Michael Damian Brandner v. Virginia Louise Hudson and James Arthur Hudson

Virginia Hudson sued Dr. Michael Brandner for negligence and assault
based on an encounter in July 2002 that occurred at Alaska Regional Hospital, where
both Hudson and Dr. Brandner worked. Hudson sought compensatory and punitive
damages, claiming that a knee injury and emotional distress resulted from an incident in which Dr. Brandner dragged her down a hallway and pushed her into her office chair.
After a bench trial, the trial court awarded Hudson $90,828 in compensatory damages
and $25,000 in punitive damages. Dr. Brandner appeals the court's damages awards and
its decision to admit records of domestic violence petitions filed against Dr. Brandner by
his wife. Because any error in admitting the domestic violence petitions was harmless
error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Because the compensatory damages
award is not clearly erroneous, and because clear and convincing evidence supports the
punitive damages award, we affirm the trial court's damages awards.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In 2002 Virginia Hudson and Dr. Michael Brandner were both employed
at Alaska Regional Hospital. Hudson's duties included scheduling surgeries. Dr.
Brandner was employed as a surgeon at the hospital. On the morning of July 5, 2002,
Hudson received a note that Dr. Brandner was upset with her regarding the schedule.
Hudson testified that later that day, she encountered Dr. Brandner in the hallway and
said, "I heard you were upset." Hudson testified that in response, Dr. Brandner grabbed
her arm and dragged Hudson down the hall to her office. When they entered the office,
Dr. Brandner pushed Hudson into her chair. As she was pushed, Hudson's foot was
tangled in the chair, and she twisted her knee. Dr. Brandner then left Hudson's office.
Immediately after the incident, Hudson showed a coworker her arm, which was red, and
told her what happened. On the following Monday, Hudson returned to work and filed
an incident report with her supervisor. Hudson then went to the emergency room and
reported the incident to the police. Dr. Brandner was given a deferred prosecution.1 Over the next several months, Hudson experienced pain in her knee and ultimately
required surgery. In addition, Hudson suffered emotional distress and sought counseling
and medication.

Hudson sued Dr. Brandner, claiming assault, negligence, and civil rights
violations, and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Hudson's husband sued for
loss of consortium. Superior Court Judge John Suddock conducted a two-day bench trial.
During the trial, over Dr. Brandner's objection, the trial court admitted Hudson's
testimony about records she discovered of domestic violence petitions filed against Dr.
Brandner. The court admitted the testimony and the records for the limited purpose of
proving Hudson's state of mind after the incident.

At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Suddock found in favor of the Hudsons.
Judge Suddock found that Dr. Brandner was negligent and had committed civil battery.
He awarded the Hudsons $90,828 in damages, including approximately $15,000 in
medical expenses and lost wages; $25,000 in pain and suffering; and $50,000 for
emotional distress. In addition, the trial court initially indicated that $50,000 in punitive
damages was appropriate. The court later reduced the punitive damages award to
$25,000.2

Dr. Brandner appeals. Dr. Brandner challenges the trial court's decision to
admit his domestic violence records, asserting that the records were irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial. Dr. Brandner also challenges the court's award of compensatory damages
for emotional distress, claiming that Hudson's emotional distress was extreme and
unusual and that it was not caused by his actions. Finally, Dr. Brandner challenges the punitive damages award, claiming it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence
and asserting that the trial court's award was the product of passion or prejudice.

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During the trial, Hudson testified that when the police interviewed her on
the day of the incident, they told her to check Dr. Brandner's record for domestic
violence. She also testified that a nurse at the hospital advised her to check Dr.
Brandner's courthouse records. The trial judge allowed Hudson's testimony that she
reviewed and copied records from which she concluded that Dr. Brandner had been
abusive to his wife.

I know that he jerked the phone out of the wall. I know that
he stalked her. I know his kids had stepped in between him
and his wife.

And what I read, he is violent. And because of reading that,
I wasn't real sure what he was capable of doing to me. I'm
not even related to him.

The trial judge overruled Dr. Brandner's objection that the testimony was hearsay,
admitting it as evidence of Hudson's state of mind. In addition to allowing the
testimony, the judge also admitted the records over Dr. Brandner's objection.

Dr. Brandner argues that the domestic violence records were irrelevant
because they occurred four years prior to the incident with Hudson and because the
petitions were dismissed. He also contends that the records were highly prejudicial.7

To be admissible, evidence must be relevant to a material issue.8 The trial
court determined that Hudson's testimony regarding her reaction to the records was
relevant to her state of mind after the assault. Dr. Brandner suggests that because
Hudson did not thoroughly read the records, any distress she experienced as a result of
the records was unreasonable. But it was for the trier of fact to determine whether
Hudson's distress was reasonable, and the testimony was relevant to the distress Hudson
experienced. As a result, the trial court's ruling that the evidence was relevant to
Hudson's state of mind was not an abuse of discretion.

But Alaska Evidence Rule 403 provides that otherwise admissible evidence
"may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Dr. Brandner suggests
that the domestic violence records were unfairly prejudicial because they could lead a
trier of fact to assume that he was guilty of the battery against Hudson.

Trial courts have broad discretion in applying the Rule 403 balancing test.9
In reviewing the trial court's decision, we balance the danger of unfair prejudice against
the probative value of the evidence "to determine whether the potential danger
predominated so greatly as to leave us firmly convinced that admitting the challenged
evidence amounted to a clear abuse of discretion under Evidence Rule 403."10 But even
where the trial court errs in admitting evidence, we will reverse only if that error was not
harmless.11 A trial court's error in admitting evidence "is harmless when there is no
reasonable likelihood that the admitted evidence had an appreciable effect on [the trier
of fact]."12 Dr. Brandner bears the burden of showing that prejudice resulted from the
trial court's admission of the testimony and records.13

While this would have been a much closer and more troubling question in
a jury trial, we hold that any error in admitting the records was harmless. In this case,
the likelihood of unfair prejudice was greatly reduced by the fact that this was a bench trial.14 Moreover, Judge Suddock indicated that he had not read the records, stating that
the "records didn't really make very much difference" and concluding that he was
"totally uninterested in [Dr. Brandner's] DV records . . . [because] the incident speaks
for itself and should be judged by itself." In other words, Judge Suddock's findings
explicitly state that he gave very little weight to the domestic violence records, even on
the issue of Hudson's state of mind. Under these circumstances, we hold that any error
in admitting the records was harmless.

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For the full text of this opinion, go to: http://www.state.ak.us/courts/ops/sp-6187.pdf