Mountainlands Conservancy, LLC v. California Coastal Commission, County of Los Angeles

1. The Legal Background: General Principles

The California Coastal Act (the Coastal Act) was passed in

1976. (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.)

1 It is

“a comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the

entire coastal zone of California.” (Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d

561, 565 (Yost).) The Coastal Act requires “all local governments

lying in whole or in part within the coastal zone . . . to prepare and

submit to the Commission a local coastal plan.” (Yost, at p. 566,

citing § 30500, subd. (a).)

1 Unless otherwise specified, further statutory references are

to the Public Resources Code.

3

A local coastal program (or LCP) is defined as “a local

government’s (a) land use plans, (b) zoning ordinances, (c) zoning

district maps, and (d) within sensitive coastal resources areas,

other implementing actions . . . .” (§ 30108.6.) “The precise

content of each local coastal program shall be determined by the

local government . . . in full consultation with the commission and

with full public participation.” (§ 30500, subd. (c).)

The local coastal program may be submitted to the

commission all at once or in two phases. The two phases are, first,

the land use plan (or LUP), and second, the zoning ordinances,

zoning maps and any other implementing actions (§ 30511).

(The parties refer to these zoning ordinances and other

implementing actions as a “local implementation plan” or LIP.)

The commission will certify a land use plan, or any

amendments to it, if the land use plan “meets the requirements of,

and is in conformity with, the policies of Chapter 3 (commencing

with Section 30200).” (§ 30512, subd. (c); Yost, supra, 36 Cal.3d at

p. 566.) These are referred to as “chapter 3 policies.” They include

policies on land resources (§§ 30240-30244), a category that

includes environmentally sensitive habitat areas (§ 30240) and

agricultural lands. The latter policies include a section on prime

agricultural land (§ 30241) and a section on all other lands suitable

for agricultural use (§ 30242).

2 Conflicts between one or more

policies of the Coastal Act are to be resolved “in a manner which on

balance is the most protective of significant coastal resources.”

(§ 30007.5.)

2 Other chapter 3 policies include policies on public access,

recreation, marine environment, development, and industrial

development. (§§ 30210-30236, 30250-30265.5.)

4

The commission’s review of a local government’s land use

plan is expressly limited to its determination that the plan “does,

or does not, conform with” the requirements of chapter 3.

(§ 30512.2, subd. (a).) As for the second-phase implementing

actions (the local implementation plan), “[t]he Commission may

only reject zoning ordinances on the grounds that they do not

conform, or are inadequate to carry out the provisions of the

certified land use plan.” (Yost, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 566, citing

§ 30513.)

“A certified local coastal program and all local implementing

ordinances, regulations, and other actions may be amended by a

local government, but no such amendment shall take effect until it

has been certified by the commission.” (§ 30514, subd. (a).)

2. The Factual and Procedural Background

Los Angeles County (the county) has divided its coastal zone

into three areas. One of these is the Santa Monica Mountains.

In 1986, the commission certified the land use plan portion of

a proposed local coastal program for the Santa Monica Mountains.

(This is referred to as the 1986 Malibu land use plan.) No zoning

ordinances or other implementing actions were adopted or

certified, so the county did not have a complete certified local

coastal program for the Santa Monica Mountains. (This meant

that the commission retained jurisdiction over land use in the

Santa Monica Mountains, and applicants for any development

project in that coastal zone had to obtain permits from the

commission rather than from the county.)

In 2007, the county’s regional planning commission

recommended approval of a proposed local coastal program that

included an “updated land use plan . . . to replace the Malibu LUP”

as well as a proposed local implementation plan. The Board of

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Supervisors (the board) indicated its intent to approve the

proposed program with modifications, but the commission never

considered or certified it.

In 2012, the commission began to encourage certification of

uncertified areas and to work with local agencies to update

existing coastal plans. After negotiations between commission

staff and the county, clarifications and amendments were made to

the 2007 proposed local coastal program.

a. The county’s proposed local coastal program

On January 2, 2014, the county gave notice the board would

consider a proposed local coastal program for the Santa Monica

Mountains at a public hearing on February 11, 2014.

The county’s proposed program included a land use plan

replacing the 1986 Malibu land use plan, and an implementation

plan with amendments to the zoning code and a zone change

ordinance. The county summarized the major differences between

the 1986 Malibu land use plan and “the current amendment to the

land use plan,” and stated that “this amendment will replace the

1986 LUP in its entirety.”

Among the significant differences was that “[a]gricultural

uses are proposed for restriction in the proposed [local coastal

program].” For reasons the county enumerated, “the County has

elected to respect the vineyards and crop areas already in

existence, and to prohibit further establishment of such uses in the

future.” Another significant difference involved critical habitat; in

the 1986 plan, “there was a far smaller designation of critical

habitat than is now presented as H1.” (“H1” is the designation for

“[t]he most sensitive and geographically constrained habitats.”)

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The board held a public hearing, and on February 18, 2014,

approved a resolution stating its intent to approve the proposed

program and submit it to the commission.

b. The commission staff’s March 27 report

On March 27, 2014, the commission staff issued a report on

the county’s proposed land use plan amendment. The staff

recommended denial as submitted, but recommended approval

subject to 60 suggested modifications. Most were clarifications and

refinements, but several modifications were suggested as

necessary to ensure the land use plan was in conformity with

chapter 3 policies.

As relevant here, in modification No. 27, the staff clarified

the provision prohibiting new crop, orchard, vineyard, and other

crop-based nonlivestock agricultural uses, adding that existing

agricultural uses “may not be expanded.” The staff also suggested

a new policy (modification No. 28) stating that “[e]xisting, legallyestablished, economically-viable crop-based agricultural uses on

lands suitable for agricultural use shall not be converted to nonagricultural use” unless certain requirements were met. (This

modification tracked a policy stated in section 30242 of the Coastal

Act, described post.) The staff also suggested (modification No. 29)

deleting a provision that limited “existing commercial or ‘hobby’

agricultural uses such as vineyards, orchards, and field or row

crops,” but again specified that existing agricultural uses may not

be expanded.

The commission staff’s report reviewed sections 30241 and

30242 of the Coastal Act (the policies on agricultural land).

