Kamyar R. Shayan v. Spine Care and Orthopedic Physicians

Plaintiff and Respondent Kamyar Shayan filed an

interpleader action to resolve claims about a disputed $19,365

sum. Two claimants and defendants had notice of the trial date

but failed to appear. The court conducted the trial, adjudicated

the case on the merits, and entered judgment. Later these

claimants filed a motion for relief under the mandatory provision

of subdivision (b) of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(All statutory citations are to this code.) This mandatory

provision applies only to defaults, default judgments, and

dismissals. The trial court denied this motion because the trial

on the merits had not been a default, a default judgment, or a

dismissal. Rather, it had been a trial on the merits. We affirm

the trial court’s straightforward interpretation of statutory

language.

The essential facts are these. Shayan is a lawyer who

recovered about $30,000 for his client Angelica Mazariegos in a

personal injury action. Various entities had liens on this

recovery. Among them were Appellants Spine Care & Orthopedic

Physicians (Spine Care) and C&C Factoring Solutions (C&C).

Shayan subtracted about $10,000 for his fee, deposited the

remaining $19,365, and initiated this interpleader action, naming

Mazariegos, Spine Care, and C&C as interpleader defendants.

These three defendants filed answers. The court set the trial

date. All parties had actual notice of this trial date, which was

June 4, 2018. Spine Care and C&C did not appear at the trial.

The trial court proceeded with trial, heard evidence, and

rendered judgment. The court signed the judgment on June 16,

2018 and Shayan gave notice. Then on July 25, 2018, Spine Care

and C&C, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to vacate

default and default judgment. The court heard this motion and

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took additional briefing. It denied the motion after a second

hearing. Its main reason was that the motion sought relief under

the mandatory portion of subdivision (b) of section 473, but that

section applied only to defaults, default judgments, and

dismissals, none of which had occurred in this case. Spine Care

and C&C appeal this ruling.

Our review is independent. (The Urban Wildlands Group,

Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 993, 998

(Urban).)

When lawyers make mistakes, they try to turn to

subdivision (b) of section 473 for relief. This subdivision offers

two kinds of relief. One is discretionary. The other is mandatory.

The mandatory provision is the one at issue here.

The text of subdivision (b) of section 473 is the focus of this

dispute, so we excerpt the pertinent text and italicize its key

words:

“[T]he court shall . . . vacate any (1) resulting default

entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will

result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default

judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless

the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact

caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

neglect.”

The trial court said this provision applied only to defaults,

default judgments, and dismissals and thus did not apply here,

where there were no defaults, default judgments, or dismissals.

Spine Care and C&C argue for a more sweeping application

of this subdivision that would expand the wording about defaults,

default judgments, and dismissals to all “analogous” situations.

There is some older case law support for this “analogous”

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approach. But more recent cases have hewed to the statute as

the Legislature wrote it. We join with these more recent cases.

Presiding Justice Paul Turner thoroughly canvassed the

cases and the arguments in his Urban decision. Quoting a range

of authorities, the Urban decision basically ruled this statute

means what it says and says what it means, which resolves the

issue: the statute covers only defaults, default judgments, and

dismissals. The Urban case acknowledged and disagreed with

earlier and contrary authority, which had expanded the reach of

the statute to situations “analogous” to defaults, default

judgments, and dismissals. Urban rejected these extensions of

the statute as contrary to its plain language. (See Urban, supra,

10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 998–1001.)

The Weil and Brown treatise agrees. It states “more recent

cases hold that the provision for mandatory relief does not apply

absent an actual default, default judgment or dismissal. This is

probably the better view, since CCP § 473(b) refers only to

‘defaults’ and ‘dismissals.’” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide:

Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶¶ 5:300.6

to 5:300.8.)

We agree with Urban and the treatise: the plain language

of the statute is unambiguous and controlling. It would be a

disservice to embroider this language with freeform extensions to

“analogous” situations. Lawyers are pretty good at inventing

analogies. This provision sees heavy use in trial courts. In the

long run, everyone benefits from clear, exact, and predictable

rules of civil procedure. This statute, as written, gives a clear,

exact, and predictable rule. The Legislature can amend it if the

coverage is wrong. Until the Legislature acts, the statute’s words

settle the matter.

The judgment is affirmed. Costs to Shayan.