Dominique Lopez, a Minor, etc. v. Sony Electronics, Inc.

When a child is allegedly harmed by in utero exposure to hazardous

chemicals, which statute of limitations applies: that for toxic exposure claims

(Code Civ. Proc., § 340.8, subd. (a)),

1 or that for prenatal injuries (§ 340.4)? The

answer determines the viability of this lawsuit. Because the toxic exposure statute

was more recently enacted, and its language plainly encompasses prenatal injuries,

we conclude it applies here. The limitations period for toxic exposure suits is two

years, but it is tolled while the plaintiff is a minor. (See § 352; Nguyen v. Western

Digital Corp. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1540-1541 (Nguyen).) Accordingly,

the claims here are not time-barred, and the trial court’s entry of summary

judgment should be reversed.



1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise

stated.

2

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dominique Lopez was born on April 13, 1999, with multiple birth

defects, including chromosomal deletion, cervical vertebrae fusion, facial

asymmetry, dysplastic nails, diverticulum of the bladder, and a misshapen kidney.

She also suffers from developmental delays. For over 20 years, including the term

of her pregnancy, plaintiff’s mother worked at a Sony Electronics, Inc. (Sony)

manufacturing plant. She allegedly worked with and around “teratogenic and

reproductively toxic” chemicals.

Plaintiff sued on January 6, 2012, when she was 12 years old. She alleged

that she and her mother were exposed to toxic chemicals at the Sony plant,

resulting in her birth defects. Seeking summary judgment, Sony argued the action

was time-barred under section 340.4, the six-year statute of limitations for birth

and prenatal injuries. It urged that, by August of 2000, plaintiff’s mother had

reason to suspect her workplace chemical exposure had caused plaintiff’s birth

defects. Plaintiff did not dispute this assertion. Instead, she maintained her action

fell not under section 340.4, governing prenatal injuries, but under section 340.8,

covering injuries caused by toxic exposure. Section 340.8’s limitations period is

only two years but, unlike section 340.4, it permits tolling during minority and

periods of mental incapacity.

The trial court applied section 340.4 and granted summary judgment. A

divided panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed. The majority disagreed with the

Sixth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Nguyen, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th 1522,

which had reached the opposite conclusion. We granted review to resolve the

conflict.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Relevant Statutes

The prenatal injury statute, section 340.4, states: “An action by or on

behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained before or in the course of his or

her birth must be commenced within six years after the date of birth, and the time

3

the minor is under any disability mentioned in Section 352 [providing for tolling

during minority or incapacity] shall not be excluded in computing the time limited

for the commencement of the action.”

The origins of the prenatal injury statute trace back to 1872, when the

Legislature first authorized a right of action for injuries sustained before birth.

(Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 892 (Young).) The original statute2 did

not specify a limitations period. A later amendment incorporated the six-year

limitations period for personal injuries and expressly prohibited tolling. (Stats.

1941, ch. 337, § 1, p. 1579; see Young, at p. 892.) The amended statute was

reenacted without substantive change as section 340.4. (Stats. 1992, ch. 163, § 16,

p. 731.) Thus, since 1941, the statute of limitations for prenatal injuries has been

six years and is not tolled during minority.

The toxic exposure statute, section 340.8, subdivision (a), states: “In any

civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or

toxic substance, the time for commencement of the action shall be no later than

either two years from the date of injury, or two years after the plaintiff becomes

aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, (1) an injury, (2) the

physical cause of the injury, and (3) sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on

inquiry notice that the injury was caused or contributed to by the wrongful act of

another, whichever occurs later.” The statute further provides that a “ ‘civil action

for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous material or toxic

substance’ ” in subdivision (a) “does not include an action subject to Section 340.2

or 340.5.” (§ 340.8, subd. (c)(1).) These exceptions refer to the statutes of

limitations specifically prescribed for asbestos-related injury claims (§ 340.2) and

medical malpractice claims (§ 340.5).

The toxic exposure statute became effective on January 1, 2004. (Stats.

2003, ch. 873, § 2, p. 6398.) We had previously held that a tort cause of action



2 Former Civil Code section 29.

4

does not accrue until the plaintiff knows, or has reason to suspect, that he was

injured as a result of someone’s wrongdoing. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21

Cal.4th 383, 397-399; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110-1111;

see Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1058-1060.)

This common law delayed discovery rule has long applied to prenatal injury

claims. (See Young, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 892-893.) The Legislature declared

that section 340.8 was intended to codify the delayed discovery rule for personal

injury and wrongful death cases involving toxic exposure. (Stats. 2003, ch. 873,

§ 2, p. 6398; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 331 (2003-

2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 29, 2003, p. 1.)3 Section 340.8 has been

applied broadly, encompassing both environmental hazards and prescription drugs.

