Susan Dent v. Kenneth S. Wolf, as Special Administrator, etc.

After concluding that appellant Susan Dent lacked

standing, the trial court dismissed her paternity lawsuit. The

narrow issue on appeal is whether a child who seeks a

declaration of paternity after her putative father is deceased

presents a justiciable controversy when the child requests no

financial remuneration. We conclude that Dent has standing to

pursue her paternity lawsuit and reverse the dismissal.

BACKGROUND

On December 23, 2014, then 69-year-old Susan Dent filed a

petition to establish parental relationship under Family Code

section 7630.1 She named the executor of her putative father’s

estate as respondent, and by the parties’ joint stipulation, the

executor was later replaced by a special administrator

(administrator). It is undisputed that Dent’s putative father died

testate in 1985, and final judgment on his estate was entered in

1993.

Administrator moved to dismiss Dent’s paternity petition

“on the ground that the Petition presents no justi[c]iable

controversy as it seeks only an Order determining paternity with

no request for any relief or payments of any kind.” Administrator

argued that Dent “does not stand to suffer any degree of injury in

this matter, and only seeks to invoke the judicial process for

apparently personal reasons. As a result, there is no actual

controversy to be determined by this Court.” In response, Dent

acknowledged that she was “not seeking any support or other

financial relief.” Nor was “she seeking any distribution or other

interest in the [putative father’s] Estate.” Instead she sought a

declaration of paternity for reasons other than financial ones.



1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Family Code

unless otherwise specified.

3

The trial court dismissed Dent’s petition. The court

explained: “Here, Petitioner is not a young child whose social

and emotional strength and stability are at issue. The probate

estate is closed precluding any financial interest in the deceased’s

estate. Petitioner does not have a social relationship to maintain

or create. The object of the paternity laws to protect a child’s

well-being is not achieved by this suit. As her stated father has

long since died, he cannot accept or contest the claim of

paternity.” This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In 1975, California adopted portions of the 1973 Uniform

Parentage Act. (Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84, 88.)

“The legislation’s purpose was to eliminate the legal distinction

between legitimate and illegitimate children.” (Ibid.) Under the

act, “ ‘[t]he parent and child relationship extends equally to every

child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the

parents.’ [Citation.] The ‘parent and child relationship’ is thus a

legal relationship encompassing two kinds of parents, ‘natural’

and ‘adoptive.’ ” (Id. at p. 89.) “ ‘The [California] Uniform

Parentage Act (UPA), Family Code section 7600 et seq., provides

the statutory framework for judicial determinations of parentage,

and governs private adoptions, paternity and custody disputes,

and dependency proceedings.’ ” (In re D.A. (2012) 204

Cal.App.4th 811, 824.)

Section 7601, subdivision (b) explains: “ ‘Parent and child

relationship’ . . . means the legal relationship existing between a

child and the child’s natural or adoptive parents incident to

which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and

obligations.” “ ‘[T]he establishment of the parent-child

relationship is the most fundamental right a child possesses to be

4

equated in importance with personal liberty and the most basic of

constitutional rights.’ ” (County of Shasta v. Caruthers (1995) 31

Cal.App.4th 1838, 1849.)

With that background, we now turn to the basis for the

appeal—to determine whether Dent had standing to bring her

paternity petition. “ ‘Standing’ is a party’s right to make a legal

claim and is a threshold issue to be resolved before reaching the

merits of an action.” (Said v. Jegan (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1375,

1382 [applying standing requirements under § 7630].) In the

context of a paternity action, section 7360 identifies those with

standing to pursue such a claim.

2 (Michael M. v. Giovanna F.

(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1278 [former Civ. Code, § 7006, the

predecessor to Fam. Code, § 7360, governs standing to have

paternity declared]; see Lisa I. v. Superior Court (2005) 133

Cal.App.4th 605, 612 [“Section 7630, part of the Uniform

Parentage Act, lists those persons who have standing to file an

action to determine paternity.”]; see also J.R. v. D.P. (2012) 212

Cal.App.4th 374, 384 [applying § 7630 to determine standing].)

