United States of America v. Alex Coleman

A jury convicted Alex Coleman of five counts of possession with intent to

distribute various controlled substances and one count of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846; one

count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug

trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The district court1 sentenced

Coleman to 161 months in prison. Coleman appeals, arguing the district court erred

in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence, and the

evidence was insufficient to convict him on any count. We affirm.

I. Suppression Issues.

On August 8, 2014, Ashlee Phillips, who resided with Coleman, called 911 to

claim that Coleman had punched her in the mouth and had a gun. North Little Rock

Police Officer Jon Crowder responded, finding Phillips outside the residence with

facial injuries. Crowder entered the residence, where he confronted and arrested

Coleman after a struggle. Additional officers responded and discovered firearms and

drugs during a protective sweep of the residence and a warrant search the following

day. Coleman’s motion to suppress argued that all evidence seized from his residence

following Officer Crowder’s initial entry, including evidence seized in the warrant

search, should be suppressed for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.

At a two-day evidentiary hearing, Officer Crowder testified that Phillips exited

the residence as he arrived, upset and crying and with visible injuries to her face.

Phillips repeated her claim that Coleman struck her and was armed, then opened the

residence door and entered the residence with Crowder. Three other responding

officers also testified, including Detective James Neely, who completed the search

warrant affidavit. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Coleman moved

to reconsider, and the district court held a second hearing at which Phillips testified.

She denied telling Officer Crowder that Coleman struck her and was armed, and

denied opening the residence door and escorting Crowder inside. The district court

found Crowder’s testimony more credible than Phillips’s and again denied the motion

1The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge of the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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to suppress. We review the court’s fact findings for clear error and its legal

conclusions de novo. United States v. Amratiel, 622 F.3d 914, 915 (8th Cir. 2010),

cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1247 (2011).

Coleman first argues that Phillips did not invite Officer Crowder inside the

residence and his warrantless entry was therefore unlawful. “The general prohibition

against warrantless entry into a home does not apply ‘to situations in which voluntary

consent has been obtained . . . from a third party who possesses common authority

over the premises.’” United States v. Cross, 888 F.3d 985, 989 (8th Cir.) (quoting

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 2018 WL

4283416 (2018). Here, Phillips’s testimony established that she possessed common

authority. The testimony of Crowder and Phillips conflicted on the issue whether she

consented to his entry. The district court explicitly credited Crowder’s testimony and

found his version of the events more accurate. We have no reason to disturb that

finding, which “is virtually unreviewable on appeal.” United States v. Walsh, 299

F.3d 729, 735 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1066 (2002).

Inside the residence, Crowder confronted Coleman standing in the kitchen.

Coleman said Crowder had no right to be in the home. Crowder explained why he

was there and told Coleman to provide an ID, noting large bulges in his pockets.

Coleman then ran down the stairs behind him. Crowder ordered him to stop, drew his

service weapon, and called for backup. Coleman walked back up, handed Crowder

an ID, and sat on the stairs. When Crowder arrested Coleman for domestic battery,

a struggle ensued. Crowder shot Coleman with a taser, Coleman fell down the stairs,

and Crowder secured him until other officers arrived. Officer Crowder found a large

bag of white substance in Coleman’s left pocket, a large amount of cash in his right

pocket, a trail of small baggies of white powder on the stairwell, and a 9mm Taurus

handgun and another bag of cocaine in a loveseat near where Coleman was arrested.

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Sergeant Craig Edwards responded because Crowder’s use of a taser needed

to be reported. Edwards proceeded to the bottom of the stairs where Coleman was

lying, secured by Crowder. Edwards observed a large amount of money and narcotics

on the floor and the handgun on the loveseat. He instructed Crowder to remove

Coleman, learned that the residence had not been secured, and ordered a protective

sweep to protect the safety of narcotics officers Edwards was contacting to investigate

the seized narcotics. Edwards conducted a cursory sweep of the basement area and

found a locked bedroom door which he opened using Coleman’s key, provided by

Phillips. He observed a bag of marijuana in plain view on the bed, which he left

undisturbed. Detective James Neely arrived after Coleman was removed, determined

there were no exigent circumstances justifying an additional warrantless search, and

used information provided by Crowder to prepare a search warrant application. A

magistrate judge signed the warrant at 11:19 p.m.

