Pasadena Police Officers Association v. City of Pasadena, Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC, Intervener and Appellant

Nikki Moore for California News Publishers Association as

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant.

Katie Townsend, Bruce D. Brown and Caitlin Vogus for

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press as Amicus Curiae

on behalf of Intervener and Appellant.

Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Timothy K. Talbot

and Jacob A. Kalinksi for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Michele Beal Bagneris, City Attorney, and Javan N.

Radfor, Chief Assistant City Attorney, for Defendant and

Respondent.

——————————

Following our decision in Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v.

Superior Court (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 268 (Pasadena Police), the

Los Angeles Times (Times) moved for attorney fees from the City

of Pasadena (City) under the California Public Records Act (Gov.

Code, § 6259, subd. (d)) (PRA). The Times also sought fees from

the City, the two involved police officers and the Pasadena Police

Officers Association (PPOA), under the private attorney general

statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 (hereafter § 1021.5)). The trial

court ultimately awarded the Times limited fees under the PRA

against the City and declined to award the Times any fees under

section 1021.5. We affirm in part and reverse in part, with

directions.

BACKGROUND

I. The trial court’s decision on the merits1

On March 24, 2012, just after 11:00 p.m., Pasadena Police

Department (PPD) officers responded to a 911 call. The caller



1 Because the underlying facts are not in dispute, we have

largely adopted the facts as set forth in our previous decision in

Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 268.

3

claimed to have been robbed at gunpoint by two men. Much

later, the caller admitted he had falsely reported that the robbers

were armed. Responding to the call, the officers proceeded in

their squad car to the area of the alleged crime. As they

approached the intersection, Kendrec McDade (McDade), a 19-

year-old African-American male, began running. The officers

pursued McDade for about two blocks. Officer Matthew Griffin

fired four shots at McDade from inside the patrol car. Officer

Jeffrey Newlen, having previously exited the squad car to give

chase, fired four more shots, killing McDade. It was later

discovered that McDade was not armed. (Pasadena Police, supra,

240 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.)

The shooting spawned multiple investigations, a citizen’s

complaint and a federal lawsuit by McDade’s mother, Anya

Slaughter (Slaughter), against the officers and the City. The Los

Angeles District Attorney conducted a criminal investigation

which concluded with a finding that, due to the false report, the

officers reasonably believed McDade was armed. No criminal

charges were filed against the officers. The Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) conducted a civil rights investigation of the

shooting, which ultimately was closed without the filing of

criminal charges or a civil complaint. Slaughter’s federal action

against the City and the officers was settled. (Pasadena Police,

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 275–276.)

The PPD conducted its own investigations. Two of the

investigations were conducted immediately after the McDade

shooting. The purpose of the first investigation, undertaken by

the PPD’s Criminal Investigations Division (CID), was to

determine whether the officers had committed a crime. A

different group of PPD investigators conducted a separate

4

internal affairs (IA) investigation. The PPD also investigated the

citizen’s complaint during its CID and IA investigations. In

March 2013, the PPD conducted a third investigation—an

administrative review based on evidence collected during the CID

and IA investigations. That review concluded that the officers

had acted within departmental policy because they reasonably

believed McDade was armed and assaulting an officer and shot

McDade in self-defense and in defense of one another. (Pasadena

Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 276.)

The City also retained the Office of Independent Review

Group (OIR) as a private consultant to conduct an independent

review of the shooting. According to PPD Deputy Chief Darryl

Qualls, “ ‘[t]he purpose of the [OIR]’s review . . . was to serve as a

review of the incident for the benefit of the department and to

evaluate how the [PPD] does business in the areas reviewed.’ ”

Deputy Chief Qualls also stated that the PPD would not use the

OIR report “ ‘to (1) affect the officers’ advancement; (2) conduct

an appraisal of the officers; or (3) consider discipline of the

officers.’ ” The trial court found that the City had retained the

OIR in order to evaluate the thoroughness and objectivity of the

PPD’s investigations of the shooting, the adequacy of officer

training, what lessons had been learned from the incident and,

based on the OIR’s review and conclusions, to recommend

institutional reforms. (Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th

at pp. 276–277.)

In August 2014, the OIR submitted a 70-page report

entitled “Report to the City of Pasadena Concerning the OfficerInvolved

Shooting of Kendrec McDade” (the OIR report). The

5

interveners2 then submitted requests to the City for disclosure of

the OIR report pursuant to the PRA.

3 On September 3, 2014,

while the PRA requests were still pending, the PPOA and

Officers Griffin and Newlen (collectively, the Plaintiffs) initiated

a reverse-PRA action, seeking and obtaining a temporary

restraining order (TRO) preventing the release of the OIR

report.4 (Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)



2 At the time, the interveners consisted of Anya Slaughter,

Kris Ockershauser, the Pasadena Branch of the National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People, ACT, and the

Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance of Greater Pasadena

(the Slaughter parties). The Times did not seek to intervene

until September 16, 2014. (Pasadena Police, supra, 240

Cal.App.4th at p. 277.) The Slaughter parties are not part of the

present appeal.

3 Instead of immediately responding to the PRA requests,

the City advised the PPOA that the City had received the

requests and would need to respond to them by September 4,

2014. The City told the PPOA that the PPOA needed to take

legal action before that date if it did not want to have the OIR

report released and noted that: “An argument has been made

that the release of the OIR report would violate certain statutory

and privacy rights of the involved officers.” It is unclear if the

City’s purposeful delay was allowed under the PRA, which

mandates that copies be provided promptly upon payment of fees

covering direct cost of duplication or statutory fee, if applicable.

(See Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012)

202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 14 (Marken).)

4 A reverse-PRA action may be filed when a party believes

it will be adversely affected by the disclosure of a document it

contends is confidential and seeks a judicial ruling precluding a

public agency from disclosing the document. (Marken, supra, 202

Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.) Like an action to compel disclosure

6

On September 9, 2014, the trial court vacated the TRO

because the matter was not yet ripe and ordered the City to

respond to the interveners’ PRA requests and to give the

Plaintiffs notice if it intended to disclose the OIR report. That

same day, the interveners submitted new or renewed PRA

requests for the OIR report to the City. On September 11, 2014,

the City announced that unless the trial court directed otherwise,

it would release the OIR report the following week but would

redact portions of the OIR report containing confidential police

officer personnel records. (Pasadena Police, supra, 240

Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)

On September 16, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed an ex parte

application seeking to enjoin the City from releasing any portion

of the OIR report. The same day, the Times filed a motion

seeking to intervene in this action and also filed a writ petition

seeking to compel release of the OIR report without redactions.

The trial court granted leave to intervene. (Pasadena Police,

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)

On October 16, 2014, the trial court issued its decision.

