the capacity and

18

surrogacy issues are set forth in the statute4 (Rains, supra, at pp. 179-180); (3) patient

representatives will bring the resident’s views to the IDT (id. at pp. 182-186); (4) other

state and federal regulations “both limit and supplement the interdisciplinary team

decisionmaking approach by granting certain rights and safeguards to affected residents”

(id. at p. 186); and (5) judicial review is available to nursing home residents under section

1418.8, subdivision (j) (Rains, supra, at pp. 182, 184-185). (See generally id. at pp. 178-

187.)

As we shall discuss, petitioners contend the Supreme Court’s intervening decision

in Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1 calls for a different outcome in this case. Fundamentally,

petitioners question whether capacity is a medical decision that can be made by a

physician, as Rains held (Rains, at pp. 177, 179-182), or a legal decision that must be

made by a judge (see Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 17). They further contend their

evidence shows the statute is not being applied within the limits established by Rains, as

when it is used to prescribe antipsychotic medications or to make end of life decisions.

Significantly, the panel deciding Rains relied on an interpretation that section

1418.8 “by its own terms applies only to the relatively nonintrusive and routine, ongoing

medical intervention, which may be afforded by physicians in nursing homes; it does not

purport to grant blanket authority for more severe medical interventions such as

medically necessary, one-time procedures which would be carried out at a hospital or

other acute care facility, as to which compliance with Probate Code section 3200 et seq.

would still be required, except in emergency situations.” (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th

4 When originally enacted in 1992, such standards were not included. (Stats.

1992, ch. 1303, § 1, p. 6327 (Assem. Bill No. 3209).) The trial judge in Rains ruled that

the statute, as enacted, was unconstitutional. (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 162.)

Before the appeal was decided, the Legislature amended section 1418.8 to include

objective standards and rules for how the competency and surrogacy decisions were to be

made; it added the provisions now contained in subdivisions (b) and (c) of section

1418.8. (Stats. 1994, ch. 791, § 1, p. 3913 (Assem. Bill No. 1139); Rains, at pp. 162-

163.) The Court of Appeal in Rains reviewed the constitutionality of the amended statute

and found it was constitutional. (Rains, at pp. 162, 165-166.)

19

at p. 186.) Rains appears to have reached this conclusion on the basis of uncodified

language in the preamble to the 1992 bill that established section 1418.8, which indicated

the statute was intended, at least in part, to facilitate “day-to-day medical treatment

decisions . . . on an on-going basis.” (Stats. 1992, ch. 1303, § 1(b), p. 6327; accord

Rains, at p. 179; see parts II.A & II.B, ante.) Beyond that, Rains points to no language in

section 1418.8 indicating it is so limited.

Petitioners contend Rains thereby established legal limits on the application of the

IDT procedure, but, on the record they have produced, they have shown the law is

presently being extended far beyond those limits. Short of life-ending decisions covered

by Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th 519, or Drabick, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 185, the

Director, in response, takes the position there are no limitations on the scope or subject

matter of medical decisions that can be made using section 1418.8. She urges an

interpretation of the statute that allows IDT’s to make all medical decisions for nursing

home residents under their care.

C. The Standard of Review

This case arises on appeal from the issuance of a writ of mandate under Code of

Civil Procedure section 1085. In such a posture, factual issues are reviewed for

substantial evidence, but legal issues, such as statutory or constitutional interpretation, are

reviewed de novo. (Boyer v. County of Ventura (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 49, 53; see

Lippman v. City of Oakland (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 750, 756.) Where the facts are not in

dispute, purely legal issues are involved in the determination of the facial

constitutionality of a statute, and we apply a de novo standard of review. (Alviso v.

Sonoma County Sheriff’s Dept. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 198, 204.) On the other hand, an

as-applied challenge “contemplates analysis of the facts of a particular case . . . to

determine the circumstances in which the statute . . . has been applied and to consider

whether in those particular circumstances the application deprived the individual to

whom it was applied of a protected right.” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th

1069, 1084.) When reviewing an as-applied constitutional challenge on appeal, we defer

to the superior court’s findings on historical facts that are supported by substantial

20

evidence and then independently review the constitutionality of the statute under those

facts. (C.M. v. M.C. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1198; Board of Administration v. Wilson

(1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1127-1130.)

D. Facial Challenge: The Due Process Requirement of Notice and an

Opportunity to be Heard

1. The Superior Court’s Ruling

The superior court’s June 2015 order in this case observed that Rains did not deal

specifically with the question of notice to the patient of the decisions on capacity and

surrogacy, and it therefore concluded Rains was not controlling on that point. Rains held

the statute did not violate due process, even though the incapacity decision was “without

notice” to the nursing home resident. (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.) Although

the court mentioned the notice issue only in passing, notice was one of the attributes of a

fair hearing that the petitioner in Rains claimed was lacking in the IDT procedure

implemented by section 1418.8. (Rains, at p. 178.) Because “cases are not authority for

propositions not expressly considered” (In re Marriage of Peters (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th

1487, 1491), the superior court correctly recognized that this case calls for a decision on

an aspect of due process that Rains left unaddressed.

Starting from the premise that a patient’s privacy right to refuse medication is not

extinguished when a person resides in a nursing home (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at

p. 171; see Drabick, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 208 [privacy rights survive

incompetence]), the superior court reasoned that notice and an opportunity to be heard are

the touchstones of due process when the deprivation of fundamental rights is threatened.5



Under People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, the superior court considered: “(1) the

private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous

5 Conservatorship of Moore (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 718, 725; Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314 (“notice reasonably calculated,

under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties . . . and afford them an

opportunity to present their objections”).

21

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,

of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the dignitary interest in informing

individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to

present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) the

governmental interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Id. at

p. 269.)

The surpassing importance of the individual rights at stake, the individual’s

dignity interests, the complete elimination of the patient’s actual participation in the

process, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the minimal fiscal and administrative

burden of notifying patients led the trial court to hold that section 1418.8, on its face,

“violates a patient’s due process rights by failing to provide for adequate notice [of four

specific items of information:] [1] the determination of incapacity, [2] the determination

of the absence of a legal substitute decision maker, [3] the prescribed medical

intervention and [4] the right to seek review under section 1418.8(j).” Without adequate

notice in each of these four areas, the court concluded, the patient will have no

meaningful opportunity to oppose decisions made by the IDT.6



The Director attacks this conclusion as unfounded, claiming that a denial of due

process cannot be asserted under California Constitution, article I, section 7, unless the

right of which the complainant claims to have been deprived is one protected by statute

6 Though the court’s lack of notice ruling is rooted in the modern style of due

process analysis under People v. Ramirez, its conclusion was broadly consistent with

California law going back nearly a century. For decisions that strip a person perceived to

be incapable of decisionmaking capacity of the right to personal autonomy, a due process

requirement of written notice to that person of the deprivation has been recognized for

nearly a century, dating back to Grinbaum v. Superior Court (1923) 192 Cal. 528, 540-

541 [“requirement . . . that notice in some form and of some manner of service must be

given to the individual alleged to be an insane or incompetent person . . . [r]ests upon the

fundamental doctrine, as old as Magna Carta, that no person can be deprived of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law”].)

22

or by the constitution. She further argues due process protections attach only where an

adjudicatory hearing is provided by statute. Besides, the Director suggests, the capacity

decision is medical, not legal, and does not trigger due process protections. She further

contends, because section 1418.8 is implemented directly by nursing homes, no state

action is involved and hence the due process clause is inapplicable. In her view, notice is

not required.

We reject the Director’s contentions as a legal matter; state deprivation of a

constitutionally guaranteed right is constrained by due process, even if there is no

separate statute granting that right. And the right to determine one’s own health care

options involves fundamental liberty interests, as well as privacy interests. (People v.

Petty, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417.) But even if a statutory right needed to be

identified, one exists in Probate Code section 4650, subdivision (a): “In recognition of

the dignity and privacy a person has a right to expect, the law recognizes that an adult has

the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to his or her own health care,

including the decision to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn.” Given

this recognized statutory protection for every individual’s health care decisionmaking, we

are satisfied the right petitioners seek to vindicate is one protected by due process.

We are unpersuaded by the Director’s insistence that what petitioners complain

about, at bottom, is isolated private conduct by a few nursing homes, that there is no state

action here, and thus there is no basis to assert a due process claim. Although section

1418.8 may be directly implemented by nursing homes, the Department is responsible for

oversight, inspection and surveying nursing homes to enforce the statute’s

implementation. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1279.) Moreover, not only are petitioners

mounting a challenge to a statutory scheme enacted by the state Legislature, but nursing

homes are, in effect, performing the state’s obligations under the parens patriae doctrine,

which requires the state to care for its most vulnerable residents who cannot care for

23

themselves.7

(See Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 15.) If, by failure of enforcement—

which is what was alleged and impliedly found here—the Director has placed the state’s

imprimatur on the nursing homes’ challenged conduct, then that is also a sufficient

ground to extend due process protection to nursing home patients.

We think the superior court was right to conclude that, looking at the statute

literally, as written, section 1418.8 fails to meet due process requirements under article I,

section 7, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution. A declaration of incapacity

subjects the nursing home resident to grievous loss and must be accompanied by due

process protections. Petitioners have presented evidence in this case that a declaration of

incapacity not only deprives the nursing home resident of decisionmaking power over his

or her own health care, but may result in loss of control over finances and freedom of

movement. The superior court’s findings amply support its determination that, as

illustrated by Gloria A.’s circumstances, section 1418.8, on its face, is constitutionally

deficient. In fact, in one critical respect—a patient’s right to notice of entitlement to a

patient representative on the IDT—we conclude the superior court’s due process analysis

did not go far enough.

2. Construing Section 1418.8 to Save it From Constitutional Infirmity

Presented with a petition for a writ of mandate seeking both declaratory and

injunctive relief, the superior court elected to proceed by injunction. In prohibiting

enforcement of section 1418.8 “to the extent that said section does not require”

constitutionally required notice, the superior court recognized that nursing home residents

who have been determined to lack decisional capacity are unlikely to understand or be

able to act on such notice. It considered the privacy rights at stake to be so fundamental

7 The amici favoring the Director disagree with petitioners that the IDT derives its

power from the state acting in parens patriae. They claim an IDT operates as a surrogate

decisionmaker for the resident on the basis of the resident’s consent. To the extent the

Director adopts this view, we disagree. An IDT is not a true surrogate selected by the

patient; the IDT derives its decisionmaking authority only from section 1418.8, and

therefore it must be considered a substitute decisionmaker selected by the state.

24

and the consequences of erroneous deprivation so potentially harmful to the patient, that

state standards of due process require, at a minimum, written notice of the four listed

categories of information.

While we agree in principle with the superior court’s due process analysis, we

think the proper remedial approach here is to preserve the statute’s constitutionality by

interpretation, not to prohibit its enforcement by injunction. Legislation comes to us

clothed with a presumption of validity, and when dealing with a challenge to a statute,

whether facial or as applied, our mission is, “wherever possible, . . . [to] interpret . . . [the

challenged] statute as consistent with applicable constitutional provisions, seeking to

harmonize Constitution and statute.” (California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott

(1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594 (Elliott); see Syrek v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals

Bd. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 519, 526 [“ ‘The power of a court to declare a statute

unconstitutional is an ultimate power; its use should be avoided if a reasonable statutory

construction makes the use unnecessary.’ ”]; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority

(1936) 297 U.S. 288, 346 (conc. opn. of Brandeis, J.).)

In rejecting a due process challenge to section 1418.8, the Rains court relied upon

the fact that the statute does not stand in isolation, but operates within a complex regime

of overlapping state and federal statutes and regulations establishing the rights of nursing

home residents. (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 186-187.) This background

regime—triggered at the time of admission to a nursing home8

—entitles residents (1) to

be “fully informed” about their “total health status”;

9 (2) to “consent to or refuse any

treatment or procedure”;

10 (3) to receive “all information that is material” to the decision

8 California Code of Regulations, title 22, section 72527, subdivision (a)(1); title

42 United States Code section 1395i-3(c)(1)(B)(i); 42 Code of Federal Regulations part

483.10(b)(1) and (2).

9 42 Code of Federal Regulations part 483.10(c)(1).

