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The general question presented is whether an employer can

sue for declaratory relief to enforce a superior court judgment

unfavorable to the Labor Commissioner without violating the

anti-SLAPP statute. The answer is yes, where, as here, the

lawsuit does not arise out of activity protected by the statute.

Supershuttle International, Inc., Supershuttle Los

Angeles, Inc., and Supershuttle of San Francisco, Inc.,

(collectively Supershuttle) filed an action for declaratory and

injunctive relief against the Labor and Workforce Development

Agency; its Secretary; the Division of Labor Standards

Enforcement; and the Chief of the Division and Labor

Commissioner (the Labor defendants). The civil action seeks a

declaration that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the

Labor Commissioner from considering wage claims filed by

drivers of Supershuttle vans because the Sacramento Superior

Court previously found the drivers were independent contractors,

not employees. The trial court denied the Labor defendants’

motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure1 section

425.16 et. seq. (the anti-SLAPP laws).

The Labor defendants appeal, contending Supershuttle’s

claims arise from statements and writings by the Department of

Labor Standards and Enforcement (DLSE) made in connection

with an official proceeding (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)) or were made in

connection with a public issue or issue of public interest.

(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) They further contend the Labor

Commissioner’s act of setting hearings on the wage claims is not

an illegal act within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP law.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code

of Civil Procedure.

3

We find the gravamen of Supershuttle’s complaint is the

harm it will suffer from the intended decision of the Labor

defendants to deny collateral estoppel effect to a final decision of

the Sacramento Superior Court, not from the Labor defendants’

writing or statements preceding or communicating that decision.

We also find the Labor defendants have not identified speech or

writings made in connection with a public issue or issue of public

importance from which the causes of action arise. Finally we find

the trial court here did not conclude that the Labor defendants

acted illegally as a matter of law within the meaning of the antiSLAPP

law. Most importantly, the trial court did not rely on any

illegality to deny the Labor defendants’ motion to strike. Nor do

we rely on any illegality to affirm the trial court’s order, which we

now do.

BACKGROUND2

When it began operations more than 25 years ago,

Supershuttle provided shared-ride van transportation to and

from airports in California; the vans were owned by Supershuttle

and the drivers were Supershuttle employees. At some time prior

to 2007, Supershuttle switched to a franchise model for its

businesses. Most employee drivers elected to become franchisees;

others took buyouts. Supershuttle viewed its franchisee drivers

as independent contractors. (¶ 26.)

In 2007, the Employment Development Division (EDD)

began an audit of Supershuttle to determine whether the

franchisee drivers were de facto employees. In 2010, the EDD

determined that the drivers were employees and it imposed an

2 The background information in this opinion is taken from

the allegations of Supershuttle’s complaint.

4

assessment on Supershuttle for unpaid employment taxes.

(¶ 42-43.) Supershuttle filed an administrative appeal, which

was denied. Supershuttle then appealed to the California

Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB). (The EDD

and the CUIAB are part of defendant Labor and Workforce

Development Agency.) (¶ 44.)

After CUIAB denied the appeal, Supershuttle filed an

action against EDD in Sacramento County Superior Court.

(¶¶ 46-47.) In August 2017, following a four-month trial and

extensive post-trial briefing, the Superior Court issued a

Statement of Decision concluding the drivers were independent

contractors. (¶¶ 51–53.)

On December 7, 2017, CUIAB sua sponte set aside its 2012

findings and issued a new decision that Supershuttle “franchisees

were not employees but independent contractors.”

Supershuttle alleges in its complaint that the “franchise

structure and organization has not materially changed since the

audit, lawsuit, EDD Judgment or CUIAB Final Decision, other

than to increase the independence of its franchisees.” (¶ 59.)