Under section 7630, subdivision (c) “an action to determine the

existence of the parent and child relationship may be brought by

the child.” Thus, California law expressly affords Dent—as a

child—standing to bring a paternity suit. Section 7630 contains

no conditional requirement that the child express a pecuniary

interest as a condition of the paternity suit. Nor does it contain

an age limitation.

Administrator largely ignores the express permission in

section 7630 for a child to pursue a paternity petition. Instead

administrator argues that Dent’s paternity suit “presented no



2 Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 similarly identifies

persons with standing to bring a wrongful death action.

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actual controversy and was therefore not justiciable.”

(Underscoring omitted.) This argument lacks merit; Dent’s

lawsuit presented an actual controversy—i.e. whether a parentchild

relationship existed.

The purpose of a paternity suit—to determine the

relationship between a parent and child—is achieved by Dent’s

lawsuit. “[T]he establishment of the parent-child relationship is

the most fundamental right a child possesses . . . .” (Ernest P. v.

Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 234, 237; see Ruddock v.

Ohls (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 271, 277-278 [“In contrast to

enforcement of a child’s right of a present or past support

obligation, the establishment of the parent-child relationship is

the most fundamental right a child possesses to be equated in

importance with personal liberty and the most basic of

constitutional rights.”].) Moreover, a paternity action “cannot

properly be characterized as a ‘claim for damages, money or other

property.’ ” (Ernest P., supra, at p. 237.) “[A] child’s right to

support, once paternity is established, may constitute such a

claim.” (Ibid.) These principles ineluctably lead to the conclusion

that Dent has a personal stake in the outcome of the paternity

action, i.e. the accurate identification of her father and other

collateral benefits such as the ability to amend her birth

certificate and to develop a relationship with family members.

(See § 7639 [permitting modification of a birth certificate

following a parentage action].) The interest in identifying her

father is independent of a claim for financial remuneration,

affords her standing, and demonstrates a justiciable controversy.

Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191

Cal.App.4th 1559 (Wilson)—upon which the administrator

heavily relies—does not suggest a different result. Wilson

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explains general principles of justiciable controversies as follows:

Justiciability “ ‘involves the intertwined criteria of ripeness and

standing. A controversy is “ripe” when it has reached, but has

not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to

permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.’ [Citation]

But ‘ripeness is not a static state’ [citation], and a case that

presents a true controversy at its inception becomes moot ‘ “if

before decision it has, through act of the parties or other cause,

occurring after the commencement of the action, lost that

essential character” ’ [citation].” (Id. at p. 1573.) In Wilson, the

court held that the substantial completion of a project rendered

moot a resolution approving the redevelopment project. (Id. at

pp. 1575-1576.)

The principles explained in Wilson support the conclusion

that Dent has standing to sue for paternity. Dent does not seek

an advisory opinion of parentage but seeks an actual

determination of her parent-child relationship—an issue upon

which the court can grant her effective relief. Dent’s injury arises

from the absence of an established parent-child relationship, not

from the absence of child support or other payments from her

putative father or his estate.

3 The issue is not moot because it



3 Administrator makes other arguments—such as whether

he is a proper party and whether the estate has an interest in the

litigation. Those arguments—which differ from standing—are

based on unsupported assertions. We do not consider them

because (1) the only ground for dismissal was standing, (2)

administrator’s factual assertions are not supported by the

record, and (3) administrator fails to provide legal authority in

support of his position. We note that Dent has not sued any

alleged relatives of her putative father’s such as in William M. v.

Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 447, 453-454. Nor has she

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was never adjudicated, and although her putative father’s death

forecloses his companionship, that is but one reason for a

paternity suit. Moreover, Wilson does not address standing in

the context of a statute expressly delineating persons who can

bring a particular lawsuit, and as noted administrator ignores

the express language of section 7630.

The dismissal of Susan Dent’s paternity lawsuit is reversed. Appellant is entitled to costs on appeal.