10 California Code of Regulations, title 22, section 72527, subdivision (a)(4).

25

whether to accept or refuse any treatment or procedure;

11 (4) to participate in their overall

“plan of care, including the identification of medical, nursing and psychosocial needs and

the planning of related services”;

12 (5) to be “immediately inform[ed]” when there is a

significant change in their “physical, mental, or psychosocial status,” or a “need to alter

treatment significantly”;

13 and (6) to be informed that they “have the right to voice

grievances to facility personnel free from reprisal and can submit complaints to the State

Department of Health Services or its representative.”14

Describing the statutory and regulatory backdrop as one “designed to protect

nursing home patients” through a set of “standards and regulations . . . which both limit

and supplement the interdisciplinary team decisionmaking approach by granting certain

rights and safeguards to affected residents” (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 186), the

Rains court concluded that “[c]onsideration of these numerous statutory safeguards

[citation] undermines the claim that section 1418.8 violates due process standards.” (Id.

at pp. 186-187.) We draw a different conclusion, on a different rationale. In our view,

the Legislature built section 1418.8 on a preexisting foundation of patient protections that

it expected would be necessary for the implementation of the statute. Rather than

“undermine” petitioners’ due process claim, we think this legal backdrop confirms that

the Legislature understood and intended there were certain bedrock procedural minima

on which it was establishing a new scheme. The gravity of the interests at stake outside

the context of “routine, day-to-day” medical decisionmaking convinces us that—at least

11 California Code of Regulations, title 22, section 72527, subdivision (a)(5).

12 California Code of Regulations, title 22, section 72527, subdivision (a)(3);

accord title 42 United States Code section 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(i).

13 42 Code of Federal Regulations part 483.10(g)(14)(B) and (C).

14 Health and Safety Code section 1599.2, subdivision (c); accord title 42 United

States Code section 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(vi).

26

with respect to notice and an opportunity to be heard—this assumed procedural

foundation is not just statutory and regulatory, but constitutional.

Faced with the choice of voiding a statute or reading it to include procedural

protections to avoid constitutional infirmity, courts have often chosen the route of

savings-by-interpretation. (See Elliott, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 594; see also Horn v.

County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 616 [construing statute to require “reasonable

notice and opportunity to be heard”]; Braxton v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 138,

144-145 [noting that statute “must be construed so as not to violate the precepts of

procedural due process; hence we interpret [statute] to require notice and a hearing”];

Board of Education v. Mass (1956) 47 Cal.2d 494, 499 [reading hearing and other

requirements into statute where law could “be reasonably interpreted in a manner

consistent with due process”]; Charles S. v. Board of Education (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d

83, 94-96 [denying writ challenging constitutionality of statute on procedural due process

grounds, and construing statute to include specific notice and hearing requirements].)

We agree with the superior court that unbefriended nursing home patients who are

perceived to lack decisionmaking capacity must receive “adequate notice” of the

incapacity decision, the absence-of-a-surrogate decision, any recommendation for

treatment by the IDT, and the right to judicial review. Without mandated notice of these

matters to patients, in our view, the respect for personal autonomy that it is the central

objective of section 1418.8 to protect is essentially meaningless. As the superior court

explained, “[t]o the extent . . . patients [covered by section 1418.8] are competent enough

to want to challenge . . . determinations” made for and about them, “notice and

opportunity may allow them to keep their decision-making capacity, or designate

someone of their own choosing, instead of placing such decisions in the hands of a team

of strangers.” At stake, fundamentally, is the right of individual dignity. “If, in fact, the

patient lacks capacity,” the superior court pointed out, “then the patient will likely be

unable to understand the nature of these determinations or to seek review,” but at least

“will have been afforded his or her due process rights.” We take the same view, but

rather than bar enforcement of section 1418.8 because it makes no express provision for

27

notice and an opportunity to be heard, we imply these requisites as a matter of statutory

interpretation and constitutional imperative.

3. Adequacy of Notice

Although we conclude the superior court’s due process analysis was correct, in

some respects it did not go far enough. Beyond requiring written notice of certain kinds

of information, for example, the court did not expound on what “adequate notice” means

in this context. When notice is required, it must be reasonably calculated to give actual

notice to the person affected. (Rasooly v. City of Oakley (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 348,

357.) We are concerned here with effective notice, that is, notice that will result in

communication to the resident, if possible. If notice is to be effective in these

circumstances, it must be given in writing as well as orally. This seems only marginally

more burdensome than oral notice alone and is much more likely to lead to the patient’s

understanding of his or her own predicament because (1) it may be referred to repeatedly

for increased comprehension, and (2) it may be shown to a friend, relative, nursing home

staff member, or local ombudsman15 for a simpler or fuller explanation of what the

writing seeks to convey.

But requiring notice to affected residents, by itself, is not sufficient. This is a

population that, by definition, will include many people who lack the ability to

15 The California Long-Term Care Ombudsman is an organization created in

response to federal legislation. (42 U.S.C. § 3058g.) Its role is to monitor nursing

homes, to take, investigate, and resolve complaints from nursing home residents, and to

report to the Department its findings and recommendations. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §

9712.5, subd. (b) [State Ombudsman is authorized to “[p]rovide services to assist

residents in the protection of their health, safety, welfare, and rights”].) CLTCOA is an

association of local long-term care ombudsman programs in California. As such, its

members are charged with monitoring nursing homes throughout California for

compliance with patient rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 9712.5, subd. (a); 42 U.S.C.

§ 3058g(a)(3)(A).) CLTCOA therefore purports to reflect the views of those who

regularly frequent nursing homes in California and observe their operation, offering us

“boots on the ground” insight into the IDT process as it is used in nursing homes

throughout California.

28

comprehend complex written expression.16 Notice to an incompetent person alone does

not comport with due process. In Covey v. Town of Somers (1956) 351 U.S. 141, where

notice of a judicial foreclosure for delinquency in paying real property taxes was sent to a

property owner, who the authorities knew was mentally incompetent and unable to

understand the meaning of any such communication, the Supreme Court held, “Notice to

a person known to be an incompetent who is without the protection of a guardian does

not measure up to this requirement [of due process].” (Id. at p. 146.) Applying the

holding in Covey under article I, section 7 of our Constitution, we think due process

requires that steps be taken to notify an incompetent person in a way that provides the

person access to assistance in comprehending what he or she is being told.

Hence, we conclude the superior court’s order in this case requiring written notice

to the resident alone did not go far enough to remedy the due process problem. Given the

health circumstances of the intended recipients, we hold that written notice must also be

given to at least one competent person who might be willing and able to discuss the

meaning of the notice to the resident. The patient representative or the local ombudsman

provided for in section 1418.8, subdivisions (e) and (f) could, for instance, receive such

notice on the patient’s behalf. Anyone empowered by the Probate Code to pursue

judicial relief for the resident, even if they are not available to serve as a surrogate

decisionmaker, might suffice. (See also Prob. Code, § 3203 [listing persons entitled to

pursue judicial remedy under Prob. Code, § 3201 on patient’s behalf].)

4. Composition of IDT

Viewing Rains as dispositive on the point, the superior court declined to rule that a

constitutionally required element of due process for nursing home patients subject to

16 See Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from

Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making (2012) 19 Hum. Rts. Brief 8, 10-11

(“persons with disabilities may need assistance in decision making through such means as

interpreter assistance, facilitated communication, assistive technologies, and plain

language”).

29

section 1418.8 is that they be notified of their entitlement to have a patient representative

serve on the IDT. On this point, we think more is required than the holding in Rains

demands. As noted, section 1418.8, subdivision (e), provides for the participation of a

patient representative on the IDT “where practicable.” The Legislature defined “patient

representative” broadly: “A patient representative may include a family member or

friend of the resident who is unable to take full responsibility for the health care decisions

of the resident, but who has agreed to serve on the interdisciplinary team, or other person

authorized by state or federal law.” (§ 1418.8, subd. (f).) According to Rains, patient

representatives may include “patient advocates, legal counsel, and all other persons

having an interest in the welfare of the patient,” as well as the public guardian or a local

ombudsman. (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.)17

Rains took the broad statutory definition as a sign that practically no patient would

be unrepresented on an IDT, finding it “almost impossible to conceive of a patient who

could not have a patient representative.” (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.) The

Rains court envisioned that a resident would be deprived of a patient representative only

in rare circumstances, such as “due to [the patient representative’s] temporary

unavailability, illness, or similar causes.” (Id. at p. 167.) Rains also found it “highly

significant that section 1418.8, subdivision (e) requires a patient representative” as a

member of the IDT in rejecting the due process challenge to section 1418.8. (Rains,

supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 166, italics added.) In fact, to render the statute

constitutional, we hold that a patient representative independent of the nursing home

17 The record evidence in this case is mixed as to how local ombudsmen, to date,

have viewed their role. Two local ombudsmen filed declarations indicating, as

ombudsmen, they were not allowed to vote on an IDT or act as a patient representative,

although they sometimes sat in on IDT’s as non-voting participants. The Director and

CMA claim there is no legal impediment to their serving as patient representatives, and

the declaration of one local ombudsman states that she acted as the resident’s “advocate”

on one IDT. CAHF reports: “Long-Term Care Ombudsmen, who are required to

investigate and resolve reports of abuse in these facilities, are not legally authorized to

assume the role of health care decisionmakers.” (Enrolled Bill Report, Department of

Aging (June 28, 1996), at p. 1.)

30

must be identified for participation on every IDT and must participate on the IDT, except

in emergencies.

Rains also construed the statute as mandating that the patient representative alone

would actually make the treatment decision; the medical staff on the IDT would make the

decision only in exigent circumstances when the patient representative was unavailable or

unwilling: “[W]e deal with a statutory procedure by which the equivalent of informed

consent may be provided, by a patient representative if practicable, and in exigent

circumstances by health professionals . . . .” (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 185-

186, italics added.)18 We read the statute somewhat differently. (Compare Rains, supra,

32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 184-186 with § 1418.8, subd. (e).) Although the patient

representative’s consent is required as part of the IDT, his or her vote on the team is but

part of the required consensus; holding that the patient representative alone could control

decisionmaking would be tantamount to making the representative the surrogate

decisionmaker for the resident, though he or she has not qualified for or is unwilling to

assume that status and may not have been chosen by the resident. A patient

representative is defined, in part, as a family member or friend who is “unable to take full

responsibility” for making the resident’s health care decisions (§ 1418.8, subd. (f)) and

therefore does not perform the role of a surrogate.

Because the threshold determination triggering the need for an IDT requires that

there be no one “with legal authority to make” health care decisions on the patient’s

“behalf,” we understand the patient’s representative designated to serve on the IDT as

something different from a surrogate decisionmaker. (§ 1418.8, subd. (a).) Where a

patient, although incompetent to make medical decisions, nonetheless is able to articulate

coherent ideas about his or her current circumstances, it is the task of the patient

representative to bring that information into the IDT’s decisionmaking process. Viewed

18 Petitioners argued in the superior court that this role was not being adhered to as

the statute was applied in nursing homes, but the court held their evidence was

insufficient to show that patient representatives were routinely omitted from participation

on IDT’s.

31

in that light, the role of the patient representative on the IDT is to take responsibility for

understanding and articulating the best approximation possible of the patient’s

perspective. In effect, as we read the statute, the Legislature has provided for virtual

representation through the IDT as a body, not actual representation through the patient

representative.

It may be that, as a practical matter, the patient representative is the member of the

IDT whose perspective comes the closest to being a stand-in for the patient—and perhaps

is the one most likely to dissent, since it is the decision of the attending physician that is

under review by the IDT. Nevertheless, we do not view the role of the patient

representative as a proxy for the patient, in the sense of an advocate or an agent who

takes guidance or instruction from a client or principal. The context here, a setting in

which the patient cannot express his or her informed decision to anyone, makes that

impossible. Where the patient’s attitudes and personal background are not known, the

patient representative provides, at minimum, the perspective of an individual unaffiliated

with the nursing home, who can be vigilant as to when judicial intervention is required.

As the IDT member uniquely responsible for presenting the patient’s perspective,

the patient representative’s role on the IDT is essential. Despite the crucial function

performed by the patient representative, the statutory language “where practicable”

(§ 1418.8, subd. (e))—if given a broad reading—would severely undervalue the right to

have such a person involved in the IDT’s decisionmaking process. We consider it

necessary to have a patient representative participate on every IDT as an element of due

process. “Where practicable” does not mean “where convenient” or “where someone

happens to step forward.” The statute imposes upon the nursing home an affirmative

duty to investigate who might serve as patient representative, and if no family or friend is

available, the nursing home must designate some person not employed by the nursing

home—and thus independent of nursing home staff—to act as patient representative.19

19 To reinforce the independence of anyone who serves as a patient representative,

and perhaps to facilitate the formation of a professional community willing to carry out

32

As Rains held, the phrase “where practicable” allows the IDT to proceed without a

patient representative only in “exigent circumstances” when the urgency of the patient’s

medical needs will not allow for the patient representative’s participation. (Rains, supra,

32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 166-167.) Nursing homes may not use the “where practicable”

language as an escape valve to avoid participation by a patient representative. A patient

representative should be designated for each resident determined to be decisionally

incapacitated as soon as that determination is made. Where no appropriate friend or

family member is identified, the nursing home must enlist the local ombudsman, public

guardian, or equivalent county officers to serve. (See Prob. Code, § 3203.)