Section 30241 specifies that the “maximum amount of prime

agricultural land shall be maintained in agricultural production to

assure the protection of the areas’ agricultural economy, and

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conflicts shall be minimized between agricultural and urban land

uses” through several stated policies. Section 30242 governs other

agricultural land, and states that lands “suitable for agricultural

use shall not be converted to nonagricultural uses unless

(1) continued or renewed agricultural use is not feasible, or

(2) such conversion would preserve prime agricultural land or

concentrate development consistent with [other specified policies].”

The staff report concluded section 30241’s mandate to

maintain the maximum amount of prime agricultural land in

agricultural production did not apply. This was because the

“limited lands within the plan area that contain prime agricultural

soils are either State or Federal public parkland or are developed

with existing uses and not in agricultural production.”3

Further, “other lands in existing agricultural use and

suitable for agricultural use are very limited in area. [A] large

percentage of the plan area consist[s] of very steep slopes and poor

soils, which are unsuitable for agriculture. . . . The steep slopes,

poor soils, limited water availability, and other constraints within

the Santa Monica Mountains make . . . the cultivation of vineyards

and other crops either infeasible, or extremely difficult and costly.”

In addition, “[a]ctivities such as vineyards or other intensive crop

cultivation can have significant adverse impacts on the biological

3 The staff report explains in detail the meaning of “prime

agricultural land” under the Coastal Act. The definition (§ 30113)

includes four categories described in Government Code

section 51201, one of which is “[l]and planted with fruit- or nutbearing trees, vines, bushes, or crops which have a nonbearing

period of less than five years” and which will normally return “not

less than two hundred dollars ($200) per acre” on an annual basis.

(Gov. Code, § 51201, subd. (c)(4).)

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integrity of the surrounding mountain environment and receiving

waterbodies.” The staff described a “confluence of factors—

including steep slopes, poor soils, scenic considerations, sensitive

watersheds, abundant [environmentally sensitive habitat areas],

and lot size limitations—[t]hat render the vast majority of the land

in the Santa Monica Mountains unsuitable for agricultural use.”

Consequently, “the prohibition on the conversion of lands suitable

for agricultural use to non-agricultural use” in section 30242 “does

not apply in most cases in this unique plan area.”

The report stated that the only areas in existing agricultural

production were “very limited vineyard areas, encompassing a very

small percentage of the plan area.” The “very limited areas where

agriculture is possible” were “the one or two areas that are already

in active agricultural production,” and these were to be protected

by modification No. 28. These two vineyard areas encompassed

approximately 50 acres. “Otherwise, the remaining vineyards in

the plan area are a very limited number of very small, ‘hobby’

vineyard plots (less than 2 acres) that are accessory to singlefamily residences,” and “these areas are very limited and often not

commercially viable.”

The staff report also stated that the “protection and

preservation of the environmentally sensitive habitats in the Santa

Monica Mountains is the most significant issue in this LUP.” The

report described the plan’s “biological resource protection

approach” and the three categories of habitat designated in the

plan (H1, H2 and H3). “H1 and H2 habitats are collectively

described as Sensitive Environmental Resource Areas (SERA’s).”

As noted earlier, the designation “H1” is for the “most sensitive

and geographically constrained habitats.” “H2 habitat consists of

areas of high biological significance, rarity, and sensitivity that are

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important for the ecological vitality and diversity of the Santa

Monica Mountains Mediterranean Ecosystem.” “H3 habitats are

developed or legally disturbed areas that may retain some residual

habitat values, but are not considered to be ESHA

[environmentally sensitive habitat areas].”4 More than 87 percent

of the 50,000 acres in the land use plan is designated either H1 or

H2.

c. Public comments

On April 7, 2014, plaintiffs—Mountainlands Conservancy,

LLC; Third District Parklands, LLC; and Third District

Meadowlands, LLC – submitted their comments. They contended

the proposed land use plan, even with the staff’s proposed

modifications, “raises substantial issues as to conformity with”

chapter 3 policies, in particular the “policy of preserving land in

the Coastal Zone for agriculture.” Plaintiffs asked the commission

either to decline certification or to “set an additional hearing on all

matters that raise such ‘substantial issues.’ ” (Section 30512

requires an additional hearing under specified circumstances, as

we discuss post.)

Specifically, plaintiffs first challenged the staff’s finding that

the only prime agricultural soils were located in public parkland

areas or developed with existing uses. Plaintiffs said they were

“aware of at least one property within the Coastal Zone containing

a deed restriction indicating the presence of ‘prime agricultural

4 The Coastal Act defines “ ‘[e]nvironmentally sensitive area’ ”

as “any area in which plant or animal life or their habitats are

either rare or especially valuable because of their special nature or

role in an ecosystem and which could be easily disturbed or

degraded by human activities and developments.” (§ 30107.5.)

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land’ on that property.” (Plaintiffs did not identify or document

this property.)

Plaintiffs also challenged the staff’s conclusion that the vast

majority of land in the Santa Monica Mountains was unsuitable

for agricultural use. Plaintiffs contended these findings were

“purely speculative”; and the report contained “no information on

the amount of land . . . that is currently under cultivation,” and no

persuasive explanation of why there is no further land suitable for

agriculture.

Plaintiffs attached an expert report from Daryl Koutnik on

agricultural use opportunities in the Santa Monica Mountains.

Mr. Koutnik, who stated he was a principal in “Biological and

Environmental Compliance,” provided a list of soil types in the

Santa Monica Mountains suitable for agriculture. He concluded

the staff report’s dismissal of agricultural uses “based solely on

soils being too rocky and steeply sloping . . . does not correspond to

current successful agricultural operations in the area.” With

modern practices, various crops “may be successful on a variety of

soil types and slope steepness,” and “[f]arming and engineering

techniques are available to address water quality and erosional

concerns.” The limitation of agricultural uses to only those

designated by the Department of Conservation based on soil types

and recent or current operation “while prohibiting such use for

properties that have been historical[ly] used for such practices is a

substantial change from the current zoning designations that allow

these agricultural activities.”

Plaintiffs submitted a soil survey of the Santa Monica

Mountains National Recreation Area (as well as other soil surveys,

soil maps and related materials). The Santa Monica Mountains

survey stated that “[a]bout 3,470 acres, or less than 2 percent of

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the survey area, would meet the requirements for prime farmland

if an adequate and dependable supply of irrigation water were

available.”