(See Nelson v. Indevus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1202,

1209.)

B. The Toxic Exposure Statute Applies to Prenatal Toxic Injuries

This case poses a pure question of statutory interpretation, subject to

independent review. (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th

524, 529.) “Our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent and give

effect to the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s

words ‘ “because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative

intent.” [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous our inquiry

ends.’ ” (In re D.B. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 941, 945.) In that case, the plain meaning

of the statute is controlling, and “ ‘resort to extrinsic sources to determine the



3 The Legislature also declared an intent to disapprove McKelvey v. Boeing

North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 161, to the extent that case put

the burden on plaintiffs to show they were unaware of published reports

suggesting a defendant’s wrongdoing. (Stats. 2003 ch. 873, § 2, p. 6398.) To this

end, section 340.8, subdivision (c)(2) states: “Media reports regarding the

hazardous material or toxic substance contamination do not, in and of themselves,

constitute sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice that the

injury or death was caused or contributed to by the wrongful act of another.”

5

Legislature’s intent is unnecessary.’ ” (Ste. Marie v. Riverside County Regional

Park & Open-Space Dist. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 282, 288.)

Plaintiff’s case appears to fall within the ambit of both statutes of

limitations. It is “[a]n action . . . for personal injuries sustained before or in the

course of . . . birth” (§ 340.4) and a “civil action for injury or illness based upon

exposure to a hazardous material or toxic substance” (§ 340.8, subd. (a)).

Allegedly, plaintiff’s injuries were both sustained before birth and caused by toxic

exposure.

When possible, courts seek to harmonize inconsistent statutes, construing

them together to give effect to all of their provisions. (State Dept. of Public

Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 955 (State Dept. of Public

Health).) Sony urges us to reconcile the provisions by holding that section 340.8

applies to all toxic exposure injuries except those incurred before birth. “But the

requirement that courts harmonize potentially inconsistent statutes when possible

is not a license to redraft the statutes to strike a compromise that the Legislature

did not reach.” (State Dept. of Public Health, at p. 956.) Here, harmony is not

possible. Each statute plainly encompasses plaintiff’s claims, yet the choice of

one automatically nullifies the other. If section 340.4 applies, a subset of toxic

exposure claims will be governed by an untollable six-year statute of limitations

instead of the two-year toxic exposure limit, tolled during minority. If

section 340.8 applies, a subset of prenatal injury claims will fall under the tollable

two-year limit instead of the six-year period. We must determine which

limitations period the Legislature intended to apply.

The rules for construing irreconcilable statutes are well established. (State

Dept. of Public Health, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 960.) “If conflicting statutes cannot

be reconciled, later enactments supersede earlier ones [citation], and more specific

provisions take precedence over more general ones [citation].” (Collection

Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey (2000) 24 Cal.4th 301, 310; see § 1859; City of

Petaluma v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 284, 288.) The rule

6

encompasses competing limitations periods. (Strother v. California Coastal Com.

(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 873, 879; see, e.g., May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217

Cal.App.4th 1307, 1337; Vafi v. McCloskey (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 874, 880;

Committee for a Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1987)

192 Cal.App.3d 847, 859.)

Section 340.8 postdates section 340.4 by more than 60 years. This fact is

important, though it does not end the inquiry. “[T]he rule that specific provisions

take precedence over more general ones trumps the rule that later-enacted statutes

have precedence.” (State Dept. of Public Health, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 960.) We

therefore examine their relative specificity. As drafted, neither statute is more

specific than the other. They both apply to personal injury claims. However, a

close reading confirms that the Legislature intended section 340.8, the laterenacted

statute, to control here.

Section 340.4 encompasses a claim arising at a given time: “An action by

or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained before or in the course of

his or her birth.” By contrast, section 340.8, subdivision (a) provides a limitation

on “any civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a hazardous

material or toxic substance.” Comparing the two, we see that the prenatal statute

speaks not to the cause of injury, but to when it was inflicted. The toxic exposure

statute applies to any personal injury, regardless of when inflicted, if the cause of

injury was toxic exposure. When an injury was caused and how it was caused are

both specific aspects of the competing statutory provisions. But neither is

inherently more specific than the other. Sony argues the different statutory

triggers create an ambiguity. They do not. Both statutes are clear. The difference

in how the two statutes are triggered creates a conflict, not an ambiguity. It is this

conflict we resolve under the guiding statutory language and interpretive tools.

