Peter Bradford Detels v. Nicoletta Detels

The plaintiff, Peter Bradford Detels,
appeals from the postjudgment order of the trial court
granting the defendant's motion for contempt. On
appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
construed the parties' separation agreement to require
that he file for bankruptcy protection to discharge the
property distribution.1 We reverse the judgment of the
trial court.

The following facts are relevant to the plaintiff's
appeal. The parties, who were married in 1987, obtained
a judgment of dissolution on April 9, 1999. Incorporated
into the judgment was a separation agreement
(agreement). Article V of the agreement, entitled ‘‘Division
of Personal Property,'' provided in paragraph 5.3:
‘‘As a lump sum property distribution, the [plaintiff]
shall pay to the [defendant] the sum of $300,000 payable at the sum of $30,000 per year for a period of ten years
commencing on or before December 31, 1999, and for
each successive year thereafter. This property distribution
is intended to be further support for the family and
shall not be dischargeable by the [plaintiff] in bankruptcy.
In the event that the [plaintiff] is physically
disabled and/or unemployable or his net worth is less
than $200,000 the [plaintiff] may discharge this obligation.''
2

On December 6, 2001, the defendant filed a motion
for contempt, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff had
violated the dissolution judgment by failing to pay the
annual property distribution as set forth in paragraph
5.3. At a hearing on the defendant's motion, the defendant
produced evidence establishing that during 2001,
the plaintiff had failed to forward any portion of the
annual property distribution. The plaintiff countered by
producing evidence that his net worth had fallen below
$200,000, thereby discharging him of his obligation to
pay the annual property distribution.

On June 14, 2002, the court issued its written memorandum
of decision granting the defendant's motion
for contempt. The court determined that even if the
plaintiff's net worth had fallen below $200,000, the plaintiff
would not be relieved from the obligation to pay.
The court, relying on Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating
Co., 260 Conn. 21, 41–42, 792 A.2d 835 (2002), rejected
the plaintiff's attempt to attribute two different meanings
to the word ‘‘discharge'' in paragraph 5.3. The court,
rather, found that the term ‘‘discharge,'' as used in paragraph
5.3, clearly related to bankruptcy proceedings and
that the plaintiff was required to make annual property
distribution payments unless the obligation was discharged
in bankruptcy. The court found that the plaintiff
wilfully had failed to comply with the terms of the
separation agreement. The court, therefore, granted the
defendant's motion for contempt and ordered the plaintiff
to convey $30,000 to the defendant. This appeal
followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly
construed the parties' separation agreement to
require that he file for bankruptcy protection to discharge
his obligation to pay the property distribution.
Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the language of
article V, paragraph 5.3, clearly showed that the parties
intended the plaintiff to be discharged from his obligation
to pay in the event that his net worth dropped below
$200,000. The plaintiff claims that the court, therefore,
improperly construed the agreement to require that he
file for bankruptcy protection to discharge the obligation.
We conclude that the word ‘‘discharge'' in the
parties' separation agreement is ambiguous and,
accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

First we set forth our standard of review. ‘‘[A] finding
of indirect civil contempt must be established by sufficient proof that is premised upon competent evidence
presented to the trial court in accordance with the rules
of procedure as in ordinary cases. . . . A finding of
contempt is a factual finding. . . . We will reverse that
finding only if we conclude the trial court abused its
discretion.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Legnos
v. Legnos, 70 Conn. App. 349, 352–53, 797 A.2d 1184,
cert. denied, 261 Conn. 911, 806 A.2d 48 (2002). ‘‘To
constitute contempt, a party's conduct must be wilful.
. . . Noncompliance alone will not support a judgment
of contempt.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gina
M. G. v. William C., 77 Conn. App. 582, 590, 823 A.2d
1274 (2003). Although a finding of wilfulness as a predicate
to a judgment of contempt is not barred, as a matter
of law, by the fact that the terms of the judgment are
ambiguous, the court may consider such ambiguity in
exercising its discretion regarding a finding of wilfulness.
Sablosky v. Sablosky, 258 Conn. 713, 723, 784
A.2d 890 (2001). We also may consider such ambiguity
in determining whether the court has abused its discretion.
Id.