The trial court acknowledged the parties’ competing positions

regarding disclosure of the OIR report—the interveners

contended the OIR report was a public record and should be

disclosed in its entirety while the Plaintiffs claimed the OIR

report was a confidential personnel record entirely exempt from

disclosure under the Pitchess statutes (Pen. Code, §§ 832.5, 832.7,

832.8; see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531) as well



under the PRA itself, a reverse-PRA suit seeks judicial review of

an agency decision under the PRA. It does not ask the court to

undertake the decisionmaking in the first instance. (Id. at

p. 1265.)

7

as the privilege exemption of the PRA (Gov. Code, § 6254,

subd. (k)). However, the City argued that all but about

20 percent of the OIR report (which it agreed was confidential

personnel information) should be disclosed. (Pasadena Police,

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)

The trial court determined the OIR report was indisputably

a public record and that the public’s interest in disclosure was

particularly substantial because it related to officer involved

shootings and governmental policies regarding law enforcement

and public safety. (Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 277–278.) Nevertheless, the trial court found, the

administrative and criminal investigations conducted in the case

were clearly separate investigations. (Id. at p. 278.) Although

the criminal investigation revealed no information about the

advancement, appraisal, or discipline of a particular officer, and

thus did not constitute a personnel record, the same could not be

said of the administrative investigation. (Ibid.) Therefore, those

portions of the OIR report containing privileged personnel

information generated in connection with the PPD’s

administrative investigation that qualified for protection must be

redacted.5 (Ibid.)

On November 13, 2014, after reviewing the City’s and

Plaintiff’s proposed redactions to the OIR report, the trial court

entered judgment and ordered release of the redacted report.

The trial court vacated its September 16, 2014 TRO, but stayed

the effect of its vacation order and judgment for 20 days to permit

the parties to seek review of the judgment.



5 The trial court ordered approximately 14 pages of the 70-

page report to be redacted from the publicly-released copy of the

OIR report.

8

The Plaintiffs then filed a writ of mandate, seeking review

of the trial court’s disclosure order. (Pasadena Police, supra, 240

Cal.App.4th at p. 279.) According to the Plaintiffs, the entire OIR

report was privileged because it was, in effect, a personnel file.

At the very least, substantial parts of the OIR report which the

trial court had refused to redact were personnel material in

nature and type as described in Penal Code sections 832.5 and

832.6, and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045. (Id. at p. 281.)

Thus, the Plaintiffs sought to preclude disclosure of the entire

OIR report or, in the alternative, the production of a more heavily

redacted OIR report. (Id. at p. 275.) The Times insisted that the

OIR report was a public record and should have been disclosed in

its entirety. (Id. at pp. 277, 282.)

We held that the trial court correctly concluded the OIR

report itself was a public document. The trial court also correctly

determined that portions of the OIR report contained confidential

personnel information exempt from disclosure under the PRA.

We further held, however, that the trial court’s redactions went

too far. Some of the material the trial court ordered redacted was

unrelated to personnel files of individual officers. The

inappropriately redacted material included analyses of the PPD’s

administrative investigation and departmental policies,

descriptions of the PPD’s responsiveness (or the absence thereof),

and the OIR’s recommendations, none of which was privileged

under the PRA. (Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p.

275.) In short, we determined that a number of redactions

proposed by the City and largely adopted by the trial court

protected not privileged information relating to the officers, but

information or findings evaluating conduct by, or the policies and

practice of, the PPD itself. Any redaction of such material, we

9

held, would subvert the public’s right to be kept fully informed of

the activities of its peace officers in order to maintain trust in its

police department. (Id. at p. 298.)

Consequently, we denied the writ petition and remanded

the matter to the trial court so it could reconsider which portions

of the OIR report contained confidential personnel records. We

also ordered additional material released, including an appendix

we attached to our opinion, and directed the trial court to issue a

new or modified judgment in conformance with our decision.

(Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 299.) On remand,

the trial court conducted further proceedings as directed by our

opinion and ultimately ordered disclosure of an additional 126

lines of the OIR report, constituting about five of the 14

previously redacted pages. On December 2, 2015, the City

released this version of the report.

II. The trial court’s attorney fees decision

On December 22, 2015, the Times filed a motion for

attorney fees and costs (the fee motion).6 The Times sought



6 The Slaughter parties and the PPOA also moved for

attorney fees. The trial court ultimately awarded the Slaughter

parties $67,158 in fees. The trial court held that the PPOA’s

motion was defective because it did not identify the parties from

whom it sought fees. The trial court further held that the PPOA

was not entitled to attorney fees under the PRA because such

fees were not available to a plaintiff seeking to prevent disclosure

of a document using a reverse-PRA action. Nor was the PPOA

entitled to fees under the private attorney general’s statute

because it did not succeed in its primary litigation goal—

preventing disclosure of the OIR report in its entirety—and thus

could not be considered a successful party under the statute.

Furthermore, the trial court noted, there was no need for the

10

attorney fees from the City under the PRA (Gov. Code, § 6259,

subd. (d)) and from both the City and the PPOA under the private

attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5) Code of Civil

Procedure section 1021.5.

7 Specifically, the Times sought

recovery of $261,327 for its work during the writ proceedings as

well as an additional $89,095 incurred in connection with postremand

issues, including the fee motion, for a total of $350,422.

On April 14, 2016, the trial court issued an order granting

the Times’ fee motion in part and denying it in part. With

respect to fee recovery under the PRA, the trial court held that

the Times could recover fees only for the work it performed to

affirmatively enforce the PRA requests it had lodged with the



PPOA’s lawsuit because the City’s proposed redactions were

sufficient to protect the police officers’ personnel records.

7 If a records requester prevails against a public agency,

the requester can recover fees under the PRA (Gov. Code, § 6259,

subd. (d)). If a requester prevails against a third party that sued

to enjoin disclosure in a reverse-PRA action, the requester can

recover fees under section 1021.5. Government Code section

6259, subdivision (d), provides for mandatory fees: “The court

shall award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the

plaintiff should the plaintiff prevail in litigation filed pursuant to

this section.” Under section 1021.5, a fee award is discretionary:

“[A] court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against

one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in

the enforcement of an important right affecting the public

interest if: (a) a significant benefit . . . has been conferred on the

general public . . . , (b) the necessity and financial burden of

private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity

against another public entity, are such as to make the award

appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice

be paid out of the recovery, if any.”

11

City, but not for the work it had performed to defend against the

PPOA’s reverse-PRA action.