The same week CUIAB reversed its position, the DLSE

served Supershuttle with notices of 13 Berman hearings to be

held in February 2018.3 Supershuttle alleged in its complaint

that “DLSE proposed to relitigate the proper classification of

3 In California if an employer fails to pay wages in the

amount, time or manner required by contract or statute, the

employee may seek administrative relief by filing a wage claim

with the Labor Commissioner. Those claims are adjudicated at

“Berman” hearings, so named after the sponsor of the legislation

creating the procedure. (Cuadra v. Millan (1998) 17 Cal.4th

855, 858.)

5

[Supershuttle’s] franchisees in [hearings of] approximately two

hours per claimant.” (Boldface omitted.) (¶ 67.) The

Supershuttle complaint alleges various actions it took to stop

these hearings. Some were stayed pending petitions by

Supershuttle to compel arbitration. The status and outcome of

the others are not clear from the allegations of the complaint.

Supershuttle alleges it raised the issue of collateral

estoppel of the driver classification issue and the DLSE’s

resulting lack of jurisdiction in its answers in the Berman

hearing notices. DLSE stated the hearings would go forward.

(¶ 69.) Supershuttle alleges “DLSE has demonstrated its

unequivocal intent to proceed with a redetermination of the

classification of [Supershuttle] franchisees and associate

operators, without any regard for [the superior court’s] careful

analysis and the subsequent determination, by [DLSE’s] sister

agency, that franchisees and associated operators are

independent contractors.” (¶ 74.)

Supershuttle alleges drivers have continued to file wage

claims with DLSE and by March 2018 about 34 drivers had

pending wage claims naming Supershuttle as their employer.

(¶ 60.)

In April 2018, Supershuttle filed the present action seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief against the Labor defendants.4

It seeks a determination that the doctrine of collateral estoppel

applies to the drivers’ wage claims and precludes the Labor

defendants from re-determining the independent contractor

4 Both sets of parties agree that for purposes of the antiSLAPP

motion, the cause of action for injunctive relief depends

on the viability of the two causes of action for declaratory relief.

We do not discuss it further.

6

status of the drivers. It also seeks a determination that the

Labor Commissioner would be acting outside her jurisdiction if

she set or held Berman hearings on the drivers’ wage claims

because the drivers are independent contractors and the Labor

Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear claims by employees only.

In the first cause of action, Supershuttle specifically seeks

only a judicial determination that “DLSE is collaterally estopped

from setting or holding any Berman hearing, or reaching any

determination in connection with any claim filed by any

franchisee(s) of Plaintiffs (or associate operator of any franchisee)

based on alleged ‘misclassification’ ”; the second cause of action

seeks a determination that “DLSE has no jurisdiction to set or

hold any Berman hearing, or reach any determination in

connection with any claim filed by any franchisee(s) of Plaintiffs

(or associate operator of any franchisee) based on alleged

‘misclassification.’ ”

Our Supreme Court has explained the procedure to obtain

administrative wage claim relief: “[An] employee may seek

administrative relief by filing a wage claim with the

commissioner or, in the alternative, may seek judicial relief by

filing an ordinary civil action for breach of contract and/or for the

wages prescribed by statute. [¶] Labor Code section 98 includes

remedial procedures for adjudicating wage claims, enforced by

the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement under the direction

of the commissioner.” (Post v. Palo/Haklar & Associates (2000)

23 Cal.4th 942, 946 (Post).)

7

“Within 30 days of the filing of a complaint, the

commissioner must notify parties as to whether he or she will

take further action. ([Labor Code,] § 98, subd. (a).) The statute

provides for three alternatives: the commissioner may either

accept the matter and conduct an administrative [Berman]

hearing (see [Labor Code,] §§ 98-98.2), prosecute a civil action for

the collection of wages and other money payable to employees

arising out of an employment relationship (see [Labor Code,]

§ 98.3), or take no further action on the complaint. ([Labor Code,]

§ 98, subd. (a).)” (Post, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 946.)