Plaintiffs also submitted an opinion from geologist Scott

Hogrefe, to refute the staff’s assertion that the Santa Monica

Mountains, because of steep topography, poor soils, limited water

availability, and constrained access, have never been an area

particular conducive for agriculture. Mr. Hogrefe, who has been a

consulting geologist on many properties in the area during the past

30 years, opined that the “vast majority of sites across the Santa

Monica Mountains do contain good to excellent soil conditions for

agricultural purposes.”

d. The commission staff’s April 9 addendum

On April 9, 2014, the commission staff issued an addendum

to its March 27 report, one day in advance of the April 10 public

hearing. Among other matters, the April 9 addendum responded

to concerns raised by the public, including by plaintiffs, about the

proposed prohibition of all new crop-based agriculture. The

addendum stated the commission staff had conferred with county

staff and agreed on some proposed changes, including its

recommendations on modifications No. 27 and 29, “to temper the

wholesale prohibition on new crop-based agriculture that appears

in the County’s original proposal.”

The trial court aptly summarized the recommended changes.

“In light of the comments received,” commission staff

recommended a modification “to allow new agricultural uses that

met the following criteria: (1) the new agricultural uses are

limited to specified areas on natural slopes of 3:1 or less steep, or

areas currently in legal agricultural use; (2) new vineyards are

prohibited; and (3) organic or biodynamic farming practices are

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followed.” The commission staff “removed the prohibition on

expanding agricultural uses, and recommended that existing legal

agricultural uses may be expanded consistent with” the three

criteria just mentioned. The commission staff “recognized that the

continuation of agricultural uses” is encouraged under the Coastal

Act if those uses “can be accomplished consistent with other

Chapter 3 policies.”

The commission staff’s new findings “justified the allowance

for new agriculture because ‘small-scale crop-based agricultural

operations (with the exceptions of vineyards) can avoid adverse

impact to biological resources and water quality,’ if ‘organic and

biodynamic farming practices are followed.’ ” The staff “explained

that ‘organic and biodynamic farming practices are required to

prevent the use of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers, which can

adversely impact the biological productivity of coastal waters and

human health.’ ” New vineyards “would remain prohibited due to

a number of identified adverse impacts attributed specifically to

those operations, including increased erosion from removal of all

vegetation, use of pesticides, large amounts of water required,

their invasive nature, and their adverse impact to scenic views.”

e. Plaintiffs’ response

Plaintiffs responded to the April 9 addendum on April 10,

the date of the public hearing.

First, plaintiffs contended that allowing affected parties less

than 24 hours to respond to the proposed revisions would violate

section 30503. (Section 30503 requires the public to be provided

with “maximum opportunities to participate” during the

preparation, approval, certification, and amendment of any local

coastal program.)

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Second, plaintiffs argued that even as revised, the proposed

land use plan “still raises substantial issues as to its compliance”

with chapter 3 policies, so that the commission “must set an

additional hearing to discuss those issues.” Plaintiffs cited

three “substantial issues.”

Plaintiffs said the revised proposal “would still exclude new

agriculture from the vast majority of land” in the Santa Monica

Mountains coastal zone. This was because new agriculture was

allowed, with two limited exceptions, “only in certain H3 habitat

areas,” and “the bulk of the area in the Coastal Zone is designated

H1 or H2.” Plaintiffs cited Dr. Hogrefe’s report that the vast

majority of land was suitable for agricultural use. Plaintiffs

asserted that “[t]o the extent that land that had potentially been

available for agricultural use would now be unavailable due to its

classification as H1 or H2 habitat, the proposed [land use plan] as

revised by the Staff’s Addendum conflicts with the policy expressed

in Section 30242 of the Coastal Act against conversion of land

suitable for agricultural use to nonagricultural land.”

Plaintiffs also challenged the staff’s justification for the

prohibition of new vineyards, contending the staff’s statements

(reproduced in the next footnote)

5 were “newly presented

5 “Vineyards require the removal of all native vegetation and

the soils must be scarified which results in increased erosion and

sedimentation of streams which adversely impact riparian areas

and water quality. In addition, vineyards typically require the

application of pesticides that can also adversely impact coast

streams and riparian habitat. Furthermore, vineyards require

large amounts of water that can require agricultural wells that can

draw down ground water and adversely impact streams and seeps

and their associated habitats. Moreover, County staff asserts that

grapevines can be an invasive type of vegetation in riparian areas.

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. . .without substantiation and without the benefit of public

comment.” (Plaintiffs similarly challenged the limitation of

additional agriculture solely to organic and biodynamic farming

methods, but they do not pursue this point on appeal.)

In addition, plaintiffs submitted two documents for the

record. The one relevant to this appeal is a June 2012 study

prepared by researchers at the UCLA Institute of the Environment

& Sustainability, entitled “Potential Extent of Vineyard

Development in the Santa Monica Mountain National Recreation

Area [SMMNRA]” (the UCLA study). The UCLA study sought to

identify “areas where vineyard development could potentially occur

given current zoning and land use regulations,” and stated that, of

the 48,394 acres in the study site, 62.5 percent had favorable

physical conditions and appropriate zoning for development. In

addition to potential vineyard development, the report identified

existing vineyards in the area (38, some with slopes greater than

33 percent). These included “large commercial vineyards, as well

as small hobby vineyards.” (We will describe the UCLA study

further in connection with our legal discussion of plaintiffs’

substantial evidence claim.)

f. The April 10 hearing and subsequent

proceedings

After presentations by county and commission staff, the

commission heard from many members of the public. Counsel for

plaintiffs argued the commission had a duty to determine whether

there were any substantial issues concerning the compliance of the

Finally, given that grapevines must be supported by trellises in a

linear, unnatural pattern, vineyards can adversely impact scenic

views.”

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land use plan with chapter 3 policies, and that there were such

issues, “especially with compliance with section 30242.”

Counsel also expressed agreement with much of the position

presented by a representative of the California Coalition of Coastal

Farmers (Mr. Don Schmitz), who spoke at some length about prime

agricultural land in the Santa Monica Mountains and against the

restriction on vineyards. Mr. Schmitz reported that the entire

Santa Monica Mountains area had been approved by federal

authorities as a fine wine growing region (designated an AVA or

American Viticultural Area).

The commission voted unanimously to approve the land use

plan with the modifications suggested by the commission staff.

Three months later, after a staff report, objections from

plaintiffs, and a public hearing, the commission approved the

county’s proposed local implementation plan, with modifications.