8 According to the trial court,

however, the Times was principally opposed by the PPOA, not the

City, throughout the litigation. For example, the trial court

noted, the PPOA sought to prevent the release of the OIR report,

filed the mandamus proceedings in the Court of Appeal, and

argued against the trial court’s subsequent unredactions.9

Unlike the PPOA, the City did not seek mandamus and its sole

argument in opposition to additional disclosure occurred in letter

briefs solicited by the Court of Appeal when deciding if it could

provide affirmative relief to the interveners. The City’s position

was that the Court of Appeal should not order any unredactions

unless the City could brief the issue—an argument which the

Court of Appeal rejected.10



8 Citing Marken supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at page 1267, the

trial court noted that Government Code section 6259, subdivision

(d), has no application in a reverse-PRA action, thus precluding

the Times from seeking fees against the PPOA under the PRA.

Although the Times expressly disavowed any attempt to recover

fees from the PPOA under the PRA, the PPOA still addressed the

issue in its opposition to the Times’ fee motion.

9 As noted above, the unredactions consisted of an

additional 126 lines of the OIR report—about five of the 14

previously redacted pages.

10 We rejected this argument because the City had already

addressed the propriety of redacting portions of the OIR report,

both on appeal and before the trial court. Indeed, the City urged

us to find that the trial court’s redactions appropriately protected

the officers. Further, we noted, the City was well aware the

interveners would urge us to conclude that the OIR report was

12

The trial court concluded that the City had taken the

correct position at trial, using the appropriate legal standard for

disclosure of an OIR report redacted to protect the officers’

personnel file records under the Pitchess statutes. The City

maintained this position on mandamus review, except it opposed

additional unredactions for procedural reasons when the issue

was raised by the Court of Appeal. Therefore, the trial court

held, the Times was the prevailing party against the City only for

the narrow matter of fees incurred during appellate mandamus

review and subsequent trial court hearings regarding additional

unredactions. Thus, with respect to fee recovery under the PRA,

the Times was entitled to recover attorney fees from the City only

as to this particular limited time period.

With respect to fee recovery under section 1021.5, the trial

court found that overall the Times had met all the elements

required for a fee award—the Times had succeeded in the

litigation; enforced an important right affecting the public

interest; conferred a significant benefit on the public; and private

enforcement by the Times was necessary.

Despite satisfying the overall requirements of

section 1021.5, the trial court held that the Times could not

recover fees against the City under the statute, which does not

provide an independent basis for an attorney fee award when

there are already existing specific statutory fee provisions—such

as the PRA—that apply.

As against the PPOA, the trial court determined that the

Times was clearly a successful party. The PPOA sought to



overredacted. (Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at

p. 297.)

13

prevent disclosure of the entire OIR report while the Times

sought the disclosure of the entire OIR report. The trial court

noted that its prior judgment ordering release of the redacted

OIR report—and our subsequent decision denying PPOA’s

mandamus claim—clearly demonstrated the Times had obtained

the majority of the relief it sought when intervening in this case.

The Times’ advocacy also enforced an important right affecting

the public interest conferring a significant benefit on the general

public by ensuring disclosure of the majority of the OIR report

and opposing PPOA’s attempts to prevent disclosure.

The necessity and burden also weighed in favor of a fee

award, given that it was unclear whether the City would

adequately represent the Times’ interests in opposing the PPOA.

Indeed, the trial court observed, the Times and the City

disagreed over the extent and necessity of the redactions in the

OIR report throughout the litigation. When the Times

intervened, a TRO had been issued preventing disclosure of the

OIR report and the City had not opposed issuance of the TRO.11

Lastly, the trial noted, while the Times did not receive any direct

monetary benefit from ensuring the release of the OIR report, it

was forced to pay significant amounts of attorney fees in order to

ensure that the OIR report would be released.



11 In addition to not opposing issuance of the TRO, the City

arguably caused the PPOA to seek out a TRO in the first place.

The City told the PPOA that the PPOA needed to take legal

action before September 4, 2014, if it did not want to have the

OIR report released. The City also outlined an argument the

PPOA could make in seeking a TRO by noting that release of the

OIR report could violate certain statutory and privacy rights of

the involved officers.

14

Nevertheless, although the Times could theoretically

recover fees from the PPOA under the statute, the trial court

went on to find that recovery was barred under Adoption of

Joshua S. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 945 (Joshua S.), which held that a

private individual could not be held liable for fees under

section 1021.5 when that individual sought a judgment that

determined only his or her private rights and did nothing to

adversely affect the public interest other than being on the losing

side of an important appellate case.

Here, the trial court noted, Officers Newlin and Griffith

were private litigants who sought to protect their privacy rights

under the Pitchess statutes from disclosure of information in

their personnel file. The PPOA, their union, was acting in a

representative capacity and not on its own behalf. According to

the trial court, while the issue was close, PPOA’s reverse-PRA

lawsuit was within the scope of Joshua S.’s protection. Officers

Newlin and Griffin, with the PPOA as their representative, were

protecting their statutory rights in filing their lawsuit. That they

sought to protect their privacy by preventing the disclosure of a

report that otherwise was required to be disclosed in the public

interest did not overcome this fact, the trial court held.

Therefore, the trial court exercised its discretion not to award the

Times fees under section 1021.5 against the PPOA or the officers.

In all, the trial court awarded the Times reasonable fees

under the PRA against the City—but only for a limited time

period—and declined to award the Times any fees under section

1021.5 against the City or the PPOA. The court then ordered the

parties to meet and confer and determine the correct amount to

award the Times for attorney fees incurred in the Court of Appeal

15

and post-appeal concerning the additional unredactions.12 The

trial court noted that the amount would be a “small fraction” of

the fees sought and would be reduced further given that the

Times and the Slaughter parties had acted together in seeking

disclosure, creating duplicative attorney efforts on these issues.

“They had the right to so,” the trial court observed, “but the City

cannot be asked to pay for multiple attorneys working on the

same issue.”

Pursuant to the trial court’s order, the Times identified the

fees it had incurred during appellate mandamus review as well

as the subsequent trial court hearings regarding additional

unredactions—less any fees incurred for duplicative work by

counsel for the Times and the Slaughter parties. The Times

submitted billing records indicating that its counsel billed

$50,163 for time spent addressing the unredaction issue in the

Court of Appeal and further billed $10,781 for the post-remand

unredaction issues. The Times sought an additional $5,760 in

attorney fees for the court-ordered meet and confer and

supplemental briefing. When added to the $15,000 previously

awarded by the trial court for counsel’s preparation of the fee

motion, the Times sought a total of $81,704.

The trial court subsequently held that a 50 percent

reduction for duplicative attorney efforts was appropriate in this

case and also declined to award the Times additional fees for its

supplemental briefing during the meet and confer process. In the

end, the trial court awarded the Times a total of $45,472 in



12 In addition to the as yet unknown number for the

unredaction issue, the Times was awarded fees of $15,000 for its

fee motion to obtain this limited award.

16

attorney fees—$30,472 for the unredaction issues and $15,000 for

the fee motion.

