California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland

Here we consider the interplay of two constitutional provisions. First,

sections 8 and 11 of article II of the state Constitution contain the people’s

initiative power, which we have described as “ ‘one of the most precious rights of

our democratic process.’ ” (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of

Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 (Associated Home Builders); Cal. Const.,

art. II (article II), §§ 8 [statewide power], 11 [local power].) Second,

article XIII C — added by one of several successful initiative constitutional

amendments concerning taxation — limits the ability of “local governments . . . to

impose, extend, or increase any general tax.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII C (article XIII

C), added by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), commonly known as Prop. 218;

Greene v. Marin County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. (2010) 49

Cal.4th 277, 284-285 (Greene) [summarizing the purpose of Prop. 218].)

2

The question before us is whether article XIII C also restricts the ability of

voters to impose taxes via initiative. The Court of Appeal here concluded that

article XIII C does not constrain voters’ constitutional power to propose and adopt

initiatives, and that under article II, section 11 and Elections Code section 9214,1

the initiative at issue should be submitted to the voters at a special election, not at

a general election, as article XIII C would require. In light of the text and other

indicia of the purpose associated with the relevant constitutional and statutory

provisions, we agree with the Court of Appeal that article XIII C does not limit

voters’ “power to raise taxes by statutory initiative.” (Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v.

State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 251 [reaching the same conclusion

with regard to article XIII A of the state Constitution] (Kennedy Wholesale).) A

contrary conclusion would require an unreasonably broad construction of the term

“local government” at the expense of the people’s constitutional right to direct

democracy, undermining our longstanding and consistent view that courts should

protect and liberally construe it. (E.g., Associated Home Builders, supra, 18

Cal.3d at p. 591.) As Ulysses once tied himself to the mast so he could resist the

Sirens’ tempting song (Homer, The Odyssey, Book XII), voters too can

conceivably make the clear and important choice to bind themselves by making it

more difficult to enact initiatives in the future. The electorate made no such clear

choice to tie itself to the mast here. Without a direct reference in the text of a

provision — or a similarly clear, unambiguous indication that it was within the

ambit of a provision’s purpose to constrain the people’s initiative power –– we

will not construe a provision as imposing such a limitation. (See Kennedy

Wholesale, at p. 252.) We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.



1 Subsequent unlabeled statutory references are to the Elections Code.

3

I.

The California Cannabis Coalition is a nonprofit corporation that drafted

the medical marijuana initiative at issue here in 2014.2 The initiative proposed

to repeal an existing City of Upland (City) ordinance banning medical marijuana

dispensaries; to adopt regulations permitting and establishing standards for the

operation of up to three dispensaries within the City; and to require that each

dispensary pay the City an “annual Licensing and Inspection fee” in the amount of

$75,000.

In September 2014, initiative proponents Nicole De La Rosa and James

Velez3 filed a notice of their intent to circulate the initiative petition (§ 9202), and

the city attorney prepared a ballot title and summary (§ 9203). The petition

plaintiffs circulated included a request that the initiative be considered by voters at

a special election. At least 15 percent of the City’s registered voters signed the

petition, meeting the statutory threshold for triggering consideration of the

initiative (§ 9214), and the City accepted a certificate of sufficiency from the San

Bernardino County Registrar of Voters on February 9, 2015. At that point, section

9214 obliged the City to either (1) adopt the initiative without alteration;

(2) immediately order a special election; or (3) order an agency report and, once

the report was presented, adopt the initiative or order a special election.

(Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th

1029, 1033 (Tuolumne Jobs); see §§ 1405 [time for special election], 9212

[referral to city agency for report].) The City elected to order an agency report.

Various city departments thereafter prepared a joint agency report. Among

other things, the report concluded that the $75,000 “fee” for the initiative would



2 We base this discussion of the facts on the Court of Appeal’s opinion.

3 We refer to De La Rosa, Velez, and the California Cannabis Coalition

collectively as “plaintiffs.”

4

exceed the costs incurred from issuing a license to and conducting annual

inspections of the dispensaries. The report estimated actual costs to be slightly

more than $15,000 and found the excess amount of the fee to constitute a general

tax. As such, the report determined that the initiative could not be voted on during

a special election as required by section 9214, but rather, under article XIII C,

section 2, had to be submitted to the voters at the next general election.4 On

March 9, 2015, the city council received the agency report and adopted a

resolution consistent with the report’s conclusions. The city council also provided

notice and direction for submitting the initiative to the voters on November 8,

2016, the next general election.

Plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of mandate in superior court. They

alleged that the City violated section 9214 by failing to submit the initiative to the

voters at a special election.5 They also argued that article XIII C, section 2 did not

apply because the $75,000 charge proposed by the initiative was not a tax, nor was

it imposed by local government. The court denied the writ petition, determining

that the charge constituted a tax and had to be placed on the next general election

ballot. The court, however, did not specifically address whether article XIII C,

section 2 applies to taxes imposed by voter initiative.

Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed. The court held that

article XIII C, section 2 only governs levies that are imposed by local government



4 Article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) prohibits a local government from

imposing a general tax unless the tax is first submitted to and approved by the

voters at an election “consolidated with a regularly scheduled general election for

members of the governing body of the local government.”

5 Plaintiffs also alleged that the City’s true motivation in declaring the charge

a general tax was its opposition to medical marijuana dispensaries.

5

and, therefore, it does not apply to the voter initiative at issue here.6 Moreover,

the court noted that the people’s initiative power must be protected and construed

liberally, with doubts resolved in favor of its exercise whenever possible. (E.g.,

Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 695 (Rossi); Associated Home Builders,

supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) The court determined that neither the text nor the

history of article XIII C contains any evidence that the enactors’ intended purpose

included constraining future voters’ ability to raise taxes via statutory initiative.