On August 26, 2014, the board issued a resolution adopting the

local coastal program, consisting of the land use plan and the local

implementation plan, both as modified by the commission. Final

commission certification took place at its meeting on October 10,

2014.

g. The writ petition proceedings

In June 2014, after the commission’s approval of the land

use plan, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate. The

amended petition filed December 9, 2014, is the operative

pleading. Plaintiffs alleged the commission did not proceed in the

manner required by law, because it did not make a “substantial

issues” determination under section 30512. Even with the

modifications in the April 9 addendum, they alleged, the proposed

land use plan raised substantial issues of conformity with

sections 30241 and 30242. They claimed the plan “converted lands

16

suitable for agricultural use to non-agricultural use in violation of

Section 30242.” They asserted that all lands of greater than

3:1 slope were converted to nonagricultural use, as were “all lands

in the 87.9% of the Coastal Zone designated as H1 or H2,” with

limited exceptions. Plaintiffs alleged the commission was required

to conduct a further hearing on those issues.

Plaintiffs also alleged that, by considering the addendum

made available to the public the day before the hearing, the

commission denied them a meaningful opportunity to address the

findings that “new vineyards deserved to be separated from other

forms of agriculture for categorical prohibition.”

Plaintiffs further alleged the commission’s findings were not

supported by substantial evidence, including insufficient evidence

to justify a categorical prohibition of vineyards as opposed to other

types of agriculture.

The trial court denied plaintiffs’ petition, issuing

two comprehensive rulings.

In its first ruling, the court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the

April 9 addendum was required to be distributed at least seven

days before the public hearing, and ruled that even if there were

such a requirement, plaintiffs could not show they were prejudiced

by the addendum’s timing. The court further concluded the

commission was not required under section 30512 to hold a

separate hearing on the matters claimed by plaintiffs to raise

“substantial issues.” The proposed land use plan was an

amendment of the 1986 Malibu plan, so that the amendment

procedure under section 30514 applied, not section 30512. In

addition, the court found the commission correctly concluded that

section 30241—requiring that the maximum amount of prime

agricultural land be maintained in production—did not apply.

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And, the court found substantial evidence supported the

commission’s findings “that a large percentage of the plan area is

not suitable for agricultural use and not subject to section 30242’s

restriction on the conversion of lands suitable for agricultural use.”

The trial court continued the hearing and ordered further

briefing, limited to the question whether the total ban on

vineyards was supported by substantial evidence. Along with their

supplemental brief, plaintiffs filed a motion to augment the record

with documents relating to the federal designation of the Santa

Monica Mountains coastal region as an American Viticultural

Area. At the continued hearing, the court denied the motion as

unauthorized and untimely.

In its second ruling, the court described and analyzed the

evidence in great detail, concluding there was substantial evidence

that vineyards are harmful to the Santa Monica Mountains ecology

“because they require clearing and scarification, increase erosion

and sedimentation, require pesticide use, and constitute an

invasive monoculture.” Further, “[o]f these harms, many are

inherent to the nature of viticulture, and there is no evidence that

they could be mitigated.”

Judgment was entered on November 20, 2017, and this

appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

With minor variations, plaintiffs make the same claims they

made to the trial court: that section 30512 applied and mandated

a further hearing; that the commission failed to enforce the

agricultural protection policies of the Coastal Act; that the hearing

was unfair and denied due process because the April 9 addendum

was issued the day before the hearing; and that no substantial

evidence supported the decision “to isolate vineyards for

prohibition.” None of these contentions has merit.

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1. The Standard of Review

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, the trial court

reviews the commission’s decision to determine whether the

commission “proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction;

whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any

prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if

the [commission] has not proceeded in the manner required by law,

the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the

findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Id., subd. (b); Ross v.

California Coastal Com. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 900, 921 (Ross).)

“The [commission’s] findings and actions are presumed to be

supported by substantial evidence,” and plaintiffs have the burden

of demonstrating otherwise. (Ross, at p. 921.)

The trial court considers all relevant evidence, but does not

substitute its own findings and inferences for those of the

commission. (Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at pp. 921-922.) The

trial court may reverse the commission’s decision “ ‘only if, based

on the evidence before it, a reasonable person could not have

reached the conclusion reached by [the commission].’ ” (Id. at

p. 922.) “Our scope of review is identical to that of the trial court.

[Citations.] We, like the trial court, examine all relevant materials

in the entire administrative record to determine whether the

[commission’s] decision is supported by substantial evidence.”

(Ibid.)

When interpreting a statute, our review is de novo, but the

commission’s interpretation of its governing statutes “is entitled to

great weight.” (Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 922.)

2. Section 30512 versus Section 30514

Plaintiffs contend the commission was required to proceed

under section 30512, rather than under section 30514 (governing

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amendments). As already noted, section 30512 requires the

commission to determine, after a public hearing, whether the land

use plan of a proposed local coastal program “raises no substantial

issue as to conformity with” chapter 3 policies. If the plan does

raise a substantial issue, the commission must identify the issues

and hold at least one public hearing on the matters identified.6

The commission, on the other hand, says that it properly

proceeded under section 30514, which has no such requirement.

Under section 30514, “[a]ny proposed amendments to a certified

local coastal program” must be submitted and processed under

sections 30512 and 30513,7 “except that the commission shall make

no determination as to whether a proposed amendment raises a

6 Specifically, section 30512 requires the commission, after

submission of the land use plan and after public hearing, to “either

certify or refuse certification, in whole or in part,” under specified

procedures. (Id., subd. (a).) The commission must determine, after

the public hearing, “whether the land use plan, or a portion thereof

applicable to an identifiable geographic area, raises no substantial

issue as to conformity with the policies of Chapter 3.” (Id.,

subd. (a)(1).) If the commission determines no substantial issue is

raised, the land use plan “shall be deemed certified as submitted.”

(Ibid.) If the commission determines that one or more portions of a

land use plan raise no substantial issue, the remainder of the land

use plan “shall be deemed to raise one or more substantial issues,”

and the commission must identify each substantial issue for each

geographic area. (§ 30512, subd. (a)(2).) The commission must

hold at least one public hearing “on the matter or matters that

have been identified as substantial issues.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)

7 Section 30513 describes the procedures that govern

submission and approval of zoning ordinances and other

implementing actions (the local implementation plan).

