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Thee Aguila, Inc. v. Century Law Group, LLP

Date: 07-04-2019

Case Number: B289452

Judge: Chaney, Acting P.J.

Court: California Court of Appeals Second Appellate District, Division One on appeal from the Superior Court, County of Los Angeles

Plaintiff's Attorney: Guinevere M. Malley

Defendant's Attorney: Karen A. Larson

Description:



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Thee Aguila, Inc. appeals from a judgment entered in a

lawsuit involving proceeds awarded to its tenants, Edgar Fragoso

and Eva Meneses, as part of an eminent domain proceeding. The

trial court determined that the parties’ lease agreement did not

support Thee Aguila’s claims, and that Thee Aguila’s asserted

claims were collaterally estopped by the judgment in the eminent

domain proceeding. We agree with the trial court and affirm.

BACKGROUND

On February 1, 2008, Fragoso and his mother, Meneses,

signed a 15-year lease for commercial property located at 2800

Firestone Boulevard in South Gate to open the El Parral

Restaurant. Central to this dispute, the form lease provided:

“13. CONDEMNATION

“If the Premises or any portion thereof are taken by the

power of eminent domain, or sold by Landlord under the threat of

exercise of said power (all of which is herein referred to as

‘condemnation’), this Lease shall terminate as to the part so

taken as of the date the condemning authority takes title or

possession, whichever occurs first. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]

“All awards for the taking of any part of the Premises or

any payment made under the threat of the exercise of the power

of eminent domain shall be the property of the Landlord, whether

made as compensation for the diminution of the value of the

leasehold or for the taking of the fee or as severance damages;

provided, however, that Tenant shall be entitled to any award for

loss or damage to Tenant’s trade fixtures and removable personal

property.”

In 2009, the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD)

filed a complaint in eminent domain seeking to have the property

condemned. (L.A. Super. Ct. No. BC416163.) The trial court

3

issued an order for prejudgment possession in favor of LAUSD in

November 2009.

LAUSD’s eminent domain complaint named, among other

interested defendants, El Parral, Edgar Fragoso individually and

doing business as El Parral, and Meneses and Fragoso’s El Parral

landlord, Thee Aguila.

In its answer to the eminent domain complaint, Thee

Aguila claimed “by assignment, each and every award herein for

the taking, including [El Parral’s] loss of good will, but not

including its[] trade fixtures.” Meneses, Fragoso, and El Parral

each claimed in their answers they were entitled to

“compensation for loss of business goodwill relating to the

operation of [El Parral] on the leased property.”

The trial court issued its judgment on the eminent domain

complaint and final order condemning the property on March 9,

2011. In that order, the trial court awarded Thee Aguila a total

of $6,198,100 for its interest in the property. Meneses, Fragoso,

and El Parral were awarded a total of $6,100,000 for their

interest in the property, including “any claims for leasehold

value, goodwill, fixtures and equipment, relocation benefits,

litigation expenses, interest and costs . . . .”

On January 6, 2014, Thee Aguila filed a complaint against,

among others, Meneses and Fragoso. The operative complaint at

the time of trial was the second amended complaint, filed May 28,

2014.1 The thrust of Thee Aguila’s complaint was that Meneses



1 The second amended complaint alleges causes of action for

breach of contract, conversion, breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing, fraud, constructive trust, and

intentional interference with contractual relations. The

complaint alleges that of $350,000 in key money Meneses and

4

and Fragoso had agreed in their lease that any award they

received as a result of condemnation was to be remitted to Thee

Aguila, and if the lease could not be so construed, there was a

separate oral agreement by which Meneses and Fragoso had

promised Thee Aguila all of the proceeds awarded in the eminent

domain proceeding.2 As a fallback, the complaint alleged that

Meneses and Fragoso had never completed the transaction to

purchase rights to operate the El Parral, and that the prior

owners (the Orozcos) had assigned all of those rights back to Thee

Aguila.3

The trial court severed certain questions of law based on

input from the parties and conducted a two-day bench trial in



Fragoso were to pay, they still owed $200,000, and that Meneses

and Fragoso owed Thee Aguila $67,000 in unpaid rent. Fragoso

and Meneses cross complained against Thee Aguila and Henry

Aguila. The operative cross-complaint at the time of trial was the

third amended cross-complaint alleging causes of action for abuse

of process, fraud, breach of contract, breach of indemnification,

and declaratory relief.