Once the commissioner accepts a claim, he or she “is

required to determine all matters arising under his or her

jurisdiction, including questions concerning the employment

status of the claimant. [Citations.] Indeed, as a predicate for

awarding a claim for unpaid wages, the commissioner must

necessarily determine that the claimant was an employee.

(1 Wilcox, Cal. Employment Law (2000) § 1.04[1][a], p. 1-9 [‘An

employment relationship must exist in order for the California

wage orders or the provisions of the Labor Code governing wages

. . . to be applicable.’ (Fn. omitted.)].)” (Post, supra, 23 Cal.4th at

p. 947.)

Since the commissioner may not award wages to an

independent contractor, there is no legitimate reason for the

commissioner to set a claim by an independent contractor for a

Berman hearing. Here, if the trial court determines that the

Sacramento court’s judgment has collateral estoppel effect in the

Berman hearings, there would be no legitimate reason for the

commissioner to conduct Berman hearings for the Supershuttle

drivers, who were determined to be independent contractors.

Collateral estoppel “precludes relitigation of issues argued and

8

decided in prior proceedings.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990)

51 Cal.3d 335, 341.) 5

DISCUSSION

California’s anti-SLAPP statute provides that “[a] cause of

action against a person arising from any act of that person in

furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech . . .

shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court

determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a

probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16,

subd. (b)(1).) The phrase, “in furtherance of a person’s right of

petition or free speech” is defined in section 425.16, subdivision

(e), which provides that “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of

petition or free speech under the United States or California

Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any

written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,

executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding

authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing

made in connection with an issue under consideration or review

by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official

proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement

or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in

connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other

conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right

of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection

5 The commissioner may accept and resolve wage claims “in

cases involving a dispute as to whether [the claimants] were

actually employees within the requirements of the Labor Code–as

opposed, for example, to independent contractors.” (Post, supra,

23 Cal.4th at p. 949.)

9

with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16,

subd.(e).)

“[I]t is clear, in light of both the language and purpose of

California’s anti-SLAPP statute, that the statutory remedy

afforded by section 425.16 extends to statements and writings of

governmental entities and public officials on matters of public

interest and concern that would fall within the scope of the

statute if such statements were made by a private individual or

entity.” (Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1, 17.)

“Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.

First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim

arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the

defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a

probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th

376, 384 (Baral).)

In the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the moving

defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of

protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them.”

(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396, italics added.) Thus, “if the

complaint itself shows that a claim arises from protected conduct

. . . , a moving party may rely on the plaintiff’s allegations alone

in making the showing necessary under prong one without

submitting supporting evidence.” (Bel Air Internet, LLC v.

Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 936.) Both parties may

introduce relevant evidence.

“On appeal, we review the trial court’s decision de novo,

engaging in the same two-step process to determine, as a matter

of law, whether the defendant made its threshold showing the

action was a SLAPP suit and whether the plaintiff established a

10

probability of prevailing. [Citation.] ‘In doing so, we consider “the

pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the

facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” ’ [Citation.]

We do not weigh the credibility of the evidence or its comparative

probative strength.” (Marijanovic v. Gray, York & Duffy (2006)

137 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270.) We do accept the pleaded facts as

true. (Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th

35, 54.) We then identify whether the “pleaded facts fall within

the statutory purpose, ‘to prevent and deter “lawsuits . . . brought

primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of

freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” ’ ”

(Ibid.)

Because we conclude the Labor defendants have not carried

their burden to establish facts satisfying the first step of the

analysis, we do not discuss the second step.

1. The Supershuttle Action Does Not Arise From Oral or

Written Statements Made in Connection with an Issue

under Consideration or Review in an Official Proceeding.

Subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16 provides an act of a

person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free

speech includes “any written or oral statement or writing made in

connection with an issue under consideration or review by a

legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official

proceeding authorized by law.” The Labor defendants contend

Supershuttle’s claims arise from DLSE’s statements and writings

made in connection with an issue under consideration or review

in Berman hearings, an official proceeding authorized by law.