It is clear to us, as it was to the panel in Rains, that the Legislature intended to give

nursing home residents something as close as possible to a voice on any IDT convened to

make a determination about the resident’s health care, and that voice was to be

communicated through a “patient representative.” (§ 1418.8, subd. (e).) Because the

resident has a statutory right to the participation of a patient representative in the IDT

process, the notice that we require in parts IV.D.2. and IV.D.3., ante, must include notice

of that right. Only through vigorous enforcement of the right to have a patient

representative serve on the IDT may the resident’s due process rights under our state

Constitution be protected and effectuated.

5. Timing Considerations

a. Timing of Notice

Petitioners’ cross-appeal presents the question whether the due process clause of

the state Constitution requires more than the relief the superior court provided, whether it

requires notice of the proposed declaration of incapacity prior to the physician making

the capacity decision, and likewise requires notice of the proposed lack of surrogate



this crucial function, the Legislature might wish to consider enacting supporting

incentives and protections for people who are designated to serve in that role. Among the

things that might be considered, for example, are (1) a scheme of funding to compensate

them and to support training and education in the skills required to carry out their

professional role, and (2) statutory immunity from civil liability.

33

finding before that finding is made. (See Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 261,

264-265 [requiring hearing before termination of welfare benefits, rather than after].)

Petitioners’ argument is that without prior notice, the right to oppose these

decisions in court afterward is ineffective, in part because it would reverse the burden of

proof. (Cf. Doe v. Gallinot (9th Cir. 1981) 657 F.2d 1017, 1022.) They also posit the

patients’ feeble health and limited intellectual capacity are obstacles to filing a petition in

court challenging the attending physician’s incapacity determination. Petitioners also

contend that notice must be accompanied by an opportunity to oppose the incapacity

decision before it is made. They insist such a hearing must provide residents with the

usual accompaniments to an adversarial hearing, including the resident’s right to counsel

or a counsel substitute.

We must reject petitioners’ contentions as to timing as being beyond the minimum

requirements of due process. We can agree with them that giving notice before a

capacity decision is made would maximize protection of the patient’s constitutional

rights, and providing for a process more closely resembling an adjudication might

increase that protection still further, but the question is whether the Legislature is

required to provide that degree of protection as a matter of constitutional imperative.

In Goldberg v. Kelly the Supreme Court’s concern about the impact on individuals

affected by the state action necessitated a pre-termination hearing for welfare recipients,

for they would suffer a grievous loss if their benefits were cut off while awaiting the posttermination

hearing afforded by the state. (397 U.S. at pp. 260-264.) The difference in

circumstances makes it far more likely here that the treatment delays that would

accompany a hearing prior to the capacity determination would work to the serious harm

of nursing home residents needing immediate medical intervention. (Rains, supra, 32

Cal.App.4th at pp. 181-182.) The very point of enacting section 1418.8 in 1992 was to

establish a fair but streamlined procedure to be used in cases of incapacitated residents

without family or friends to make health care decisions on their behalf. To require, as a

matter of due process, all the features of a judicial proceeding would undermine the

34

fundamental purpose of the statute, which was to avoid the complications and delays

inherent in the judicial procedure established by Probate Code section 3200 et seq.

Timing constraints make petitioners’ proposed procedure infeasible. Notice

immediately following a doctor’s determination of incapacity, with an opportunity for

judicial review before treatment begins, satisfies due process. Although the statute

provides no opportunity for the resident to oppose the incapacity decision before it is

made, and no administrative review procedure separate from the IDT, it does allow for

judicial review of the incapacity and surrogacy decisions. This complies with the

requirements of due process. The statute presupposes the patient needs a medical

procedure or prescription, presumably on a relatively short timetable. (§ 1418.8,

subd. (a).) There is no requirement for a standalone capacity determination.20 When the

capacity determination is made contemporaneously with a treatment recommendation, the

patient’s needs generally will not allow for an adjudicative hearing in every case. Nor

must we presume that every recommended procedure or every incapacity finding will be

opposed by the resident.

The Director’s amici argue that a ruling by this court requiring a judicial

determination in each case, as a matter of course, would result in lengthy delays, and

patients would go without needed medicine or medical procedures, resulting in suffering

and possible death while waiting for a court ruling on capacity. Especially if

antipsychotics cannot be prescribed by an IDT, they predict more nursing home patients

will end up in mental hospitals. Additionally, more nursing home patients would have to

be admitted to hospitals or urgent care facilities because their health problems would turn

into emergencies while awaiting judicial action. Ultimately, the Director argues, nursing

homes may refuse to accept patients subject to decisionmaking under section 1418.8

because they may believe they would be unable to tend to the patient’s medical needs

20 Despite the wording of the statute, the evidence submitted by petitioners

included declarations by ombudsmen suggesting that capacity determinations are

routinely made upon the patient’s first entry into the nursing home, regardless of whether

there is any immediate need for informed consent, and the CMA agrees.

35

timely and responsibly. Hence, the Director and her amici predict, if we were to agree

with petitioners’ arguments, this most vulnerable population would run the risk of being

confined to acute care facilities or hospitals or left without a viable means of securing

medical care.

Petitioners clarify that a full-blown judicial proceeding such as that involved in

Probate Code section 3201 is unnecessary, but rather the Constitution would be satisfied

by an administrative board or a hearing procedure presided over expeditiously, such as

the administrative hearings put into operation by the Legislature following the decision in

Riese v. St. Mary’s Hospital & Medical Center (1987) 209 Cal.App.3d 1303, 1318. (See

Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5332.) Such a hearing, they suggest, could be conducted by “a

court-appointed commissioner or referee, or a court-appointed hearing officer” (Welf. &

Inst. Code, § 5334, subd. (c)), and therefore need not be made by a judge. This added

protection, in our view, would dispense with the IDT structure altogether. Petitioners

want to throw out the baby with the bath. Nothing so drastic is required. Pitted against

the argument that time is of the essence in medical decisions, the preference for prior

notice and an opportunity to resist the determination before it is made must give way to

efficacy of the proposed intervention.

b. Timing of Recommended Medical Interventions

As we view the statute, there is an opportunity to be heard in court upon a petition

under Probate Code section 3201 if the collaborative model of decisionmaking results in

deadlock (i.e., if anyone on the IDT disagrees with the incapacity or lack of surrogacy

determinations or the proposed treatment). Petitioners point out that, for incapacitated

persons, providing for a remedy in superior court is unrealistic and impractical due to

their physical and mental health challenges. Because individuals other than the patient

may initiate such proceedings (Prob. Code, § 3203), and because the procedure employed

on judicial review would include appointment of counsel for the resident (Prob. Code, §

3205), we see no lack of due process in the procedure provided, so long as the

36

implementation of the proposed treatment is delayed until after any judicial challenge has

been decided (with the exception of cases of emergency).

The opportunity to be heard must be provided at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner. (Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 267; Armstrong v. Manzo,

supra, 380 U.S. at p. 552.) Unless implementation of the physician’s recommended

treatment is postponed until after a collaborative decision has been made by the IDT or

judicial review has been completed, the medical procedure may have already been

completed before the patient may realistically oppose the incapacity determination and

the proposed medical intervention in court. This is why we conclude that, except in

emergencies, to give nursing home residents a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the

IDT’s decision on implementing treatment must be postponed until after notice has been

given, and the treatment may not begin until after the resident has had an opportunity to

seek judicial review.

Section 1418.8, subdivision (e) provides that the IDT must “review . . . the

prescribed medical intervention” before it is implemented. There is no language in

section 1418.8 either specifically authorizing or specifically prohibiting the IDT from

reviewing capacity determinations, but the Director presented evidence in the superior

court that IDT’s can and do review capacity and surrogacy determinations, as well as

medical treatments. This, she claims, is part of reviewing the patient’s overall

“condition” as prescribed in section 1418.8, subdivision (e)(1). Adopting that

construction of the statute, we find the IDT process serves as a more expeditious, and

constitutionally sound, alternative to judicial review, so long as a patient representative is

included on the IDT.

E. Facial Challenge on Cross-Appeal: Who Decides Capacity, Judge or

Doctor?

1. The Requirement of a Judicial Determination of Decisional Capacity

Petitioners contend in their cross-appeal that a physician cannot lawfully decide

whether the patient has decisional capacity because the question of capacity is inherently

37

a legal one, not a medical one. (Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 17.) Because section

1418.8 places that decision in a physician’s hands, petitioners contend it violates the

resident’s privacy rights under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. Even

worse, they point out, the decision under section 1418.8, subdivision (a) rests with the

attending physician, whom they consider a non-neutral party,21 who also participates on

the IDT (§ 1418.8, subd. (e)), which they contend deprives the patient of a neutral

decisionmaker in violation of due process.

Petitioners suggest, because section 1418.8 lacks a judicial determination of

incapacity as part of its procedure, the statute violates California’s privacy guarantee.

(Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) They contend the superior court’s declaration of

unconstitutionality of section 1418.8 did not go far enough because it did not declare a

determination of incapacity by a treating physician was unconstitutional. In response, the

Director claims the entire procedure described in section 1418.8 calls for the making of

medical decisions, not legal decisions. She finds some support in Washington v. Harper,

where the Supreme Court took no issue with the lack of a judicial hearing as to the need

for antipsychotic medication because it considered such matters best assessed by medical

professionals. (Washington v. Harper, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 231-233.) Rains, too,

adopted this reasoning. (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 184-185.)

In its June 2015 order, the superior court noted that section 1418.8 does not

“provide the same procedural safeguards found in Washington [v. Harper] requiring an

independent decisionmaker. Instead, section 1418.8[, subdivision] (e) requires the same

attending physician [who] determined the patient to be incompetent to be a part of the

IDT that reviews that physician’s prescribed medical intervention prior to administration

of the medical intervention.” Nevertheless, the superior court did not hold our

21 Petitioners portray attending physicians as being almost adversarial to the

residents. They insist upon their right to a “neutral” decisionmaker, casting attending

physicians as anything but that. We, like Rains, fail to share petitioners’ cynicism. We

cannot “presume the bias if not dishonesty of physicians opining as to the patient’s

capacity.” (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 181-182.)

38

Constitution demands that nursing home residents be provided with an independent

decisionmaker. It found the issue was decided by Rains.

We must determine whether the statute, on its face, violates the rights of nursing

home residents. To assert a privacy violation, Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1 requires three

elements: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious

invasion of privacy.” (Id. at pp. 39-40.) The Director contends there is no violation of

the patient’s privacy rights because the IDT procedure does not constitute an “egregious

breach of . . . social norms.” (Id. at p. 37.) Rains agreed with that analysis (Rains, supra,

32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 174-177), but petitioners contend the Supreme Court’s subsequent

decision in Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1, which addressed whether mentally disordered

offenders (MDOs) could be compelled against their will to be treated with antipsychotic

medication, casts into doubt the central holding of Rains.

The Mentally Disordered Offender Act requires that offenders who have been

convicted of violent crimes related to their mental disorders, and who continue to pose a

danger to society, receive mental health treatment during and after termination of their

parole until their mental disorder can be kept in remission. (Pen. Code, § 2960 et seq.)

Qawi addressed whether the petitioner, an MDO who had finished his period of parole,

could refuse antipsychotic medication for his mental disorder despite the statute

authorizing continued medication. (Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 9, 11.) In the MDO

Act, the Legislature specifically provided that MDOs who have completed their term of

parole retain the same rights granted to mentally ill patients that have been involuntarily

civilly committed under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act), found in Welfare and

Institutions Code section 5000 et seq. (See Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (g).)

Petitioners base their argument in large part on three sentences from Qawi, supra,

32 Cal.4th 1: “ ‘ “Competence is not a clinical, medical, or psychiatric concept. It does

not derive from our understanding of health, sickness, treatment, or persons as patients.

Rather, it relates to the world of law, to society’s interest in deciding whether an

individual should have certain rights (and obligations) relating to person, property and

39

relationships.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 17, quoting Riese v. St. Mary’s Hospital & Medical Center,

supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 1321.) From this premise, petitioners argue the statute’s

placement of the decisionmaking about capacity with doctors rather than judicial officers

deprives nursing home residents of their constitutionally-protected rights to make their

own medical decisions.