2 The trial court summarized Thee Aguila’s complaint

succinctly: “Notwithstanding the stipulated judgment in [the

LAUSD eminent domain action, Thee Aguila], the lessor, lays

claim to El Parral’s entire condemnation award.”

3 On November 17, 2016, Thee Aguila filed a motion for

leave to amend a third amended complaint. The trial court

denied Thee Aguila’s motion for leave to amend. The trial court’s

order denying Thee Aguila’s motion is not part of the record on

appeal, and Thee Aguila does not challenge the trial court’s

denial of that motion on appeal.

5

April 2017.4 The trial court issued its rulings on August 29,

2017. It concluded, in pertinent part, that the lease’s

condemnation clause did not give Thee Aguila an interest in El

Parral or entitlement to monies awarded to El Parral in the

eminent domain judgment. The trial court also concluded that

the eminent domain judgment collaterally estopped Thee Aguila

from any of its various claims to the money awarded to El Parral

in the eminent domain judgment.

In December 2017, the trial court deemed its written

rulings a statement of decision. The trial court concluded that

there were no further issues for the trial court or for a jury to

consider, and entered judgment in favor of Meneses, Fragoso, and

the Century Law Group. Thee Aguila filed a motion for new trial,

which the trial court denied on March 29, 2018. Thee Aguila

timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Condemnation Clause

Thee Aguila contends that the El Parral lease’s

condemnation clause gave Thee Aguila the exclusive right to

recover all moneys from any condemnation of the property

(except “loss or damage to . . . trade fixtures and removable



4 The trial court ordered the parties to meet and confer

regarding issues to be tried to the bench. After the parties did so,

they stipulated as to certain issues to be tried, and the trial court

issued an order based on the parties’ stipulation. Thee Aguila

has not provided us a copy of that order. Nevertheless, in a

minute order dated August 29, 2017, the trial court stated that it

had tried the issues identified in the order. The trial court

identified each of the issues in its rulings. Most of the issues

tried to the bench arose from the declaratory relief cause of action

in the third amended cross-complaint.

6

personal property”). As a result, Thee Aguila argues, it was

entitled to recover moneys awarded for loss of goodwill resulting

from LAUSD’s taking.5 We review questions of contract

interpretation de novo. (Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v.

Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 340,

347.)

As Meneses and Fragoso point out, and as we have recently

explored, the owner of a business conducted on property taken by

eminent domain is entitled to compensation for loss of goodwill

resulting from the taking. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.510, subd. (a);

see Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v.

Yum Yum Donut Shops, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 662, 668.)

Absent a contractual provision to the contrary, Thee Aguila is not

entitled to compensation for El Parral’s goodwill. (See also City

of Vista v. Fielder (1996) 13 Cal.4th 612, 618 (Fielder).)

Thee Aguila cites a single case in support of its lease

agreement interpretation argument: Fielder. Thee Aguila points

to language in Fielder that explains that the general rule that

“[u]nder the Eminent Domain Law, a provision of a lease that

declares that the lease terminates if all the property subject

thereto is acquired for public use does not deprive the lessee of

any right he may have to compensation for the taking of his

leasehold or other property . . . may indeed be displaced by a

provision of a lease to the contrary.” (Fielder, supra, 13 Cal.4th

at p. 618.) Besides pointing out that parties may contract



5 Thee Aguila limits its contentions about interpretation of

the lease agreement to a discussion of El Parral’s goodwill. We

similarly limit our discussion.

7

between themselves to allocate eminent domain awards, Fielder

offers Thee Aguila no assistance.

Thee Aguila bases its contentions here on language in the

lease that states “any payment made under the threat of the

exercise of the power of eminent domain shall be the property of

the Landlord, whether made as compensation for the diminution

of the value of the leasehold or for the taking of the fee or as

severance damages . . . .” But Fielder expressly distinguishes the

lessee’s leasehold interest from lessee’s interest in goodwill “as

owner of a business.” (Fielder, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 617, fn. 1.)

Rejecting an argument that a tenant’s interest in its “leasehold

and goodwill stand or fall together” with respect to a contract

that provided for termination of the lease in the event of

condemnation, the Fielder court observed: “That is not the

case. . . . [G]oodwill can exist apart from a leasehold, and a

leasehold can exist apart from goodwill.” (Id. at p. 620, fn. 6.)