The court accordingly directed the superior court to issue a writ of mandate

compelling the City to place the initiative on a special ballot in accordance with

section 9214.

We granted the City’s petition for review on June 29, 2016. On November

8, 2016, the initiative at issue was submitted to the voters and defeated, with 64.38

percent voting no.7 While the case is thus technically moot, it nonetheless

presents important questions of continuing public interest that may evade review.

(Peterson v. City of San Diego (1983) 34 Cal.3d 225, 227.) We therefore exercise

our discretion to retain the matter and address the issues.8 (People v. Carbajal

(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5.)

II.

We apply similar principles when construing constitutional provisions and

statutes, including those enacted through voter initiative. (Silicon Valley

Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44



6 In light of its holding, the Court of Appeal did not address whether the

$75,000 charge is a fee.

7 (San Bernardino County Registrar of Voters, Elections Office, City of

Upland, Measure U

[as of Aug. 28, 2017].)

8 Moreover, we note that neither party has sought dismissal on mootness

grounds.

6

Cal.4th 431, 444.) Our primary concern is giving effect to the intended purpose of

the provisions at issue. (Id. at p. 448 [explaining that we construe provisions “in a

manner that effectuates the [enactors’] purpose in adopting the law”].) In doing

so, we first analyze provisions’ text in their relevant context, which is typically the

best and most reliable indicator of purpose. (Larkin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals

Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 157; Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51

Cal.4th 310, 321 [when interpreting voter initiatives, “ ‘we begin with the text’ ”].)

We start by ascribing to words their ordinary meaning, while taking account of

related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional

scheme. (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 39

Cal.5th 282, 293; Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th

205, 212 (Bighorn).) If the provisions’ intended purpose nonetheless remains

opaque, we may consider extrinsic sources, such as an initiative’s ballot materials.

(Larkin, at p. 158.) Moreover, when construing initiatives, we generally presume

electors are aware of existing law. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 890,

fn. 11 (Lance W.).) Finally, we apply independent judgment when construing

constitutional and statutory provisions. (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Board

of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 401, 416.)

A.

The people’s initiative power is contained in article II, sections 8 and 11.

The former section provides, “The initiative is the power of the electors to propose

statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.” (Art. II,

§ 8, subd. (a).) The latter contains the local power, providing that “[i]nitiative and

referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each city or county under

procedures that the Legislature shall provide.” (Id., § 11, subd. (a).) In Associated

Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d 582, we briefly described the history and

longstanding judicial interpretation of the initiative power.

7

The state Constitution was amended to include the initiative power in 1911.

The Constitution “speak[s] of the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted

the people, but as a power reserved by them.” (Associated Home Builders, supra,

18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) Since then, courts have consistently declared it their duty to

“ ‘jealously guard’ ” and liberally construe the right so that it “ ‘be not improperly

annulled.’ ” (Ibid.; see, e.g., Perry v. Brown (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1116, 1140.)

Moreover, when weighing the tradeoffs associated with the initiative power, we

have acknowledged the obligation to resolve doubts in favor of the exercise of the

right whenever possible. (Associated Home Builders, at p. 591.) We more

recently explained that the enactment of the initiative power was sparked by

“dissatisfaction with the then governing public officials and a widespread belief

that the people had lost control of the political process.” (Perry, at p. 1140.) Its

purpose, in effect, was empowering voters to propose and adopt provisions “that

their elected public officials had refused or declined to adopt.” (Id. at p. 1140.)

When the right of initiative was grafted onto the Constitution, the

Legislature also enacted statutory procedures for city and county voters to exercise

the right. (Tuolumne Jobs, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1042, citing Stats. 1911, Ex.

Sess. 1911, ch. 33, § 1, pp. 131-132.) Most relevant here is section 9214, the

current statute setting forth a local government’s duty with respect to initiatives

whose proponents request a special election. The provision requires the city

government, upon receipt of a petition signed by not less than 15 percent of the

city’s voters, to (1) adopt the ordinance without alteration; (2) immediately order a

special election; or (3) order an agency report and, once the report is presented to

the city council, adopt the ordinance or order a special election. (§ 9214;

Tuolumne Jobs, at p. 1033.) Section 9212 requires that an agency report be

presented to the city council no later than 30 days after the initiative petition has

been certified as having the sufficient number of signatures. (§ 9212, subd. (b).)

8

And section 1405 generally requires that the special election “be held not less than

88 nor more than 103 days after the date of the order of election.” (§ 1405,

subd. (a).) Collectively, the intended purpose of these statutes is to require “public

officials to act expeditiously on initiatives.” (Tuolumne Jobs, at p. 1037.)

Against this constitutional and statutory backdrop, we have held that the

people’s power to propose and adopt initiatives is at least as broad as the

legislative power wielded by the Legislature and local governments. (See, e.g.,

Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11

Cal.4th 220, 253 (Guardino) [discussing statewide right to initiative]; DeVita v.

County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 775 (DeVita) [discussing local right to

initiative]; Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 696 [noting “local initiative power may be

even broader than the initiative power reserved in the Constitution”].) When

voters exercise the initiative power, they do so subject to precious few limits on

that power.9 (Rossi, at p. 695.) Moreover, we have explained that procedural

requirements imposed on the Legislature and local governments do not similarly

constrain the electorate’s initiative power without evidence that such was their

intended purpose. (E.g., DeVita, at p. 785 [“existence of procedural requirements

for the adoptions of local ordinances generally does not imply a restriction of the

power of initiative”]; Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 588, 593-

596.) In Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pages 251 to 252, for example,

we held that the constitutional requirement that the Legislature obtain a two-thirds

vote before raising taxes (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 3) is a requirement that does

not apply to voters’ initiative power.



