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In 2015 the California Legislature enacted the California

Voter Participation Rights Act (Elec. Code, §§ 14050-14057)1

(VPRA) to remedy the typically low voter turnout in off-cycle local

elections.

2 The VPRA requires political subdivisions in the state

to consolidate local elections with statewide on-cycle elections if

the local jurisdiction’s turnout falls at least 25 percent below the

locality’s average voter turnout in the previous four statewide

general elections.

The City of Redondo Beach challenged the VPRA on the

ground it improperly infringed the plenary authority conferred on

charter cities by article XI, section 5, of the California

Constitution to schedule their own elections for local offices. The

superior court upheld the City’s challenge, issued a writ of

mandate barring the Secretary of State from enforcing the VPRA

against the City and declared it unconstitutional as applied to

charter cities. We affirm the judgment to the extent it restrains

the Secretary from enforcing the VPRA against the City on the



1 Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise

stated.

2 “Elections that are held at the same time as statewide

elections are often referred to as ‘on-cycle’ elections, while

elections held at other times are often referred to as ‘off-cycle’

elections.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses,

Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended

June 23, 2015, p. 5.)

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ground the Legislature failed to clearly provide the VPRA applies

to charter cities.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The VPRA

The VPRA was signed into law on September 1, 2015 and

became operative January 1, 2018. Section 14052,

subdivision (a), provides that “a political subdivision shall not

hold an election other than on a statewide election date if holding

an election on a nonconcurrent date has previously resulted in a

significant decrease in voter turnout.” A “‘[p]olitical subdivision’”

is defined as “a geographic area of representation created for the

provision of government services, including, but not limited to, a

city, a school district, a community college district, or other

district organized pursuant to state law.” (§ 14051, subd. (a).)

“‘Significant decrease in voter turnout’ means the voter turnout

for a regularly scheduled election in a political subdivision is at

least 25 percent less than the average voter turnout within that

political subdivision for the previous four statewide general

elections.”3 (Id., subd. (b).)



3 Other provisions permit a political subdivision a respite

from enforcement if, by the operative date of January 1, 2018, it

has adopted a plan to consolidate a future election with a

statewide election no later than the November 8, 2022 statewide

general election (§ 14052, subd. (b)); authorize the superior court

to implement appropriate remedies for a violation (§ 14053);

authorize a voter who resides in the political subdivision to sue to

enforce the VPRA if the political subdivision has failed to do so

(§ 14055); and authorize the recovery of reasonable attorney fees

and costs (§ 14054).

4

On July 11, 2017 the Attorney General issued an opinion

concluding the VPRA applies to charter cities and school districts

governed by city charter.

2. The City of Redondo Beach’s Challenge to the VPRA

The City of Redondo Beach is a charter city. Its charter

requires all municipal and school board elections to be held on

“the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of each

succeeding odd-numbered year . . . .” School board elections are

required to be consolidated with municipal elections.

Notwithstanding these charter provisions, in October 2017 the

City school board unanimously adopted a resolution rescheduling

board member elections to the first Tuesday after the first

Monday in November of each even-numbered year beginning in

November 2020 to encourage voter participation and to comply

with the VPRA. The board’s resolution relied on an analysis of

voter turnout rates that demonstrated “a significant decrease in

voter turnout in odd-numbered years as compared to statewide

election dates.”

The Redondo Beach City Council considered the effect of

the VPRA at a November 7, 2017 meeting. A memorandum

prepared by the City Clerk and the City Attorney advised the

Council there was a question as to the applicability of the VPRA

to charter cities but acknowledged that the City’s last four local

off-cycle elections showed at least a 25 percent voter turnout

decline from the average turnout of the previous four statewide

general elections. A memorandum from the office of the Los

Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk to Redondo

Beach’s City Clerk compared the estimated costs to the City for

on-cycle and off-cycle municipal elections: The costs for on-cycle

general municipal elections (that is, elections consolidated with

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statewide general elections) ranged between $97,000 and

$111,000, while the projected costs for stand alone, off-cycle

elections ranged between $588,000 and $593,000.

Despite these data and the school board’s action, the City

initiated this lawsuit, filing a petition for writ of mandate under

Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and a complaint for

declaratory relief against the State of California and the

Secretary of State.4 The City sought a writ of mandate

prohibiting the Secretary from applying the VPRA to the City;

injunctive relief precluding the Secretary from enforcing the

VPRA against the City; and a judicial declaration the VPRA is

unconstitutional as applied to charter cities.