The toxic exposure statute embraces “any” civil action. (§ 340.8,

subd. (a).) “Any” is a term of broad inclusion, meaning “without limit and no

matter what kind.” (Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798.) The

7

word “any” means that section 340.8 applies to all actions described in the statute

unless an express exception is made. (See Delaney, at p. 798.)

Section 340.8 makes two exceptions to its broad limitations rule. The

choice to include these exceptions, and no other, also shows the Legislature

intended the toxic exposure statute to apply here. Section 340.8 states that the

actions to which it applies do “not include an action subject to Section 340.2

[alleging asbestos exposure] or 340.5 [alleging medical malpractice].” (§ 340.8,

subd. (c)(1).) Section 340.8 does not make an exception for prenatal injury claims

falling under section 340.4.

“Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio

alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional

exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.” (Sierra Club

v. State Bd. of Forestry (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1230; see Vafi v. McCloskey,

supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 881.) We have cautioned that the expressio unius

inference properly arises only when there is reason to believe a legislative

omission was intentional, such as when the statute contains a “specific list” or

presents a “facially comprehensive treatment.” (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn.

v. Padilla (2016) 62 Cal.4th 486, 514.) Here, there is a list. Section 340.8,

subdivision (c)(1) specifically excludes asbestos and medical malpractice claims.

The Legislature clearly recognized that section 340.8 could potentially overlap

other statutes of limitations, as is the case here. The Legislature could have

provided that prenatal injuries be excluded from section 340.8’s reach. It did not

do so. We will not create an exception the Legislature did not enact. (See Sierra

Club, at p. 1230; Williams v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1968)

68 Cal.2d 599, 603 (Williams).)

Moreover, section 340.8, subdivision (d) goes on to state: “Nothing in this

section shall be construed to limit, abrogate, or change the law in effect on the

effective date of this section with respect to actions not based upon exposure to a

hazardous material or toxic substance.” (Italics added.) By negative inference, it

8

appears that the Legislature did intend to alter the law for all toxic exposure

claims, except for those specifically excluded.

Citing various legislative committee reports, Sony argues the Legislature’s

sole purpose in enacting section 340.8 was to codify the delayed discovery

doctrine for toxic exposure cases. The Legislature did declare an intent to codify

the delayed discovery rule (Stats. 2003, ch. 873, § 2, p. 6398), and the statutory

language reflects our holdings on that concept. (§ 340.8, subds. (a), (b); see

Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 397-399.) However, the text of

section 340.8 does more. It creates a two-year statute of limitations applicable to

all hazardous exposure claims except those alleging injury due to asbestos or

medical malpractice. We cannot ignore this additional language. Moreover,

nothing in the legislative history suggests an intent to exclude prenatal hazardous

exposure claims from the reach of section 340.8. Because the Legislature acts

with one stated purpose does not preclude it from achieving other purposes as

well.

We addressed a similar question in Young, supra, 41 Cal.3d 883. There,

the plaintiff alleged injury during birth caused by the negligence of health care

providers. (Id. at p. 889.) The question was whether the action was governed by

the prenatal injury statute of limitations4 or the more recently enacted medical

malpractice statute. (Young, at p. 889.) Under the delayed discovery rule, the

plaintiff’s claims would have been timely under the prenatal injury statute but not

under the stricter medical malpractice provisions. (Id. at pp. 893-894; see

§ 340.5.) We noted that specific statutes prevail over conflicting provisions in

more general statutes (see § 1859) but observed “[t]he two statutes on their face

are equally specific. Section 29 governs all actions for prenatal and birth injuries,

regardless of their cause. Section 340.5 governs all actions for injuries caused by



4 The specific statute at issue in Young was former Civil Code section 29, the

predecessor statute to section 340.4. (Stats. 1992, ch. 163, § 16, p. 731.)

9

medical malpractice, regardless of the nature of the injury.” (Young, at p. 894.)

We concluded section 340.5 controlled because it was later enacted as part of the

Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), “an interrelated legislative

scheme enacted to deal specifically with all medical malpractice claims.” (Young,

at p. 894.) Section 340.8 is the later-enacted statute here. Although section 340.8

was not part of a comprehensive scheme, its broad language signals the

Legislature’s intent to encompass all hazardous and toxic exposure claims, subject

only to two exceptions.

5

Sony asserts that giving effect to section 340.8 would impliedly repeal

section 340.4 for a subset of prebirth injuries. Repeals by implication are

disfavored. “We do not presume that the Legislature intends, when it enacts a

statute, to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is

clearly expressed or necessarily implied.” (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio)

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 199; see Williams, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 603.) “Thus,

‘ “ ‘we will find an implied repeal “only when there is no rational basis for

harmonizing . . . two potentially conflicting statutes [citation], and the statutes are

‘irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have

concurrent operation.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v.

Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838 (Even Zohar).) We have,

in many instances, found harmonization possible.

6 This is not such an instance.



5 Attempting to turn Young to its advantage, Sony asserts that the prenatal

injury statute is part of a long-standing statutory scheme. The characterization is

inapt. The only related statute Sony identifies is Civil Code section 43.1, which

authorizes a right of action for injuries sustained in utero. (Snyder v. Michael’s

Stores, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 991, 996.) These two statutes, which are both

derived from former Civil Code section 29, do not comprise a statutory “scheme”

comparable to MICRA.

6 For example, in Even Zohar we found no conflict between the statute

limiting repeated motions for reconsideration (§ 1008) and the statute authorizing

relief from default (§ 473, subd. (b)). (Even Zohar, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 840-

841.) The conclusion that section 1008 restricted repeated motions for relief under

10

Sections 340.4 and 340.8 cannot be given “concurrent operation,” because two

different statutes of limitations cannot govern the same claim. (See, e.g., Young,

supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 894; May v. City of Milpitas, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at

p. 1337; Vafi v. McCloskey, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 880-881.) The implied

repeal at issue here is limited in scope, however. Section 340.8 supersedes

section 340.4 only for prenatal injuries resulting from exposure to toxic or

hazardous materials. It does not apply to injuries from other causes. (See § 340.8,

subd. (d).)

C. Applying the Toxic Exposure Statute Does Not Produce Absurd Results

To justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the

result must be so unreasonable that the Legislature could not have intended it. (In

re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 946.) Because section 340.8 permits minority

tolling, applying it to prenatal toxic exposure injuries could potentially enlarge the

limitations period from a child’s sixth birthday to its 20th. However, this

difference may not be as striking in reality as it may appear. The discovery rule is

available to extend the time for filing all prenatal injury claims, even under

section 340.4. (See Young, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 892-893.) Nonetheless, Sony

urges that the enlargement of time possible under section 340.8 is so great as to be

absurd. The argument fails.

The Legislature could reasonably have chosen to treat in utero toxic

exposure cases differently from the more general class of injuries suffered before

or during birth. The potential causes of many birth-related injuries will be readily

identifiable, and it is reasonable to expect their effect will manifest before a child



section 473, subdivision (b) gave full effect to the language of both statutes.

Similarly, in In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 408, we concluded a statute

limiting the conditions for a juvenile ward’s institutional commitment did not

impliedly repeal a long-standing provision giving the juvenile court discretion to

dismiss a wardship petition, even when such a dismissal could result in the ward’s

commitment. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 733, subd. (c), 782; see also In re

Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 289.)

11

reaches age six. A prohibition against tolling during minority may not be onerous

in those circumstances.

The toxic exposure statute, on the other hand, is not limited to an

identifiable period like gestation and birth. It covers an exposure occurring at any

age. The exposure may also occur under circumstances less likely to put a

plaintiff on notice. It may happen over a brief or extended period, in the

workplace, the home, or other frequented locations. The harmful effects of

exposure may take longer to manifest than injuries from other causes, regardless

of whether the exposure occurred before or after birth. The Legislature’s policy

choice to permit tolling during a period of minority or incapacity, as section 352

does, reflects these differences.7



7 The toxic exposure statute does not specifically mention tolling. However,

its limitations period appears subject to tolling under section 352, subdivision (a).

(Nguyen, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1540-1541; see Williams, supra, 68 Cal.2d

at p. 601.) The parties do not dispute this point. However, an amicus curiae brief

filed on Sony’s behalf contends a different rule should apply if the hazardous

exposure occurred before birth. These amici argue the no-tolling rule of

section 340.4 can be severed and applied to all prenatal injury claims, making

plaintiff’s claims untimely even if section 340.8 applies. We are aware of no

authority for parsing statutory provisions in this fashion, restoring vitality to some

parts while leaving others inoperative. The amici rely on California

Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 270-274, but there we

were addressing the very different topic of excising unconstitutional portions of a

statute to prevent invalidation of the whole. That severability analysis is informed

by the general presumption in favor of statutes’ constitutionality. (See Santa

Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315, 330-331; In re Blaney

(1947) 30 Cal.2d 643, 655.) No similar rationale supports the severance amici

would have us conduct.