We view the decision on incapacity as involving both medical and legal aspects:

the decision on competency entails legal consequences and therefore may be considered

primarily legal—as Qawi found—but it undeniably has a medical aspect as well. A

person may become incompetent by reasons best explained medically. The legal

conclusion is therefore based at least in part on medical evidence, subject to a

standardized definition of incapacity in section 1418.8, subdivision (b), which supplies

some safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice.22 The determination of decisional

capacity is, to be sure, increasingly recognized as a complicated undertaking, especially

in patients with dementia. Petitioners’ evidence, as well as briefing supplied by

petitioners’ amici, further shows that determination of incapacity is far from an exact

science, that mistakes are made, and that capacity may vary from one context to another

and from one time to another, often fluctuating with the specific circumstances a resident

is in and the availability of someone who knows how to communicate effectively with

him or her. Declarations by ombudsmen and others familiar with nursing home practices

22 Physicians whose decisions on capacity were included in one study of 29

patients with mild Alzheimer’s disease showed only 54 percent agreement among the

doctors as to the capacity of the subjects to make their own medical decisions. (Marson

et al., Consistency of Physician Judgments of Capacity to Consent in Mild Alzheimer’s

Disease, Journal of the American Geriatric Society (April 1997) Vol. 45, pp. 453-457;

see also Moye, et al., Neuropsychological Predictors of Decision-Making Capacity over

9 Months in Mild-to-Moderate Dementia, J Gen. Intern. Med. (Jan. 2006) 21(1), pp. 78-

83.) When a standardized definition of capacity was introduced, a comparable study

showed doctors agreed 76 percent of the time. (Marson et al., Consistency of Physicians’

Legal Standard and Personal Judgments of Competency in Patients with Alzheimer’s

Disease, Journal of the American Geriatric Society (August 2000) Vol. 48, pp. 911-918.)

40

recount instances of erroneous or questionable determinations of incapacity, as in Gloria

A.’s case.

To convince us that the risk of error is so high that we should find a due process

violation here, petitioners point to language in Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1 stating that “in

order to give MDOs the same rights as LPS patients, an MDO can be compelled to take

antipsychotic medication in a nonemergency situation only if a court, at the time the

MDO is committed or recommitted, or in a separate proceeding, makes one of two

findings: (1) that the MDO is incompetent or incapable of making decisions about his

medical treatment; or (2) that the MDO is dangerous within the meaning of Welfare and

Institutions Code section 5300.” (Qawi, at pp. 9-10.) What they overlook is that our

Supreme Court’s decision in Qawi was based on statutory construction, not constitutional

analysis. (Id. at pp. 13-14, 24-25.)

We are not persuaded that Qawi calls for a judicial determination of incapacity.

Just because a capacity determination has some legal consequences does not mean it must

be made by a judge in every circumstance. In this statutory setting, the physician’s

decision regarding capacity is guided by objective standards and requires an investigation

regarding possible surrogacy and patient wishes. (§ 1418.8, subds. (b) & (c).) But the

most fundamental distinction is that, by its establishment of an IDT and provision for the

participation of a patient representative, section 1418.8 allows for an informal and

expeditious method—based on a collaborative model of decisionmaking—to resolve any

objections that might be expressed on the patient’s behalf.23 We conclude that so long as

23 Section 1418.8 is not unique in providing for an alternative to the adversarial

process as a decisionmaking model. For instance, the federal Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) employs a collaborative

decisionmaking process for disabled students to achieve a free appropriate public

education (FAPE). (See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d)(1)(B).) “The premise of the

IDEA is that parents and schools working together to design an IEP [individualized

education program] is the ideal way to reach the statute’s goal of a FAPE for every child.

See Ridley [School Dist. v. M.R. (3d Cir. 2012)] 680 F.3d [260,] 269; see also Schaffer v.

Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). Congress anticipated, however, that ‘the collaborative

41

the patient’s viewpoint is represented within the collaborative decisionmaking process of

the IDT, due process is not violated. The regulations implementing section 1418.8 allow

for the physician to make the incapacity determination only where the patient

representative raises no objection. If an objection is raised, the incapacity decision must

be made by a court. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 72527, subd. (c) [“The patient's

incapacity shall be determined by a court in accordance with state law or by the patient's

physician unless the physician’s determination is disputed by the patient or patient’s

representative.”].)

As Rains reasoned, the resident of a nursing home sacrifices a great deal of

privacy by reason of the very circumstances that have placed him or her there. (Rains,

supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 173-174.) Given their reduced expectation of privacy, Rains

held, the incursions on nursing home residents’ rights to self-determination of medical

treatment are not so severe as to call for increased protection of nursing home residents.

(Id. at pp. 172-177.) Given most especially the participation of a patient representative

(§ 1418.8, subd. (e)) and the availability of judicial review (id., subd. (j)), Rains held the

minimum standards of due process are met and there is no unconstitutional incursion into

residents’ privacy rights. (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 177, 182, 184, 187.) We

agree with Rains in that respect.

To adopt petitioners’ view—requiring a judicial determination for every case of

incapacity in every nursing home in the state—would throw us back into the thick of the

problem that led to the enactment of section 1418.8 in the first place. We could not find

our way there through any form of statutory construction, for that result would be

diametrically opposed to the Legislature’s intent. We would be justified in imposing



process’ may at times break down. [Citation.] Hence, the Act allows either party to

respond to a stalemate in the discussions by requesting an impartial due process hearing

before a state or local administrative officer. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).” (M.R. v. Ridley

School Dist. (3d Cir. 2014) 744 F.3d 112, 117.)

42

such a requirement on section 1418.8 only if it were a matter of constitutional imperative,

and it is not.

Rains rejected the idea that due process requires an adjudicative hearing to make

an initial determination of incapacity. (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 184-185.)

“Capacity determination, which must be decided under section 1418.8 before required

medical intervention is activated thereunder on potentially thousands of elderly nursing

home patients in this state,[24] would thereby be delayed, as would such treatment. No

case cited to us, or disclosed by our independent research, has suggested that procedural

due process requires postponement of medical intervention for a nursing home patient

who is found by a physician to lack capacity to consent thereto until, in each case, the

medical capacity issue is separately decided in some adversarial hearing. [¶] . . . Prompt

and effective medical treatment of these unfortunate citizens would be seriously

jeopardized [by such a ruling].” (Rains, at pp. 181-182.)

Rains also observed that the Legislature was better able to “reflect a proper

balance of social values at stake in this significant and difficult problem, and that it has

done so in enacting section 1418.8.” (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.) Thus, the

Legislature, after conducting hearings and giving considerable thought to various options,

elected to adopt a collaborative decisionmaking process rather than an adversarial one.

Rains held due process was nevertheless assured because of the right to seek judicial

review of a physician’s determination of a patient’s incapacity as well as to the medical

intervention itself, pursuant to section 1418.8, subdivision (j). (Rains, at p. 182.) Thus,

Rains held a judicial determination of decisional incapacity was not required, and the



24 At the time section 1418.8 was enacted, it was expected to affect some 10,000

nursing home residents in California. (Assem. Com. on Human Services, Analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 3209, May 5, 1992 (Reg. Sess. 1991-1992), pp. 2-3.) More recent

legislative estimates suggest some 3,000 to 12,000 nursing home residents are subject to

IDT decisionmaking under the statute. (Assem. Jud. Com. Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 481,

July 11, 2017 (Reg. Sess. 2017-2018), p. 6.) CAHF estimates that some 6,000 to 12,000

current residents of nursing homes in California are subject to decisionmaking under

section 1418.8.

43

procedure prescribed under section 1418.8 did not violate a patient’s due process rights.

(Rains, at p. 184.)

With the exception of the notice issue previously discussed—where we build upon

Rains in order to preserve section 1418.8’s facial constitutionality—we embrace the

Rains court’s conclusion that an IDT decisionmaking framework comports with

procedural due process (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 184), and we find no greater

protection is necessary for nursing home residents under the privacy guarantee of the

California Constitution. (Rains, at p. 178.) Nothing in Qawi convinces us Rains erred in

its essential holding that the basic IDT procedure prescribed by section 1418.8 is

constitutional.

2. Petitioners’ Argument to Exclude the Attending Physician as

Decisionmaker on Capacity

If the decision is to be made by someone other than a judicial officer, petitioners

argue, it must at least be someone uninvolved in the treatment of the resident. They rely

in part on Washington v. Harper, supra, 494 U.S. 210, where the United States Supreme

Court found a state prison inmate’s federal due process rights were not violated, even

though he was forcibly medicated, because an independent medical board determined he

was a danger to himself and others and the treatment was in his medical interest. (Id. at

p. 229.)

In Washington v. Harper, supra, 494 U.S. 210, under the institution’s policy,

before administration of antipsychotic drugs could begin, an inmate who refused such

medication was entitled to a hearing before a special committee consisting of a

psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the associate superintendent of the institution, none of

whom could be, at the time of the hearing, involved in the inmate’s treatment or

diagnosis. (Id. at p. 215.) The policy also provided for notice, the right to be present at

an adversary hearing, and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses. (Id. at

p. 216.) If the committee determined by a majority vote that the inmate suffered from a

mental disorder and was gravely disabled or dangerous, the inmate could be medicated

against his will, provided the psychiatrist was in the majority. (Id. at pp. 215-216.) The

44

Supreme Court found the provision of a neutral decisionmaking board significant in

upholding the constitutionality of the prison’s procedure. (Id. at pp. 233-235.)

Section 1418.8 does not provide for the same kind of independent decisionmaker,

for the prescribing physician in California nursing homes makes an initial autonomous

decision about the patient’s incapacity, lack of a surrogate decisionmaker, and proposed

treatment, and then is routinely included on the IDT that reviews those findings and the

proposed treatment.25 (§ 1418.8, subds. (a) & (e).) We do not agree that this role by the

attending physician renders section 1418.8 unconstitutional. “Due process is flexible and

calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (Morrissey v.

Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481; accord People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268.)

Like the Rains court, we will not assume bias or self-interest on the part of a

treating physician. (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 181-182.) Physicians are

governed by standards of practice and ethical oaths that lead us to presume they act in

what they perceive to be their patients’ best interests. They do not occupy the same role

as the jailers who wanted to medicate a prisoner in Washington v. Harper, the welfare

authorities who were terminating public benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S.

254, 271, or the parole officials who wanted to return a parole violator to prison in

Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 485-486. In those cases, there was by

definition a preexisting relationship to some degree adversarial, whereas in the attending

physician-patient context there should exist a relationship of trust or at least neutrality.

Petitioners have not shown otherwise. (See Washington v. Harper, supra, 494 U.S. at

pp. 233-234 [Vitek v. Jones (1980) 445 U.S. 480 and Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U.S. 584

identified as “previous cases involving medical decisions implicating similar liberty

interests [in which] we have approved use of similar internal decisionmakers”].)

25 Although the statute nominally requires the attending physician to serve on the

IDT, amicus curiae CLTCOA tells us that, in practice, typically no physician actively

participates on the IDT.

45

3. Petitioners’ Argument that an Attending Physician Should Not Sit on the

IDT

For the same reasons they contend an attending physician is non-neutral and

cannot be a decisionmaker on capacity, petitioners argue that an attending physician

should not be allowed to participate in reviewing his or her own recommended medical

intervention in his or her own patient’s case as a participant on an IDT. We reject this

variation of petitioners’ physician bias argument for the reasons just stated.

4. Determination of Existence of Surrogate Decisionmaker

Whether a surrogate exists for the resident is a purely factual question that can be

answered through a legal proof process, or an investigative one, which in our view could

be conducted and determined by medical personnel or by legal personnel. With statutory

guidance on how to conduct a fair and thorough investigation aimed at identifying a

surrogate decisionmaker (§ 1418.8, subd. (c)), treating physicians may be entrusted with

making a determination following such an investigation. Our state Constitution offers no

impediment on this ground, and the IDT process offers a meaningful review, followed by

judicial review if the patient or his or her representative continues to resist a finding of no

surrogate.

F. Facial Challenge: Additional Due Process Claims on Petitioners’ CrossAppeal

Petitioners argue, largely on the basis of Washington v. Harper, supra, 494 U.S.