13

On appeal, the Times contends the trial court incorrectly

applied Joshua S. in denying section 1021.5 fees and that the

Times is entitled to attorney fees against the officers and the

PPOA under the statute.

14 The Times also contends it is entitled

to additional attorney fees against the City under the PRA.

15

According to the Times, the trial court incorrectly determined

that the Times had prevailed against the City only for a limited

time period and that the trial court’s subsequent 50 percent

reduction of the Times’ fee award under the PRA was both

unreasonable and contrary to the statute’s purpose.



13 The trial court awarded the Slaughter parties $67,158 in

attorney fees—$25,000 for the unredaction issues, as agreed to by

the City and the Slaughter parties; $27,158 for fees incurred

before September 11, 2014; and $15,000 for the fee motion. (As

noted above, on September 11, 2014, the City said that unless

directed otherwise, it would release the OIR report while

redacting those portions of the report containing confidential

personnel records. See Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th

at p. 277.)

14 The Times does not appeal the trial court’s

determination that attorney fees are not available against the

City under section 1021.5.

15 As noted above, the Times has never argued that

attorney fees were available against the officers or the PPOA

under the PRA.

17

DISCUSSION

I. Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5—the private

attorney general statute—authorizes an award of fees when

(1) the action resulted in the enforcement of an important right

affecting the public interest, (2) a significant benefit was

conferred on the general public, and (3) the necessity and

financial burden of private enforcement make the award

appropriate. (Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2011)

52 Cal.4th 1018, 1026 (Serrano).) “[F]ees granted under the

private attorney general theory are not intended to punish those

who violate the law but rather to ensure that those who have

acted to protect public interest will not be forced to shoulder the

cost of litigation.” (San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, Inc.

v. County of San Bernardino (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 738, 756.)

Thus, the statute “ ‘acts as an incentive for the pursuit of public

interest-related litigation that might otherwise have been too

costly to bring.’ ” (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San

Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 611–612.) Fees must be

awarded under section 1021.5 when the statutory criteria have

been met “unless special circumstances render such an award

unjust.” (Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th

382, 391.)

Our review of an order granting a section 1021.5 award of

attorney fees is limited to whether the trial court abused its

discretion. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132

(Ketchum).) Under that standard, we will overturn an order, only

if we find “that, under all the evidence viewed most favorably in

support of the trial court’s decision, no judge could reasonably

18

have made the challenged order.” (County of Kern v. Ginn (1983)

146 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1115.) “The ‘ “experienced trial judge is the

best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his

court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it

will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that

it is clearly wrong.” ’ ” (Ketchum, at p. 1132.) Here, the trial

court found that the Times satisfied all the statutory

requirements of section 1021.5 but determined that Joshua S.

precluded a fee award under the statute. Thus, the Times

contends, de novo review is appropriate here. (See Serrano,

supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1026.) We need not resolve which

standard of review is proper, however. The trial court erred

under either standard.

B. MERITS

1. Threshold issues

At the outset, the PPOA argues that the Times cannot seek

fees against the union under section 1021.5 because the PRA’s

fee-shifting provision (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d)) is the solely

applicable statute. However, the PPOA brought its reverse-PRA

action pursuant to Marken, not the PRA. Indeed, the Marken

court’s rationale for recognizing reverse-PRA lawsuits is that

they are not permitted under and do not arise from the PRA.16



16 As the Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th 1250 court

recognized, although the PRA “provides a specific statutory

procedure for the resolution of disputes between the party

seeking disclosure and the public agency, no comparable

procedure exists for an interested third party to obtain a judicial

ruling precluding a public agency from improperly disclosing

confidential documents.” (Id. at p. 1267.) Therefore, third

parties must bring an independent action for declaratory relief or

19

(Marken, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.) Consequently, as

the trial court correctly concluded, the PRA does not authorize,

and thus cannot limit, fee-shifting against third parties who

pursue reverse-PRA suits under Marken.

The trial court also correctly determined that the Times

was not collaterally estopped from recovering section 1021.5 fees

based on a 2011 ruling in a different case involving a different

police union—Los Angeles Times Communications LLC v. Los

Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Super. Ct. L.A. County,

2011, No. BS123076 (Los Angeles Times v. Sheriff’s Department).

Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and

decided in prior proceedings. (Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion

Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604.) We apply the doctrine

only if several threshold requirements are met. First, the issue

sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that

decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have

been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must

have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth,

the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the

merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought

must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to a former

proceeding. (People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 691.)

In Los Angeles Times v. Sheriff’s Department, the Times

successfully sued the sheriff’s department to compel the

disclosure of public records. The Times then moved for an award

of attorney fees under the PRA and section 1021.5 against both

the sheriff’s department and a law enforcement union that had



traditional mandamus if they believe they will be adversely

affected by disclosure. (Ibid.)

20

intervened in the case. With respect to fees under the PRA, the

trial court granted the Times’ fee request against the sheriff’s

department but denied the Times’ fee request against the union

because Government Code section 6259, subdivision (d),

expressly mandates that the public agency—and only the public

agency—pay the attorney fees of a prevailing plaintiff under the

PRA.

With respect to fees under section 1021.5, the trial court

denied the Times’ fee request against both the sheriff’s

department and the union because “[Government Code] section

6259[, subdivision] (d) provides the exclusive method by which a

prevailing plaintiff or defendant can obtain an award of costs

following a CPRA lawsuit.” The trial court recognized that the

union was the cause of much of the fee award, however, and

noted that “in another context [the union] would have to bear

that cost.”

Filing a reverse-PRA suit, which is not permitted under

and does not arise from the PRA, (Marken, supra, 202

Cal.App.4th at p. 1267), is such a context. The trial court’s

determination that attorney fees against a third party were

unavailable under Government Code section 6259,

subdivision (d), following a PRA lawsuit was entirely consistent

with a conclusion that such fees are available against a third

party under section 1021.5 following a reverse-PRA action.17



17 Amici California News Publishers Association argues

that requesters also should be permitted to recover fees from

public agencies under section 1021.5 following a reverse-PRA

action. Because the Times has not appealed the trial court’s

determination that fees were unavailable against the City under

section 1021.5, we do not address the issue here.

21

Thus, Los Angeles Times v. Sheriff’s Department does not aid the

PPOA here, as the trial court in this case correctly held.

2. Application of Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th 945

The trial court also found that the Times had satisfied all

the statutory requirements of section 1021.5, which ordinarily

mandates a fee award, but determined that Joshua S. precluded

an award against the PPOA. Joshua S. is not applicable here,

however.

Joshua S, supra, 42 Cal.4th 945. arose from an adoption

dispute between a lesbian couple identified in the opinion only by

their first names, Sharon and Annette. Sharon gave birth to two

children through artificial insemination. When both children

were born, Sharon and Annette were in a committed relationship.