3. The Superior Court’s Decision

The matter was briefed for the court;

5 and the League of

California Cities, an association of cities throughout California,



4 The City erroneously named the State of California as a

defendant. A mandamus action contesting the constitutionality

of a state law is properly brought against the state officer who

bears the duty of enforcing that law. (American Indian Health &

Services Corp. v. Kent (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 772, 784;

Covarrubias v. Cohen (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1231, fn. 3.)

5 With their briefing, both sides submitted declarations from

their expert witnesses. The City’s expert, Douglas Johnson,

Ph.D., runs an election consulting firm that advises jurisdictions

on redistricting and other election issues. Dr. Johnson opined

that voter turnout in off-cycle elections sometimes exceeds the

turnout in on-cycle elections but had never attempted to quantify

the relationship. He also opined that low voter turnout is

essentially benign, reflecting the fact that “residents are happy

with how things are going” and that off-cycle local elections tend

to “bring out voters who are particularly interested in and aware

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was permitted to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the

City’s position the VPRA does not apply to charter cities.

After a hearing the superior court made no specific findings

but entered judgment in favor of the City and issued a writ of



of issues in their local jurisdiction.” He also pointed to the

problem known as “voter roll off,” which refers to the tendency of

some voters to tire of lengthy ballots and leave them incomplete,

to the detriment of local races found in the latter part of the

ballot.

The Secretary’s expert, Zoltan L. Hajnal, Ph.D., a professor

of political science at the University of California, San Diego,

opined that aligning municipal elections with statewide elections

dramatically increases voter turnout and cited multiple studies

confirming this effect. Professor Hajnal was the lead author of a

2002 study sponsored by the Public Policy Institute of California

that collected and reviewed available voter turnout data and

concluded that consolidation of local elections with statewide

elections offered “[t]he first and most important step to increase

voter participation in city elections.” (Hajnal et al., Municipal

Elections in California: Turnout, Timing, and Competition (2002)

p. xi.) Hajnal’s subsequent book, America’s Uneven Democracy:

Race, Turnout, and Representation in City Politics (Cambridge

Press 2010), won the American Political Science Association’s

award for best book on urban politics. Recent studies have

confirmed Professor Hajnal’s view that the voters in off-cycle

elections are less representative of the public as a whole than

those in on-cycle contests. (See Kogan et al., Election Timing,

Electorate Composition, and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from

School Districts (2018) 62 Am.J. of Pol. Sci. 637 [finding voters in

on-cycle elections in California significantly more representative

of the voting age population in terms of race, income and age

than voters in off-cycle elections]; Anzia, Timing and Turnout:

How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups (U. Chicago

Press 2014).)

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mandate prohibiting the Secretary from enforcing the VPRA

against the City and declared the VPRA unconstitutional as

applied to charter cities.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

A writ of mandate “may be issued by any court . . . to

compel the performance of an act which the law specifically

enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to

compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a

right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the

party is unlawfully precluded . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085,

subd. (a).) Mandamus under section 1085 is the appropriate

vehicle to challenge the constitutionality or validity of statutes or

other official acts. (See Jolicoeur v. Mihaly (1971) 5 Cal.3d 565,

570, fn. 2 [mandate is the appropriate remedy for compelling a

public official to act in accordance with the law and challenging

the constitutionality or validity of a statute].) Because the

construction and validity of a statute is a question of law, we

review the superior court’s decision de novo. (Vergara v. State of

California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 619, 642; accord, Boyer v.

County of Ventura (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 49, 53.)

2. The Authority of Charter Cities over the Timing of

Municipal Elections

California law recognizes two types of cities. A city

organized under the general law of the Legislature is referred to

as a general law city. (Gov. Code, § 34102.) A municipality

organized under a charter, like the City of Redondo Beach, is a

charter city. (Gov. Code, § 34101.) As the Supreme Court

explained in State Building & Construction Trades Council of

8

California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 555 (Vista),

“Charter cities are specifically authorized by our state

Constitution to govern themselves, free of state legislative

intrusion, as to those matters deemed municipal affairs.