The officers executed a warrant search the next day. In different parts of the

residence, they found methamphetamine, cocaine, cocaine base, heroin, marijuana,

various narcotic pills, numerous cell phones, and Coleman’s ID card in a box of

baggies next to digital scales with residue. They also found a Remington rifle and

paperwork in Coleman’s name in the locked bedroom. A Honda Accord was parked

in the residence’s driveway. Unsure whether the warrant included Coleman’s car, the

officers had a police canine sniff the car’s exterior. When the dog alerted, they

searched the car, finding additional cocaine and another firearm under the back seat.

Coleman levels numerous Fourth Amendment attacks on the officers’ actions.

First, he argues that Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), established that

Coleman’s demand that Crowder leave the residence prevailed over co-occupant

Phillips’s consent to enter. We disagree. In Randolph, an objecting co-tenant at the

door refused to consent to entry by police who were told by his co-tenant there was

evidence of drug use in the house. The Court made clear that a co-tenant’s consent

to entry will suffice if a potential objector is nearby but not part of the threshold

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colloquy. Id. at 121; see United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir.

2009) (en banc) (“Hudspeth was not at the door and objecting and does not fall within

Randolph’s ‘fine line.’”). In addition, the Court in Randolph made clear that “this

case has no bearing on the capacity of the police to protect domestic victims.” Id. at

118 and 127 (Breyer, J., concurring). Here, Coleman did not object until after

Crowder entered the residence with Phillips’s consent to investigate her report of

domestic violence. Coleman’s objection did not invalidate the lawful entry.

Coleman next argues the protective sweep was an invalid search of the locked

bedroom because Coleman had been removed, so a reasonably prudent officer would

not infer “that the area to be swept harbor[ed] an individual posing a danger to those

on the arrest scene.” United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir. 2006)

(quotation omitted). Like the district court, we disagree. Coleman was in the

basement prior to his arrest, the locked room was connected to the room in which he

was arrested, others were occupying the residence, one firearm had been found, and

narcotics officers needed to investigate the large amount of drugs on the basement

floor and in the nearby loveseat. These circumstances gave Sgt. Edwards “a

reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept

harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Maryland v.

Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990). Phillips’s consent to search the locked room was not

constitutionally required. Moreover, even if the sweep was an improper search, the

evidence seized in the bedroom during the warrant search would inevitably have been

discovered. See United States v. Pruneda, 518 F.3d 597, 604 (8th Cir. 2008).

Coleman next argues that the warrant did not describe with sufficient

particularity the things to be seized and the places to be searched because it broadly

authorized search and seizure of “books, records, receipts, ledgers, and other papers

related to the transportation, purchase, distribution, or secreting of controlled

substances” at premises where other persons were present, without identifying

Coleman by name. “[W]here [an overbroad] warrant is invalid only in part, the

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warrant is ‘severable,’ and items seized pursuant to valid portions of the warrant need

not be suppressed.” United States v. Timley, 443 F.3d 615, 622 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 549 U.S. 889 (2006). Here, Coleman complains that officers seized cell

phones that were not specifically mentioned in the warrant. We agree with the district

court that cell phones were within the class of “instrumentalities of criminal activity”

the warrant specifically described. “[A] search warrant need not name any particular

defendant against whom evidence will be used.” United States v. Blaylock, 535 F.3d

922, 927 (8th Cir. 2008), cert denied, 558 U.S. 830 (2009).

Finally, Coleman argues the police illegally searched his vehicle because

search of the vehicle was beyond the scope of the warrant, the automobile exception

does not permit warrantless search of a vehicle parked at a private residence, and the

dog sniff of a vehicle parked in the residence’s curtilage was illegal under Florida v.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). The district court rejected this argument, noting our

decisions holding that the automobile exception applies to a search with probable

cause of a vehicle parked in the driveway of a residence. See Blaylock, 535 F.3d at

926-27; United States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 551-52 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated on

other grounds, 517 U.S. 1152 (1996).