The Legislature has determined that a business owner’s

goodwill for a business operated on property taken by eminent

domain is compensable separate and apart from the parties’

interests in the property taken. The Supreme Court in Fielder

has likewise distinguished between property taken by eminent

domain and the goodwill held by the operator of a business

located on property taken by eminent domain. And neither the

language in the form lease nor Thee Aguila’s arguments give us

any reason to read the lease language more expansively or as

counter to Code of Civil Procedure section 1263.510.

B. Collateral Estoppel

Thee Aguila contends that the trial court erred by applying

the doctrine of collateral estoppel to all of its claims (including

goodwill and $267,000 in unpaid rent and key money) to moneys

8

awarded to Meneses and Fragoso in LAUSD’s eminent domain

proceeding.6

Thee Aguila argues that because it and El Parral, Fragoso,

and Meneses were all defendants in the eminent domain



6 The parties’ dispute about unpaid rent centers on rent

Thee Aguila claims was due it for December 2009 and January

2010. On November 6, 2009, the trial court issued in the eminent

domain proceeding an order for prejudgment possession of the

property subject to the parties’ lease in favor of LAUSD. By its

own terms, the lease terminated “as of the date the condemning

authority [took] title or possession, whichever occur[red] first.”

The lease also terminated as a matter of law; “[w]here all the

property subject to a lease is acquired for public use, the lease

terminates.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1265.110.) That termination was

effective when “the plaintiff [was] authorized to take possession

of the property as stated in an order for possession.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1265.140.) Thee Aguila was not entitled to rent for

December 2009 and January 2010 after a prejudgment possession

order in favor of LAUSD was issued in November 2009. If

LAUSD wished to claim rent for those months, it could have done

so in its negotiations with Meneses and Fragoso, whom LAUSD

presumably allowed to holdover for the additional two months

they operated El Parral.

The dispute regarding so-called key money turns on

payments made pursuant to a lease addendum providing for

$200,000 in “additional rent” and another $150,000 Thee Aguila

contended was “accounted for outside the” parties’ lease

agreement. Any “additional rent” argument goes the way of Thee

Aguila’s unpaid rent argument. Thee Aguila’s complaint admits

that Meneses and Fragoso had paid $150,000 before LAUSD filed

its condemnation complaint. We could locate no evidence in the

record of any other payment of key money or “additional rent”

due before the lease terminated.

9

proceeding, they were not adversaries in that proceeding, and the

judgment in that action has no preclusive effect as between

defendants, but rather only as between LAUSD and any

defendant. “The trial court’s application of the doctrine of

collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is a question of law subject

to de novo review.” (Johnson v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (2008) 166

Cal.App.4th 1497, 1507.)

“Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued

and decided in prior proceedings. [Citation.] Traditionally, we

have applied the doctrine only if several threshold requirements

are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from

relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former

proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated

in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily

decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the

former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the

party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or

in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” (Lucido v.

Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, fn. omitted.)

Although it appears to be the primary thrust of Thee

Aguila’s argument here, there is no hard and fast requirement

that the same parties to the current litigation were adverse in a

prior action. (Cf. City of Santa Cruz v. MacGregor (1960) 178

Cal.App.2d 45, 49 [codefendants in condemnation proceedings

“are, in substance, litigating against each other”].) The doctrine

requires only that the issue sought to be precluded from

relitigation was litigated to finality in the prior action with the

party (or its privity) against whom preclusion is sought.

In its answer to the eminent domain complaint, Thee

Aguila “claim[ed] by assignment, each and every award herein for

10

the taking, including the tenant’s loss of [goodwill], but not

including its[] trade fixtures.” In their answers to the eminent

domain complaint, Meneses, Fragoso, and El Parral claimed that

they were “entitled to compensation for loss of business goodwill

relating to the operation of [El Parral] on the leased property.”

In the eminent domain judgment, the trial court noted that Thee

Aguila “assert[ed], inter alia, just compensation for the property,

severance damages, precondemnation damages for loss of rental

income, a claim for the tenant’s loss of business goodwill, and for

litigation expenses and costs of suit.” The judgment also noted

that LAUSD and Thee Aguila had “agreed on a full and final

settlement of any and all issues in this matter . . . .” The

judgment continued: Meneses, Fragoso, and El Parral

“assert[ed], inter alia, just compensation for [the] leasehold

interest, loss of business goodwill, leasehold improvements, and

for litigation expenses and costs of suit.” Meneses, Fragoso, and

El Parral agreed with LAUSD “to a full and final settlement of

any and all of [their] claims, including without limitation any

claims for leasehold value, goodwill, fixtures and equipment,

relocation benefits, litigation expenses, interest and costs . . . .”

