Maria G. Garcia v. Gilbert Escobar

“A ‘juvenile court’ is a superior court exercising limited

jurisdiction arising under juvenile law.” (In re Chantal S. (1996)

13 Cal.4th 196, 200.) “ ‘[F]amily court’ refers to the activities of

one or more superior court judicial officers who handle litigation

arising under the Family Code. It is not a separate court with

special jurisdiction, but is instead the superior court performing

one of its general duties.” (Id. at p. 201.) Both the juvenile court

and the family court may issue protective orders to protect

against domestic violence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 213.5, 304;

Fam. Code, §§ 6218, 6320.) A protective order enjoins specific

acts of abuse. (Fam. Code, § 6218.)

In this case, the juvenile court issued a protective order,

protecting appellant Maria G. Garcia and her daughter and

enjoining respondent Gilbert Escobar from specified acts of

abuse. The protective order remained effective after the juvenile

court terminated its jurisdiction. On appeal, Garcia and amicus

curiae persuasively show that Family Code section 6345—which

governs the renewal of a domestic violence restraining order—

applies to the renewal of a domestic violence restraining order

issued by a juvenile court (not exclusively to the renewal of an

order issued by the family court). We hold that after a juvenile

court has terminated its jurisdiction, the family court has

jurisdiction over domestic violence orders and may issue a

renewal. We remand the case to the superior court to apply the

renewal statute.

BACKGROUND

Garcia and Escobar dated for seven years and separated in

July 2013. Their only child, A., was three at the time of their

separation.

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On July 29, 2013, Garcia filed a request for a restraining

order in family court (Judicial Council form DV-100). The case

apparently was transferred to juvenile court. On September 16,

2013, the juvenile court issued a restraining order protecting

Garcia and A. from Escobar. The order indicated that it was an

“[o]rder [a]fter [h]earing,” and that a hearing had been conducted

September 16, 2013. The order expired September 16, 2016. The

order was on a form mandated by the Judicial Council, which

referenced both the Welfare and Institutions Code and the

Family Code. The order enjoined Escobar from “molest[ing],

attack[ing], strik[ing], stalk[ing], threaten[ing], sexually

assault[ing], batter[ing], harass[ing], destroy[ing] the personal

property of, contact[ing], or disturb[ing] the peace” and required

him to stay 100 yards from Garcia and A. except for his visitation

of A.

On May 20, 2014—prior to the expiration of the restraining

order—the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction. Escobar

was permitted only supervised visitation of A. because, among

other reasons, he had not made progress in his court ordered

domestic violence offenders program.

1. Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order

On September 7, 2016 (nine days before her juvenile court

restraining order was set to expire), Garcia filed a request for a

domestic violence restraining order in family court. A copy of the

juvenile court’s restraining order was attached to Garcia’s

declaration. Also on September 7, 2016, Garcia caused Escobar

to be served with notice of a hearing on the restraining order.

2. Hearing

At the outset of the hearing concerning Garcia’s requested

restraining order, the trial court indicated that it understood

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Garcia’s application as a request for a restraining order, not a

request for the renewal of a restraining order. The court stated:

“[T]he way I read the papers is, this is not really a renewal, it is a

request for a restraining order.” Garcia’s counsel did not argue

that she was requesting a renewal. But subsequently, the parties

appeared willing to stipulate to a renewal of a restraining order

though no stipulation concerning a five-year or other specific time

period was discussed. The trial court, however, concluded it did

not have jurisdiction to renew the restraining order because it

was issued by the juvenile court.1

3. Order

The trial court issued a one-year restraining order on

October 21, 2016. The trial court’s order protected both Garcia

and A. from Escobar.

DISCUSSION

As we shall explain, the family court erroneously concluded

that it lacked jurisdiction to renew Garcia’s restraining order.

Family Code section 6345, subdivision (a) provides: “In the

discretion of the court, the personal conduct, stay-away, and

residence exclusion orders contained in a court order issued after

notice and a hearing under this article may have a duration of

not more than five years, subject to termination or modification

by further order of the court either on written stipulation filed

with the court or on the motion of a party. These orders may be

1 Garcia testified at the hearing. Garcia testified that in

2010, she requested a restraining order and the case was

transferred to juvenile court. A copy of the then-recently expired

juvenile court restraining order was admitted into evidence. A

criminal protective order also was admitted into evidence.

Escobar testified and admitted that he had violated the prior

restraining order.