The Supreme Court recently refused to extend the automobile exception to the

warrantless search of a vehicle parked in a portion of a driveway that is part of the

residence’s curtilage. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669-1671 (2018). But

this case has an additional fact of controlling significance. Officers who were

lawfully inside Coleman’s residence executing a valid warrant to search “the premises

and curtilage area” had a drug dog sniff the exterior of a car parked in the driveway.

The warrant distinguishes this case from Jardines, where the drug dog sniffed the

curtilage of a home before a warrant was obtained, 133 S. Ct. at 1413, and from

Collins, where an officer with probable cause obtained off premises searched a motor

cycle parked in the curtilage without a warrant. In both cases, the strong Fourth

Amendment interest in the curtilage of a home was determinative. Jardines, 133 S.

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Ct. at 1415; Collins, 138 S. Ct at 1671, 1674. That interest was not compromised

here. We conclude that the warrant to search “the premises and curtilage area”

permitted the officers either to search a vehicle parked in the curtilage, or, more

prudently, to have a drug dog sniff the vehicle’s exterior to confirm there was

probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband named in the warrant.

For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in denying

Coleman’s motion to suppress.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

At trial, the government offered the items seized when Coleman was arrested

and in the subsequent warrant search of his residence -- methamphetamine, cocaine,

cocaine base, heroin, marijuana, various narcotic pills, Coleman’s ID card in a box

of baggies next to digital scales with residue, and three firearms -- supported by the

testimony of police officers involved in the arrest, the subsequent searches, and

analysis of the seized narcotics. The government also introduced numerous text

messages to or from “Alex” recovered from the cell phones seized at the residence,

which DEA Special Agent Brad Abbot identified as messages concerning the

purchase and sale of various narcotics. A former cell-mate testified to incriminating

statements made by Coleman while they were incarcerated together.

Coleman argues that this evidence was insufficient to establish any of the eight

counts of conviction. We review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a

conviction de novo. We will affirm unless, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government and accepting all reasonable inferences that may be

drawn in favor of the verdict, “no reasonable jury could have found [Coleman]

guilty.” United States v. Thompson, 686 F.3d 575, 582 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 568

U.S. 1054 (2012). Viewing the verdict under this deferential standard, we conclude

the evidence was sufficient to convict Coleman of each count.

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A reasonable jury could conclude Coleman knowingly possessed the narcotics

and firearms found in the residence. Constructive possession “is established if the

person has dominion over the premises where the firearm [or drugs are] located, or

control, ownership, or dominion over the firearm [or drugs themselves].” Cross, 888

F.3d at 990 (quotations omitted). Coleman lived in the downstairs area of the

residence. Officers accessed the locked basement bedroom and the car in the

driveway using Coleman’s keys, finding firearms, paperwork bearing Coleman’s

name, and cell phones containing text messages consistent with drug trafficking.

There was substantial circumstantial evidence establishing intent to distribute -- the

seizure of large amounts of narcotics far greater than typical user quantities, together

with drug packaging, cash, digital scales, and the text messages. See United States

v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 736-737 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1024 (2002).

In addition to firearm possession, the evidence was sufficient to convict

Coleman of possession in furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A). The firearms were easily accessible and found in close proximity to

drugs found on Coleman’s person, in the loveseat, and in his vehicle. Agent Abbott

testified that drug traffickers often use guns to protect their narcotics and sale

proceeds. This evidence was sufficient to prove “a nexus between the defendant’s

possession of the firearm and the drug crime.” United States v. Goodrich, 739 F.3d

1091, 1098 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 150 (2014).

The final count was conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to

distribute a controlled substance. “To convict a defendant of conspiring to distribute

a controlled substance, there must be sufficient evidence that: (1) a conspiracy existed

for an illegal purpose; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant

knowingly joined in it. The conspiracy’s existence may be proved by direct or

circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 461 F.3d 939, 945 (8th

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The numerous text messages evidencing drug

trafficking found in cell phones seized at Coleman’s residence, together with the

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seizure of quantities of a diverse array of illegal drugs, some packaged for

distribution, along with substantial cash and multiple firearms, was more than

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Coleman guilty of conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute multiple controlled substances.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.