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substantial issue as to conformity” with chapter 3 policies “as

would otherwise be required by Section 30512.” (§ 30514,

subd. (b), italics added.) There is no limitation on the number of

amendments included in a submittal. (Ibid.) And the scope of

section 30514 is broad: “A certified local coastal program and all

local implementing ordinances, regulations, and other actions may

be amended . . . .” (§ 30514, subd. (a).)

The record shows the county identified its February 14, 2014

submission to the commission with a caption that begins with the

words, “formal submittal of amendment to the 1986 land use plan.”

The submission included a “summary of the major differences

between 1986 Malibu LCP, LUP and the current submittal.”

Similarly, the commission staff’s March 27 report describing the

county’s proposed local coastal program stated that, “[f]or the Land

Use Plan portion, the County is requesting an amendment to its

existing certified Land Use Plan, consisting of a comprehensive

update to replace the existing Land Use Plan with a new proposed

Land Use Plan.”

In the trial court, plaintiffs argued that section 30514

applies only when the local government is seeking “a minor change

to its already-certified LCP.” They relied on subdivision (e) of

section 30514, which states that “ ‘amendment of a certified local

coastal program’ includes, but is not limited to, any action . . . that

authorizes the use of a parcel of land other than a use that is

designated in the certified local coastal program as a permitted use

of the parcel.” The trial court disagreed, pointing out that

plaintiffs’ argument was inconsistent with the plain language of

section 30514, which specifies that an amendment “is not limited

to” parcel use changes. (§ 30514, subd. (e).)

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On appeal, plaintiffs take a different tack, telling us that

section 30514 only applies to amendment of “[a] certified local

coastal program” (§ 30514, subd. (a)), and in this case there was no

certified local coastal program (only the 1986 certified land use

plan).8 We are not persuaded. A local coastal program does

consist, as plaintiff observes, of both a land use plan and an

implementation plan. But the only basis for rejection of an

implementation plan is that it does not conform to or is inadequate

to carry out a certified land use plan. (§ 30513, subd. (b).) The

substance and prerequisite of a local coastal program is the

certified land use plan; there cannot be any implementation plan

without the land use plan. Plaintiffs’ limited view of the scope of

section 30514 as permitting amendment of a local coastal program

but not a land use plan is not supported by a sensible construction

of its words nor by any legal authority. To the extent legal

authority exists, it is to the contrary. (Cf. Yost, supra, 36 Cal.3d at

p. 573, fn. 9 [“A local government can amend a certified LCP [local

coastal program] or LUP [land use plan] (§ 30514).”].)

Plaintiffs insist that when a land use plan entirely replaces

an existing land use plan, it is not an amendment. The cases

plaintiffs cite do not support that proposition. For example,

plaintiffs tell us that the repeal and replacement of a statute

“supersedes all prior statutes,” rendering them “annulled, repealed

8 The trial court observed that plaintiffs “do not argue that

section 30514(b) applies only to amendments to a certified LCP,

and the County only had a certified LUP at the time of the

April 10, 2014 Commission hearing. In any event, the

Commission’s interpretation of section 30514(b)’s procedure as

applying to an amendment to a certified LUP is entitled to

deference.”

22

and void.” For this rule, plaintiffs cite Wood v. Roach (1932)

125 Cal.App. 631, 638. The aptness of plaintiffs’ analogy is

questionable, but in any event Wood v. Roach repeatedly refers to

the enactments at issue, which established “a new and complete

scheme,” as the “amendments.” (Id. at pp. 636-638.)

In short, we see no basis in legal authority or sound

reasoning for concluding that an amendment to a land use plan

must do something less extensive than to replace the plan entirely.

This is a circumstance where it is entirely appropriate to defer to

the commission’s interpretation of its own procedures. (See Hines

v. California Coastal Com. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 830, 849 [“ ‘it is

well established that great weight must be given to the

administrative construction of those charged with the enforcement

and interpretation of a statute. [Citations.] We will not depart

from the Commission’s interpretation unless it is clearly

erroneous’ ”].) We note as well that the commission has used the

amendment process in analogous circumstances in the past.

(Cf. Headlands Reserve, LLC v. Center for Natural Lands

Management (C.D.Cal. 2007) 523 F.Supp.2d 1113, 1120-1121

[referring to the commission’s certification of an amendment to a

local coastal program where “[t]he new amendment replaced the

pre-existing 1986 [local coastal program] and covered [a]

previously uncertified . . . area”].)

In sum, the commission proceeded properly under

section 30514, and therefore was not required to make the

“substantial issue” determination otherwise required by

section 30512. (§ 30514, subd. (b).)

23

3. The “Blanket Determination” Issue: Agricultural

Policies in Sections 30241 and 30242

Plaintiffs next argue the commission failed to proceed in the

manner required by law because “it made a blanket determination

that the Santa Monica Mountains are not suitable for agriculture.”

Plaintiffs say that sections 30241 and 30242 of the Coastal Act

contemplate a determination of the feasibility of agriculture “in

relation to a specific parcel of property,” on “a case-by-case basis.”

We disagree. Plaintiffs misconstrue sections 30241 and 30242,

mischaracterize what the commission did, and apparently

misunderstand the point of a land use plan.

First, plaintiffs cite no authority for their “case-by-case

basis” claim. As the commission points out, the whole point of a

local coastal program is to allow local governments to do area-wide

planning in conformity with the policies of the Coastal Act.

Second, sections 30241 and 30242 do not “contemplate” a

case-by-case or parcel-by-parcel determination of the feasibility of

agriculture. The commission properly considered these provisions,

finding section 30241 does not apply, and appropriately protecting

other lands suitable for agriculture as required by section 30242,

as we now explain.

a. Section 30241

As we have said, section 30241 specifies that the “maximum

amount of prime agricultural land shall be maintained in

agricultural production.”

9 The commission found this provision did

not apply, because prime agricultural lands in the plan area were

either public parkland, or were developed with existing uses and

9 Section 30241 also specifies six ways in which conflicts

between agricultural and urban land uses must be minimized.

(§ 30241, subds. (a)-(f).) Such conflicts are not at issue here.

24

not in agricultural production. (The areas containing prime soils

“represent less than 2 percent of the entire plan area,” and the

only areas in agricultural production “are very limited vineyard

areas.”) Plaintiffs have identified no basis for disagreement with

the commission’s conclusion (and completely misstate the basis for

finding section 30241 inapplicable). As the trial court pointed out,

the commission’s finding that section 30241 did not apply was

“supported by all the evidence in the record, not just substantial

evidence.”

b. Section 30242

As we also said earlier, section 30242 states that “[a]ll other

lands suitable for agricultural use shall not be converted to

nonagricultural uses” unless “continued or renewed agricultural

use is not feasible.” (§ 30242.)