While retaining her parental rights, Sharon consented to

Annette’s adoption of the children. When Sharon and Annette

later separated, Annette filed a motion for an order of adoption.

Sharon moved for court approval to withdraw her consent to

adopt. Sharon argued that the form of second parent adoption

sought by Annette was unlawful. The California Supreme Court

held that this form of second parent adoption was lawful.

Annette subsequently moved for attorney fees pursuant to

section 1021.5. Annette argued that she was entitled to the fees

because she “had prevailed in the Supreme Court on the second

parent adoption issue, an issue of benefit to a large class of

persons.” (Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 950.) The trial

court awarded attorney fees to Annette, but the Court of Appeal

reversed.

Our Supreme Court noted “that the litigation here did yield

a substantial and widespread public benefit.” (Joshua S., supra,

42 Cal.4th at p. 952.) But the court concluded that “even when

22

an important right has been vindicated and a substantial public

benefit conferred, and when a plaintiff’s litigation has

transcended her personal interest . . . section 1021.5 was not

intended to impose fees on an individual seeking a judgment that

determines only his or her private rights, but who has done

nothing to adversely affect the public interest other than being on

the losing side of an important appellate case.” (Id. at p. 958.)

The court found that Sharon “fits squarely into this category.”

(Ibid.) The court explained that Sharon was “a private litigant

with no institutional interest in the litigation, and the judgment

she sought in the present case would have settled only her

private rights and those of her children and Annette. She simply

raised an issue in the course of that litigation that gave rise to

important appellate precedent decided adversely to her.” (Id. at

p. 957, fn. omitted.) “[S]ection 1021.5 attorney fees should not be

imposed on parties such as [Sharon], an individual who has only

engaged in litigation to adjudicate private rights from which

important appellate precedent happens to emerge, but has

otherwise done nothing to compromise the rights of the public or

a significant class of people.” (Id. at p. 954.)

In Serrano, supra, 52 Cal.4th 1018, the California Supreme

Court explained the narrow scope of Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th

945. (Serrano, at p. 1026.) The relevant Serrano facts are these:

a court reporting service, Coast Court Reporters (Coast), charged

the plaintiffs in a personal injury action an unreasonable fee for

expediting a copy of a deposition noticed by the defendant. The

plaintiffs asked the trial court to require Coast to provide the

copy without the fee, but despite finding the fee unconscionable,

the trial court believed it had no authority to determine how

much a deposition reporter may charge. (Id. at pp. 1020–1021.)

23

The plaintiffs appealed and prevailed in a published Court of

Appeal decision that established the trial court’s jurisdiction to

regulate such fees.18 The plaintiffs then sought fees under

section 1021.5 for litigating their claim against the court

reporting agency through the Court of Appeal. Based in part on

Joshua S., however, both the trial court and the Court of Appeal

denied an award, finding that the case was merely a “ ‘private

business disagreement’ ” that “ ‘did not arise from an attempt to

curtail any conduct on the part of Coast that was infringing a

statutory or public right.’ ” (Serrano, supra, 52 Cal.4th at

p. 1027.)

The Supreme Court granted review and reversed. The

court explained that Joshua S. had only “carved out a limited

exception” to section 1021.5. (Serrano, supra, 52 Cal.4th at

p. 1026.) Based on its independent review of the facts, the court

held that the Joshua S. exception did not apply. “While the

proceedings in the trial court regarding transcript charges might

be deemed a minor dispute limited to the circumstances of this

litigation, on appeal Coast strenuously defended its institutional

interest in controlling the fees charged to a nonnoticing party

without judicial oversight.” (Serrano, at p. 1027.) “Accordingly,

this is not a case in which a ‘private litigant with no institutional

interest in the litigation’ pursued ‘only [its] private rights.’ ”

(Ibid., quoting Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 957.) “Rather,

we are presented with the usual circumstance where private

attorney general fees are sought from a party ‘at least partly

responsible for the policy or practice that gave rise to the



18 See Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008)

162 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1037.

24

litigation.”’ (Id. at pp. 1027–1028, quoting Connerly v. State

Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1181.)

In the instant case, the trial court did not discuss Serrano

in its opinion. However, Serrano persuades us that Joshua S.’s

narrow exception does not apply in this case. In seeking to obtain

the OIR report from the City, which required opposing the

PPOA’s attempt to block the report’s release, the Times’ action

directly affected public rather than private rights. Indeed, we

explicitly recognized the nature of the suit in our prior opinion

when we noted that: “The public’s interest in disclosure is

‘particularly great’ where, as here, the underlying case involves

an officer involved shootings and policies regarding public safety

and law enforcement.” (Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th

at p. 298.) Any redaction of such material, we held, would

subvert the public’s right to be kept fully informed of the

activities of its peace officers in order to maintain trust in its

police department. (Ibid.)

Instead of examining the Times’ purpose in bringing the

lawsuit, which plainly served the public interest, the trial court

credited the motivations of the individual officers in opposing

disclosure. Officers Newlin and Griffith were private litigants

who sought to protect their privacy rights under the Pitchess

statutes, the trial court noted, and did nothing to adversely affect

the rights of the public. However, the power exercised by police

officers, and their public visibility, naturally subjects them to

public scrutiny and can render them public officials. (See Kahn

v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1611.)

Moreover, the subjective intent of the party seeking to

prevent disclosure is immaterial. Although such a party must

have “done something to compromise the rights of the public”

25

before having to pay attorney fees under section 1021.5, our

Supreme Court refused to impose a “bad faith” requirement.

(Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 958.) The court held only,

“consistent with the language and evident intent of the statute,

that the party against whom such fees are awarded must have

done or failed to do something, in good faith or not, that

compromised public rights.” (Ibid.) Regardless of the officers’

personal motivation in filing a reverse-PRA suit, in so doing, the

officers and the PPOA plainly attempted to restrict the public’s

right of access to police records.

The officers and the PPOA claimed that the OIR report was

a confidential personnel record entirely exempt from disclosure

under the Pitchess statutes as well as the PRA’s privilege

exemption. In fact, they sought to expand the statutes’ reach,

inviting us to find that in addition to records generated in

connection with employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline,

the Pitchess statutes should be read to encompass records—like

the entire OIR report—which contained information that

theoretically “ ‘could be used’ ” for such purposes. (Pasadena

Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 292.) As we already informed

the parties in this case: “We may not and would not do so.”

(Ibid.)

The expansion sought by the officers and PPOA further

justifies the imposition of attorney fees. In Serrano, supra, 52

Cal.4th 1018, for example, Coast strenuously defended its

institutional interest in controlling the fees charged to a nonnoticing

party. (Id. at p. 1027.) Because the company had an

institutional interest in the litigation, rather than a purely

private interest, Joshua S. did not apply and a fee award could be

imposed under section 1021.5. (Serrano, at pp. 1027, 1030.)