9 The most often invoked limitation is the single-subject requirement. (Art.

II, § 8, subd. (d); see also art. II, §§ 8, subds. (e) & (f), 11, subds. (b) & (c), 12

[containing other narrow limitations]; see Elec. Code, § 9218 [prohibiting two

special municipal elections on the same subject matter within a 12-month period].)

9

Just how that power relates to taxation was the subject of our holding in

Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th 688, which concerned a city ordinance added by voter

initiative. When the statewide initiative power was originally adopted, we

observed, “taxation was not only a permitted subject for the initiative, but was an

intended object of that power.” (Id. at p. 699.) We found evidence of that purpose

in the history of the measure that added the initiative power in 1911, the

contemporary understanding of the measure, and statements made by the

measure’s drafter and leading proponent. (Ibid.) We also considered subsequent

unsuccessful attempts to amend the initiative power “to exclude measures related

to taxation,” efforts that “would have been unnecessary if tax-related measures

were not permissible subjects of the initiative.” (Ibid.; see id. at pp. 699-702.)

There is no restriction, we concluded, “on the use of the initiative in the area of

taxation.” (Id. at p. 702.) That is, electors may “use the initiative process to

prospectively adopt or annul (repeal) statutes imposing taxes.” (Ibid.; id. at

p. 696.)

Whether the context involves taxation or not, all of these cases underscore

how courts preserve and liberally construe the public’s statewide and local

initiative power. Indeed, we resolve doubts about the scope of the initiative power

in its favor whenever possible (Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at

p. 591), and we narrowly construe provisions that would burden or limit the

exercise of that power (see Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 696; see also DeVita,

supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 781). It is against this backdrop that we consider whether

article XIII C, section 2 applies when voters seek to impose taxes via initiative.10



10 Article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e) defines “ ‘tax’ ” as “any levy,

charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government,” with certain

exceptions. (Italics added.) In light of our conclusion that article XIII C, section 2

does not apply to voter initiatives, our use of the word “tax” throughout this

10

B.

Article XIII C was added by Proposition 218, an initiative constitutional

amendment adopted at the 1996 general election. Article XIII C, section 2,

subdivision (b) provides, “No local government may impose, extend, or increase

any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and

approved by a majority vote. . . . The election required by this subdivision shall be

consolidated with a regularly scheduled general election for members of the

governing body of the local government . . . .” Despite no mention of voter

initiatives, the City and the concurring and dissenting opinion (conc. & dis. opn.,

post, at pp. 1-2) contend this provision nonetheless applies to such instruments

and, notwithstanding section 9214, requires that initiatives imposing, extending, or

increasing a general tax must first be submitted to the electorate at a regularly

scheduled general election, rather than a special election. We disagree.

By its terms, article XIII C, section 2 only applies to actions taken by a

“local government.” To cabin uncertainty about what “local government”

connotes, article XIII C then defines the term to mean “any county, city, city and

county, including a charter city or county, any special district, or any other local or

regional governmental entity.” (Id., § 1, subd. (b).) The crux of the City’s

argument is that this definition is broad enough to include the electorate. (See

conc. & dis. opn., post, pp. 4-5.) It is true enough that in the contemporary

understanding of our democracy, governmental entities exist to serve the public,

and not the other way around. (See art. II, § 1 [“[g]overnment is instituted for [the

people’s] protection, security, and benefit”].) But this important principle does



(footnote continued from previous page)

opinion is meant not as the term is defined in subdivision (e), but as it is

commonly understood.

11

not, in the abstract or in the context of the laws at issue in this case, imply that we

should assume the public and the governmental entity corresponding to where the

public resides to be one and the same. While one understanding of a city or

comparable jurisdiction might blur the distinction between its residents, electorate,

and government (e.g., American Heritage Dict. of the English Language (4th ed.

2000) p. 339 [“city” includes “[t]he inhabitants of a city considered as a group”];

conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 5 [“city . . . refers to the municipal corporation and

body politic”]), such an interpretation is unpersuasive –– at least in this context —

and a survey of rationales specific to this provision, as well as broader principles

in our jurisprudence, shows why.

First, the common understanding of local government does not readily lend

itself to include the electorate, instead generally referring to a locality’s governing

body, public officials, and bureaucracy.11 (See Bighorn, supra, 39 Cal.4th at

p. 212 [using term’s ordinary meaning]; see also Black’s Law Dict. (4th ed. 1951)

p. 824 [defining “local government” as “[t]he government or administration of a

particular locality; especially, the governmental authority of a municipal

corporation, as a city or county, over its local and individual affairs”].) Arguing to



11 The City argues that the separate use of the term “governing body” in article

XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) demonstrates that local government means

something more than a city council. We agree. But the existence of a distinction

between a local government and its governing body does not mean that local

government must therefore include the electorate, any more than separate references

to, say, the California Environmental Protection Agency and its top official imply the

absence of a meaningful distinction between the agency and the public it serves. Nor

can we ignore the distinction between the electorate and the governmental entities

identified in article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (b). Consistent with its statutory

definition here and its usage elsewhere in our law, the term “local government”

plausibly refers to the entire organization constituting the local or regional

governmental entity in question — including its bureaucracy and its corporate form

— and not simply a locality’s elected officials. (E.g., Banning Ranch Conservancy v.

City of Newport Beach (2017) 2 Cal.5th 918, 925 [“every local government in the

coastal zone must submit a local coastal program for Coastal Commission approval”

(italics added)].)