Article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution

provides: ‘It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that

the city governed thereunder may make and enforce all

ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject

only to restrictions and limitations provided in their several

charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to

general laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution

shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to

municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.’”

(Italics omitted.) Known as the home rule doctrine, the broad

authority of charter cities was originally “‘enacted upon the

principle that the municipality itself knew better what it wanted

and needed than the state at large, and to give that municipality

the exclusive privilege and right to enact direct legislation which

would carry out and satisfy its wants and needs.’ [Citation.] The

provision represents an ‘affirmative constitutional grant to

charter cities of “all powers appropriate for a municipality to

possess . . .” and [includes] the important corollary that “so far as

‘municipal affairs’ are concerned,” charter cities are “supreme and

beyond the reach of legislative enactment.”’” (Id. at pp. 555-556;

see Johnson v. Bradley (1992) 4 Cal.4th 389, 394-398; California

Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d

1, 12 (CalFed).)

In Johnson v. Bradley, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 398 the

Court elaborated on the constitutional definition of “municipal

affair”: “Whereas subdivision (a) of article XI, section 5,

9

articulates the general principle of self-governance,

subdivision (b) sets out a nonexclusive list of four ‘core’ categories

that are, by definition, ‘municipal affairs.’ The first three

categories of municipal affairs are: (1) regulation, etc., of ‘the city

police force’; (2) ‘subgovernment in all or part of a city’; and

(3) ‘conduct of city elections.’ The final category gives charter

cities exclusive power to regulate the ‘manner’ of electing

‘municipal officers.’ It provides, ‘(4) plenary authority is hereby

granted, subject only to the restrictions of this article, to provide

[in all city charters for] the manner in which, the method by

which, the times at which, and the terms for which the several

municipal officers . . . shall be elected.’” (Italics & fn. omitted.)

Charter cities’ constitutional authority over municipal

elections is reflected in statutes governing election timing.

Section 1000 currently sets forth three “established election

dates” for elections within the state: “(a) The first Tuesday after

the first Monday in March of each year[;] (b) The second Tuesday

of April in each even-numbered year[; and] (c) The first Tuesday

after the first Monday in November of each year.” Section 1003,

subdivision (b), however, provides that “[t]his chapter shall not

apply to the following: . . . (b) Elections held in chartered cities or

chartered counties in which the charter provisions are

inconsistent with this chapter,” thus acknowledging and

preserving the authority of charter cities over election timing.

The City’s charter is consistent with section 1000, as it

identifies “the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of

each succeeding odd-numbered year” for elections to fill elective

offices within the City. (Redondo Beach Charter, § 18.) The

charter further provides, “All elections held under this Charter

shall be held and conducted in accordance with the provisions of

10

the Elections Code of the State of California as the same now

exists or may hereafter be amended, for the holding of elections

in general law cities unless such provisions are in conflict with

the provisions of this Charter or unless an ordinance providing

for the manner of holding and conducting elections is adopted by

the City Council.” (Id., § 18.2.)

If construed to apply to charter cities, the VPRA conflicts

with the City’s charter, requiring the City to adopt an ordinance

altering the date of its municipal elections. When a statute

clearly intended to apply to charter cities appears to conflict with

a city’s constitutional home rule authority, a court must utilize a

four-part analytical framework to determine whether the city’s

authority must cede to the state’s: (1) “whether the city

ordinance at issue regulates an activity that can be characterized

as a ‘municipal affair’”; (2) whether there is “‘an actual conflict

between [local and state law]’”; (3) “whether the state law

addresses a matter of ‘statewide concern’”; and (4) “whether the

law is ‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of that concern

[citation] and ‘narrowly tailored’ to avoid unnecessary

interference in local governance.” (Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at

p. 556, quoting CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17; accord,

Marquez v. City of Long Beach (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 552, 565.)

3. The Legislature Has Failed To Demonstrate a Clear

Intention To Apply the VPRA to Charter Cities

a. Courts have usually insisted on statutory language

clearly including charter cities before engaging in the

CalFed/Vista constitutional analysis

“‘The first principle of statutory construction requires us to

interpret the words of the statute themselves, giving them their

ordinary meaning, and reading them in the context of the statute

11

. . . as a whole.’” (People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 868.)