26

Here, as in Serrano, a litigant defended against a suit that

sought to expand the government’s power to curtail important

public rights. (See Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 957.)

Therefore, attorney fees are not precluded by the narrow

exception set out in Joshua S. (See ibid.; see also County of San

Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 848, 866–

869 [section 1021.5 fees awarded to protesters when suit by

county and private parties to pay for damage would have chilled

right to protest].)

Furthermore, the PPOA said it represented the interests of

all its members, not just Officers Newlin and Griffith, in seeking

to prevent the release of the OIR report. Indeed, the PPOA

expressly stated its goal was to ensure that the confidential

personnel information of peace officers remained confidential in

the face of PRA requests and that its work in this case affected

the confidential information of all peace officers. Thus, despite

the trial court’s determination to the contrary, the PPOA did not

simply represent the two officers as private litigants—the union

also acted on its own behalf. Indeed, a public employee union

with a prominent role in governmental activity “has assumed the

role of a public institution.” (Daniels v. Sanitarium Assn., Inc.

(1963) 59 Cal.2d 602, 608.) Although section 1021.5 was not

intended to impose fees on an individual seeking a judgment that

determined only his or her private rights (see Joshua S., supra,

42 Cal.4th at p. 958), here, a public organization sought a

judgment that determined the rights of all its members.

27

Consequently, Joshua S.’s narrow limitation on the imposition of

section 1021.5 fees is inapplicable here.19

Although the PPOA contends it merely sought to enforce

the officers’ private rights, even Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th 945

noted that fees can be imposed “[w]hen a party initiates litigation

that is determined to be detrimental to the public interest.” (Id.

at p. 957.) “Moreover, attorney fees have been awarded to those

defending against suits by public entities, or those purporting to

represent the public, that seek to expand the government’s power

to curtail important public rights.” (Ibid.) In other words, even

litigation that enforces important statutory rights—such as

lawsuits involving the Pitchess statutes—can lead to fee-shifting

against the unsuccessful plaintiff if the suit is determined to be

adverse to the public interest. (See Joshua S., at p. 957.)

In short, this case involves public officials and a public

employee union pursuing litigation designed to expand the ability

of police officers and a police department to withhold information

from the public. The position taken by the officers and the PPOA

is easily distinguishable from the private litigant in Joshua S.,

supra, 42 Cal.4th 945, who had no institutional interest in the

litigation and who sought a judgment that would have settled

only her private rights as well as those of her children and former

domestic partner. (Id. at p. 957; see Serrano, supra, 52 Cal.4th at

p. 1027 [Joshua S. did not apply when unsuccessful party

“strenuously defended its institutional interest” throughout

litigation].)



19 Therefore, we need not address the Times’ alternative

argument that California Constitution article I, section 3(b)

independently justifies reversal of the trial court’s decision.

28

The cases cited by the PPOA are similarly inapposite. In

Azure Ltd. v. I-Flow Corp. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 60, one

business sued another for breach of fiduciary duty. (Id. at

pp. 63–64.) The lawsuit resulted in a California Supreme Court

decision bearing on the rights of all property owners whose

property has been wrongfully transferred to the state by another

private party. (Id. at p. 63.) Nevertheless, the Fourth District

found, the underlying litigation still involved a private dispute

and “merely advancing the state of the law does not transform a

private dispute over substantial economic losses into a section

1021.5 case in which fees may be awarded to attorneys for

serving the public interest as private attorneys general.” (Ibid.)

However, in denying fees, the Fourth District noted that the

unsuccessful party had “no institutional interest in the litigation”

and was not a “quasi-public agent in any sense” but instead

“merely sought to avoid paying significant damages . . . in this

particular case.” (Id. at pp. 68–69.) In other words, this was a

standard dispute among two private parties who “fought over

who would be left holding the bag for losses that had already

occurred.” (Id. at p. 68.) Consequently, the case has no bearing

on a suit involving public officials who sought to suppress an

important public record, thus adversely affecting the public

interest. (See id. at p. 69.)20



20 Save Our Heritage Organisation v. City of San Diego

(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 154, is also inapt. There, the Fourth

District declined to impose fees on a private, nonprofit

organization that unsuccessfully challenged the City’s approval of

a development project. (Id. at pp. 157–158.) However, the court

limited its holding to the circumstances of the case and refused to

hold that “a court may never award 1021.5 attorney fees to a

project proponent because such an award would defeat section

29

Because we are convinced Joshua S. is not applicable here,

we hold the trial court’s determination to the contrary was an

abuse of discretion and that the Times is thus entitled to a fee

award under section 1021.5. We therefore reverse the trial

court’s order denying the Times fees under section 1021.5 and

remand the matter to the trial court with directions to award the

Times reasonable fees against the officers and/or the PPOA for its

work during all stages of this case, including the present appeal.

II. Government Code section 6259, subdivision (d)

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“California courts have long held that trial courts have

broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable

attorney’s fee award. This determination is necessarily ad hoc

and must be resolved on the particular circumstances of each

case.” (Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67

Cal.App.4th 437, 452.) In exercising its discretion, the trial court

may accordingly “consider all of the facts and the entire

procedural history of the case in setting the amount of a

reasonable attorney’s fee award.” (Ibid.) A fee award “‘will not

be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion, a

prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by

substantial evidence.’ ” (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown

Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 894.)

The abuse of discretion standard includes a substantial

evidence component: “We defer to the trial court’s factual

findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence,

and determine whether, under those facts, the court abused its



1021.5’s purpose of encouraging public interest litigation.” (Id. at

p. 160.)

30

discretion. If there is no evidence to support the court’s findings,

then an abuse of discretion has occurred.” (Tire Distributors, Inc.

v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538, 544 (Tire Distributors).)

A court’s ruling on the issue whether a plaintiff is a

prevailing party under Government Code section 6259,

subdivision (d)—the PRA—is a factual determination reviewed

under the substantial evidence standard. (Galbiso v. Orosi

Public Utility Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1085 (Galbiso);

see Motorola Communication & Electronics, Inc. v. Department of

General Services (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1351.) Numerous

courts have applied this review standard to the issue whether a

plaintiff’s lawsuit caused the production of public records. (See,

e.g., Motorola Communication, at p. 1351; see also Los Angeles

Times v. Alameda Corridor Transp. Authority (2001) 88

Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391 (Los Angeles Times v. Alameda

Corridor).) Courts have recognized that this causation question

is an intensely factual and pragmatic one, frequently requiring

courts to go outside the merits of the precise underlying dispute

and focus on the condition that the fee claimant sought to change.