12

the contrary, the concurring and dissenting opinion relies on In re Pfahler (1906)

150 Cal. 71 (Pfahler), a 111-year-old case cited by none of the briefs. (Conc. &

dis. opn., post, at pp. 5-7.) But that case considered whether a constitutional

provision conferring local legislative power on “[a]ny county, city, town, or

township” precluded a city’s charter from authorizing voters to exercise the city’s

power via initiative. (Pfahler, at p. 81.) Answering in the negative, we explained

that legislative power is not inherently reserved to representative assemblies. (Id.

at p. 83.) We did not suggest, however, that the terms “local government” and

“electorate” are equivalent or not meaningfully distinguishable, particularly when

considering whether explicit restrictions on the former should impliedly be

imposed on the latter. (See id. at p. 87 [distinguishing between actions of a city

council and electors].)12

Moreover, construing local government as an entity distinct from the public

is consistent not only with how the term is used in the provision’s text, but also

with how it is used in its findings and declarations. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec.

(Nov. 5, 1996) text of Prop. 218, p. 108 [“This measure protects taxpayers by

limiting the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers”

(italics added)]; see also Orange Citizens for Parks & Recreation v. Superior

Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 141, 154 [“The Governor’s Office of Planning and

Research encourages local governments to structure their procedures to facilitate

public involvement . . . .” (italics added)].) Contrary to the concurring and

dissenting opinion (conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 2, 5, 8), this understanding also



12 Of course, in the 111 years since we decided Pfahler, California has borne

witness to significant developments affecting the extent and significance of the

initiative power. The 1906 earthquake occurred months before Pfahler was issued

— and a political earthquake in the form of the constitutional initiative power

followed five years later. Since then, we have spilt much ink regarding the nature

and scope of direct democracy in this state.

13

proves compatible with section 9200, which provides that “[o]rdinances may be

enacted by and for any incorporated city,” encompassing situations where the

electorate enacts an ordinance, via initiative, for the city.

Second, the only portion of article XIII C even mentioning the voters’

direct democracy rights appears in section 3. (Art. XIII C, § 3 [citing art. II, §§ 8

& 9, respectively the people’s initiative and referendum powers].) The concurring

and dissenting opinion (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 9) concludes this language

means the voters knew the initiative power could affect local taxes and, further,

must mean voters intended to (silently) subsume tax-related initiatives within the

ambit of article XIII C, section 2. But section 3’s single reference to the initiative

power proves, at best, too slender a reed to support the substantial limitations that

the City and the concurring and dissenting opinion would have us read into

Proposition 218’s provisions. If anything, the reference in section 3 makes the

omission of any limitations on the initiative power in section 2 –– or anywhere

else in article XIII C –– even more glaring. To infer from that absence a

calculated decision to squelch voters’ initiative rights is essentially to embrace a

presumption against the initiative power, rather than in favor of it. Such a

conclusion would be profoundly at odds with our obligation to “ ‘jealously guard’

” the voters’ exercise of their initiative power. (Associated Home Builders, supra,

18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) Confronted with the text of article XIII C, a reasonable

reader would be unlikely to infer that Proposition 218 was designed to regulate the

initiative power through an explicit reference in section 3 and an implicit one in

section 2.

Third, even if it were conceivably possible to treat the term “local

government” in article XIII C as an unusually oblique reference to the voters who

comprise the relevant electorate, the difficulty in accepting this inference ratchets

up given how the definition of “local government” closes with the phrase, “or any

14

other local or regional governmental entity.” (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (b).) That

the elected officials and civil servants more commonly understood to be part of a

local government can be surprised by the actions of the voters they serve belies the

idea that the amalgam of individuals who constitute the electorate comprise a local

or regional governmental entity.

What’s more, the principle of ejusdem generis suggests that when “specific

words follow general words in a statute or vice versa,” the general words

ordinarily are best construed in a manner that underscores their similarity to the

specific words. (International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers,

Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 319, 342.) Interpreting

“city” to include the electorate would give that term a much broader meaning than

the adjoining specific term, “local or regional governmental entity.” (Art. XIII C,

§ 1, subd. (b).) Thus, our interpretation of local government is consistent with the

ordinary understanding of the term, the text of related provisions, and the ejusdem

generis principle. By contrast, the interpretation of the City and the concurring

and dissenting opinion would require us to insert words — such as “electorate,”

“voters,” or “people” –– into section 1, subdivision (b) and section 2, subdivision

(b) of article XIII C. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 [“In the construction of a

statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare

what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been

omitted . . .”].)

Our interpretation is also consistent with article XIII D of the state

Constitution, which, like article XIII C, was added by Proposition 218. (Greene,

supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 285.) Article XIII D addresses the imposition of

assessments and property-related fees by local agencies, and section 4 of that

article contains a variety of procedural requirements that must be fulfilled before

an “agency” may adopt an assessment (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 4 [e.g., notice

15

and hearing requirements].) Article XIII D defines agency as “any local

government as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1 of [article XIII C].” (Id.,

§ 2, subd. (a).) Under the City’s interpretation then, “agency” in article XIII D

also includes voters — an understanding that seems, at best, quite an improbable

version of what was plausibly contemplated when this provision was enacted.