Plaintiffs contend it was “arbitrary and capricious” to find,

as stated in the staff report, that a “confluence of factors—

including steep slopes, poor soils, scenic considerations, sensitive

watersheds, abundant [environmentally sensitive habitat areas],

and lot size limitations—render the vast majority of the land in the

Santa Monica Mountains unsuitable for agricultural use.”

Plaintiffs point to Mr. Hogrefe’s testimony that the “vast majority

of sites” contain good to excellent soil conditions for agricultural

purposes, and that topographic conditions allow sustainable

agricultural uses.

We see nothing arbitrary or capricious about the

commission’s conclusion.

First, there was ample evidence in the staff report that the

plan area is generally unsuitable for agriculture. In addition to

steep slopes and poor soils, water availability is limited, and the

area contains significant biological and scenic resources.

25

“Activities such as vineyards or other intensive crop cultivation

can have significant adverse impacts on the biological integrity of

the surrounding mountain environment and receiving

waterbodies.”

Second, as the trial court pointed out, “[t]he mere possibility

of successful agricultural use,” as presented in the comments of

plaintiffs’ experts, is not sufficient. Plaintiffs did not show that

land in the plan area is actually suitable or feasible for

agricultural uses. The Coastal Act defines “feasible” as “capable of

being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable

period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social,

and technological factors.” (§ 30108, italics added.)

The staff report found that, in combination with the

relatively steep topography, “vegetation removal, increased soil

exposure, and chemical/fertilizer and irrigation requirements from

crop-based agriculture can result in significant impacts to

biological resources and water quality from increased erosion,

sedimentation of streams, pollution, slope instability, and loss of

habitat.” And plaintiffs completely ignore the requirement for

protection of environmentally sensitive habitat areas. (Recall that

more than 87 percent of the 50,000 acres in the land use plan is

designated either H1 or H2 (sensitive environmental resource

areas), making those areas unsuitable for agriculture.) An

assessment of “feasibility” requires consideration of these factors.

Further, the Legislature recognized there would be conflicts

between the policies of the Coastal Act, and declared that “such

conflicts be resolved in a manner which on balance is the most

protective of significant coastal resources.” (§ 30007.5.)

Third, section 30242 protects against the conversion of lands

to nonagricultural uses. This necessarily means, as the words of

26

the statute demonstrate, that the lands being protected either are

now in agricultural use, or have been in agricultural use in the

past. The prohibition on conversion to nonagricultural uses does

not apply where “continued or renewed agricultural use is not

feasible.” (§ 30242, italics added.) As the trial court put it, “[t]his

plain language means that suitable lands that are feasible for

‘continued or renewed agricultural use’ cannot be used for another

purpose. It does not mean that all land suitable for agriculture

must be used for agriculture.”

Thus the trial court correctly gave no credence to testimony

that the Santa Monica Mountains area has been zoned for

agriculture “[f]or nearly 100 years.” The pertinent point was that

“[t]here simply is no evidence that the [local coastal program]

converts to a non-agricultural use any land that actually has been

used for agricultur[e] anytime within the past 100 years.” The

local coastal program approved by the commission fully protects

areas currently in agricultural production, as dictated by section

30242.

There is no doubt that the preservation of agricultural land

uses is an important public policy in California. (§§ 10201,

subd. (c), 31050, 31051.) But so is the preservation of coastal

resources, including environmentally sensitive habitat areas.

(§ 30240, subd. (a) [“Environmentally sensitive habitat areas shall

be protected against any significant disruption of habitat values,

and only uses dependent on those resources shall be allowed

within those areas.”].) We find no error in the commission’s

construction and application of the agricultural protections

embodied in sections 30241 and 30242.

27

4. The Fair Trial Issue

Our inquiry extends to “whether there was a fair trial.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) “[T]he ‘fair trial’ requirement

is equivalent to a prescription that there be a fair administrative

hearing.” (Pomona College v. Superior Court (1996)

45 Cal.App.4th 1716, 1730.)

Plaintiffs contend the April 10 hearing was unfair and

denied them due process because the commission “gave less than

24-hours’ notice of a new [land use plan] that would completely

ban vineyards.” Plaintiffs are referring to the staff’s April 9

addendum, which responded to the public comments on the staff’s

March 27 report. The staff responded by proposing modifications

to the land use plan that would allow new agriculture (but not

vineyards), subject to slope and “organic or biodynamic farming”

requirements.

To be clear, the April 9 addendum was not a “new” land use

plan, nor did it propose a new treatment of vineyards. The

addendum was issued in response to public comments, including

those of plaintiffs, and it addressed their arguments opposing the

agriculture ban by allowing some new agriculture, subject to

significant restrictions. The addendum was issued the day before

the public hearing, and complied with the pertinent regulations, as

did the March 27 report. That is the way the process is supposed

to work. Specifically:

Several regulations govern commission action on land use

plans. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 13530-13541.) As pertinent

here, section 13532 of the regulations governs the staff

recommendation. It requires the executive director to prepare the

recommendation, which must set forth specific findings, including

facts, legal conclusions, suggested modifications, and so on. “In

28

order to assure adequate notification,” the regulation specifies the

distribution of “the final staff recommendation” to interested

persons and organizations, “within a reasonable time but in no

event less than 7 calendar days prior to the scheduled public

hearing.” As the trial court pointed out, the March 27 report was

the “final staff recommendation” meeting the criteria in section

13532 of the regulations.

The succeeding section of the regulations (§ 13533) provides

for comments from the public and others on the staff

recommendation. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13533, subd. (a).)

Notably, section 13533, subdivision (b) states: “The staff shall

respond to significant environmental points raised during

evaluation of the [local coastal program]. The response may be

included within the staff report and shall be distributed to the

Commission and the person making the comment. The response

shall be available at the hearing on the [local coastal program] for

all persons in attendance.”

The April 9 addendum was the staff’s response to the

comments received concerning the agricultural ban, taking them

into account and recommending the modified policy described

above. As the trial court found, the staff response and

recommendation “met the requirements of 14 CCR section 13533,

which only requires that it be ‘available at the hearing on the [local

coastal program] for all persons in attendance.’ ”

Plaintiffs assert the commission’s compliance with the

regulations “is of no moment,” citing a case that states an affected

person “might well be able, in the circumstances of a given case,”

to demonstrate a denial of procedural due process notwithstanding

full compliance with all applicable regulations. (Laupheimer v.