(Crawford v. Board of Education (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1397,

1407.) An appellate court must defer to the trial court’s

determinations on the causation issue, unless there is no

evidence to support the trial court’s factual conclusion. (See Tire

Distributors, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 544.)

B. MERITS

1. Prevailing party determination

The trial court held that the Times could recover fees

against the City under the PRA for the work the Times

performed in affirmatively enforcing its PRA requests. However,

because the Times spent the bulk of its time defending against

31

the PPOA’s reverse-PRA suit, rather than affirmatively enforcing

its PRA requests against the City, the trial court found that the

Times was entitled to only a fraction of the fees it sought.

The PRA generally provides for inspection of public records

maintained by state and local agencies. (Pacific Merchant

Shipping Assn. v. Board of Pilot Commissioners (2015) 242

Cal.App.4th 1043, 1046.) Such “access to information concerning

the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and

necessary right of every person in this state.” (Gov. Code, § 6250;

Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 425–426

(Filarsky).) The PRA contains procedures to challenge a public

agency’s response to a records request, and provides that: “Any

person may institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative

relief or writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction to

enforce his or her right to inspect or to receive a copy of any

public record” under the PRA. (Gov. Code, § 6258.)

A plaintiff prevailing in litigation under the PRA is entitled

to reasonable attorney fees. (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d).) This

fee award “is mandatory if the plaintiff prevails.” (Filarsky,

supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 427.) The PRA’s fee award provision is

designed to encourage members of the public to seek judicial

enforcement of their right to inspect public records subject to

disclosure. (See Galbiso, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.)

Litigation under the PRA is one of the rare instances where a

losing party may still be deemed a prevailing party entitled to an

attorney fee award. This is because the plaintiff has prevailed

within the meaning of the PRA when he or she files an action

that “results in defendant releasing a copy of a previously

withheld document.” (Belth v. Garamendi (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d

896, 898 (Belth).)

32

Thus, a plaintiff need not achieve a favorable final

judgment to be a prevailing party in PRA litigation. A

defendant’s voluntary action in providing public records that is

induced by plaintiff’s lawsuit will still support an attorney fee

award on the rationale that the lawsuit “‘spurred defendant to

act or was a catalyst speeding defendant’s response.’ ” (Belth,

supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 901.) Additionally, if a plaintiff

succeeds in obtaining only partial relief, the plaintiff is entitled to

attorney fees unless the plaintiff obtains results “that are so

minimal or insignificant as to justify a finding that the plaintiff

did not [in fact] prevail.” (Los Angeles Times v. Alameda

Corridor, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1391–1392.)

Here, the trial court held that the Times was the prevailing

party against the City only for the narrow matter of fees incurred

during appellate mandamus review and subsequent trial court

hearings regarding additional unredactions, and could recover

reasonable attorney fees only as to this particular time period.21

In finding that the Times prevailed against the City for this

limited period only, the trial court determined that the City “took

the correct position at trial.” According to the trial court, the City

adopted the appropriate legal standard regarding disclosure of



21 The trial court then directed the Times and the City to

meet and confer and file supplemental briefs to determine the

amount of that award. The Times’ supplemental brief expressly

stated the Times was submitting its request solely in compliance

with the court’s order and reserved its right to appeal the order.

The Times’ notice of appeal also stated it was appealing the

April 14th order, the May 17th order and “all other appealable

rulings entered or embodies within those Orders.” Thus, any

claim that the Times has waived its right to appeal any portion of

the trial court’s orders is incorrect.

33

the OIR report and maintained its position on mandamus review,

except it opposed additional unredactions for procedural reasons

when the issue was raised by the Court of Appeal.

According to the Times, courts have consistently held that a

requester who obtains a previously-withheld record has prevailed

under the PRA—and is thus entitled to a fee award—even if the

court determined that other records, or portions of records, were

properly withheld. For example, in Los Angeles Times v.

Alameda Corridor, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th 1381, the trial court

held that the Times was not the prevailing party, principally

because it did not obtain all the documents it sought. The Court

of Appeal reversed, noting that cases denying attorney fees to a

plaintiff under the PRA have done so because substantial

evidence supported a finding that the litigation did not cause the

defendant to disclose any of the documents ultimately made

available. (Id. at p. 1391.) “In short, if a public record is

disclosed only because a plaintiff filed a suit to obtain it, the

plaintiff has prevailed.” (Ibid.)

Notably, the Court of Appeal observed, “[n]othing in any

case decided under the [PRA] supports the contention that a

plaintiff who obtains only one of two documents sought has not

prevailed within the meaning of the act. Other cases, without

discussion, have awarded fees where disclosure is ordered for

fewer than all of the documents sought.” (Los Angeles Times v.

Alameda Corridor, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.) The Court

of Appeal also flatly rejected the defendant’s argument that it

should look to other statutes for the definition of “prevailing

party,” such as the costs statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032) and

case law interpreting the Federal Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA). (Id. at p. 1391, fn. 9.) Under FOIA, the court has

34

discretion to withhold fees. Even a plaintiff who has

“ ‘substantially prevailed’ ” and is thus eligible for fees will

receive an award only after the court balances a number of

factors, including among others the reasonableness of the

agency’s withholding and the benefit to the public. (Ibid.) “That

is not the standard under the [PRA],” the Court of Appeal

observed. (Id. at p. 1392, italics added.)

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the possibility that in

some cases a plaintiff might obtain documents that are so

minimal or insignificant as to justify a finding that it did not

prevail. Absent such circumstances, however, fees and costs

should be awarded. To do otherwise would be inconsistent with

the express purpose of the statute, “to broaden public access to

public records,” and “would chill efforts to enforce the public right

to information.” (Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor, supra,

88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1392.)

In Los Angeles Times v. Alameda Corridor, supra, 88

Cal.App.4th 1383, however, it was undisputed that the soughtafter

document was disclosed only because the Times sued to

obtain it. (See id. at p. 1391.) Here, however, the Times did not

seek to compel release of the OIR report without the City’s

proposed redactions until September 16, 2014—approximately

two weeks after the Slaughter parties first requested the report

under the PRA. (See Pasadena Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at

p. 277.) While the Times’ intervention undoubtedly led to the

subsequent disclosure of additional information contained within

the report, we cannot say that the report itself was disclosed only

because the Times sued to obtain it. Arguably, it was the

Slaughter parties who initially spurred the City to act or who

35

served as a catalyst speeding the City’s response. (See Belth,

supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 901.)