The alternative is to treat the term “local government” as encompassing the

entire coterie of individuals constituting the electorate –– thus burdening voters’

power to propose and adopt initiatives concerning taxation. (Rossi, supra, 9

Cal.4th at p. 702.) If this quite significant consequence were consistent with the

most reasonable understanding of Proposition 218’s purpose despite the absence

of text in articles XIII C or D bolstering this view, one would assume there would

be some mention of such a goal elsewhere in Proposition 218 or its ballot

materials. (Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc. (2001) 531 U.S. 457, 468

[enactors do not “hide elephants in mouseholes”]; see Kennedy Wholesale, supra,

53 Cal.3d at p. 250.) The City and the concurring and dissenting opinion cite no

such evidence. Nor can we find any. To the contrary: The crux of the concern

repeatedly reflected in the ballot materials is with local governments and

politicians –– not the electorate –– imposing taxes. Nowhere in the materials is

there any suggestion that Proposition 218 would rescue voters from measures they

might, through a majority vote, impose on themselves.

For example, Proposition 218’s findings and declarations state, “local

governments have subjected taxpayers to excessive tax, assessment, fee and

charge increases . . . . This measure protects taxpayers by limiting the methods by

which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their consent.”

(Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) text of Prop. 218, p. 108, italics added

(1996 Ballot Pamp.).) The ballot materials are in accord. The argument in favor

of the measure, for example, stated that it “does NOT prevent government from

16

raising and spending money for vital services. . . . If politicians want to raise

taxes they need only convince local voters that new taxes are really needed.”

(1996 Ballot Pamp., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 218, p. 76, italics added;

id., rebuttal to argument against Prop. 218, p. 77 [“Proposition 218 simply gives

taxpayers the right to vote on taxes and stops politicians’ end-runs around

Proposition 13” (italics added)].)13 In short, these materials indicate both that

article XIII C employs the term “local government” as it is commonly understood

and that the provision’s intended purpose did not include limiting voters’ “power

to raise taxes . . . by statutory initiative.”14 (See Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53

Cal.3d at p. 250.)

This reading finds further support in the ballot materials concerning two

related initiative constitutional amendments: Proposition 13, which added article

XIII A in 1978, and Proposition 26, which amended article XIII C in 2010. The

ballot materials concerning both initiatives similarly evince a specific concern

with politicians and their imposition of taxes without voter approval. (E.g., Ballot

Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 6, 1978) rebuttal to argument against Prop. 13, p. 59

[“We must not let the spendthrift politicians continue to tax us into poverty”

(italics added)]; Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2010) argument in



13 The concurring and dissenting opinion (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 10)

cites other statements discussing the electorate’s right to vote on taxes and on local

government’s actions. The opinion rightly focuses on the purpose of article

XIII C. (E.g., conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 2, 6 [highlighting the “stated

purposes” of Prop. 218], 10 [emphasizing the provision’s “overarching purpose”].)

But it identifies no evidence or other reason to conclude that the provision

encompasses the imposition of taxes by the electorate via initiative.

14 The City identifies another purpose of requiring that general taxes only be

considered during regularly scheduled general elections. It contends that this

requirement forces politicians to face the voters at the same time as any tax

proposal he or she may have supported or to answer questions about the

politicians’ stance on tax measures. But such a purpose makes limited sense in the

context of taxes imposed by voter initiatives.

17

favor of Prop. 26, p. 60 [“STOP POLITICIANS FROM ENACTING HIDDEN

TAXES” (italics added)]; ibid. [“[l]ocal politicians have been calling taxes ‘fees’

so they can bypass voters” (italics added)]; ibid. [“Proposition 26 requires

politicians to meet the same vote requirements to pass these Hidden Taxes” (italics

added)].) All of this is more evidence that the drafters of these propositions, like

the drafters of Proposition 218, simply did not contemplate that they were

affecting the power of voters to propose taxes via initiatives. (See Jacks v. City of

Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 258-260 [discussing relationship between the

various propositions]; see also Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 250

[“Nothing in the official ballot pamphlet supports the inference that the voters

intended to limit their own power to raise taxes in the future by statutory

initiative”].)15

What the City contends in the alternative is that, even if “local government”

does not directly encompass the electorate, article XIII C, section 2, subdivision

(b) indirectly applies to voters for two reasons. The City contends it applies to the

electorate because, in the City’s view, the voters are the ones who ultimately

impose every local tax. The City notes that, under the provision, no local

government may impose a general tax “unless and until” (art. XIII C, § 2,

subd. (b)) the tax is submitted to the voters and approved by a majority vote. For

support the City cites Guardino, supra, 11 Cal.4th 220. But in that case, we



15 The concurring and dissenting opinion posits that the ballot materials’

repeated reference to “politicians,” and silence regarding voter initiatives, simply

reflects that “most local tax increases have, indeed, been initiated by elected

officials.” (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 10.) That is certainly one possibility.

Another more plausible one is that the silence with regard to initiatives reflects

that the drafters either were not concerned with initiatives proposing taxes —

perhaps because such was a rare or unheard of occurrence or because such would

constitute an expression of direct democracy — or they simply did not have that

issue in mind.

18

simply noted that a local government’s imposition of a general tax “will not take

effect” absent subsequent approval by the voters — in other words, the voters’

approval acts as a precondition (id. at p. 240) to a tax measure becoming

operative. But that does not transform voters into the “local government”

referenced in article XIII C, section 2. Nor does it mean it is always and only the

electorate that imposes a tax. Suppose a constitutional provision required that no

city council could impose a zoning restriction unless and until the restriction was

submitted to and approved by the city attorney. Does that mean that it is the city

attorney –– and not the city council –– that actually imposes zoning restrictions?

No.

