Mitchel A. Davis v. Anna Herbert

Anna Hebert, the defendant in the
first case and the plaintiff in the second case (hereinafter
the plaintiff), appeals from the judgment of the
trial court rendered following the granting of the motion
by Yolanda Davis, the defendant in the second case,
and Mitchel A. Davis, the plaintiff in the first case,
(hereafter the defendants) to restore consolidated cases
to the docket and to compel settlement. She claims that
the court improperly made a finding of mutual mistake
sufficient to restore the withdrawn consolidated cases
to the docket.1 We reverse the judgment of the trial
court.

The following facts are relevant to the plaintiff's
appeal. The plaintiff owned a home in Enfield. At some
point, the plaintiff transferred the home by quitclaim
deed to her daughter, Yolanda Davis, and subsequently
moved into an apartment in Manchester then owned
by Yolanda Davis' husband, Mitchel Davis. In April,
2005, Mitchel Davis filed an eviction action against the
plaintiff for failure to pay rent. In response, the plaintiff
filed an answer to the eviction complaint and filed a
separate action against her daughter for the return of
the Enfield home to the plaintiff. Yolanda Davis filed a
response with special defenses as well as a counterclaim
to this action.

On August 10, 2005, the court granted a motion to
consolidate the two cases. Prior to the commencement
of the trial, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement, and all parties filed withdrawals of their
actions.2 The settlement agreement provided, inter alia,
that Yolanda Davis would quitclaim her interest in the
Enfield property to the plaintiff so that the plaintiff
could reestablish it as her home. It also provided that
the plaintiff would file a petition in bankruptcy so as
to avoid as much debt as possible against the Enfield
property. Furthermore, it provided that ‘‘[u]pon
obtaining a final nonappealable order avoiding all possible
judgment liens against the Enfield property, which
date is anticipated by the parties to be on or about ninety
(90) days after [the plaintiff] receives her discharge
in bankruptcy, [the plaintiff] will thereupon without
protest, objection or delay, vacate the Enfield property.
[The defendants] will also immediately thereupon take
all necessary and appropriate steps to sell the
Enfield [p]roperty.''

Approximately nine months after the settlement
agreement was entered into and the actions were withdrawn,
the defendants received a letter from the plaintiff
indicating that she was not interested in selling her
Enfield home or moving. In response, the defendants
moved the court to compel the settlement agreement.
The plaintiff objected to the motion to compel, as the
actions were withdrawn and the court no longer had
jurisdiction over the parties absent a motion to restore
the consolidated cases to the docket. In response to
the plaintiff's objection, the defendants filed a motion
to restore the cases to the docket and then filed a
supplemental motion to restore the cases to the docket
and to compel the settlement agreement. The plaintiff
filed an objection to the defendants' motions, arguing
that the motion to restore the cases to the docket was
untimely, as it was filed after the four month limitation
set forth in General Statutes § 52-212a.3 The motions
were heard and a decision rendered in which the court
found that, although the motions were filed after the
four month limitation, the parties had operated under
a mutual mistake regarding the timing of resolving the
lien issue through bankruptcy. As mutual mistake is
an exception to the four month limitation, the court
restored the consolidated cases to the docket and compelled
the settlement agreement. This appeal followed.
It is well established that ‘‘[a] judgment rendered may
be opened after the four month limitation [set forth in
General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 17-43]
if it is shown that the judgment was obtained by fraud,
in the absence of actual consent, or because of mutual
mistake.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Richards
v. Richards, 78 Conn. App. 734, 739, 829 A.2d 60, cert.
denied, 266 Conn. 922, 835 A.2d 473 (2003). This court
has concluded that withdrawals are analogous to final
judgments. See Sicaras v. Hartford, 44 Conn. App. 771,
775–79, 692 A.2d 1290, cert. denied, 241 Conn. 916, 696
A.2d 340 (1997). As such, § 52-212a and its exceptions
for fraud, lack of actual consent and mutual mistake
apply to restoring cases to the docket as well as to
opening final judgments. See id., 778.

In the present case, the defendants filed their motion
to restore the consolidated cases to the docket after
the four month limitation provided in § 52-212a. The
defendants argued that, although they filed their motion
outside of the four month limitation period, their motion
fit within the mutual mistake exception. The court
found that the parties were mutually mistaken regarding
the timing for the bankruptcy process to resolve the
lien issue in the parties' settlement agreement. On the
basis of this finding of mutual mistake, the court
restored the cases to the docket and compelled the
settlement agreement.

‘‘The question of whether a case should be restored
to the docket is one of judicial discretion.'' Id., 779. ‘‘A
court's determinations as to . . . whether there has
been a mutual mistake are findings of fact that we will
not disturb unless they are clearly erroneous.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Terry v. Terry, 102 Conn.
App. 215, 223, 925 A.2d 375, cert. denied, 284 Conn.
911, 931 A.2d 934 (2007). ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to
support it . . . or when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.'' (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Doody v. Doody, 99 Conn. App. 512, 517, 914
A.2d 1058 (2007).

‘‘A mutual mistake is one that is common to both
parties and effects a result that neither intended.''
Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency v. Landmark
Investment Group, Inc., 218 Conn. 703, 708, 590 A.2d
968 (1991). ‘‘[A] unilateral mistake will not be sufficient
to [restore the cases to the docket].'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Richards v. Richards, supra, 78 Conn.
App. 740. In the present case, the court determined that
the ‘‘parties underestimated the time it would take to
resolve the lien issue through bankruptcy to allow for
the intended sale of the property. This error with
respect to the legal consequences arose from ignorance,
surprise, imposition or misplaced confidence.'' The
court made this determination based solely on the settlement
agreement. An evidentiary hearing was never
held.4 We conclude that, given the evidence before the
court, the finding of mutual mistake was clearly
erroneous.

The question before the court, as raised by the defendants
in their motion to restore the cases to the docket,
was whether both parties were under the mistaken
belief that receiving a final, nonappealable order
avoiding all possible judgment liens would take no
longer than four months from the execution of the settlement
agreement. The court concluded that both parties
were mistaken about the time it would take to
resolve the lien issue because it was not resolved within
four months from the time the settlement agreement
was entered into but, rather, was resolved on or after
July 21, 2006. In other words, the court assumed that
both parties intended that the process would take no
longer than four months from the execution of the settlement
agreement in order to conclude that this intention
of the parties was mistaken. There was no evidence
before the court to support its conclusion that both
parties intended that the entire process would take no
longer than four months to be completed. Although the
defendants may have been operating based upon this
mistaken belief, a unilateral mistake is not sufficient to
restore the cases to the docket. See Richards v. Richards,
supra 78 Conn. App. 740. The only timetable contemplated
by both parties was how soon after the
bankruptcy process a final, nonappealable order resolving
all liens would be received by the plaintiff. The
anticipated time frame would be ninety days from the
bankruptcy discharge. This timetable did not include
filing for a discharge in bankruptcy and receiving that
discharge. Because there is no evidence in the record
tending to show that both parties intended that the
entire process would take no longer than four months
from the execution of the settlement agreement, the
court's finding that the parties were mutually mistaken
about this intention is clearly erroneous.

* * *

http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP105/105AP112.pdf

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to deny the defendants’ motion to restore
the consolidated cases to the docket and to compel settlement.

Unknown

Unknown

None