11

The allegations of Supershuttle’s complaint show its claims

arise from the commissioner’s intended act of refusing to accord

collateral estoppel effect to the Sacramento Superior Court

judgment. It is the DLSE decision to disregard the Superior

Court judgment which would harm Supershuttle by forcing it to

repeatedly re-litigate the issue of driver classification.

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “ ‘Acts

of governance mandated by law, without more, are not exercises

of free speech or petition.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of

California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1064 (Park);

City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 425

(Montebello) [both quoting San Ramon Valley Fire Protection

Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2004)

125 Cal.App.4th 343, 354 (San Ramon)].) The Supreme Court

paraphrased with approval the San Ramon court’s explanation

that “holding acts of governance to be protected activity under

section 425.16 ‘would significantly burden the petition rights of

those seeking mandamus review for most types of governmental

action.’ . . . [T]he result would be to ‘chill the resort to legitimate

political oversight over potential abuses of legislative and

administrative power.” (Montebello, at pp. 425–426; see also

Park, at p. 1067 [Board’s decision after grievance proceeding to

deny tenure not an exercise of free speech or petition].) The

Labor defendants’ intention to deny collateral estoppel effect to

the Sacramento judgment, like the Board’s decision in Park to

deny tenure, is not by itself an exercise of free speech petition,

and so it may not be defeated by an anti-SLAPP motion.

Nevertheless, the Labor defendants assert the motion to

strike should have been granted because their “writings and

statements are made to . . . further the third party rights of

12

individual workers, whose constitutional right to petition

includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking

administrative action.” This is an extremely opaque argument.

In any administrative or quasi-judicial proceeding, the parties

will generally submit some forms of pleadings and evidence and

the decision-maker will often communicate with the parties

during hearings. The administrative decision-maker will

generally communicate its decision by speech or writing. (See

Park, supra, at p. 1068.) “[A] claim is not subject to a motion to

strike simply because it contests an action or decision that was

arrived at following speech or petitioning activity, or that was

thereafter communicated by means of speech or petitioning

activity.” (Id. at p. 1060.) The Supershuttle claims “may be

struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong

complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading

to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Ibid.) The

Labor defendants have not shown that despite the allegations of

the Supershuttle complaint referring to the commissioner’s acts,

their writings or statements are in fact the wrongs from which

the Supershuttle claims arise or upon which its claims are based.

The allegations of the Supershuttle complaint show only

that its action was filed in response to the Labor Commissioner’s

intention to deny the collateral estoppel effect of the Sacramento

judgment and to set Berman hearings. “[T]he mere fact an action

was filed after protected activity took place does not mean it

arose from that activity. The anti-SLAPP statute cannot be read

to mean that ‘any claim asserted in an action which arguably was

filed in retaliation for the exercise of speech or petition rights

falls under section 425.16, whether or not the claim is based

on . . . those rights.’ ” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002)

13

29 Cal.4th 69, 76–77, italics omitted (Cotati).) “To construe

‘arising from’ in section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) as meaning ‘in

response to,’ . . . would in effect render all cross-actions potential

SLAPP’s.” (Cotati, at p. 77.)

In Cotati, a case which bears many similarities to this case,

defendant property owners filed a declaratory relief action in

federal court against the City of Cotati. Shortly thereafter Cotati

filed its own state court declaratory action against defendant

property owners. Defendant property owners filed an antiSLAPP

motion to strike Cotati’s state court action. There was

little doubt the state action was filed in response to the filing of

the federal action. However, that the state action may have been

“triggered by protected activity does not entail that it is one

arising from such.” (Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 78.) Our

Supreme Court held that to prevail on its anti-SLAPP motion,

defendant property owners had to show that the state court

action was based on the owners’ federal lawsuit or their activities

in that lawsuit. This, the Court found, the owners could not do.