The City also argues that article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b)

constrains voter initiatives because “statutory and constitutional limits on the

power of local government apply equally to local initiatives.” The City primarily

relies on Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, but that case offers the

City no support. It involved a statutory initiative that proposed to adjust state

legislative and congressional district boundaries after the Legislature had already

engaged in decennial redistricting. (Id. at p. 663.) Noting that the state

Constitution prohibited the Legislature from redistricting more than once per

decade (id. at p. 668), we concluded that the initiative was impermissible (id. at

p. 663). We explained that “the power of the people through the statutory

initiative is coextensive with the power of the Legislature.” (Id. at p. 675.) Yet, as

we later indicated, Legislature v. Deukmejian simply stands for the proposition

that “neither the Legislature nor the voters may enact a law of a nature that

exceeds a limitation on the state’s lawmaking power.” (Kennedy Wholesale,

supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 252; DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 776 [discussing local

initiatives].) By contrast, procedural requirements imposed on the Legislature or

local governments are presumed not to apply to the initiative power absent

19

evidence that such was the intended purpose of the requirements. (DeVita, at

p. 776; Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 252.) To illustrate: When a local government

lacks authority to legislate in an area, perhaps because the state has occupied the

field (e.g., American Financial Services Assn. v. City of Oakland (2005) 34

Cal.4th 1239, 1252 [predatory lending practices]), that limitation also applies to

the people’s local initiative power. (DeVita, at p. 776.) In contrast, where

legislative bodies retain lawmaking authority subject to procedural limitations,

e.g., notice and hearing requirements (Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d

at p. 594) or two-thirds vote requirements (Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 251), we

presume such limitations do not apply to the initiative power absent evidence that

such was the restrictions’ intended purpose. (DeVita, at p. 785; Kennedy

Wholesale, at p. 252.)

The concurring and dissenting opinion interprets these cases more

narrowly, as applying exclusively when the procedural requirements at issue are

“incompatible with initiative procedures.” (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 14-15.)

Yet this reading proves too cramped an understanding of these cases’ holdings or

their significance. While our cases noted that the restrictions at issue made little

sense in light of the distinct initiative process (e.g., Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53

Cal.3d at p. 252, fn. 5 [“electorate does not generally follow ‘legislative’

procedures when exercising the initiative power”]), nothing suggests those

observations formed the metes and bounds of our holding. To the contrary, our

reasoning was broader and grew out of our presumption in favor of the initiative

power. (E.g., DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 785 [“it is well established in our

case law that the existence of procedural requirements for the adoptions of local

ordinances generally does not imply a restriction of the power of initiative or

referendum”], 786 [this “rule is a corollary to the basic presumption in favor of the

electorate’s power of initiative and referendum”].)

20

Taking account of this legal context, along with the relevant provision’s

text and other indicia of purpose, we conclude that the requirement in article XIII

C, section 2, subdivision (b) — mandating that general taxes be submitted to the

voters at a regularly scheduled general election — applies only to local

governments and not to the electorate’s initiative power without evidence that

such was the intended purpose of the requirement. The City cites no such

evidence, because there is none here.

Indeed, as we observed in Kennedy Wholesale, 53 Cal.3d at page 252, when

an initiative’s intended purpose includes imposing requirements on voters,

evidence of such a purpose is clear. In article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d),

for example, the enactors adopted a requirement providing that, before a local

government can impose, extend, or increase any special tax, voters must approve

the tax by a two-thirds vote. That constitutes a higher vote requirement than

would otherwise apply. (§ 9217 [providing for a majority vote].) That the voters

explicitly imposed a procedural two-thirds vote requirement on themselves in

article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d) is evidence that they did not implicitly

impose a procedural timing requirement in subdivision (b). (See Kennedy

Wholesale, at p. 252.) Moreover, had the voters wanted the procedural

requirements contained in article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) to apply to the

initiative power, Proposition 218 could have made that clear by providing, “No

local government or initiative may impose, extend, or increase . . . ,” by defining

local government to include the electorate exercising its initiative power, or by

imposing an absolute ban, i.e., “No general tax shall be imposed, extended, or

increased . . . .” (See Kennedy Wholesale, at p. 253 [discussing similar language

in Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 1, subd. (a)].) The voters did not do so, and we will

not infer such a purpose. (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 694; Kennedy Wholesale, at

p. 252 [“ ‘Where the electorate has demonstrated the ability to make their intent

21

clear, it is not the province of this court to imply an intent left unexpressed’ ”].)

Particularly because, given that article XIII C was enacted via initiative

constitutional amendment, its enactors were certainly well aware of the initiative

power. (Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 890, fn. 11.)

The City offers a final reason for applying article XIII C, section 2,

subdivision (b) to the electorate here. It contends that the term “impose” in that

provision includes the collection of taxes by a local government, so subdivision

(b) precludes the City from collecting a general tax imposed via initiative unless

and until the tax is approved by the voters at a regularly scheduled election. Not

so. The Court of Appeal in this case concluded that the ordinary meaning of

“impose” is “to establish,” not to collect (e.g., Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City of

San Ramon (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1761, 1770, citing Webster’s 3d New Internat.

Dict. (1970) p. 1136), and because it found no reason to depart from this

understanding of the term, it construed the meaning of “impose” in article XIII C,

section 2, subdivision (b) as consistent with this understanding. We agree.

Indeed, in Guardino, supra, 11 Cal.4th 220, we interpreted nearly identical

language and reached the same conclusion. In that case, we construed a statute

added by Proposition 62, a statutory initiative adopted at the 1986 general election.

The relevant language provided, “No local government or district may impose any

special tax unless and until such special tax is submitted to the electorate . . .”