In the present case, the court found that ‘‘it is clear
that the term discharge relates to bankruptcy proceedings.
The plaintiff must make annual property distribution
payments unless that obligation is discharged in
bankruptcy.'' We disagree with the court's determination
that the word ‘‘discharge'' in the separation
agreement clearly and unambiguously related to bankruptcy
proceedings. We conclude, rather, that the term
‘‘discharge'' in the separation agreement is ambiguous
with regard to the circumstances under which the plaintiff
is entitled to discharge the obligation.3

‘‘Where a judgment incorporates a separation
agreement, the judgment and agreement should be construed
in accordance with the laws applied to any contract.''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Champagne
v. Champagne, 43 Conn. App. 844, 848, 685 A.2d 1153
(1996). ‘‘Where the language of the contract is clear
and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect
according to its terms. . . . Although ordinarily the
question of contract interpretation, being a question of
the parties' intent, is a question of fact . . . [w]here
there is definitive contract language, the determination
of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments
is a question of law.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) ARB Construction, LLC v. Pinney
Construction Corp., 75 Conn. App. 151, 154, 815 A.2d
705 (2003). The court's determination as to whether a
contract is ambiguous is a question of law; our standard
of review, therefore, is de novo. See United Illuminating
Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn. 665,
669–70, 791 A.2d 546 (2002); see alsoARB Construction,
LLC v. Pinney Construction Corp., supra, 155.

‘‘A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear
and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where
ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . .
Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance different
interpretations of the language in question does not
necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.''
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut,
LLC, supra, 259 Conn. 670.

‘‘In contrast, a contract is ambiguous if the intent of
the parties is not clear and certain from the language
of the contract itself. [A]ny ambiguity in a contract must
emanate from the language used by the parties. . . .
The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each
provision read in light of the other provisions . . . and
every provision must be given effect if it is possible to
do so.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 670–71.

The first part of paragraph 5.3 at issue in this appeal
specifically stated that ‘‘[t]his property distribution is
intended to be further support for the family and shall
not be dischargeable by the [plaintiff] in bankruptcy.
. . .'' The term ‘‘dischargeable'' as used in that sentence
clearly relates to the law of bankruptcy and employs
a special meaning.4 According to the language of this
sentence, the defendant is not discharged from the obligation
to pay, even in the event of bankruptcy, because
the property distribution is intended to be further support
for the family.5

The very next sentence, however, states that ‘‘[i]n
the event that the [plaintiff] is physically disabled and/
or unemployable or his net worth is less than $200,000
the [plaintiff] may discharge this obligation.'' The use
of the term ‘‘discharge'' in that second sentence appears
to alter the previous sentence by employing a common,
ordinary meaning to the term ‘‘discharge.''6 It appears
that by that sentence, the parties may have created a
condition subsequent that would operate to discharge
the plaintiff from his obligation to pay the annual property
distribution in the event that his net worth fell
below $200,000, regardless of whether he filed for bankruptcy
protection.7 See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts
(4th Ed. 1998) § 11.7, p. 399. (‘‘condition
subsequent is any event the existence of which, by
agreement of the parties, discharges a duty of performance
that has arisen'').

Because ‘‘the intent of the parties is not clear and certainfrom
the language of the contract itself;'' UnitedIlluminating
Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, supra, 259
Conn. 670–71; we conclude that the use of the term ‘‘discharge''
in the last sentence of paragraph 5.3 is ambiguous.
8Wefurther conclude that because of that ambiguity
and because there was evidence that the plaintiff's net
worthwasless than $200,000, the courtabused its discretion
in finding the plaintiff's noncompliance to be wilful
and granting the defendant's motion for contempt.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction toconductanevidentiary hearing to determine
the parties' intention relative to the term ‘‘discharge''
in the last sentence of paragraph 5.3, including
what act or acts would entitle the plaintiff to ‘‘discharge''
and what obligation is to be discharged.

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