The filing of the owners’ federal lawsuit was not itself the

controversy in the state court action. Rather, “the actual

controversy giving rise to both actions—the fundamental basis of

each request for declaratory relief—was the same underlying

controversy respecting [the legality of the] City’s ordinance.”

(Id. at p. 80.) At most, the filing of the federal action informed

Cotati of the existence of an actual controversy between the

parties over the ordinance. (Ibid.)

Virtually the same situation exists here. The primary

controversy raised by the wage claims filings and preliminary

proceedings, including writings and statements, is whether

collateral estoppel precludes the Labor Commissioner from

14

treating the drivers as employees. Indeed, the Berman notices

informed Supershuttle that there was a disagreement among the

parties over the collateral effect of the Sacramento Superior

Court judgment. In this action, Supershuttle seeks a declaration

that collateral estoppel precludes the Labor Commissioner from

treating the drivers as employees. Supershuttle may well have

filed this action in response to the wage claims, but those claims,

like the owners’ federal lawsuit in Cotati, appear to have simply

alerted the Supershuttle entities to the existence of the

(continuing) controversy over the drivers’ classification. (See

Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 79.)

The Labor Commissioner contends its writing and

statements protect the petitioning right of individual workers by

ensuring that every Supershuttle driver who wishes to have a

Berman hearing may do so.6 Framing the issue in this manner

does not advance the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Supershuttle does not complain of the drivers’ acts of filing

claims with the Labor Commission nor does it seek to prevent the

drivers from doing so. As we have discussed, the Labor

Commissioner has a range of responses to such claims. It is the

Labor Commissioner’s response to the claims, specifically her

intention not to acknowledge the collateral estoppel effect of the

Sacramento judgment, that is the basis of Supershuttle’s action.

(And we note the question whether the Sacramento judgment

6 We recognize a defendant moving to strike under section

425.15 is not required to “demonstrate that its protected

statements or writings were made on its own behalf (rather than,

for example, on behalf of its clients or the general public).”

(Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th

1106, 1116, italics omitted.)

15

should be accorded collateral estoppel effect in this context is

relevant to the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, plaintiff’s

likelihood of success on the merits. Because we determine the

Labor defendants have not met their burden in the first step, we

do not reach this issue.)

Moreover, even in the absence of this declaratory relief

action, once the first Berman hearing on a Supershuttle driver’s

wage claim is completed, Supershuttle can appeal any decision

holding the driver is an employee. Supershuttle “may seek

review by filing an appeal to the municipal or superior court ‘in

accordance with the appropriate rules of jurisdiction, where the

appeal shall be heard de novo.’ (Labor Code, § 98.2, subd. (a).)

The timely filing of a notice of appeal forestalls the

commissioner’s decision, terminates his or her jurisdiction, and

vests jurisdiction to conduct a hearing de novo in the appropriate

court.” (Post, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 947.) There, Supershuttle

can argue that collateral estoppel required a finding that the

driver was an independent contractor and that the Labor

Commissioner had no jurisdiction to award wages to an

independent contractor. “ ‘ “A hearing de novo [under Labor Code

section 98.2] literally means a new hearing,” that is, a new trial.’

[Citation.] The decision of the commissioner is ‘entitled to no

weight whatsoever, and the proceedings are truly ”a trial anew in

the fullest sense.” ’ ” (Post, at p. 948.)

Further, in the court proceeding, the court would have

authority to enter the broader judgment sought here, directing

that the Labor Commissioner give collateral estoppel effect to

Supershuttle’s judgment in all claims brought by Supershuttle

drivers. (See Cuadra v. Millan, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 863

[affirming judgment directing the Labor Commissioner to change

16

its policy “for all claims processed” under the Berman hearing

process by any office of the Labor Commissioner and not finally

resolved as of the date of the court’s order granting the writ],

disapproved on other grounds by Samuels v. Mix (1999)

22 Cal.4th 1, 16, fn. 4.)

Thus, regardless of the Labor defendants’ writings and

statements, Supershuttle has the right to seek an answer to the

question whether collateral estoppel applies to these claims.