The “plain meaning” rule, however, “does not prohibit a court from

determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports

with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision is

consistent with other provisions of the statute. The meaning of a

statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the

words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the

same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.”

(Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735; see Mendoza v.

Nordstrom, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1074, 1084 [“‘[w]e do not construe

statutory language in isolation, but rather as a thread in the

fabric of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part’”];

DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983,

992 [if the statutory language is reasonably subject to multiple

interpretations, a court will consider extrinsic aids, such as “‘“‘the

legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative

construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a

part’”’”].)

The Secretary contends the plain language of the VPRA,

which applies to a “political subdivision” defined as “a geographic

area of representation created for the provision of government

services, including, but not limited to, a city . . . ,” establishes the

Legislature’s intent that the VPRA applies to all cities, not just

general law cities. The Legislature, however, is usually quite

specific when it intends the term “political subdivision” to include

charter cities. For instance, the Government Code often specifies

“charter cities” or “any city” when defining or utilizing the term

“political subdivision.” (See, e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 53208.5, 53217.5

& 53060.1 [setting various limits on benefits for “members of the

legislative bodies of all political subdivisions of the state,

12

including charter cities and charter counties”], 8557, 8698, 12650

& 12424 [“political subdivision” includes “any city, city and

county [or] county”], 37364, subd. (e) [“[t]he provisions of this

section shall apply to all cities, including charter cities”].)6

Likewise, the Supreme Court and courts of appeal have

often demanded a clearer indication than the use of a general



6 The City and amicus curiae League of California Cities

identify several other statutes defining “political subdivision” to

include charter cities or otherwise specifying their application to

charter cities. (See, e.g., Pub. Util. Code, §§ 5810 [“political

subdivision” defined as “a general law city, general law county,

charter city, charter county, charter city and county”], 21010

[“political subdivision” defined as “any county, city, city and

county . . . or other political entity”], 21690.6 [“[t]he provisions of

this article shall apply to any airport owned or operated by a

political subdivision, including a charter city”]; Rev. & Tax. Code,

§§ 30462 [section 30111 prohibits imposition of taxes by “any city,

charter city, town, county, charter county, city and county, . . . or

other political subdivision or agency of this state”], 18670,

subd. (a) [“political subdivision” includes “a city organized under

a freeholders’ charter”]; Pub. Contract Code, §§ 7203, subd. (c)

[applies to “a city, charter city, county, charter county, . . . and

any other political subdivision”], 20671, subd. (b) [defining “public

entity” as “any city, charter city, city and county, . . . or political

subdivision of the state”]; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16117 [“‘City’

includes a charter city”]; Health & Saf. Code, § 12081, subd. (e)

[“no city, county, city and county, or other political subdivision of

this state, including, but not limited to, a chartered city, county,

or city and county”]; Elec. Code, § 306 [term “city measure”

includes “any proposed city charter”]; Veh. Code, § 34002,

subd. (a) [“no state agency, city, city and county, county, or other

political subdivision of this state, including, but not limited to, a

chartered city, city and county, or county, shall adopt or enforce

any ordinance or regulation . . . inconsistent with this division”].)

13

term, be it “a political subdivision” or “a city,” before concluding a

statute is intended to apply to charter cities.7 In Vista, supra,

54 Cal.4th at page 554 the Supreme Court cited an earlier version

of the prevailing wage law that “expressly referred to charter

cities in a provision requiring such cities to pay prevailing wages

in contracts for street or sewer improvement work.” Similarly, in

Johnson v. Bradley, supra, 4 Cal.4th 389, the statute at issue (the

Political Reform Act of 1974, Gov. Code, §§ 81000-91015)



7 In fact, the term “political subdivision of the state” has

been construed to distinguish counties from “municipal

corporations” with separate and distinct powers and purposes. In

rejecting a claim that former Civil Code section 3287 applied to

municipal corporations, the Supreme Court explained in Abbott v.

City of Los Angeles (1958) 50 Cal.2d 438, 467-468, “‘A county is a

governmental agency or political subdivision of the state,

organized for purposes of exercising some functions of the state

government, whereas a municipal corporation is an incorporation

of the inhabitants of a specified region for purposes of local

government.’ This view was relied upon and reiterated in Otis v.