210, that additional procedural protections must be incorporated into section 1418.8 in

order to bring it in line with the demands of due process. In formulating their objections

to section 1418.8, petitioners attempt to convert the particular features of one institution’s

policy described in Washington v. Harper into absolute minimum requirements for a

panel of nonjudicial decisionmakers to pass constitutional muster in making medical

decisions. Though the prison policy in Washington v. Harper was held to comply with

federal due process, the Supreme Court in that case made no pretense of setting forth

minimum standards for precise emulation by other institutions. (494 U.S. at pp. 228-

236.) We must examine only whether the procedures established by our state Legislature

46

for medical treatment of nursing home residents comport with minimum due process

standards of the state Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.)

Seeking a procedure more protective of patients’ rights, petitioners suggest (1) the

prescribing physician must not be allowed to participate on the IDT, (2) a patient should

be provided with counsel or a counsel substitute in the determination of incapacity, and

(3) the IDT is not allowed to review capacity and surrogacy decisions. Petitioners

thereby attempt to engraft onto the statute an adversarial process, presided over by a

judge, with two sides, each represented by counsel, taking opposing positions and

entrusting resolution of their disagreement to a neutral judicial officer.

We have already rejected petitioners’ first argument for the reasons stated in parts

IV.E.2 & IV.E.3., ante. Petitioners’ third point we resolve by holding that an IDT does

have the authority to review an attending physician’s capacity and surrogacy decisions.

Given the requirement that it review medical interventions quarterly (§ 1418.8, subd. (g))

and the fact that capacity fluctuates, the IDT presumably will revisit the incapacity

determination at the time of its quarterly reviews. The Director presented evidence that

the statute has been construed to allow the IDT that power, and we adopt that

interpretation as consistent with, though not compelled by, the statutory language. We

find no due process violation in the Legislature’s choice to provide nursing home

residents with an informal, collaborative decisionmaking process for determining

medication needs.

Nor are we persuaded that nursing home residents facing an incapacity

determination must be provided with some form of legal representation. Here again

petitioners presuppose that a resident perceived to lack decisional capacity must have

input before the capacity determination is made. We have determined that notice after

the determination, coupled with the availability of judicial review, satisfies due process.

If the resident or someone on his or her behalf (Prob. Code, § 3203) were to challenge the

incapacity determination through a petition under Probate Code section 3201, counsel

would be appointed at that stage. (Prob. Code, § 3205.)

47

Given our holdings that the IDT process does not itself offend the Constitution and

that IDT’s may reconsider the attending physician’s determination of incapacity, we

reject the notion that legal counsel must be appointed to help deal with that issue,

whenever it arises. The Legislature sought to eliminate from the process the timeconsuming

and adversarial nature that the participation of attorneys tends to entail.

Instead, it provided that residents would have a patient representative serve on an IDT.

(§ 1418.8, subds. (e), (f).) The inclusion of a patient representative in a collaborative

decisionmaking process, as we have explained, is enough to satisfy due process in this

context. (See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 236 [“lay adviser”

familiar with medical issues was adequate for purposes of subjecting prison inmate to

forced medication].)

G. As-Applied Challenge: Use of Section 1418.8 in Prescribing Antipsychotic

Medication

1. The Nature and Dangers of Antipsychotic Medications

Although antipsychotic drugs have been recognized to have considerable benefit

to mentally ill patients, they also have severe side effects, including some reversible

conditions, some irreversible, and even on rare occasions, sudden death. (Qawi, supra,

32 Cal.4th at pp. 14-15; Keyhea v. Rushen (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 526, 531 (Keyhea);

Washington v. Harper, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 229-230.) Antipsychotics “ ‘also possess a

remarkable potential for undermining individual will and self-direction, thereby

producing a psychological state of unusual receptiveness to the directions of

custodians.’ ” (Keyhea, at p. 531.) For this reason, authorities often seek to medicate

prisoners and others under their control, and those subject to such medication often

object. In light of the grave consequences of administering these antipsychotic drugs,

courts have recognized that MDOs, as well as state prisoners threatened with forcible

administration of antipsychotics, have procedural rights before they may be administered

these drugs against their will. (Qawi, at pp. 20-21, 27-28; Keyhea, at pp. 541-542;

48

Washington v. Harper, at p. 236.) The exact procedures required may vary from one

context to another. (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 481.)

2. Antipsychotics as Prescribed in Nursing Homes

According to the Director and her supporting amici curiae, the administration of

antipsychotics to nursing home residents proceeds much as described in section 1418.8,

such drugs are extremely beneficial to the many nursing home patients who need them,

and their use may be considered “nonintrusive” and “routine” in nursing homes. (See

Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Health and Safety Code section 1418.9

specifically authorizes the prescription of antipsychotics to a nursing home patient after

seeking the consent of the resident and notifying “an interested family member,” and so

long as the resident does not object. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1418.9, subds. (a), (b) &

(d).) That provision is evidently intended for patients not subject to IDT decisionmaking

under section 1418.8. The population subject to IDT decisionmaking often would have

no “interested family member” and so no notice would go out on their behalf. Once

again, a third party should also receive notice on behalf of the resident.

The Director and her amici point out the broad purposes of section 1418.8, namely

to “secure, to the greatest extent possible, health care decisionmakers” for unrepresented

residents lacking decisionmaking capacity “to ensure that the medical needs of nursing

facility residents are met even in the absence of a surrogate health care decisionmaker.”

(Stats. 1992, ch. 1303, § 1(c), p. 6327.) They claim the protections built into section

1418.8, together with other protections in the regulatory environment, are sufficient to

satisfy the residents’ constitutional rights to autonomy privacy and due process. They

also point out that more modern atypical antipsychotics have fewer side effects and are

now frequently used in nursing homes because they can be administered orally instead of

by injection. (Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 15.) These newer medications are also

49

controversial for use in institutional settings, however, because administration requires

patient cooperation.

26 (Qawi, at p. 15.)

Petitioners and their amici tell a decidedly different tale. They begin with the fact

that the “attending physician and surgeon” referenced in section 1418.8 is frequently the

nursing home’s medical director. The attending physician is, at any rate, usually assigned

to the resident, not chosen freely by the resident. (In re Conroy, supra, 486 A.2d at

p 1237.) As the medical director, the attending physician has a financial interest in

medicating patients with antipsychotics: by medicating them into a more complacent

state, whether in their best medical interests or not, the nursing home can manage the

facility’s population with fewer employees, thus increasing the facility’s profit.

Studies have shown that residents of nursing homes tend to be overmedicated with

antipsychotics. (E.g., Alice F. Bonner, Rationales That Providers and Family Members

Cited for the Use of Antipsychotic Medications in Nursing Home Residents with

Dementia (2015) 63 J. Am. Geriatrics Soc’y. 302, 302; Jan Goodwin, Antipsychotics

Overprescribed in Nursing Homes, AARP BULLETIN (July/Aug. 2014)

[as of July 22, 2019].) This is a special concern not only because

of the severe side effects ordinarily associated with these drugs, but because the effects

are much more detrimental in elderly patients (Prakash S. Masand, Side Effects of

Antipsychotics in the Elderly (2000) 61 J. Clinical Psychiatry 43, 43), and those over age

65 make up nearly 85 percent of the population in nursing homes nationwide.

(, p. 35 [as of July 22,

2019].)

The Director argues, however, that such problems have been recognized and

addressed, and abuse of antipsychotics in nursing homes has sharply declined in recent

years. Current data indicate that as of the fourth quarter of 2018, antipsychotic use has

been reduced to 11.1 percent of California nursing home residents, a 48.5 percent

reduction since 2011. (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), National

Partnership to Improve Dementia Care in Nursing Homes: Antipsychotic Medication Use

Data Report, Quarterly Prevalence of Antipsychotic Use for Long-Stay Residents, States

(April 2019)

[as of July 22, 2019].) This represents the fourth lowest prevalence of

use among the 50 states. (Ibid.) The statewide prevalence of 11.1 percent is well below

the national average of 14.6 percent. (Ibid.) Thus, the Director argues, past abuse

provides no legitimate reason for declaring nursing home residents to have special due

process protections in the administration of antipsychotics, where the regulatory system

already rigorously controls the use of antipsychotics in nursing homes. As for the risks

involved with antipsychotics, the Director points out that other common medications,

such as insulin and blood thinners, are riskier and have been connected with far more

adverse events and deaths than antipsychotics.

3. The Regulatory Environment

Through the Nursing Home Reform Act, which applies to almost all California

51

nursing homes,27 and its implementing regulations, the federal government has sought to

reduce over-prescription of psychotherapeutic drugs by explicitly limiting their use in

nursing homes. The law expressly provides that psychopharmacologic drugs may be

administered to nursing home residents only on the orders of a physician as part of a

written plan of care “designed to eliminate or modify the symptoms for which the drugs

are prescribed,” and only if, at least annually, an “independent, external consultant

reviews the appropriateness of the drug plan of each resident receiving such drugs.” (42

U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(D).)

The law also provides that nursing home residents have a right to be free from

“chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience and not required

to treat the resident’s medical symptoms.” (42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A)(ii).) Such

restraints may only be imposed “to ensure the physical safety of the resident or other

residents,” and “only upon the written order of a physician that specifies the duration and

circumstances under which the restraints are to be used,” except in emergencies. (Ibid.)

“The information material to a decision concerning the administration of a

psychotherapeutic drug or physical restraint, or the prolonged use of a device that may

lead to the inability of the patient to regain use of a normal bodily function shall include

at least the following: [¶] (1) The reason for the treatment and the nature and seriousness

of the patient’s illness. [¶] (2) The nature of the procedures to be used in the proposed

treatment including their probable frequency and duration. [¶] (3) The probable degree

and duration (temporary or permanent) of improvement or remission, expected with or

without such treatment. [¶] (4) The nature, degree, duration and probability of the side

effects and significant risks, commonly known by the health professions. [¶] (5) The

27 That Act applies to nursing homes that have provider agreements under the

Medicaid or Medicare programs. (See Cal. Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, Inc. v.

Chapman (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2013, No. 12-CV-06408-JST) 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77807,

at pp. *2-3; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(g)(1)(A), 1396r(g)(1)(A) [requiring state certification

of compliance by facilities].) The Director informs us that only a small fraction of the

state’s nursing homes are not certified for participation in these programs, in some cases

because they are in process of obtaining certification.

52

reasonable alternative treatments and risks, and why the health professional is

recommending this particular treatment. [¶] (6) That the patient has the right to accept or

refuse the proposed treatment, and if he or she consents, has the right to revoke his or her

consent for any reason at any time.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 72528, subd. (b); see

also id., § 72527, subd. (a)(5).)

Under federal regulations, facilities must ensure that antipsychotic drug therapy is

not given to residents who have not previously used psychotropic drugs “unless the

medication is necessary to treat a specific condition as diagnosed and documented in the

clinical record,” and they must give residents “gradual dose reductions, and behavioral

interventions, unless clinically contraindicated, in an effort to discontinue these drugs.”

(42 C.F.R. § 483.45(c)(3), (e)(1) & (e)(2).) Each resident’s drug regimen must be

reviewed on a monthly basis by a pharmacist, who must report “irregularities,” and

facilities must act on such reports. (42 C.F.R. § 483.45(c)(1) & (c)(4).)

The Director assures us the Department, too, is concerned about overuse of

antipsychotic drugs in nursing homes. She nevertheless appeals the superior court’s

order requiring judicial approval of such prescriptions, arguing (1) the legislative history

of section 1418.8 shows it was intended to allow the IDT procedure for prescription of

antipsychotics; (2) no restrictions on such use of the statute are mentioned in the statute

itself; and (3) due to efforts by the Department and other agencies over the past few

years, prescriptions of antipsychotics in nursing homes have declined by more than 48

percent in California. (See part IV.G.2, ante.) The Department argues that without

availability of the IDT procedure, patients who need antipsychotics will not get them in a

timely manner and will suffer distress and possibly transfer to an acute care or psychiatric

facility as a result. The Department has never condoned or encouraged the abuse of

antipsychotics in nursing homes, so far as we can tell from the record.

4. The Legal Background

Rains did not discuss the administration of antipsychotic drugs to nursing home

patients found incompetent under section 1418.8. The only inferential reference to

antipsychotic drugs in section 1418.8 itself is the authorization of “chemical restraints” in

53

an emergency, without a prior IDT determination to administer such restraints.

(§ 1418.8, subd. (h); Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) If such “chemical

restraints” are used, an IDT must be convened within one week thereafter to evaluate that

use. (§ 1418.8, subd. (h).) Petitioners argue that the IDT process cannot be used to

prescribe antipsychotics due to the statute’s lack of procedural safeguards required as a

matter of due process. They rely on a handful of cases concerned with forcible

administration of antipsychotics in settings distinct from that of the nursing homes with

which we deal.