The question of what moneys were to be paid to Thee

Aguila and what moneys were to be paid to Meneses and Fragoso

for the condemnation, then, were issues decided in the eminent

domain proceeding.7 That includes moneys Thee Aguila would

have been entitled to had the lease continued in effect.



7 At his deposition in the eminent domain proceeding,

Henry Aguila and Thee Aguila’s attorney appear to have

acknowledged that the eminent domain proceeding was

conclusive as to the parties’ claims to moneys resulting from

condemnation. LAUSD’s attorney asked Aguila “Have you

11

Those issues were necessarily decided in the eminent

domain proceeding: “[W]here there are divided interests in

property acquired by eminent domain, the value of each interest

and the injury, if any, to the remainder of such interest shall be

separately assessed and compensation awarded therefor. . . .

[¶] . . . [¶] . . . The plaintiff may require that the amount of

compensation be first determined as between plaintiff and all

defendants claiming an interest in the property. Thereafter, in

the same proceeding, the trier of fact shall determine the respective

rights of the defendants in and to the amount of compensation

awarded and shall apportion the award accordingly.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1260.220, italics added.) Thee Aguila does not dispute

that the eminent domain judgment is final or that it was a party

in the eminent domain proceeding. We affirm the trial court’s

collateral estoppel conclusion.8



resolved your claim for compensation with El Parral on the

goodwill matter?” After an evasive response, LAUSD further

inquired: “So you are just withdrawing [your claim for loss of

business goodwill] altogether and you are not making a claim

even against El Parral?” Aguila’s attorney responded: “We are

not seeking to apportion any portion of the business operator’s

goodwill claim, if any.”

8 At argument, Thee Aguila fervently argued about an

alleged assignment it obtained in December 2012 (well after the

March 2011 condemnation order) from a couple (the Orozcos) who

ran El Parral before Meneses and Fragoso and purportedly

owned the temporary operating permit under which Meneses and

Fragoso operated. In the trial court and here, Thee Aguila

argued that the escrow for transfer of the temporary operating

permit never closed, and therefore the right to operate El Parral

never passed to Meneses and Fragoso. El Parral’s goodwill—

under this theory—belonged to the Orozcos, who assigned it to

12

C. Motion for New Trial

Although Thee Aguila appealed from the trial court’s order

denying its motion for new trial, Thee Aguila has presented

neither record citations nor authority for its argument that the

trial court abused its discretion. “It is the appellant’s

responsibility to support claims of error with citation and

authority; this court is not obligated to perform that function on

appellant’s behalf.” (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647,

656.) We are presented here with an 18-volume clerk’s

transcript, four volumes of reporter’s transcript, and a single

paragraph of argument in Thee Aguila’s brief that does not even

assert an abuse of discretion, much less attempt to explain the

abuse. We will not attempt to divine an argument where Thee

Aguila failed to draft one.



Thee Aguila. While this theory does not appear from the record

to have been at issue in the bench trial, this argument fails for

the same reason the rest of Thee Aguila’s arguments fail.

Meneses and Fragoso were the business owners when LAUSD

took the property, regardless of whether the title to the

temporary operating permit ever exchanged hands. The Orozcos

were not operating El Parral at the time of the condemnation.

And if Thee Aguila believed El Parral’s goodwill claim in the

eminent domain proceeding belonged to someone other than

Meneses and Fragoso, the eminent domain proceeding was the

time to raise that issue. (See McFadden v. Los Angeles County

Treasurer & Tax Collector (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1079.)
Outcome:
The judgment and the trial court’s order denying Thee Aguila’s motion for new trial are affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of Thee Aguila, Inc. v. Century Law Group, LLP?

The outcome was: The judgment and the trial court’s order denying Thee Aguila’s motion for new trial are affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.

Which court heard Thee Aguila, Inc. v. Century Law Group, LLP?

This case was heard in California Court of Appeals Second Appellate District, Division One on appeal from the Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, CA. The presiding judge was Chaney, Acting P.J..

Who were the attorneys in Thee Aguila, Inc. v. Century Law Group, LLP?

Plaintiff's attorney: Guinevere M. Malley. Defendant's attorney: Karen A. Larson.

When was Thee Aguila, Inc. v. Century Law Group, LLP decided?

This case was decided on July 4, 2019.