Shawn E. Moore v. Peak Oilfield Service Company; Peak Alaska Ventures, Inc.; Nabors Alaska Services Corp.

Shawn Moore's truck overturned after running into a dead moose in the
center of the road. His passenger, Shannon Parnell, was critically injured. Parnell sued
Peak Oilfield Service Company, the owner of the truck that had hit the moose sometime
earlier. Peak then filed a third-party claim against Moore for allocation of fault. Because
the jury found that Peak was not liable for Parnell's injuries, it did not reach the question
of Moore's comparative fault. In a separate appeal we reversed and remanded the issue
of Peak's liability for a new trial.1

This appeal considers the same trial, but involves the superior court's failure
to rule that Moore was negligent and reckless as a matter of law because he was driving
while intoxicated at the time of the accident. Peak moved for such a ruling based on
Moore's conviction of driving while intoxicated in violation of AS 28.35.030. The
conviction was based on Moore's plea of no contest to the charge.

This case is controlled by our recent decision in Lamb v. Anderson.2 In
Lamb we held that
a conviction based on a no contest plea will collaterally estop
the criminal defendant from denying any element in a
subsequent civil action against him that was necessarily
established by the conviction, as long as the prior conviction
was for a serious criminal offense and the defendant in fact
had the opportunity for a full and fair hearing.[3]

The Lamb factors are satisfied in this case. Driving while intoxicated is a serious
criminal offense.4 Moore had the opportunity for a full and fair hearing on his criminal
charge. He was represented by a public defender when he entered his plea.
Both negligence and recklessness are established by a conviction of
operating a vehicle while intoxicated.5 Thus, Moore is estopped from denying his
negligence and recklessness at the time of the accident. But his ultimate liability remains
an open question. Whether Moore's negligence and recklessness caused the accident is
not an issue that was necessarily established by his conviction. Moore is therefore not
barred by the conviction from arguing that his negligence and recklessness were not a
legal cause of the accident.

* * *

The superior court’s denial of Peak’s motion for partial summary judgment
is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

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