We are convinced that context matters, and the same procedures employed in

prison settings need not be employed in nursing homes, not because nursing home

residents are less worthy of protection (obviously they are not), but because nursing home

patients have the protection of other laws sufficient to protect their privacy interests. And

because of the urgency of medical decisions in nursing homes, and the size and staffing

of the facilities, the same procedures need not be employed as are used in prisons or

mental hospitals in order to comply with due process.

The right to refuse antipsychotic medication is not absolute but may be limited by

countervailing state interests. (Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 15.) Rains held the state’s

interest in providing care to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves on a timely

basis is a compelling state interest (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 176), and we agree

with that assessment. Courts have permitted unconsented medical treatment of an adult

when that adult has been adjudged incompetent. (Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 15-16;

Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 535.) We conclude the same result should hold true

when an individual has been deemed incapacitated by his or her attending physician and

lawfully prescribed an antipsychotic drug through an IDT process under section 1418.8.

In Keyhea, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d 526, a taxpayer action was brought challenging

the practice at the California Medical Facility (CMF) of involuntary treatment of

prisoners with antipsychotic drugs. The decision to administer antipsychotic drugs

involuntarily on a long-term basis was made by the chairman of an institutional review

board upon referral by a prison psychiatrist. (Id. at p. 531.) The chairman’s decision

54

would be made after an oral presentation by the referring psychiatrist, a review and

discussion of the patient’s file by the board members, and an interview of the prisoner.

(Ibid.) CMF’s internal procedure provided for the board to review the decision to

medicate every 90 days. (Ibid.)

Under CMF’s policy, inmates were afforded no right to counsel at board hearings

and no right to judicial review. (Keyhea, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 531.) Penal Code

section 2600 provides that a prisoner may be deprived only of such rights as necessary to

provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which the prisoner is confined and

for the reasonable protection of the public. The Keyhea court found that, by statute, state

prisoners retained the same rights accorded to nonprisoners in this area, and further found

that under the LPS statutory scheme, nonprisoners in California have a statutory right to

refuse long-term treatment with antipsychotic drugs absent a judicial determination that

they are incompetent to refuse treatment. (Id. at pp. 534-537.) Keyhea held state

prisoners, like nonprisoners committed under the LPS Act, are entitled to a judicial

determination of their competency to refuse treatment unless deprivation of this right is

necessary to prison security. (178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 541-542.) The Court of Appeal held

the trial court had properly ruled that prisoners were entitled to notice, judicial hearing,

judicial determination, personal appearance, and assistance of counsel, as afforded to LPS

committees. (Id. at p. 542, fn. 14.) The appellate court’s ruling was based on statutory

construction, however, not constitutional compulsion. (Id. at p. 541.)

Qawi also found procedures used for prescribing antipsychotic drugs to MDOs

were insufficient to protect their rights, but again, it made the ruling as a matter of

statutory construction, not constitutional analysis. (Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 24-25.)

Washington v. Harper examined an institution’s procedure for prescribing antipsychotics

to prisoners and found it met constitutional requirements. (See parts IV.E.1 & IV.F,

ante.) It did not thereby establish each feature of that procedure as a requirement of due

process. In sum, none of the cases cited by petitioners sets specific due process

requirements when state authorities prescribe antipsychotic drugs for persons in their

custody or subject to their control.

55

Moreover, in each of the cases just discussed, there was a question of forcible

administration of antipsychotics. In other words, we know the institutionalized

individual objected to the administration of the drugs, whereas in considering a challenge

to section 1418.8, the viewpoint of the patient is unknown. If the patient objects to being

given antipsychotics, judicial review is available, and treatment with antipsychotics is

usually not so urgent that the judicial process is unworkable for purposes of review. If

the patient is not so staunchly opposed to the proposed medication, the IDT may be used

as a viable first step to attempt to reach consensus on whether the medication should be

administered. We have already held that the IDT process complies with due process, and

that is true regardless of the nature of the medical intervention.

5. The Superior Court’s Decision

The superior court’s judgment on the antipsychotics issue included the following

directive:

“II. [¶] (A) That the use of Health and Safety Code section 1418.8 is prohibited for

the administration of antipsychotic drugs to residents unless authorized pursuant to the

procedures set forth in Probate Code section 3200 et seq., except in emergency situations

as emergencies are defined under California law; [¶] (1) Provided, however, that for those

residents already receiving an antipsychotic drug pursuant to the process set out in

section 1418.8, subdivision (e), the facility is prohibited from continuing to implement

the prescription or order for such drug, after 180 days following issuance of this writ,

absent: (a) notification in writing of the right to contest the above determinations and

decision set forth in I. above; and (b) implementation by the Department of procedural

safeguards consisting of either a judicial finding of incompetency as in In re Qawi (2004)

32 Cal.4th 1 or Keyhea v. Rushen [(1986)] 178 Cal.App.3d 526, or an independent

review process with notice and opportunity to be heard as in Washington v. Harper

(1990) 494 U.S. 210.”

The superior court thus read Washington v. Harper, Qawi, and Keyhea, as

establishing the procedural safeguards necessary for due process. The trouble is, as

56

described above, none of those cases sets forth minimum constitutional requirements for

a procedure used to administer antipsychotics even in the context in which they were set;

they certainly did not set forth constitutional due process requirements for determination

of medication needs in nursing homes.

6. As a Matter of Statutory Construction, There is No Basis for Treating

Prescription of Antipsychotics Differently from Other Proposed Medical

Interventions

In construing a statute, we turn first to the words used, for that is the best indicator

of legislative intent. (Ramirez v. City of Gardena (2018) 5 Cal.5th 995, 1000; see

Lippman v. City of Oakland, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.) Looking at the statutory

text here, the specific question presented is whether a prescription for antipsychotics is a

“medical intervention” as used in section 1418.8, subdivision (a). We conclude it is.

Although we, too, begin with the foundation established by the holding in Rains—

which we view as basically sound—this case presents issues outside the context of the

“routine, day-to-day” medical decisionmaking, and those issues, we think, not only

require us to expand upon Rains, but to reexamine some aspects of the approach to

statutory interpretation the Rains court took. (Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Board of

Equalization (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 19, 35 (Lucent) [recognizing “latitude [each Court

of Appeal panel has] to disregard the decisions of . . . sister Courts of Appeal (and even

our own prior decisions) [citation] . . . when there is ‘good reason’ to do so”].) Rains did

not address the issue of whether administration of antipsychotic drugs is permitted under

section 1418.8, but it did opine that section 1418.8 applied only to nonintrusive, routine

medical procedures. (Rains, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Petitioners suggest that

the severe side effects of antipsychotics renders them non-routine and extremely

intrusive, therefore meriting special protection for nursing home residents. We find no

language in the statute to support the interpretation that it applies only to routine medical

interventions.

Rains relied on language in the preamble to section 1418.8 suggesting it was

required to make sure nursing homes could secure substituted consent to meet their

57

patients’ medical needs, including “day-to-day medical treatment decisions . . . on an ongoing

basis,” which were difficult to secure using the pre-existing legal methods. (Stats.

1992, ch. 1303, § 1(b), p. 6327.) The preamble, by our reading, does not limit section

1418.8’s application to those “day-to-day” decisions, however. Although the conception

of section 1418.8 the Rains court adopted in passing on the issue of facial

constitutionality appears to be predicated on an understanding that the preamble may be

read as, in effect, a limitation on the reach of the statute, this case requires us to confront

the question in a specific setting, as applied. While we otherwise agree with the Rains

holding, on this specific point we do not. (People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 858-

861 (Allen) [uncodified statement of legislative intent may not be read into the text of the

statute itself to justify construction contrary to plain meaning].)

We see no evidence in the text of the statute that the preamble was intended to be

anything more than illustrative. Giving the operative statutory text its plain meaning, as

we must, we conclude that section 1418.8 was drafted with breadth enough to cover

antipsychotic medications, even though their effects on patients is anything but “routine.”

In an apparent effort to fit the case within Rains, the Director asserts, to the contrary, that

the administration of antipsychotic drugs is “routine” in nursing homes. Finding no

support for this position, the superior court rejected the argument that administering

antipsychotics could accurately be characterized as “nonintrusive and routine, ongoing”

care. It was justified in doing so, but even if administration of antipsychotic drugs in

nursing homes is “routine” in the sense that it is common, as several amicus briefs

suggest, we find the issue to be beside the point because we do not view section 1418.8 to

be limited to “routine” medical interventions.

The superior court held, “Patients in skilled nursing facilities and intermediate care

facilities are entitled to no [fewer] rights than mentally ill patients and prisoners, and

therefore are either entitled to procedural safeguards consisting of either a judicial finding

of incompetency as in Qawi and Keyhea, or some type of independent review process of

the attending physician’s recommendation to administer antipsychotic drugs along with

notice and opportunity to be heard as in Washington [v. Harper].” Because section

58

1418.8 does not provide such procedural safeguards, the court found the Department’s

application of section 1418.8 permitting patients to be treated with antipsychotic drugs

under this statutory procedure would violate these patients’ due process rights. In order

to avoid this unconstitutional result, the superior court construed section 1418.8 as simply

not applying to administration of antipsychotic medications: “Since section 1418.8 was

not intended to permit administration of antipsychotic drugs, compliance with the

procedures set forth in Probate Code section 3200 et seq. would still be required, except

in emergency situations.” We cannot accept this construction of the statute, as further

explained below.

7. As a Matter of Due Process, Residents are Entitled to No Greater Rights in

the Prescription of Antipsychotic Medications than in Any Other

Prescription

We see no textual reason for excepting antipsychotic medications from the

procedure established in section 1418.8, and no mode of constitutional analysis requires

us to read it that way. The same due process safeguards found to be required in the

inherently coercive context of involuntary commitments are not required here. (Rains,

supra, 32 Cal.App. 4th at pp. 186-187.) For incapacitated nursing home residents section

1418.8 provides an approximation of informed consent, while for prisoners and MDOs

informed consent is disregarded altogether. A higher level of due process scrutiny is selfevidently

necessary in that setting. We must examine section 1418.8 as it comes to us,

bearing in mind that “ ‘due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as

the particular situation demands.’ ” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 268,

quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 481.)

Although we part ways with Rains in assessing the breadth of the statute, we see

the context in essentially the same way that court did. The situation here is that of

individuals, often elderly and poor, who have been determined by their doctors to lack the

capacity to make their own medical decisions, who have no advance directive, no

conservator, no surrogate decisionmaker, and no next of kin or other family or friends to

speak up for them. As a premise to application of the statute, we will often know nothing

59

about their wishes in the circumstances. Their privacy and self-determination interests,

while remaining precious, are somewhat diminished by their very physical and mental

condition. The nursing home has a strong and often urgent interest in getting these

patients their medications, including antipsychotic medications if necessary to treat a

medical condition (and not used for patient control). As described above, the statutory

and regulatory framework now in place sets clear limitations on the use of

psychotherapeutic drugs. If the Director implements the law as written, the kind of abuse

that has been described to us should not occur.

We admit to alarm at the descriptions of rampant abuse of antipsychotic

medications that are contained in the amicus curiae briefs filed on behalf of the

petitioners, as well as petitioners’ somewhat anecdotal evidence submitted at trial. We

anticipate that the changes we have mandated as a matter of due process—written notice

to the resident and at least one additional supportive person, an opportunity to oppose

treatment and capacity determinations in the IDT process by mandatory participation of a

patient representative, and the opportunity for a judicial decision via judicial remedies

authorized by section 1418.8, subdivision (j)—will help to prevent future abuse of

antipsychotics in nursing homes. Those changes, together with vigilant enforcement of

existing laws and regulations, should offer protection to nursing home patients, while not

requiring judicial intervention in every prescription of antipsychotic medication.