State of California (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 440, 456, 449 [rejecting

29

claim that a statute and rules (on forest resources) as written

denied procedural due process].) Plaintiffs have made no such

demonstration, nor could they in the circumstances of this case.

(Cf. Ryan v. California Interscholastic Federation-San Diego

Section (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1072 [due process “ ‘ “varies

according to specific factual contexts” ’ ”; in some cases, “ ‘ “due

process may require only that the administrative agency comply

with the statutory limitations on its authority” ’ ”].)

Instead, all plaintiffs do is insist that the April 9 addendum

“significantly altered the fundamental premise” of the land use

plan and was a “complete change in position without any advance

knowledge” that “flies in the face of due process ‘dignity’ and

fairness.” Plaintiffs’ rhetoric does not comport with the facts or the

law.

Nothing about the proposed modifications—responsive to

public comment on the plan—altered the plan’s original objective:

“Agricultural uses are proposed for restriction in the proposed

[local coastal plan].” The modification merely eased, to a very

limited extent, the categorical restriction on new agriculture.

To call this a “complete change in position” is simply wrong.

Plaintiffs repeatedly protest that they had no time to refute

the “special, distinct prohibition of all new vineyards.” But the

prohibition on new vineyards never changed, and plaintiffs present

no rational explanation of their assertion that the “complete and

singular vineyard ban” would generate a significantly different

response from the original ban on “[n]ew crop, orchard, vineyard,

and other crop-based non-livestock agricultural uses.” Moreover,

plaintiffs in fact responded to the “new” ban on vineyards in the

April 9 addendum, both in writing (by letter and with the

submission of two research reports), and at the hearing.

30

In addition, there is precedent for the issuance of a staff

addendum under similar circumstances. In Ross, the court

rejected a claim that availability of a staff report 13 days before

the hearing was unreasonable, observing it was nearly twice the

period (seven days) required by the regulations. (Ross, supra,

199 Cal.App.4th at p. 939.) As relevant here, an addendum to the

staff report was issued two days before the hearing. The court

held the addendum was “not subject to the notice requirement

under Code of Regulations, title 14, section 13532.” (Ibid.) The

court observed that, “[i]n the addendum, the commission

responded to public comments; recommended modification of the

view corridors in response to public comments; and discussed

additional biological information specific to the subject property’s

proposed subdivision.” (Ibid.) The same is true here: the staff

responded to public comments with a modification of the ban on

new agriculture.

Plaintiffs argue Ross does not apply because the addendum

in that case “made minor changes to the prior commission staff

report” (Ross, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 915), and did not

involve a proposed new local coastal plan, but rather was directed

primarily at a particular beach-front property. These are

distinctions that make no difference. Ross did not base its analysis

on a minor-versus-major basis. Nor do we consider the continued

ban on vineyards to be a major change.

Further, we note that the commission’s regulations permit a

local government to amend its land use plan “prior to the

commencement of the vote” on the plan as submitted, and the

commission then determines whether or not the amendment “is

material and includes changes that have not been the subject of

public review and comment before the Commission.” (Cal. Code

31

Regs., tit. 14, § 13536.) If the amendments are minor, or if they

are material but have been the subject of adequate public comment

at the public hearing, the commission is to consider the

amendment and act on the plan as amended rather than as

initially submitted. (Ibid.) That is analogous to the circumstances

here. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated either the materiality of

the changes made in the April 9 addendum or that they were not

the subject of adequate public comment at the hearing.

Plaintiffs’ final argument on its due process claim is that the

trial court erred in refusing to augment the record with documents

relating to the federal designation of the Santa Monica Mountains

coastal region as an American Viticultural Area. But plaintiffs did

not even seek augmentation of the record until after the

September 5, 2017 hearing on the merits of their writ petition. At

that hearing, the court resolved all other issues, and the vineyard

ban was briefed and argued. The court requested supplemental

briefing, solely on whether the ban on vineyards was supported by

substantial evidence. Plaintiffs did not request augmentation

until a month later, contemporaneously with filing their

supplemental brief.

The court denied the motion as unauthorized and untimely.

The court stated that plaintiffs “did not ask, and the court did not

authorize, a motion to augment the record,” and plaintiffs provided

“no excuse for their failure to bring this motion at the original writ

hearing.” The court further stated that the documents could have

been obtained in time for the commission hearing had plaintiffs

exercised reasonable diligence. Indeed, plaintiffs “admit that

many of the documents they seek to add to the Administrative

Record existed at the time of the Commission’s April 10, 2014

hearing.”

32

Plaintiffs do not explain why the court’s ruling was an abuse

of discretion, and of course it was not. They simply assert—

again—that they were “misled” and could have produced more

evidence to challenge the vineyard ban if more than 24 hours’

notice had been given, and thus they “were prejudiced by the

denial of due process.” As we have seen, there was no failure of

due process. There was likewise no error in the court’s denial of

plaintiffs’ motion to augment the record.

5. The Substantial Evidence Issue

Plaintiffs contend, in essence, there is no evidence vineyards

are any worse than other crops that are not subject to a total ban:

They contend “there was no substantial evidence that vineyards

were deserving of isolation or distinction as being uniquely

disruptive of watersheds, erosion, [environmentally sensitive

habitat areas], scenic views or of any other coastal resource.” Our

review of the record, like the trial court’s, leads to a contrary

conclusion.

There are, in particular, two pieces of evidence—the UCLA

study (mentioned in the fact section) and expert testimony from

Dr. Jonna Engel, the commission’s staff ecologist—that directly

support the commission’s conclusion that vineyards pose a threat

to coastal resources and therefore should be banned.10 The

evidence plaintiffs cite, on the other hand, while it supports the

suitability of lands in the Santa Monica Mountains for vineyards,

10 There was other evidence as well, including letters and

statements from various groups and public officials, that supported

the vineyard ban. The trial court found these documents were “not

particularly persuasive” because there was no discussion of the

evidence underlying their conclusions, so they were “not sufficient

on their own to constitute substantial evidence.”