(Gov. Code, § 53722), and we explained that “impose” “in this context means

enacted.” (Guardino, at p. 240; see Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of

Riverside (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 679, 681-682 [using “impose” and “enact”

interchangeably when discussing Proposition 218]; see also Weisblat v. City of San

Diego (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1034 [same with regard to Prop. 13].) This

is also consistent with usage in the relevant ballot materials. (E.g., 1996 Ballot

22

Pamp., supra, analysis of Prop. 218 by the Legis. Analyst, p. 73 [using “create,”

“establish,” and “impose” interchangeably].)16

The City then seeks to bolster its argument for equating “impose” with

“collect” by relying on Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001)

25 Cal.4th 809. There we construed Proposition 62 for purposes of determining

when the statute of limitations began to run on the plaintiffs’ action against the

city for wrongfully “imposing and collecting a general tax.” (Howard Jarvis, at

p. 812.) What we concluded is that the ongoing collection of the tax at issue

constituted a continuing injury but, in reaching that conclusion, we relied on

language stating that taxes imposed prior to the measure’s enactment “shall

continue to be imposed only if approved by a majority vote of the voters.” (Gov.

Code, § 53727, subd. (b); Howard Jarvis, at p. 823; see also Gov. Code, § 53728

[providing a remedy when a government continues to collect an unauthorized

tax].) We explained that, “[c]learly, in this provision, ‘imposition’ is not limited



16 Indeed, a critical aspect of our analysis involves understanding what

“impose” means in the context of article XIII C. The concurring and dissenting

opinion conveniently assumes its conclusions about this term by concluding in

effect that only local governments can impose taxes because, administratively,

only local governments can collect and spend them. (E.g., conc. & dis. opn., post,

at pp. 2 [“A tax passed by voter initiative, no less than a tax passed by vote of the

city council, is a tax of the local government, to be collected by the local

government, to raise revenue for the local government”], 4 [“A local government

tax is a local government tax, no matter how it may have been legislated into

being”].) Here, “impose” most plausibly means to establish or enact, and article

XIII C, section 2 applies only if it is the local government doing so. The

concurring and dissenting opinion emphasizes that when the electorate exercises

its initiative power, it is acting in a legislative capacity. (E.g., conc. & dis. opn.,

post, at pp. 4-5.) No doubt. But that is not sufficient to establish that the

electorate is indistinguishable from representative politicians for the purposes of

triggering article XIII C, section 2, particularly when that provision gives no

indication whatsoever that it was designed to interfere with the exercise of the

initiative power.

23

to the time of initial enactment . . .” and Proposition 62’s intended purpose extends

to cover “continued imposition or collection of [an unauthorized] tax as well.”

(Howard Jarvis, at pp. 823-824, italics added.) So Howard Jarvis is inapposite.17

C.

Given the language and other indicia of intended purpose for article XIII C,

section 2, subdivision (b), we conclude the provision’s requirements apply only

when a local government seeks to impose, extend, or increase a general tax. (See

DeVita, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 785.) By contrast, its requirement that a general tax

be submitted to the voters at a general election does not apply to taxes that are

imposed by initiative after securing the electorate’s approval in a manner

consistent with section 9214. (See Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.4th at

pp. 251-252.) A contrary conclusion would work an implied repeal of

section 9214, something against which we have a strong presumption. (E.g.,

Tuolumne Jobs, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1039 [noting we will find an implied repeal

only where there is no way to reconcile the two provisions].)

Without an unambiguous indication that a provision’s purpose was to

constrain the initiative power, we will not construe it to impose such limitations.

Such evidence might include an explicit reference to the initiative power in a

provision’s text, or sufficiently unambiguous statements regarding such a purpose

in ballot materials. The concurring and dissenting opinion queries “ ‘by what



17 Although the City does not cite the provision, we note that article XIII C,

section 2, subdivision (c) provides, “Any general tax imposed, extended, or

increased, without voter approval, by any local government on or after January 1,

1995, and prior to the effective date of this article, shall continue to be imposed

only if approved by a majority vote of the voters voting in an election on the issue

of the imposition . . . .” But this language does not alter our conclusion since,

here, the tax would only have been imposed if a majority of the voters had voted

for it.

24

authority’ ” we require clear evidence of an intended purpose to constrain exercise

of the initiative power. (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 14.) Our answer is rooted

firmly in the longstanding and consistent line of cases emphasizing courts’

obligation to protect and liberally construe the initiative power (e.g., Associated

Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591) and to narrowly construe provisions

that would burden or limit its exercise (see, e.g., Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at

p. 696).18 Those cases underscore the centrality of direct democracy in the

California Constitution, and the status of our presumption liberally construing the

initiative power as a paramount structural element of our Constitution. (E.g.,

Associated Home Builders, at p. 591 [describing the initiative as “ ‘one of the most

precious rights of our democratic process’ ”].) A clear statement rule is consistent

with, and indeed, appropriately advances our duty to safeguard the exercise of the

initiative power. Although limits may be placed on it, and in some cases they

have been, the best way to implement our oft-repeated references to the

importance of the initiative is to avoid presuming that a provision constrains that

power without a clear statement or equivalent evidence that such was the

provision’s intended purpose.



18 The concurring and dissenting opinion indicates it has “no quarrel with this

general principle” (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 14), but its analysis does not

sufficiently grapple with the necessary implications of that presumption. Our

cases underscore courts’ obligation to “ ‘jealously guard’ ” (Associated Home

Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591) and “liberally construe” (Perry v. Brown,

supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1145, fn. 16) the initiative power, preserving its exercise

“[i]f doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of [its] use.” (Associated Home

Builders, at p. 591.) While the concurring and dissenting opinion acknowledges

our precedent in passing (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 14), it nonetheless begins its

analysis looking for evidence that article XIII C, section 2 –– which makes no

reference to initiatives –– evinces an intent to exempt initiatives from its

provisions (conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 1). This approach relegates our previous

conclusions regarding the initiative power to the status of an afterthought, likely to

hold little relevance in this case or perhaps any case.