H. As-Applied Challenge: Applicability of Section 1418.8 to End of Life

Decisions

1. The Trial Court’s Ruling and the Contentions of the Parties

In the last set of issues framed by the parties, we are tasked with reviewing an

injunction against the use of section 1418.8 “to make end of life decisions regarding the

withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for [nursing home] residents,”

subject to four exceptions, first for decisions implementing a patient’s wish to end life,

second for decisions carrying out a patient’s instructions, third for decisions to decline

patient instructions for ineffective care or care contrary to generally accepted medical

standards, and fourth for decisions to cease curative care and begin hospice care. The

60

injunction issued upon an order granting petitioners’ request for a writ of mandate on

their eighth cause of action, which attacks the use of section 1418.8 “for treatments or

discontinuation thereof which would result in death, such as, but not limited to[,] do not

resuscitate, comfort care or discontinuation of treatment, or for POLST orders.” (Italics

added.)28

Petitioners contend section 1418.8 must not be used to end the lives of nursing

home residents, and to the extent it has been so used, it violates due process and the

California constitutional privacy guarantee. (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 7.) In 1993, a

memo describing the implementation of the relatively new section 1418.8 was written by

the Department of Health Services’29 Licensing and Certification branch and sent to

District Administrators throughout the state. The memo included a “Question and

Answer” sheet which posed, as one potential question, whether section 1418.8 could be

used to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment. It then answered the question:

“No. H & S Code, Section 1418.8, authorizes the IDT to make decisions regarding

medical interventions. Since withdrawing or withholding life sustaining treatments are

not medical interventions, this statute does not authorize the IDT to make these decisions

on behalf of residents.” (Italics added.) But the Director now takes the position, as she

did in the superior court, that while section 1418.8 is not designed for decisions to

withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatments, it may be used for some end of life

decisions, such as the use of DNR orders directing that medically intrusive and painful

resuscitative life-saving procedures not be used, or that terminally ill patients be sent to

28 “POLST” means a “request regarding resuscitative measures that directs a

health care provider regarding resuscitative and life-sustaining measures.” (Prob. Code,

§ 4780, subd. (a)(3); see id., § 4788, subd. (a)(3).) A patient or the patient’s legal

surrogate and a physician, nurse practitioner, or physician’s assistant must sign the

POLST in order for it to be enforceable. (Prob. Code, § 4780, subd. (c).) A “do not

resuscitate” (DNR) order is “a written document, signed by . . . a legally recognized

health care decisionmaker, and . . . the individual’s physician, that directs a health care

provider regarding resuscitative measures.” (§ 4780, subd. (a)(1); see id., subd. (e)).

29 The Department of Health Services was the predecessor to the Department.

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hospice care.30 The Director urges us, however, not to reach the merits of the issue

because the superior court’s order was an advisory opinion, because the review of that

order raises issue that are not yet ripe for decision, and because the court improperly

attributed actions by nursing homes to state action by the Department. If we reach the

merits, the Director urges us to preserve an exception for referral to hospice care, which

she argues is not an “end of life decision.”

2. Justiciability

We reject the contention that any review of the superior court’s ruling on the use

of section 1418.8 for end of life decisionmaking is nonjusticiable on any of the grounds

the Director advances. The superior court made specific factual findings about the

practices of IDT’s in making end of life decisions, and in doing so ruled on a concrete,

live controversy that placed in doubt the constitutionality of section 1418.8 and its

ongoing applicability—or inapplicability, as the case may be—to thousands of nursing

30 The declaration of Dr. Steinberg, submitted in opposition to petitioners’ motion

for writ of mandate, states that: “Denying unbefriended residents the opportunity for

IDT’s to make certain decisions regarding appropriate end of life care would result in

unnecessary pain and harm to residents, mandated provisions of care that is contrary to

generally accepted health care standards, and the denial of care to which they are legally

entitled. For example, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is not indicated in cases of

cardiac or respiratory arrest of certain frail, terminally ill patients where CPR is highly

likely to be medically ineffective and to cause broken ribs and other complications for the

very small percentage of such individuals who survive the initial arrest. Many

geriatricians and other health care professionals believe it would be not only a distinct

unkindness, but also medically futile (sometimes called ‘medically ineffective’)

treatment, which doctors are not required to provide. Most unbefriended residents, in the

absence of an advance directive, pre-existing Physician Order for Life Sustaining

Treatment (POLST), or other information about their treatment wishes, would be unable

to obtain any such ‘do not resuscitate’ order if resort to court approval or conservatorship

appointment were required due to practical and financial constraints. Also, terminally ill

residents are entitled under Medicare to the benefit of hospice care. This care provides

immeasurable benefits to residents with advanced terminal illness that helps them die

with dignity, including specialized pain-relieving care and additional social service

support . . . . However, if court intervention or conservatorship were required to make

hospice referrals, many residents would be denied their rights to receive hospice

benefits.”

62

home residents across the state. The test for ripeness requires us to consider not only

whether the issue presented is appropriate for judicial resolution, but any hardships that

may result if we refuse to decide the issue now. CAHF, as an intervenor in the superior

court, estimated that 15 percent of the nursing home residents covered by section 1418.8

(900 to 1,800 residents) currently receive hospice or palliative care through the section

1418.8 process. Even if we thought the issue might be unripe (and we do not), the risk of

grave consequences to a significant number of Californians would nevertheless move us

to answer the questions posed now. And as for the Director’s state action objection, “the

state constitutional right to privacy (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1), one of the traditional sources

of a patient’s right to autonomy and bodily integrity, protects against private conduct[.]”

(Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 541, fn. 10.)

3. Petitioners Have Not Established That Section 1418.8 Has Been Used for

True “End of Life” Decisions

Turning to the merits, we will reverse the order granting writ relief on the

petitioners’ eighth cause of action. We see no evidence in the record to support any use

of IDT’s by nursing homes to make end of life decisions which result in death, which is

what petitioners alleged and here on appeal remains the thrust of their argument,

supported by repeated references in their briefs to “life ending” decisions.31 The

evidentiary record supporting the eighth cause of action consists of a series of

declarations from social workers and ombudsmen knowledgeable about practices of

nursing facilities in different parts of the state, and relatives of individuals who have

passed away but who were once nursing home residents, recounting situations in which

nursing home staff members—acting on their own, without consulting the resident, and

31 Petitioners’ opening brief on cross-appeal at pages 30, 57 (IDT’s are making

decisions under section 1418.18 “to end lives”); id. at page 58 (“the Department is in no

way limiting the ending of lives”); id. at page 77 (“When statutes permit ending life, they

say so explicitly.”); id. at page 78 (“far greater protections would be required to cause

death” than section 1418.8 provides”); ibid. (“result” of decisions under section 1418.8 to

cease curative care is “final, unappealable death”).

63

sometimes without even pretense of the authority from an IDT or a physician—imposed

or changed a POLST or a DNR order, or decided to place a resident on comfort care,

sending the person to hospice care and ceasing all curative treatment. Citing these

declarations, the trial court specifically found that nursing homes are “making end of life

decisions without consulting patients and without considering the patient’s wishes as to

end of life decisions.”32

There is an evidentiary gap between what was pleaded on this issue and what was

proved. The problem here is that the principal case cited by the petitioners in support of

the eighth cause of action, and relied upon by the superior court in issuing writ relief on

that claim, Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th 519, does not speak of “end of life

decision[making].” That broad phrase, which the superior court adopts in its order

granting writ relief, encompasses a range of decisions that may lead to the process of

dying, or relate to it in some way, but that do not themselves “result in death.” Especially

32 The principal findings were as follows: (1) “[T]he declaration of ombudsman

Cheryl Simcox describes being at IDT meetings that discuss decisions such as hospice

care, [and] DNR [Do Not Resuscitate] . . . .” (2) “Social Worker Margaret Main also

describes a patient whose wishes included that she did not want life sustaining treatment

were conveyed to the RN and social service designee, but the primary physician

determined that the patient lacked capacity and changed the POLST to CPR and full

code. . . . The social worker later found a cousin of the resident to sign the POLST

reflecting the patient’s wishes, but Main points out that the patient could have been

subjected to various life sustaining treatments against the patient’s wishes.” (3) “A

physician order for life-sustaining treatment (POLST) was signed by a physician, but not

by [resident] Mark [H.], that stated ‘full code’ [meaning full life-sustaining treatment]

when Mark [H.] entered the nursing facility. Prior to a meeting by the IDT, [local

ombudsman Geneva] Carroll visited Mark [H.] and asked if he wanted to live or die, but

he did not respond, nor did his facial expression change, although when Carroll left, he

stated ‘come back any time.’. . . At a meeting of the IDT, Carroll discovered that no one

had asked Mark [H.] what he wanted so the IDT went to talk to him, but all he said to the

nurse practitioner that spoke to him was ‘Do you know what I am?’ Thereafter, the

meeting resumed and Mark [H.]’s POLST was changed from full code to comfort care

only, meaning Mark [H.] would receive no life sustaining treatment although he would

receive nutrition . . . . Mark [H.] passed away at the facility while in the care of hospice in

February 2013,” about two months after the change in his POLST.

64

given the magnitude of the issues presented here, we think it important to speak with

precision about the types of decisions at issue in this case—as established by the evidence

presented—rather than in broad generalities.

4. This Case Is Not Governed by Wendland

At issue in Wendland was a stark, life-or-death decision about whether to withhold

life support from a conscious but incapacitated patient who faced imminent death without

it. (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 523-524.) After spending more than a year in a

coma following an auto accident, Robert Wendland, the patient in Wendland, remained

severely disabled, physically and cognitively, despite years of therapy. (Id. at p. 524.)

He was able to supply some yes or no answers using an augmented communication

device, and on one occasion after answering a series of such questions, he did not answer

when asked whether he wished to die. (Id. at p. 528.)

Rose Wendland, Robert’s wife and conservator, authorized a series of surgeries to

replace dislodged feeding tubes, but when asked to do so on a fourth occasion, declined

to approve it. (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 525-526.) Robert’s treating physician

inserted a temporary tube pending decision from the hospital ethics committee, and that

committee ultimately supported Rose’s decision. (Id. at p. 526.) The case arose when

Robert’s mother and sister objected to Rose’s instruction to the medical team that they

remove his temporary feeding tube and let him die. (Id. at p. 524.) Because there was an

objection, Rose sought approval for her proposed decision from the probate court, where

she argued that as conservator she had exclusive authority to make all medical decisions

on Robert’s behalf she deemed appropriate so long as she believed they were in his best

interest. (Id. at pp. 552-553.) Our Supreme Court ultimately determined that the trial

court properly denied Rose’s request. (Id. at p. 524.)

As framed in the Supreme Court, the issue presented was whether a conservator

may “withhold artificial nutrition and hydration from a conscious conservatee who is not

terminally ill, comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state, and who has not left formal

instructions for health care or appointed an agent or surrogate for health care decisions.”

(Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 523-524.) “Interpreting Probate Code section 2355

65

in light of the relevant provisions of the California Constitution” (Wendland, at p. 524)—

the privacy clause, Article I, section 1, securing a right to refuse medical treatment, which

is in turn rooted in the fundamental right of personal autonomy (Wendland, at pp. 531-

532)—the court held that “a conservator may not withhold artificial nutrition and

hydration from such a person absent clear and convincing evidence the conservator’s

decision is in accordance with either the conservatee’s own wishes or best interest.” (Id.

at p. 524.) That burden of proof was not met, the court found, under the “dual standard”

governing conservator decisionmaking under Probate Code section 2355 (Wendland, at

p. 542): either the “primary standard” for evaluating Rose’s proposed decision (based on

Robert’s actual wishes) (id. at pp. 542-552), or the “fallback” best interests standard

(which applies in all cases where the patient’s wishes cannot be determined) (id. at

pp. 552-554).

It seems clear why petitioners characterize the IDT determinations they seek to

challenge in the eighth cause of action, in blunt terms, as “decisions to end life.” That is

the causative framing used by the Wendland court. (See Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at

p. 554 [“the exceptional case where a conservator proposes to end the life of a conscious

but incompetent conservatee”]; id. at p. 530 [“the conservator has claimed the authority

to end the conservatee’s life”]; id. at p. 538 [“[a]t the time the Legislature was

considering the present version of section 2355, no court had interpreted any prior

version of the statute as permitting a conservator deliberately to end the life of a

conscious conservatee,” italics omitted]; id. at p. 545 [“the primary standard for

decisionmaking set out in section 2355 does articulate what will in some cases form a

constitutional basis for a conservator’s decision to end the life of a conscious patient”].)

But Wendland used this language to describe the plight of a conservatee who faced

certain death if deprived of life support, which is why temporary life-sustaining measures

had to be taken while his conservator’s decision to “pull the plug” was litigated.

We are unpersuaded Wendland is controlling here. That case, at its core, turns on

“ ‘the “gravity of the consequences that would result from an erroneous determination

of” ’ ” a decision to remove a conscious but impaired patient from life support.

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(Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 546.) By contrast to situations where there is “ ‘the

potential that a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated[,] [a]n

erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment . . . is not susceptible of

correction.’ ” (Id. at p. 547.) To deal with circumstances where the “ultimate decision is

whether a conservatee lives or dies” and the risk of error is that the conservator’s decision

will “subject him to starvation, dehydration, and death” while he silently dissents but

cannot speak (ibid.), the Wendland court chose to set the conservator’s burden of proof at

a level high enough to protect the conservatee’s fundamental right to personal autonomy.