City of Los Angeles (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 605, 611-612, wherein it

was decided that actions for declaratory relief under section 1060

of the Code of Civil Procedure may be maintained against

municipal corporations. In so deciding the court expressly

recognized . . . [citations] that section 1060 of the Code of Civil

Procedure does not authorize the bringing of an action for

declaratory relief against the state or its political subdivision, but

declared [citation] that ‘respondents’ contention that the legal

status of a municipal corporation is akin to that of a county

cannot be sustained either upon reason or authority.’” (See, e.g.,

Wat. Code, §§ 83-60 [addressing powers of “[a]ny district,

municipality, or political subdivision of the State”], 8618

[addressing power of “[a]ll political subdivisions, agencies of the

State, and municipal and quasi-municipal corporations” to make

agreements relating to flood control].)

14

contained a provision (Gov. Code, § 82008) expressly defining

“city” to mean “a general law or a chartered city.” (See also

Anderson v. City of San Jose (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 683, 694 [as

provided by Gov. Code, § 54221, subd. (a), the Surplus Land Act

(Gov. Code, §§ 54220-54233) “applies to ‘every city, whether

organized under general law or by charter’”].) In Marquez v. City

of Long Beach, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at page 569, this court found

the minimum wage provisions of certain Industrial Welfare

Commission’s wage orders apply to charter cities because the

wage orders used the term “‘any city.’” (See also Baggett v. Gates

(1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 131 [Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of

Rights Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3300-3311) applies to “any” public safety

department (Gov. Code, § 3309.5, subd. (a))]; Trader Sports, Inc. v.

City of San Leandro (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 37, 45 ([determining

provisions of Proposition 62 to be “facially applicable to charter

cities”; Gov. Code, § 53720, subd. (a), defined “‘local governments’

for purposes of implementing Proposition 62’s provisions as

including ‘any county, city, city and county, including a chartered

city or county’”].)

Only two recent decisions have not addressed this

threshold statutory issue: Jauregui v. City of Palmdale (2014)

226 Cal.App.4th 781 (Jauregui) and City of Huntington Beach v.

Becerra (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 243. In each of those cases, the

court engaged in the CalFed/Vista constitutional analysis

without first considering whether the Legislature intended the

statute to apply to charter cities.8 Their significance for our



8 Our review of the briefing in those cases confirms that

neither city made a statutory argument regarding the

Legislature’s intention and instead focused on the conflict

15

decision on this point is therefore quite limited: “[I]t is axiomatic

that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.”

(People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1176; see Johnson v.

Bradley, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 415 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)

b. The legislative history of the VPRA does not indicate a

clear intention to include charter cities

The VPRA does not include a comprehensive definition of

its intended reach. As introduced by State Senator Benjamin

Hueso, Senate Bill No. 415 stated, “It is the intent of the

Legislature to enact legislation to prohibit a political subdivision

from holding an election on a date other than the date of a

statewide direct primary election or statewide general election if

doing so would result in a significant decrease in voter turnout as

compared to the voter turnout at a statewide election.” (Sen. Bill

No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as introduced Feb. 25, 2015.)

An amended version designated the title of the bill and defined

“political subdivision” as “a geographic area of representation

created for the provision of government services, including, but

not limited to, a city, a school district, a community college

district, or other district organized pursuant to state law.” (Sen.

Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 6, 2015.)

The definition of “political subdivision” remained unchanged

thereafter and is codified in section 14051, subdivision (a).

Senate Bill No. 415’s definition of “political subdivision”

was apparently borrowed from the California Voting Rights Act,

Elections Code section 14025 et seq. (CVRA), enacted in 2002 to

prevent political subdivisions from using at-large elections to



between the respective statutes at issue and the cities’

constitutional home rule authority.

16

dilute the votes of members of a protected class. (See § 14026,

former subd. (c), added by Stats. 2002, ch. 129, § 1.) Ruling on a

challenge to the CVRA in Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 781,

Division Five of this court assumed the Legislature intended the

CVRA to apply to charter cities and evaluated the statute under

the analytical framework of CalFed and Vista, concluding that

the dilution of votes of a protected class is a matter of statewide

concern and does not unnecessarily infringe on the constitutional

authority of charter cities. (Jauregui, at pp. 795-802.)

