Cecilia Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.

Cecilia Thomas appeals the decision of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama dismissing her Title VII retaliation claim on summary
judgment. After review and oral argument, we affirm.

I. Background

Cecilia Thomas worked at Cooper Lighting, Inc. ("Cooper") on a full time
basis as an assembler and floater from February 2004 until July 2005 under the
supervision of Eddie Cain. On the evening of April 8, 2005, Thomas accused Cain
of sexual harassment. On April 11, 2005, Thomas presented the Human Resource
Manager of the facility, James Davis, with a written complaint of sexual harassment.
That complaint outlined two specific sexually-tinged comments and stated that Cain's
communication was "sexually nasty."

Thomas's employment with Cooper was terminated effective July 7, 2005. The
reason given by Cooper for the separation was excessive absenteeism consistent with
the company's "no fault" Absentee Policy and Procedure.

On March 1, 2006, Thomas commenced this employment discrimination action
against Cooper, alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliation
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
sections 2000e et seq. In her October 24, 2006 Response to Defendant's Motion to
Compel Discovery of Plaintiff's Health Records and Rule 35 Examination, Thomas voluntarily dismissed the sexual harassment cause of action, leaving only the
retaliation claim. She contends that Cooper retaliated against her by terminating her
employment on July 7, 2005.

At the close of discovery, Cooper filed a motion for summary judgment on the
remaining claim. The district court granted that motion, finding that Thomas's
allegations did not come close to the threshold of a hostile work environment required
by Title VII, and therefore Thomas did not have an objectively reasonable belief that
the complained-of conduct violated Title VII.

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To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, "the plaintiff must
show (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some causal relation between the two
events." Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994)
(internal citations omitted). The parties hotly contest whether Thomas held an
objectively reasonable belief that the complained-of conduct constituted an unlawful
employment practice and thus, necessarily, whether Thomas established the first
element of her prima facie case for the retaliation claim. See Berman v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., Inc., 160 F.3d 697, 702 (11th Cir. 1998) ("In order to state a
retaliation claim, the plaintiff need only show that he had a ‘reasonable belief' that
an unlawful employment practice was occurring, and is not required to show that the
employer actually engaged in an unlawful employment practice."); see also Lipphardt
v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that the plaintiff is required to show that a "good faith, reasonable belief"
of harassment led her to report the conduct). However, this court need not decide
whether Thomas held such a "good faith, reasonable belief" because the record
reveals that Thomas has failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find a causal connection between the April 8 and 11, 2005 complaints and the July 7, 2005 termination. The causation issue was expressly raised in Cooper's
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
the parties had the opportunity to thoroughly brief this issue. We may affirm the
district court's judgment on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that
ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below. See Powers v. United
States, 996 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (11th Cir. 1993).

The burden of causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity
between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse employment action. See
Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798-99 (11th Cir. 2000). But
mere temporal proximity, without more, must be "very close." Clark County Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1511, 149 L. Ed.2d 509 (2001)
(internal citations omitted). A three to four month disparity between the statutorily
protected expression and the adverse employment action is not enough. See id.
(citing Richmond v. ONEOK, 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997) (3 month period
insufficient) and Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (4
month period insufficient)). Thus, in the absence of other evidence tending to show
causation, if there is a substantial delay between the protected expression and the
adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law. See Higdon v.
Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001)).

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For the full text of this opinion, go to: http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/200710233.pdf