And that called for the most demanding civil burden—clear and convincing proof. (Id. at

p. 554.)

None of the IDT decisions set forth in petitioners’ declarations involving POLSTs,

DNR orders or hospice care are life or death decisions that would expose the patient to

“starvation, dehydration, and death.” (Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 547.) They are

all decisions that, if erroneous, nonetheless remain subject to change within an IDT

process that meets the constitutional requisites we have set forth in this opinion. None

involves a decision that, at least so far as the record here shows, directly and inexorably

resulted in death. It seems to us that they are better characterized, instead, as decisions

made in anticipation of the end of life, since they all have to do with ensuring comfort

and quality of life, as a patient’s end draws near.33 Anyone subject to a change in a

33Much of the dispute between the parties over what petitioners characterize as

“life ending” decisions revolves around the question whether a referral to hospice care, in

particular, should be characterized as such a decision. We agree with the Director that it

is not properly so characterized. To the contrary, it is most often a choice in favor of

comfort and quality of life over unbearable pain. Essentially, hospice care “recognizes

that the impending death of an individual warrants a change in the focus from curative

care to palliative care for relief of pain and for symptom management.” (Medicare

Program, FY 2017 Hospice Wage Index and Payment Rate Update and Hospice Quality

Reporting Requirements, 81 Fed.Reg. 52144, 52145 (Aug. 5, 2016) (Medicare Program

Update); see 48 Fed.Reg. 56008, 56008 (Dec. 16, 1983).) The “goal of hospice care is to

help terminally ill individuals continue life with minimal disruption to normal activities

while remaining primarily in the home environment.” (Medicare Program Update, supra,

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POLST or DNR order or to a hospice transfer decision will receive notice, and anyone on

the IDT who has reservations about such matters can object, triggering the potential for

judicial review not only before any such decision is implemented, but on an ongoing

basis in the process of periodic IDT review.

5. Section 1418.8 Covers the IDT Decisions Being Challenged in This Case

As a matter of statutory interpretation, separate from their reliance on Wendland,

petitioners argue that section 1418.8 may be used only for routine, day-to-day decisions

to initiate nonintrusive medical treatment, which, so they say, cannot include decisions to



81 Fed.Reg. 52145.) “[H]ospice uses an interdisciplinary approach to deliver medical,

nursing, social, psychological, emotional, and spiritual services through use of a broad

spectrum of professionals and other caregivers, with the goal of making the beneficiary as

physically and emotionally comfortable as possible.” (Ibid.)

We see nothing in the federal statute and regulations governing Medicare coverage

for hospice care requiring that life-sustaining care, such as insulin, therapeutic

transfusions, dialysis, or a feeding tube—which are forms of supportive care, since they

are not designed to bring about a cure—must be discontinued. These statutes and

regulations prohibit transfer to hospice absent two physicians’ determinations that the

patient is terminally ill with a life expectancy of six months or less. (42 C.F.R.

§§ 418.20, 418.22(b)(l).) For such Medicare beneficiaries, hospice care is a benefit under

Medicare Part A. (42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(4).) Under Medicare, however, the patient must

be notified of “the palliative rather than curative nature of hospice care, as it relates to the

individual’s terminal illness.” (42 C.F.R. § 418.24(b)(2).) Upon electing hospice care,

the patient waives other “Medicare services that are related to the treatment of the

terminal condition for which hospice care was elected or a related condition,” with

certain exceptions. (42 C.F.R. § 418.24(d), italics added.)

Similarly, under California law, Medi-Cal provides a hospice care benefit for its

beneficiaries that are terminally ill, which also is limited to a patient’s last six months of

life expectancy, and is offered “in lieu of other care.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 51349,

subds. (a), (c); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 14132, subd. (w); but see Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 14132.75, subd. (a)(4).) But here, too, “[p]alliative care,” which is utilized in hospice,

is not inherently incompatible with curative care and does not by its nature require the

end of curative care. Removing any doubt about this, legislation enacted in 2014 makes

clear that palliative care is available along with curative care in California. (Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 14132.75, subd. (a)(4).)

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withhold or cease treatment. We have dealt with the first step in this line of argument

already in the context of the administration of antipsychotic medications. (See part

IV.G.6., ante.) We reach the same conclusion here. The breadth of the statutory text,

read plainly—“decisions concerning his or her heath care”—encompasses health care

decisions made in anticipation of the end of life. In deciding the facial constitutionality

of section 1418.8, the Rains court was not called upon to consider actual IDT

decisionmaking, yet in dicta it placed a “routine, day-to-day” limitation on the statute by

reference to the statutory preamble. Absent ambiguity, we see no need, nor is it proper,

to delve into legislative intent suggested by uncodified language outside the body of the

statute. (Allen, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 860-861.) Faced, as we are, with an as-applied

constitutional challenge to IDT decisionmaking that goes beyond “routine, day-to-day”

medical treatment, we believe there is good reason to depart from the interpretation of

section 1418.8 adopted in Rains on this specific point, while otherwise following its

holding. (Lucent, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 35.)

As for the second step in petitioners’ statutory interpretation argument—that the

statute allows affirmative decisions to initiate treatment, but not decisions to withhold or

cease treatment—the logic is strained, and we reject it. Drabick, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d

185, declined to adopt a similarly circumscribed construction of Probate Code section

2355 in a conservatorship case, holding that, “by necessary implication, [it] gives the

conservator power to withhold or withdraw consent to medical treatment under

appropriate circumstances. Probate Code section 2355 contemplates that the conservator

faced with a decision about medical care will exercise his judgment. . . . Following this

process, the conservator may consent to treatment. Just as importantly, however, the

conservator may also withhold consent. Unless Probate Code section 2355 is read to

include that correlative power, the statute would simply—and absurdly—require the

conservator to approve blindly all medical recommendations. This cannot be what the

Legislature intended, since to deny conservators the power to withhold consent would

render meaningless the statutory references to a decisional process.” (Id. at pp. 200-201.)

The same reasoning applies here.

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We close with another apt observation from Drabick, one that we think sums up

well, in a general way, the importance of upholding section 1418.8 in application, and

doing so in a way that it respects the constitutionally protected rights of nursing home

residents. Drabick, like Wendland, involved a conservator’s proposal to withdraw

feeding and hydration tubes that were keeping the conservatee alive. (Drabick, supra,

200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 191-192.) That conservatee, William Drabick, was in even worse

circumstances than those of Robert Wendland. He was unconscious, having been in a

coma for more than two years when his conservator sought to remove him from life

support. (Id. at p. 191.) In an opinion that thoroughly canvassed the applicable precedent

a few years before Wendland, a Sixth District panel reversed a trial court order denying

the conservator’s request and directed it to reconsider. (Drabick, at p. 189.)34

Among other things, the Drabick court said this: “Once it is acknowledged that

William Drabick has a right to have medical treatment decisions made in his best

interests, it is readily apparent that the right is meaningless unless someone is permitted

to make the decisions. To delegate an incompetent person’s right to choose inevitably

runs the risk that the surrogate’s choices will not be the same as the incompetent’s

hypothetical, subjective choices. Allowing someone to choose, however, is more

respectful of an incompetent person than simply declaring that such a person has no more

rights. . . . As another court has observed, ‘[w]e do not pretend that the choice of [the

incompetent’s] parents, her guardian ad litem, or a court is her own choice. But it is a

genuine choice nevertheless—one designed to further the same interests she might pursue

had she the ability to decide herself. We believe that having the choice made in her

behalf produces a more just and compassionate result than leaving [her] with no way of

34 The Supreme Court disagreed with Drabick’s analysis in certain particulars

(Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 537) and reached a different conclusion than Drabick

did about the applicable burden of burden of proof (Wendland, at pp. 544-548), but

notably left Drabick’s holding undisturbed in the context of a permanently unconscious

and persistently vegetative conservatee (Wendland, at p. 555).

70

exercising a constitutional right.’ ” (Drabick, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 209, footnote

omitted.)

The petitioners suggest there is indeed a way to ensure incapacitated, unbefriended

nursing home residents may exercise their constitutionally protected rights, and that is to

recognize a right to counsel and adjudication of those rights in a judicial forum. It is far

from clear to us, however, that the adversary process which is so familiar to us in the

court system is the optimal default means for decisions of the kind we have here, which

are often as much ethical as they are medical and legal. (Drabick, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d

at p. 204.) Section 1418.8 may not be a perfect solution to the difficult and nearly

insoluble problem of providing for informed consent to medical treatment on behalf of

decisionally incapacitated residents of nursing homes who are without family or friends

to speak for them, but it was our Legislature’s choice. While petitioners have done much

in this case to expose the imperfections of the statutory scheme the Legislature enacted, it

is our duty to uphold the challenged statute if it can be done in a manner that is consistent

with constitutional imperatives. That is what we have done.
Outcome:
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the superior court with

directions to dissolve its injunction enjoining the enforcement and use of section 1418.8. The superior court shall enter a modified judgment declaring that, to preserve the constitutionality of the statute, the court interprets section 1418.8 to require nursing homes to adopt, and the Department to enforce, the following procedural safeguards: (1) Notice: Written and oral notice must be provided to every resident for whom section 1418.8 is invoked, of (a) any determination of the resident’s incapacity; (b) any determination that no surrogate decisionmaker for the resident is available; (c) any medical intervention proposed by the attending physician; (d) the fact that a decision will be made by the IDT on a proposed medical intervention; (e) the resident’s right to have a patient representative participate in IDT decisionmaking; and (f) the resident’s right to judicial review of IDT decisions under section 1418.8, subdivision (j). All such written notifications must be made not only to the resident, but also to at least one competent person whose interests are aligned with the resident. (2) Opportunity to be Heard: Except in emergency circumstances, no medical treatment decision by an IDT on behalf of a resident may be implemented until (a) after notice of the decision has been provided to the resident and (b) the resident has been given a reasonable opportunity to seek judicial review of the decision under section 1418.8, subdivision (j).

(3) Composition of IDT: Except in emergency circumstances, (a) every IDT must

include a patient representative, and (b) where the resident has no family or friend willing to serve on the IDT, someone unaffiliated with the nursing home must be found to serve as the patient representative. In addition, the superior court’s modified judgment shall declare that the IDT process may be used (1) to authorize the administration of antipsychotic medications in nursing homes to the extent authorized by state and federal law, and (2) for decisions to

create or make a change to POLSTs, DNRs or comfort care orders, and to transfer

patients to hospice care. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Karen Smith?

The outcome was: The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the superior court with directions to dissolve its injunction enjoining the enforcement and use of section 1418.8. The superior court shall enter a modified judgment declaring that, to preserve the constitutionality of the statute, the court interprets section 1418.8 to require nursing homes to adopt, and the Department to enforce, the following procedural safeguards: (1) Notice: Written and oral notice must be provided to every resident for whom section 1418.8 is invoked, of (a) any determination of the resident’s incapacity; (b) any determination that no surrogate decisionmaker for the resident is available; (c) any medical intervention proposed by the attending physician; (d) the fact that a decision will be made by the IDT on a proposed medical intervention; (e) the resident’s right to have a patient representative participate in IDT decisionmaking; and (f) the resident’s right to judicial review of IDT decisions under section 1418.8, subdivision (j). All such written notifications must be made not only to the resident, but also to at least one competent person whose interests are aligned with the resident. (2) Opportunity to be Heard: Except in emergency circumstances, no medical treatment decision by an IDT on behalf of a resident may be implemented until (a) after notice of the decision has been provided to the resident and (b) the resident has been given a reasonable opportunity to seek judicial review of the decision under section 1418.8, subdivision (j). (3) Composition of IDT: Except in emergency circumstances, (a) every IDT must include a patient representative, and (b) where the resident has no family or friend willing to serve on the IDT, someone unaffiliated with the nursing home must be found to serve as the patient representative. In addition, the superior court’s modified judgment shall declare that the IDT process may be used (1) to authorize the administration of antipsychotic medications in nursing homes to the extent authorized by state and federal law, and (2) for decisions to create or make a change to POLSTs, DNRs or comfort care orders, and to transfer patients to hospice care. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

Which court heard California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Karen Smith?

This case was heard in California Court of Appeals First Appellate District, Division Four on appeal from the Superior Court, County of Alameda, CA. The presiding judge was Streeter, J..

Who were the attorneys in California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Karen Smith?

Plaintiff's attorney: Amitai Schwartz. Defendant's attorney: Mark Emerson Reagan, Joshua N. Sondheimer and Cassidy Elizabeth Cole.

When was California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Karen Smith decided?

This case was decided on July 23, 2019.