25

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the concurring and dissenting opinion

starts from the premise that the electors must have wanted to tie their own hands

with respect to the imposition of local taxes. This very premise then undergirds

the opinion’s reading of the term “local government” as necessarily including the

electorate. Nothing supports this premise, despite the opinion’s confident

assertion –– as if it were discussing the attitudes of an individual well known only

to select observers –– that “[w]hether a local government tax has been enacted by

voter initiative or by vote of the city council is not article XIII C’s concern.”

(Conc. & dis. opn., post, p. 18). Defending this assertion is difficult for the simple

reason that nothing in the text of article XIII C, or its context, supports the

conclusion that the term “local government” was meant to encompass the

electorate. Any reasonable construction of article XIII C, section 2 must take into

account the robust importance of the initiative power in other constitutional

provisions — irrespective of whether or not the “voter initiative” is “article XIII

C’s concern” (conc. & dis. opn., post, p. 18). (See, e.g., Associated Home

Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591 [describing the importance of the initiative

power].)

In playing down the importance of giving full effect to these provisions, the

concurring and dissenting opinion turns our case law on its head — by essentially

demanding evidence that the electors intended to exempt the initiative power from

article XIII C, section 2 as a precondition for preserving that power in

unencumbered form. (E.g., conc. & dis. opn., post, pp. 1-2, 9.) To impose this

requirement would be a stark departure from our precedent, and one impossible to

square with our decisions on the power of initiative. (E.g., DeVita, supra, 9

Cal.4th at pp. 785-786 [refusing to infer limits]; Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 696

[emphasizing breadth of initiative power and looking for express evidence of

intent to limit].) Our analysis in those decisions consistently begins with the

26

presumption that the initiative power is not constrained, then searches for clear

evidence suggesting that electors could reasonably be understood to have imposed

restrictions upon their constitutional power. (E.g., Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53

Cal.3d at p. 253 [concluding the plaintiff failed to identify evidence of intent to

limit initiative power]; DeVita, at pp. 785-786; Rossi, at pp. 695-696.)

What the City maintains is that our interpretation, whatever its merits

otherwise, would create a kind of loophole in article XIII C, section 2. A

hypothetical city council, it suggests, could conceivably collude with a public

employee union to place a levy on the ballot as a means of raising revenue for a

goal supported by both. To repay the union for campaign support, or simply

because the union and council agree on the policy, the council accepts the union’s

contract proposal –– which will be funded by increasing a utility tax. Under our

interpretation, the City reasons, the city council could meet with the union, and the

union could mobilize city employees to collect signatures on an initiative

proposing the tax increase. Once enough signatures are collected — 15 percent

under section 9214 or 10 percent under section 9215 — the city council could

simply adopt the ordinance without submitting the tax increase to the voters.

(§§ 9214, subd. (a), 9215, subd. (a).) Thus, the city council could effectively skirt

article XIII C, section 2’s command that “[n]o local government may impose,

extend, or increase any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the

electorate and approved by a majority vote.” (Ibid.) These facts are not presented

here, and we decline to take up what would happen should they arise.

D.

The sequence of the City’s actions with respect to the initiative causes us to

make a final observation. Upon receiving a petition signed by not less than 15

percent of the city’s voters, section 9214 obliges a city to (1) adopt the ordinance

without alteration; (2) immediately order a special election; or (3) order an agency

27

report and, once the report is presented to the city council, adopt the ordinance or

order a special election. These deadlines are mandatory (Tuolumne Jobs, supra,

59 Cal.4th at p. 1038), and the City erred when it ignored them. Its unilateral

determination that the proposed initiative constituted a general tax and was

therefore governed by article XIII C, section 2 did not relieve it of its obligation to

adhere to section 9214 — particularly given that the initiative purported to propose

a “fee” and was thus, facially at least, not a tax measure. In the future, cities

should follow section 9214 and order a special election. At that point, either the

city or other interested parties may pursue any appropriate legal challenge to the

measure either in the pre-, or more likely, postelection context. (E.g., Legislature

v. Deukmejian, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 665-666 [discussing the propriety of

preelection review].)

28

III.

Multiple provisions of the state Constitution explicitly constrain the power

of local governments to raise taxes. But we will not lightly apply such restrictions

on local governments to voter initiatives, “ ‘one of the most precious rights of our

democratic process.’ ” (Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.)

Only by approving a measure that is unambiguous in its purpose to restrict the

electorate’s own initiative power can the voters limit such power, tying themselves

to the proverbial mast as Ulysses did. Unless a provision explicitly constrains the

initiative power or otherwise provides a similarly clear indication that its purpose

includes constraining the voters’ initiative power, we will not construe provisions

as imposing such limitations. (See Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at

p. 252.) We conclude that article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) does not limit

voters’ power to propose and adopt initiatives concerning taxation. Neither the

provision’s text nor anything else shedding light on its intended purpose support a

contrary conclusion. We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment in its entirety.

Multiple provisions of the state Constitution explicitly constrain the power

of local governments to raise taxes. But we will not lightly apply such restrictions on local governments to voter initiatives, “ ‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic process.’ ” (Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) Only by approving a measure that is unambiguous in its purpose to restrict the electorate’s own initiative power can the voters limit such power, tying themselves to the proverbial mast as Ulysses did. Unless a provision explicitly constrains the initiative power or otherwise provides a similarly clear indication that its purpose includes constraining the voters’ initiative power, we will not construe provisions as imposing such limitations. (See Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 252.) We conclude that article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b) does not limit voters’ power to propose and adopt initiatives concerning taxation. Neither the provision’s text nor anything else shedding light on its intended purpose support a contrary conclusion. We affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment in its entirety.