Only two weeks before the introduction of Senate Bill

No. 415, however, Assemblymember Roger Hernández, a

co-author of the bill, introduced Assembly Bill No. 277 (2015-2016

Reg. Sess.), which amended the CVRA’s definition of political

subdivision to encompass “a geographic area of representation

created for the provision of government services, including, but

not limited to, a general law city, general law county, charter city,

charter county, charter city and county, a school district,

community college district, or other district organized pursuant to

state law.” (§ 14026, subd. (c).) Enacted into law (see Stats. 2015,

ch. 724, § 2), Assembly Bill No. 277 expressly affirmed the

Legislature’s intent to clarify the CVRA’s application to charter

cities and counties and to codify the holding in Jauregui. (Sen.

Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of

Assem. Bill No. 277 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 7,

2015, p. 3.)

The City contends this essentially contemporaneous

amendment of the CVRA to expressly include charter cities and

introduction of the VPRA using the original, less specific

definition of “political subdivision” demonstrate the Legislature

did not intend the VPRA to apply to charter cities. Otherwise, it

17

argues, the Legislature would have utilized the more inclusive

definition of a political subdivision in the VPRA. (See Scher v.

Burke (2017) 3 Cal.5th 136, 144-145 [“[a]s a general rule, when

the Legislature uses a term in one provision of a statute but

omits it from another . . . we generally presume that the

Legislature did so deliberately, in order ‘“to convey a different

meaning”’”].)

Indeed, an analogous legislative background led the

Supreme Court in Ector v. City of Torrance (1973) 10 Cal.3d 129

(Ector) to reject a claim that a state statute barring local agencies

from requiring employees to live within their jurisdiction

prevailed over a contrary city charter provision. There, the City

of Torrance fired an employee when it was discovered he lived

outside the city. The employee sued for reinstatement citing

Government Code section 50083, enacted in 1970, which

provided, “No local agency or district shall require that its

employees be residents of such local agency or district.”

Government Code section 50001 defined “‘[l]ocal agency’ as used

in this division” to mean “county, city, or city and county, unless

the context otherwise requires.” The Court reasoned the

definition did not include charter cities because, in the legislative

session immediately following the adoption of section 50083, the

Legislature had rejected an attempt in the Assembly to amend

the definition of “local agency” to expressly include charter cities

and to limit cities’ constitutional authority to implement

residency requirements. (Ector, at pp. 133-134.) As the Court

explained, “We may reasonably infer that by so voting the

Legislature rejected the very extension of the statute which

appellant now asks us to adopt under the guise of judicial

construction. This, of course, we may not do.” (Id. at p. 134.)

18

In addition to analyzing this legislative history of

Government Code section 50083, the Ector Court recognized that

broadly construing the definition of “local agency” to include a

charter city would raise a serious constitutional question and

explained, “We must presume that in adopting section 50083 the

Legislature intended to enact a valid statute.” (Ector, supra,

10 Cal.3d at p. 133.) Accordingly, to prevent a conflict with the

“explicit constitutional authorization” of charter cities to set their

employees’ qualifications, the Court held the Legislature “meant

to limit [section 50083’s] reach to general law cities.” (Ibid.; see

People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 682 [“a statute will be

interpreted to avoid serious constitutional questions if such an

interpretation is fairly possible”]; People v. Gutierrez (2014)

58 Cal.4th 1354, 1373 [“[w]hen a question of statutory

interpretation implicates constitutional issues, . . . ‘“[i]f a statute

is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it

constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part,

or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court

will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the

reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in

its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even

though the other construction is equally reasonable”’”]; see also

Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230 [courts “‘“will not decide constitutional

questions where other grounds are available and dispositive of

the issues of the case”’”].)9



9 A legislative proposed, voter approved constitutional

amendment in 1976 revised Article XI, section 10, of the

Constitution to disallow residency requirements of the sort relied

on by the City of Torrance.

19

In addition to Assembly Bill No. 277, Assemblymember

Hernández introduced Assembly Bill No. 254 (2015-2016 Reg.

Sess.) during the same legislative session. That bill sought to

require cities, school districts, community college districts and

special districts to hold their general elections in conjunction with

statewide elections by deleting the off-cycle election dates from

section 1000, as well as the exemption for charter cities in

section 1003. Citing the plethora of research (including Professor

Hajnal’s) showing that consolidation of local elections with

statewide elections is the single best means of increasing voter

turnout, the bill declared its intent to apply to every political

subdivision in the state, including charter cities and counties.