33

does nothing to counter the evidence of environmental harm

caused by vineyards. As the trial court pointed out, it is feasibility,

not suitability of the land, that is critical, and feasibility as defined

in the Coastal Act requires the consideration of environmental

factors.

The UCLA study

The UCLA study sought to identify areas where vineyard

development could potentially occur, and to identify existing

vineyards in the area. Plaintiffs cited the study to the trial court

as “directly on point” and characterized it as “an unbiased report.”

They emphasized its finding that 62.5 percent of the land in the

Santa Monica Mountains is favorable for vineyard development.

Remarkably, however, plaintiffs completely ignored the

substance of the report. (They do not refer to it at all in their

appellate briefing.) The abstract of the study begins with the

observation that, despite conservation efforts, urbanization “has

already contributed to widespread disturbance throughout the

[Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area (SMMNRA)],

and recent trends in the development of vineyards could pose

further threats. Additional vineyard development has the

potential to severely disturb natural areas, which could result in

fragmentation and loss of native species.”

The abstract of the study summarizes: “Analysis indicated

that unprotected areas in the SMMNRA are at risk of being

disturbed by vineyard development. Of the 48,394 acres in the

study site, 62.5% had favorable physical conditions and

appropriate zoning for development. A land cover analysis

underscored the potential effects of widespread development as

74.5% of native vegetation in the study site was at risk.” (Italics

added.)

34

The report explained in its introduction that an increasing

number of private landowners were beginning to explore

opportunities for developing hobby vineyards, and “[w]e attempted

to identify potential areas for vineyard development in order to

distinguish habitats at risk of disturbance and improve land use

policy.” The report identified “vegetation types that were at high

risk of being displaced or disturbed by development.” The study

explained that “[t]he extent of maximum development and

displaced vegetation are important due to the adverse effects that

vineyard development may have on an ecosystem.” The authors

cited other studies showing that “[d]isplacement of natural

vegetation is a direct cause of habitat loss and is disruptive to

ecosystem health,” and that “[d]evelopment effects include

fragmentation and increased edge effects[,] decreases in habitat

size and complexity, changes in predominant vegetation types,

effects on local hydrology, water pollution, soil erosion, and air

pollution [citations].”

Dr. Engel’s rebuttal statement

Testimony at the April 10 hearing likewise supported the

ban on vineyards. Dr. Engel testified that vineyards present

“numerous significant adverse impacts upon the native

Mediterranean habitats” in the Santa Monica Mountains,

including habitat loss, habitat fragmentation, disruption of wildlife

corridors, and a significant reduction of biodiversity. “From

myriad species of plants and animals, to a near monoculture of

non-native species, peer reviewed research has demonstrated that

the insect community associated with vineyards tends to support

more non-native species, and that the modified insect community

spills over to the adjacent native habitats.”

35

Further, “[d]ue to the inherent biology of grapevines,

vineyards in particular introduce significant negative changes to

the soil chemistry from the perspective of Mediterranean plant

communities.” Dr. Engel also testified that, while vineyards in

general “may not require much fertilization, they typically require

pesticides and fungicides, which are introduced into the

surrounding native habitats, including the creeks and streams,

and watersheds with vineyards.” Other points in her testimony

are reproduced in the next footnote.

11

Dr. Engel concluded by citing a recent paper in the

proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, in which the

author stated: “ ‘Vineyards have long lasting effects on habitat

quality, and may significantly impact fresh water resources. In

addition to introducing sterilizing chemicals and fertilizer, which

remake the ecosystem, mature vineyards have low habitat value

11 Dr. Engel countered testimony from Mr. Schmitz of the

California Coalition of Coastal Farmers that vineyards increase

soil fertility through nitrogen fixation and mineral depositing. She

agreed, but observed “[t]his is not a positive for Santa Monica

Mountains plant communities that are adapted to porous, nutrient

poor acidic soil. More nutrient rich soils, such as those created by

vineyards, also tend to facilitate the invasion of non-native

species.” Dr. Engel also responded to Mr. Schmitz’s testimony that

wine grapes have deep roots that may serve to stabilize slopes.

“While grapevines may have deep roots, the native woodland,

coastal sage scrub and chaparral communities have plant species

that exhibit root stratification. That is plants with shallow roots,

moderately deep roots, and deep roots. This pattern of root

distribution naturally provides great soil stability. It is also

thought that this is an adaptation of these species to limited water

resources.”

36

for native species, and are visited more often by non-native

species.”

As noted above, plaintiffs do not address the evidence in the

UCLA study, and they refer to Dr. Engel’s testimony only to

challenge her statement that vineyards “typically require

pesticides and fungicides,” and to wrongly characterize her

testimony as “inherently untrustworthy.” Instead, plaintiffs

contend the evidence “that was specifically related to vineyards”

was “undisputed that vineyards were ideally suited for the Santa

Monica Mountains,” as vineyards require much less water and

thrive on steep slopes and in poor soils. That evidence misses the

point: As the trial court observed, “suitability does not make

vineyard development feasible,” because feasibility requires an

evaluation of environmental, social, and economic factors.

(§ 30108.) And there is no evidence in the record that counters the

evidence that vineyards are harmful to the ecosystem and coastal

resources in the Santa Monica Mountains.12

In short, we are in complete agreement with the trial court’s

summary of the substantial evidence in the record: “[V]ineyards

are harmful to the Santa Monica Mountains ecology because they

require clearing and scarification, increase erosion and

sedimentation, require pesticide use, and constitute an invasive

monoculture. Of these harms, many are inherent in the nature of

viticulture, and there is no evidence they could be mitigated.

12 The evidence with which plaintiffs sought to augment the

record would not help. As the trial court pointed out, the federal

“American Viticultural Area” designation “makes no findings about

the environmental harms caused by vineyards or the

appropriateness of their use,” and “does not counter [the]

Commission’s evidence that viticulture is harmful to the ecosystem

and coastal resources of the Santa Monica Mountains.”

37

Vineyards increase erosion because the hillsides are planted with

grapes where the hillsides are bare during winter months and lack

the root stratification of native vegetation. . . . They create air

pollution from dust. Grapevines are an invasive monoculture

species that impact all of the surrounding vegetation and harm

riparian habitat. . . . They create water runoff and sedimentation

of streams. The only impacts that could be mitigated [are] the use

of pesticides, which is already banned under the [local coastal

plan], and water usage. Under these circumstances, substantial

evidence supports the Commission’s decision to ban new

vineyards.”

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.