2. The Labor Defendants’ Denial of the Applicability of

Collateral Estoppel Does Not Further Speech and Petition

Activity in Connection with an Issue of Public Interest.

Subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16 protects “any other

conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right

of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection

with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” The antiSLAPP

statute does not define the terms “public issue” or “public

interest.” (MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th

167, 179.) The Labor defendants argue: (1) the very ability of

drivers to petition for administrative resolution of their wage

claims is a matter of public interest; (2) Berman hearings serve

the public interest; and (3) the issue of employee misclassification

is an issue of significant public interest.

The Labor defendants have, at most, identified issues of

public interest. They have not explained how their conduct in

denying the collateral estoppel effect of the Sacramento judgment

furthers the drivers’ speech or petition activity. The Labor

defendants’ intention to re-litigate the issue of employee status

may help the merits of the drivers’ cases, but the grant or denial

of the individual wage claims is itself not a matter of public

interest nor does it further the drivers’ fundamental rights to

17

speech or petition activity. The drivers are not seeking the

general right to petition for administrative relief or for continued

Berman hearings. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1072

[challenged decision must further “particular” speech and it must

be shown that “that speech is on a matter of public interest.”])

The Labor Commissioner’s decision will simply be whether an

individual driver is an employee of a particular employer. The

Labor defendants do not explain how that specific decision is a

matter of public interest. To us it does not appear to be.

Although the Labor defendants describe “employee

misclassification” as a third issue of public interest, what they

are describing is misclassification by an employer. They cite

legislative action aimed at employers and rely on cases in which

employers challenged worker classifications. In this case, the

drivers’ classification (or misclassification) was already

determined by a court. Thus, the drivers’ petitioning activity is

not connected to the issue of employer misclassification.

3. Denial of the Motion to Strike is Not Dependent on a

Finding That the Labor Defendants’ Engaged in Illegal

Activity.

Anti-SLAPP protection is not available to defendants whose

actions are illegal as a matter of law. (§ 425.18, subd. (h).) Thus,

in Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260,

285, our Supreme Court explained plaintiffs can establish that a

defendant’s actions are illegal as a matter of law either through a

defendant’s concession or because the illegality is conclusively

established by evidence presented in connection with the motion

to strike. Once illegality as a matter of law has been established,

a defendant is not entitled to the protection of the anti-SLAPP

statute for those illegal activities. (Id. at pp. 286–287.) Here, the

18

Labor defendants contend the trial court erroneously found the

Labor defendants had acted illegally as a matter of law and

therefore were not entitled to anti-SLAPP relief. We disagree

with their characterization of the trial court’s order.

The trial court’s order states: “As in San Ramon, supra,

plaintiffs[’] claims seek only to stop and remedy unlawful

government acts, as such these claims cannot give rise to an antiSLAPP

motion.” The Labor defendants argue the Labor

Commissioner has the authority to determine her jurisdiction

and therefore setting and hearing wage claims are not “illegal”

acts. We do not understand the trial court’s statement to be

invoking the “illegality as a matter of law defense” to an antiSLAPP

motion. (See, e.g. Montebello, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 424.)

The trial court described Supershuttle’s claims by reference

to San Ramon, where plaintiff alleged the government entity

failed to comply with mandatory duties and abused its discretion

in deciding on certain benefit contributions. In its conclusion, the

San Ramon court referred to the importance of “judicial oversight

over potential abuses of legislative and administrative power.”

(San Ramon, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) In context, we

understand the trial court here to be stating that Supershuttle is

seeking judicial review of government acts which it alleges are

not in conformity with the law, that is, an overreaching assertion

of jurisdiction over the drivers’ wage claims in light of the

Sacramento judgment. The trial court did not, nor do we

independently, find that the evidence conclusively established the

Labor Commissioner acted illegally as a matter of law.

The trial court’s order is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.