(See Assem. Bill No. 254 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended

Mar. 18, 2015, §§ 2-4; Assem. Com. on Elections and

Redistricting, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 254 (2015-2016 Reg.

Sess.) as amended March 18, 2015.) On June 1, 2015, however,

the bill was amended to delete the proposed amendments to

section 1003, which, in essence, ensured any amendments to

section 1000 would not apply to charter cities that had adopted

conflicting election dates in their charters. Ultimately, Governor

Jerry Brown vetoed this bill, citing the changes to election timing

already enacted by Senate Bill No. 415. (See Assem. Bill No. 254

(2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) §§ 1-5; Governor’s veto message to Assem.

on Assem. Bill No. 254 (Oct. 1, 2015) (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.); Off.

of Assem. Floor Analysis, Governor’s Veto analysis of Assem. Bill

No. 254 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as enrolled Sept. 4, 2015, p. 2.)

But the history of Assembly Bill No. 254 indicates its author

encountered significant resistance to his proposal to withdraw

section 1003’s exemption for charter cities and suggests a similar

struggle would have ensued if there had been an effort to

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expressly include charter cities within the reach of Senate Bill

No. 415.

Against this legislative backdrop the Attorney General

issued an opinion concluding the VPRA could be constitutionally

applied to charter cities. (100 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 4 (2017).) The

opinion stated, “As a threshold matter, we find that the

Legislature intended the Act to apply to charter cities and school

districts.” (Id. at p. 7.) In support of this conclusion the Attorney

General relied on the purported plain meaning of “city” and

“political subdivision,” without confronting the inherent

ambiguity of those terms. Further, his opinion presumes the

definition of “political subdivision” was taken from the CVRA, as

do we, but asserts that definition was found by the Jauregui

court to include charter cities without addressing the fact that

the Jauregui court did not actually construe the statute and find

an intent to include charter cities, but simply proceeded directly

to the CalFed/Vista constitutional analysis.

Finally, the Attorney General’s opinion cites the comments

of Senator Hueso, who indicated his understanding the

application of the VPRA to charter cities would not violate the

Constitution. (100 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 7, fn. 30, citing

Assem. Standing Com. on Elections and Redistricting, Hearing

(July 1, 2015), testimony of Sen. Ben Hueso [stating his view the

VPRA does not violate the constitutional rights of charter cities].)

As amicus curiae League of California Cities points out, “[T]he

expressions of individual legislators generally are an improper

basis upon which to discern the intent of the entire Legislature.”

(People v. Farrell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 394; see Myers v. Philip

Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 845 [“we have

repeatedly declined to discern legislative intent from comments

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by a bill’s author because they reflect on the views of a single

legislator instead of those of the Legislature as a whole”].) More

telling is the comment on charter cities found in legislative

analyses of Senate Bill No. 415 that acknowledge that charter

cities have substantial autonomy over the rules governing the

election of municipal officers and observes “By potentially

compelling charter cities to change the dates of their regularly

scheduled municipal elections, this bill goes to the heart of [that]

autonomy. . . . This bill does not explicitly address the question

of whether it is intended to be applicable to charter cities,

however, so it is unclear whether those cities would be subject to

a lawsuit under this bill.” (Assem. Floor Analysis, 3d reading

analysis of Sen. Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended

June 23, 2015, at p. 2; Assem. Com. on Elections and

Redistricting, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.)

as amended June 23, 2015, p. 5.)

This comment, especially when viewed in light of Assembly

Bill No. 277’s contemporaneous amendment of the CVRA to

expressly include charter cities, reinforces our view that the

Legislature deliberately left unresolved the question whether the

VPRA applies to charter cities, placing on the courts the

responsibility to divine intent from ambiguous language. Under

these circumstances, guided by the precept that, when

reasonable, we will construe a statute to render it free from doubt

as to its constitutionality, where the Constitution confers plenary

authority on charter cities to set the timing of their elections, we

will not infer an intent to contravene that authority without more

explicit guidance from the Legislature.10



10 Because we affirm the superior court’s judgment issuing a

writ of mandate prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing

The judgment of the superior court ordering a peremptory

writ of mandate is affirmed. The City is to recover its costs on

appeal.