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Plaintiff J.M. appeals from an order denying his petition for

a domestic violence protective order pursuant to Family Code1

section 6200 et seq., the Domestic Violence Prevention Act

Further statutory references are to the Family Code.

(DVPA). Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his request for a continuance of the hearing

and in denying the protective order. We reverse.

II. BACKGROUND

On January 8, 2019, plaintiff filed a request for a domestic

violence protective order against defendant W.T. Plaintiff alleged

that he and defendant had been in a dating relationship that

included incidents of abuse. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that on

December 23, 2017, defendant threw a book at plaintiff and

yelled at him. On January 13, 2018, defendant called plaintiff a

“‘fucking cunt’” repeatedly over the phone. On January 20, 2018,

defendant hit plaintiff with a closed fist multiple times, leaving

him with bruises on the leg and chest. That same day, during

sex, defendant bit plaintiff on the right side of his torso, breaking

the skin. On February 2, 2018, defendant sent text messages to

plaintiff threatening to hurt a dog that defendant had recently

adopted. Defendant was angry and jealous that the dog had

chosen to lay on the couch with plaintiff instead of with

defendant. On February 20, 2018, defendant drove recklessly

with plaintiff in the car. Defendant also yelled at plaintiff and

punched the steering wheel. On March 17, 2018, defendant

demanded to be allowed into plaintiff’s condominium. After being

allowed in, defendant screamed at plaintiff, blocked plaintiff’s

movements, and flailed his arms. Defendant noticed plaintiff had

installed security cameras and he demanded that plaintiff turn

them off.

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On January 8, 2019, the trial court issued a temporary

restraining order against defendant. The court scheduled the

DVPA hearing for January 29, 2019. (§ 242.)

On January 24, 2019, plaintiff submitted a request to

continue the DVPA hearing using Judicial Council Form DV-115.

As to item 1, part b, plaintiff checked box one, indicating that he

needed a continuance because he “could not get the papers served

before the hearing date.” He also checked box four, “[o]ther good

cause,” explaining that he was scheduled to undergo a medicallynecessary spinal surgery on January 28, 2019, the day before the

scheduled hearing, and had not learned about the date for the

surgery until January 15, 2019. According to plaintiff, this was

his second spinal surgery and he anticipated that he would “be

physically unable to stand or sit for any length of time and

[would] be unable to walk or care for [him]self without

substantial assistance for a period of several days, as was the

case with the previous surgery.” Plaintiff further explained that

he would likely require medication after the surgery, which

would impair his ability to competently and adequately present

evidence at the hearing, including his own testimony.

On January 29, 2019, the trial court held the DVPA

hearing. Neither of the parties appeared. The court dismissed

plaintiff’s request for a protective order, stating: “This one is

dismissed with prejudice. The most recent incident happened ten

months ago, so it is dismissed with prejudice.”2

2 We note that “[t]he length of time since the most recent act

of abuse is not, by itself, determinative. The court shall consider

the totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant

or deny a petition for relief.” (§ 6301, subd. (c).)

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The trial court also denied plaintiff’s request for a

continuance and issued an order stating: “The requesting party

did not appear at the January 29, 2019[,] hearing. This request

was received by the [c]ourt on January 24, 2019. Request to

continue a hearing prior to the scheduled hearing date must be

submitted to Department 2C by way of an Ex-Parte Application.”

On March 11, 2019, plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal

of the January 29, 2019, order.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by denying his

request for a continuance of the hearing and his request for a

domestic violence protective order. We address the denial of

plaintiff’s request for a continuance first.

A. Legal Authority

Pursuant to section 245, subdivision (b): “Either party may

request a continuance of the hearing [under the DVPA], which

the court shall grant on a showing of good cause. The request

may be made in writing before or at the hearing or orally at the

hearing. The court may also grant a continuance on its own

motion.”

The failure to grant a requested continuance is reviewable

on appeal from the judgment. (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192

Cal.App.4th 523, 527.) “Trial courts generally have broad

discretion in deciding whether to grant a request for a

continuance.” (Ibid.) “The denial of a motion for continuance for

absence of a party may constitute an abuse of discretion by the

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trial court sufficient to justify reversal only where there is an

affirmative showing of ‘good cause,’ such as serious illness or

unforeseen circumstances which prevented a party from

appearing at trial.” (Young v. Redman (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 827,

831; see also In re Marriage of Teegarden (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d

401, 406.)

B. Analysis

The basis for the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for

a continuance is not clear. The court noted that the “[r]equest to

continue a hearing prior to the scheduled hearing date must be

submitted to Department 2C by way of an Ex-Parte Application.”

It is undisputed that plaintiff submitted his request “prior to the

scheduled hearing date,” that is, January 24, 2019, although the

court did not file it until January 29, 2019.

To the extent the trial court denied the request because

plaintiff did not serve defendant with notice of either the request

for a protective order or the request for a continuance before the

January 29, 2019, hearing, we note that section 245 does not

require any such prior service. To the contrary, an earlier

version of section 245 specifically provided that: “The court may,

upon the filing of a declaration by the petitioner that the

respondent could not be served within the time required by

statute, reissue an order previously issued and dissolved by the

court for failure to serve the respondent.” (Stats. 2010, ch. 572,

§ 10.) This language, which expressly permitted a continuance

on the grounds that a petitioner had failed to serve a respondent

with the request for a protective order, is inconsistent with

requiring service on respondent prior to the granting of a request

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for continuance. Section 245 was amended in January 2016 by

Assembly Bill No. 1081 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.), but the

Assembly Judiciary Committee’s analysis indicates that the

amendment was meant to broaden, not limit, the permissible

grounds for continuance: “[T]his bill allows a continuance to be

granted for either party for good cause shown. As the author has

correctly identified, the need for a continuance is not limited to

inability of service, which is what the current law provides for

petitioners.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill

No. 1081 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) May 2, 2015, pp. 4–5; cf. Stats.

2010, ch. 572, § 10.)

Plaintiff’s declared reasons for requesting a continuance

were: that he had been unable to serve defendant prior to the

hearing date; that he would be undergoing necessary spinal

surgery the day before the hearing; and that as a result of the

surgery, he would be unable to walk or care for himself for a

period of several days. Further, plaintiff explained that his

surgery had not been scheduled until January 15, 2019. In other

words, this was an unforeseen circumstance. On these facts, we

conclude that plaintiff demonstrated good cause for a continuance

of at least a few days and the trial court thus abused its

discretion by denying any continuance at all. (See, e.g., Cohen v.

Herbert (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 488, 492, 496 [denying a

continuance of one week for defendants to prepare affidavit was

an abuse of discretion].) We will reverse and remand for the trial

court to schedule a new DVPA hearing. (Ross v. Figueroa (2006)

139 Cal.App.4th 856, 868.) We need not address plaintiff’s

remaining arguments concerning the trial court’s denial of the

request for a protective order.

The order denying the request for a domestic violence protective order is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant the plaintiff’s request for continuance within 30 days after issuance of this court’s remittitur. If plaintiff still desires a protective order, the court

shall set a new hearing date. In the interests of justice, plaintiff shall bear his own costs on appeal.