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renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five years or

permanently, without a showing of any further abuse since the

issuance of the original order, subject to termination or

modification by further order of the court either on written

stipulation filed with the court or on the motion of a party. The

request for renewal may be brought at any time within the three

months before the expiration of the orders.” As we shall explain,

section 6345 applies not only to restraining orders issued by the

family court, but also to restraining orders issued by the juvenile

court.

When a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition

is filed in juvenile court, the juvenile court has jurisdiction to

issue restraining orders until the petition is dismissed or the

dependency is terminated. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.620(b),

5.630.) The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is not affected by the

jurisdiction of the family court. (Fam. Code, § 6221, subd. (b).)

However, once the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction, the

family court assumes jurisdiction over restraining orders issued

in juvenile court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4.)

2

Even when the juvenile court has jurisdiction, the Family

Code applies to protective orders issued by the juvenile court. (In

re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206.) Both courts apply the

same definitions of abuse when issuing restraining orders. (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 5.630, citing Fam. Code, § 6203.) Like the

2 Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4 provides that

when a juvenile court terminates jurisdiction over a child, the

juvenile court may issue a protective order as defined by Family

Code section 6218. Such an order “shall continue until modified

or terminated by a subsequent order of the superior court.”

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 362.4.)

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family court, the juvenile court may issue orders both ex parte

and after notice and a hearing. Welfare and Institutions Code

section 213.5 expressly references Family Code section 6300

(allowing for ex parte orders). Under Welfare and Institutions

Code section 213.5, subdivision (d)(1), the court may issue those

orders upon notice and a hearing consistent with Family Code

section 6340.

3 Thus, the process for obtaining a restraining order

is the same in juvenile and in family court.

By its plain language, Family Code section 6345 is not

limited to restraining orders originating in family court. It

requires that the order sought to be renewed was issued “after

notice and a hearing under this article,” referring to article 2

(orders issuable after notice and a hearing) of part 4 (protective

orders and other domestic violence prevention orders) of division

10 (prevention of domestic violence) of the Family Code. The

juvenile court’s order was an “order after hearing” consistent

with Family Code section 6340. (In re B.S. (2009) 172

Cal.App.4th 183, 194 [order issued under Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 213.5 was analogous to order issued under Fam. Code, § 6340].)

The hearing that led to Garcia’s restraining order was held

September 16, 2013, in the juvenile court. The conduct

restrained was identical to conduct described in the Family Code

3 The juvenile court’s restraining order referenced Family

Code section 6218, which in turn references Family Code section

6320. Section 6320 allows for an ex parte order “enjoining a

party from molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening,

sexually assaulting, battering, . . . harassing, telephoning, . . .

contacting . . . , coming within a specified distance of, or

disturbing the peace,” and Family Code section 6340 allows for

the same order following a noticed hearing.

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warranting protection. (Fam. Code, §§ 6320, subd. (a), 6340,

subd. (a).) Therefore, the restraining order issued by the juvenile

court was subject to renewal by the family court.

The purpose of Family Code section 6345 also supports this

conclusion. In 1993, section 6345 was expanded to cover

restraining orders regardless of the nature of the proceeding in

which they were issued. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29F

West’s Ann. Fam. Code (2013 ed.) foll. § 6345, p. 398.) Stated

otherwise the statute was expanded to include orders issued in a

proceeding for dissolution or in a paternity action. (Ibid.)

Moreover, the purpose of section 6345 applies equally to

restraining orders issued by the juvenile court as well as those

issued by family court. The lengthy five-year renewal period in

section 6345 was implemented to “ ‘save the victims [of domestic

violence] the harrowing ordeal of returning to court every three

years [or sooner] to renew the orders and allow them to go about

their lives with more peace of mind.’ ” (Avalos v. Perez (2011) 196

Cal.App.4th 773, 777.) The same purpose applies regardless of

which court issued the restraining order. In short, as Garcia

argues, the family court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction

to renew her restraining order issued by the juvenile court. The

case must be remanded for the trial court to apply the renewal

statute to determine whether Garcia is entitled to a five-year or

permanent restraining order.4

4 Although Garcia argues that her request for the renewal of

a restraining order was uncontested and that therefore this court

should enter a five-year or permanent restraining order, the

record does not support her assertion. Initially, Escobar’s counsel

appeared willing to stipulate to the renewal of a restraining

The order is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court to apply Family Code section 6345 to determine if Garcia is entitled to a five-year or permanent restraining order. Each side is to bear his or her own costs on appeal. The stay extending Garcia’s domestic violence order through December 31, 2017, shall remain in place until further order by the trial court.