Moreover, the language of section 340.4 does not support extending the notolling

rule outside the statute’s own boundaries. Section 340.4 is a single

sentence: “An action by or on behalf of a minor for personal injuries sustained

before or in the course of his or her birth must be commenced within six years

after the date of birth, and the time the minor is under any disability mentioned in

Section 352 shall not be excluded in computing the time limited for the

commencement of the action.” Under a straightforward reading, “the minor”

(§ 340.4, italics added) in the second clause refers to the same “minor” in the first

12

We presume the Legislature was aware of section 340.4 when it enacted

section 340.8. (See People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329.) Indeed, it

made exceptions for statutes that appear in the code before (§ 340.2) and

immediately after (§ 340.5) the prenatal injury statute. (See § 340.8, subd. (c)(1).)

The Legislature was also presumably aware of the long-standing rule that most

claims belonging to minors are tolled during minority. (See § 352; Williams,

supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 602.) Nearly 50 years ago, we observed it was “a deep and

long recognized principle of the common law and of this state” that “children are

to be protected during their minority from the destruction of their rights by the

running of the statute of limitations.” (Williams, at p. 602.) Yet, aware of this

general tolling principle, the Legislature chose not to include section 340.4 among

the enumerated exceptions to the toxic exposure statute. It may well have

considered a longer limitations period appropriate for injuries caused by in utero

exposure to hazardous substances due to potential difficulties in identifying such

injuries in children or in tracing their source. Although these problems might have

been alleviated by the common law delayed discovery rule, the Legislature may

have considered application of that rule under section 340.4 too uncertain. After

all, its purpose in enacting section 340.8 was to codify the discovery rule for “any”

personal injury or wrongful death claim based on exposure to hazardous materials.

(§ 340.8, subd. (a).) Alternately, the Legislature may have wished to avoid having

different limitations periods apply depending on whether a toxic exposure

produced injuries before or after birth. Applying the same statute to all hazardous

exposure claims, regardless of when they accrued, makes it unnecessary to



clause who must file suit within six years. Likewise, read in context, the second

clause’s prohibition on tolling of “the time limited for the commencement of the

action” (§ 340.4, italics added) refers to the six-year limitations period established

in the statute’s first clause. There is no indication this provision was meant to

apply to any actions other than those subject to section 340.4.

13

confront difficult factual questions about when an exposure occurred and when it

caused injury.

“When statutory language is unambiguous, we must follow its plain

meaning ‘ “ ‘whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the

act, even if it appears probable that a different object was in the mind of the

legislature.’ ” ’ ” (In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948.) Here, the language of

section 340.8 clearly encompasses claims of prenatal injury based on exposure to

toxic substances. Adhering to this language, and applying section 340.8 to all

hazardous exposure claims, regardless of when the injury occurred, does not

produce absurd results. Although our construction of section 310.8 means that

plaintiffs who suffer injury from prenatal toxic exposure have up to 20 years to

sue, there is no dispute that an infant who is so exposed postdelivery also has close

to 20 years to file suit. (See §§ 340.8, subd. (a), 352.) Limitations rules are an

exercise in line-drawing. We cannot say it was implausible or absurd for the

Legislature to redraw the line for prenatal injuries caused by toxic exposure.

Accordingly, we conclude section 340.8 governs plaintiff’s action.

D. Application

At the earliest, plaintiff’s claims against Sony accrued in 1999, when she

was born. Section 340.8 did not go into effect until January 1, 2004. (Stats. 2003,

ch. 873, § 2, p. 6398.) Before that time, plaintiff’s claims would have been subject

to section 340.4’s shorter period for filing suit.

Previous decisions have established rules for determining the effect of

extending a limitations period. “As long as the former limitations period has not

expired, an enlarged limitations period ordinarily applies and is said to apply

prospectively to govern cases that are pending when, or instituted after, the

enactment took effect. This is true even though the underlying conduct that is the

subject of the litigation occurred prior to the new enactment.” (Quarry v. Doe I

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 956.) Because section 340.8 was in effect in 2012, when

plaintiff filed this lawsuit, it governs her claims so long as they were not time-

14

barred under the previously applicable statute of limitations. Section 340.4

required that plaintiff file suit within six years after her date of birth. Her time for

filing under section 340.4 would have expired on April 13, 2005, more than a year

after section 340.8 became effective. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims had not

lapsed and are governed by section 340.8. Claims subject to this statute of

limitations may be tolled during the plaintiff’s minority. (See ante, at p. 11.)

Because plaintiff filed this lawsuit while still a minor, her claims are timely under

section 340.8 pursuant to section 352 tolling. The trial court erred in granting

summary judgment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The case is to be remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its order granting summary judgment.