Nevertheless, as the Times notes, the trial court’s

conclusion that the City took the “correct position at trial” is in

fact contrary to our prior opinion. As we explained, “a number of

redactions proposed by the City and largely adopted by the trial

court protected not privileged information relating to the officers,

but information or findings critiquing conduct by or the policies

and practice of the PPD itself.” (Pasadena Police, supra, 240

Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) Redacting this material, we found, would

have subverted the public’s right to be kept fully informed of

police activities, which is necessary to maintain trust in a police

department. (See ibid.) The inappropriately redacted material

“include[d] analyses of the PPD’s administrative investigation

and departmental policies, descriptions of the PPD’s

responsiveness” (or lack thereof), and the OIR’s

recommendations, “none of which [was] privileged under the

PRA.” (Id. at p. 274.)

“However, a PRA plaintiff does not qualify as a prevailing

party merely because the defendant disclosed records sometime

after the PRA action was filed.” (Sukumar v. City of San Diego

(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 451, 464 (Sukumar).) “There must be more

than a mere temporal connection between the filing of litigation

to compel production of records under the PRA and the

production of those records. The litigation must have been the

motivating factor for the production of documents. [Citations.]

The key is whether there is a substantial causal relationship

between the lawsuit and the delivery of the information.” (Ibid.)

Although the Times cites Sukumar in support of its

argument here, the case is distinguishable. In Sukumar, supra,

36

14 Cal.App.5th 451, a single requester sought records from the

city. After receiving several batches of records, Sukumar

continued to ask the city if additional material would be

forthcoming. Although the city repeatedly assured Sukumar that

it had fully responded to his records request, it subsequently

produced an additional five photographs and 146 pages of emails

as a result of court-ordered depositions in the case. (See id. at

pp. 454–461.) The Fourth District reversed the trial court’s

finding that Sukumar was not a prevailing party under

Government Code section 6259, subdivision (d), holding that the

litigation led to the release of additional responsive and material

documents. (Id. at pp. 464–465.) “[B]ut for Sukumar’s persistent

demand for discovery and the court-ordered depositions that

resulted from those efforts, the City would not have produced any

of the above-mentioned responsive documents.” (Id. at p. 465.)

The Fourth District remanded the case so the trial court could

determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees. (Id. at p. 468.)

Thus, we have no published record as to whether Sukumar

received the full amount of fees he sought. More importantly,

Sukumar was the only requester in that case. Consequently,

when determining causation, there was no need to establish

which action by Sukumar prompted the city’s compliance—it was

enough that the litigation itself resulted in the release of records

that would not otherwise have been released. (Id. at p. 464.)

Here, there is clearly a “substantial causal relationship”

between the Times’ intervention and the City’s release of an

additional 126 lines of the OIR report—about five of the 14

previously redacted pages. (Sukumar, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at

p. 464.) But there is no such relationship between the Times’

intervention and the City’s initial decision to release (an overly

37

redacted version) of the report. Nor can there be, given the

chronology of this case.

The Times is correct that the “unredaction issue” is simply

another way of characterizing the single overarching question in

the entire litigation—namely, what portions of the OIR report, if

any, were exempt from disclosure under the PRA given the scope

of the Pitchess statutes? The Times focused on this issue

throughout the litigation, both in enforcing its own PRA petition

against the City and in opposing the PPOA’s reverse-PRA action.

We agree that the Times’ advocacy helped shape our prior

opinion. But the overlapping nature of the Times’ substantive

legal arguments against both the City and the PPOA does not aid

its argument here. The PRA only allows for recovery from the

City.22 Thus, the trial court was tasked with determining what

portion of the Times’ work was spent battling that entity alone.

The trial court found that the Times was the prevailing party

against the City only for the narrow matter of fees incurred

during appellate mandamus review and the subsequent hearings

over additional unredactions. If there is no evidence to support a



22 The Times’ reliance on Thompson Pacific Const., Inc. v.

City of Sunnyvale (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525 is misplaced.

There, the Sixth District held that allocation of fees is not

required when the issues are “ ‘so interrelated that it would have

been impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney

fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not.’ ”

(Id. at p. 555.) But Thompson involved multiple issues, not

multiple defendants. Although the plaintiff’s legal work could

not be so easily parsed in Thompson, the same cannot be said

here. (See Sweeney v. McClaran (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 824, 830

[fees for work related to interpleader claim clearly separable

temporally from fees incurred before claim was added].)

38

trial court’s findings, then an abuse of discretion has occurred.

(Tire Distributors, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 544.) We cannot

say an abuse of discretion occurred here.

2. Award reduction

Pursuant to the trial court’s order, the Times identified the

fees it had incurred during appellate mandamus review as well

as the subsequent trial court hearings on additional

unredactions—less any fees incurred for duplicative work by

counsel for the Times and the Slaughter parties. The Times

submitted records indicating that its counsel billed $50,163 for

time spent addressing the unredaction issue in the Court of

Appeal and billed $10,781 for the post-remand unredaction

issues. The Times also sought an additional $5,760 in fees for the

court-ordered meet and confer and supplemental briefing.

The trial court noted that “the Slaughter [parties] raised

the unredaction issue and both the L.A. Times and Slaughter

[parties] filed separate letter briefs, and separately appeared at

oral arguments, overlapping on multiple arguments.” Indeed, the

Times conceded that at least two arguments were duplicative.

Thus, the trial court held, a 50 percent reduction for duplicative

attorney efforts was appropriate.

23

The Times contends that the trial court erred in reducing

its fee award based on “an artificial distinction” between

arguments by the Times in opposing PPOA’s reverse-PRA action

and arguments made to affirmatively enforce the PRA requests it

had lodged with the City. As discussed above, we do not believe

the trial court erred in this respect. The Times could not rely on



23 The trial court also declined to award the Times

additional fees for its supplemental briefing during the meet and

confer process.

39

the City to oppose the PPOA’s efforts to bar access to the OIR

report. As a result, the Times unavoidably incurred fees against

both entities. But while this circumstance justifies a fee award

under section 1021.5 and the PRA, it has nothing to do with the

duplicative efforts by the Times and the Slaughter parties.

Admittedly, the Times could not more precisely tailor its

arguments during the proceedings, which might have prevented

potentially duplicative efforts, given that the Times did not have

access to the withheld portions of the OIR report. (See Pasadena

Police, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 296.) However, based on the

broad discretion afforded trial courts under these circumstances,

(see, e.g., Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144

Cal.App.4th 140, 161), we cannot say that the trial court abused

its discretion in its fee allocation.

The order is affirmed in part and reversed in part with

directions. We affirm the trial court’s order awarding limited

fees under the PRA (Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d)). We reverse

the trial court’s order awarding no fees under the private

attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5). The trial

court is directed to award the Los Angeles Times

Communications, LLC, reasonable fees under Code of Civil

Procedure section 1021.5 against the officers Griffin and Newlen

and/or the Pasadena Police Officers Association. The parties are

to bear their own costs on appeal.