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Darin v. Cais
Date: 11-16-2015
Case Number: AC37426
Judge: Bethany J. Alvord
Court: Connecticut Appellate Court
Plaintiff's Attorney: William P. Monigan
Defendant's Attorney: John S. Bennet
Description:
The defendant, Milan Cais, appeals from asummaryjudgmentrenderedbythetrialcourtinfavor of the plaintiff, Keith J. Darin, the building official for thetownofEastHaddam(town).Thetrialcourtgranted a permanent injunction ordering, inter alia, that Cais remedy violations of § 115 of the State Building Code with respect to certain of his real property. On appeal, Cais claims: (1) ‘‘The court abused its discretion in failing to apprise [him] of his obligations under a summary judgment motion’’ and (2) ‘‘The court abused its discretion by denying [him as] a pro se defendant due process protections.’’1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. Cais is the owner of real property locatedat27PowerhouseRoadinthevillageofMoodus in the town of East Haddam. Cais and the town have beenindisputeovertheconditionofthispropertysince atleast1984.Thetownhasbroughtzoningenforcement actions against Cais, and Cais has sued the town in federal court. In 2008, a fire destroyed the main structure on the property, a brick industrial building that was formerly usedasapowerhouse.Afterthefire,thetownbulldozed the charred remains of the building. Cais claims that the town removed perimeter fencing without his permission; the town argues that there was no fencing, just piles of debris. By 2012, the property was marked by an open subsurface foundation and a debris field of bricks, scrap metal, and other materials. On April 4, 2012, the town issued Cais a ‘‘Notice of Unsafe Structure,’’ pursuant to § 115 of the State Building Code.2 On August 20, 2013, the town filed a complaint against Cais in Superior Court alleging that Cais hadnotcompliedwiththedirectivesinthetown’sinitial notice,hispropertycontinuedtobeinviolationof§ 115 of the State Building Code, and he had not appealed the notice. The town requested that the court grant a permanent injunction, ordering Cais to bring his property into compliance with the State Building Code, and issue an order allowing the town to take corrective action on the property if Cais failed to comply with the injunction. Cais responded by filing a counterclaim. He sought reimbursement for damage allegedly caused by the town when it bulldozed his property in 2008. He also requested that the court order the town to install fencing around his property at the town’s expense. The court granted the town’s motion to strike the counterclaim,findingthatCais’counterclaimdidnotarisefrom the same transaction or occurrence as the town’s complaint. Cais did not replead his counterclaim nor did he fileamotionforjudgmentonthestrickencounterclaim. On September 10, 2014, the town filed a motion for
summary judgment on its complaint. On October 22, 2014, a hearing was scheduled on the town’s motion for summary judgment, but Cais did not appear. The court continued the case for two weeks, expressing concern that Cais may not have been aware of the motion.3 OnNovember3,2014,therescheduledhearing commenced with Cais appearing as a self-represented party. The court informed Cais that if he wanted to oppose the motion for summary judgment, he needed tofileanobjectionandanaffidavit:‘‘Inotethatnothing has been filed, although this motion was filed back on September 10,you have notfiled anything. Icould have acted on this motion in your absence last—two weeks ago, I chose not to because I know that this is a matter of some importance to you. You’ve been before me in the past, and I recognize your commitment to this property and the property that you own. However, today,you’rehere,they’vefiledtheirmotions,I’veheard their argument. You have not filed any written objection. However, you’re here, I will hear you.’’ Cais raised several issues: Darin was no longer employed by the town,thetownremovedhisfence,andheneededmore time to clean up the property. Cais, however, never challenged the basic premise of the town’s complaint: that the condition of the property violated § 115 of the State Building Code. The court granted the town’s motion for summary judgment and ordered Cais to demolish any standing walls and to fill in the open foundation. The court further stated that if Cais failed to comply, the town was authorized to enter the property and to complete the work. This appeal followed. I Cais’ first claim on appeal is that the ‘‘court abused itsdiscretioninfailingtoapprise[him]ofhisobligations under a summary judgment motion.’’ We disagree. The court afforded Cais ample opportunity to challenge the motion for summary judgment, but Cais did not avail himself of that opportunity. We conclude that the court was not obligated to do anything more than it did to assist Cais in the summary judgment proceeding. This court’s review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary. New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sielski,159Conn.App.650,654–55, A.3d (2015). ‘‘Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgmentshallberenderedforthwithifthepleadings,affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Apartymovingforsummaryjudgmentisheldtoastrict standard. . . . To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant,the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent. . . . When
documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bombero v. Bombero, 160 Conn. App. 118, 128–29, A.3d (2015). This standard also applies to selfrepresentedparties:‘‘[I]tistheestablishedpolicyofthe Connecticutcourtstobesolicitousof[self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights ofotherpartiestoconstruetherulesofpracticeliberally in favor of the [self-represented] party . . . we are also aware that [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigantssomelatitude,therightofself-representationprovides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rulesofproceduralandsubstantivelaw.’’(Internalquotationmarksomitted.)Tonghiniv.Tonghini,152Conn. App. 231, 240, 98 A.3d 93 (2014). In the present case, Cais failed to raise a genuine issueofmaterialfact.ThetownclaimedthatCais’propertywasinviolationof§ 115oftheStateBuildingCode. Cais agreed that his property was in poor condition. His litigation strategy focused on assigning blame to the town: ‘‘Now, there is the ruins of the house, which the town is responsible for because they did it; they bulldozed the property and they spread the bricks, it wasahuge,brickhouse,theyspreadthebricksaround.’’ Ultimately,henevercontestedthattherewasaviolation of the State Building Code: ‘‘I didn’t create [the] violation; the town did create the violation, so why should I be punished for the doing of the town.’’ In deciding thesummaryjudgmentmotion,thecourtdidnotspecifically find that there were no genuine issues of material fact, but the central elements of the town’s claim were uncontested. Viewing the facts presented in the light most favorable to Cais, the court had no basis before it on which to find genuine issues of material fact relating to whether Cais was the owner of the subject property and whether the property was in violation of § 115 of the State Building Code. Cais offered no evidence orevenanargumenttoraiseanygenuineissueofmaterial fact. He also did not seek permission to make a late filing of an affidavit or a written objection to the motion for summary judgment. Beforehearingargumentsonthemotionforsummary judgment, the court was solicitous of Cais’ status as a self-represented litigant. Cais had not filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment; nonetheless, the court allowed him to present his arguments orally at the rescheduled hearing on November 3, 2014. Cais usedtheopportunitytocomplain aboutthetown’spast actions; hedid notmake argumentsthat challengedthe town’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Cais argues that if the court had properly advised him, he would have presented documents showing that the town was the cause of the violation of the State Building Code.4 The court was well aware of Cais’ position and its irrelevancy to the decision on thetown’smotionforsummaryjudgment.5 Thus,during the hearing, the court offered Cais the opportunity to address the central issue of the complaint, the town’s claim that his property was in violation of the State Building Code. Cais did not challenge the merits of the town’s complaint; he conceded that his property was in violation of that building code, and even in this appeal, he does not challenge that he was the owner ofthepropertyandthattherewasacontinuingviolation of § 115 of the State Building Code. II In his second claim on appeal, Cais argues that the manner in which the summary judgment proceeding was conducted denied him his right to due process. Caishasprovidednoconstitutionalprovisions,statutes, case law, or analysis to support this position. ‘‘It is well established that we are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
summary judgment on its complaint. On October 22, 2014, a hearing was scheduled on the town’s motion for summary judgment, but Cais did not appear. The court continued the case for two weeks, expressing concern that Cais may not have been aware of the motion.3 OnNovember3,2014,therescheduledhearing commenced with Cais appearing as a self-represented party. The court informed Cais that if he wanted to oppose the motion for summary judgment, he needed tofileanobjectionandanaffidavit:‘‘Inotethatnothing has been filed, although this motion was filed back on September 10,you have notfiled anything. Icould have acted on this motion in your absence last—two weeks ago, I chose not to because I know that this is a matter of some importance to you. You’ve been before me in the past, and I recognize your commitment to this property and the property that you own. However, today,you’rehere,they’vefiledtheirmotions,I’veheard their argument. You have not filed any written objection. However, you’re here, I will hear you.’’ Cais raised several issues: Darin was no longer employed by the town,thetownremovedhisfence,andheneededmore time to clean up the property. Cais, however, never challenged the basic premise of the town’s complaint: that the condition of the property violated § 115 of the State Building Code. The court granted the town’s motion for summary judgment and ordered Cais to demolish any standing walls and to fill in the open foundation. The court further stated that if Cais failed to comply, the town was authorized to enter the property and to complete the work. This appeal followed. I Cais’ first claim on appeal is that the ‘‘court abused itsdiscretioninfailingtoapprise[him]ofhisobligations under a summary judgment motion.’’ We disagree. The court afforded Cais ample opportunity to challenge the motion for summary judgment, but Cais did not avail himself of that opportunity. We conclude that the court was not obligated to do anything more than it did to assist Cais in the summary judgment proceeding. This court’s review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary. New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sielski,159Conn.App.650,654–55, A.3d (2015). ‘‘Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgmentshallberenderedforthwithifthepleadings,affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Apartymovingforsummaryjudgmentisheldtoastrict standard. . . . To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant,the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent. . . . When
documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bombero v. Bombero, 160 Conn. App. 118, 128–29, A.3d (2015). This standard also applies to selfrepresentedparties:‘‘[I]tistheestablishedpolicyofthe Connecticutcourtstobesolicitousof[self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights ofotherpartiestoconstruetherulesofpracticeliberally in favor of the [self-represented] party . . . we are also aware that [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigantssomelatitude,therightofself-representationprovides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rulesofproceduralandsubstantivelaw.’’(Internalquotationmarksomitted.)Tonghiniv.Tonghini,152Conn. App. 231, 240, 98 A.3d 93 (2014). In the present case, Cais failed to raise a genuine issueofmaterialfact.ThetownclaimedthatCais’propertywasinviolationof§ 115oftheStateBuildingCode. Cais agreed that his property was in poor condition. His litigation strategy focused on assigning blame to the town: ‘‘Now, there is the ruins of the house, which the town is responsible for because they did it; they bulldozed the property and they spread the bricks, it wasahuge,brickhouse,theyspreadthebricksaround.’’ Ultimately,henevercontestedthattherewasaviolation of the State Building Code: ‘‘I didn’t create [the] violation; the town did create the violation, so why should I be punished for the doing of the town.’’ In deciding thesummaryjudgmentmotion,thecourtdidnotspecifically find that there were no genuine issues of material fact, but the central elements of the town’s claim were uncontested. Viewing the facts presented in the light most favorable to Cais, the court had no basis before it on which to find genuine issues of material fact relating to whether Cais was the owner of the subject property and whether the property was in violation of § 115 of the State Building Code. Cais offered no evidence orevenanargumenttoraiseanygenuineissueofmaterial fact. He also did not seek permission to make a late filing of an affidavit or a written objection to the motion for summary judgment. Beforehearingargumentsonthemotionforsummary judgment, the court was solicitous of Cais’ status as a self-represented litigant. Cais had not filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment; nonetheless, the court allowed him to present his arguments orally at the rescheduled hearing on November 3, 2014. Cais usedtheopportunitytocomplain aboutthetown’spast actions; hedid notmake argumentsthat challengedthe town’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Cais argues that if the court had properly advised him, he would have presented documents showing that the town was the cause of the violation of the State Building Code.4 The court was well aware of Cais’ position and its irrelevancy to the decision on thetown’smotionforsummaryjudgment.5 Thus,during the hearing, the court offered Cais the opportunity to address the central issue of the complaint, the town’s claim that his property was in violation of the State Building Code. Cais did not challenge the merits of the town’s complaint; he conceded that his property was in violation of that building code, and even in this appeal, he does not challenge that he was the owner ofthepropertyandthattherewasacontinuingviolation of § 115 of the State Building Code. II In his second claim on appeal, Cais argues that the manner in which the summary judgment proceeding was conducted denied him his right to due process. Caishasprovidednoconstitutionalprovisions,statutes, case law, or analysis to support this position. ‘‘It is well established that we are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Outcome:
We conclude that Cais’ due process claim has been inadequately briefed. Accordingly, we decline to review it. The judgment is affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:
About This Case
What was the outcome of Darin v. Cais?
The outcome was: We conclude that Cais’ due process claim has been inadequately briefed. Accordingly, we decline to review it. The judgment is affirmed.
Which court heard Darin v. Cais?
This case was heard in Connecticut Appellate Court, CT. The presiding judge was Bethany J. Alvord.
Who were the attorneys in Darin v. Cais?
Plaintiff's attorney: William P. Monigan. Defendant's attorney: John S. Bennet.
When was Darin v. Cais decided?
This case was decided on November 16, 2015.