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J. William Cagne, Jr. v. Enrico Vaccaro
Date: 12-09-2003
Case Number: AC 22872
Judge: McLachlan
Court: Court of Appeals of Connecticut
Plaintiff's Attorney:
P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Defendant's Attorney:
Felix Esposito, with whom was Enrico Vaccaro, pro
se, for the appellant (defendant).
This case returns to us following a
remand to the trial court by the Supreme Court. In this
appeal, the defendant, Enrico Vaccaro, claims the trial
court improperly (1) denied his motion to open and to
set aside the judgment, (2) awarded the plaintiff offer
of judgment interest and (3) granted the plaintiff's prejudgment
remedy of attachment. We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
This action between attorneys originated in a personal
injury matter. The plaintiff, J. William Gagne, Jr.,
brought an action to recover damages for the defendant's
failure to pay him a portion of attorney's fees
recovered in the settlement of that matter in which the
plaintiff had performed a significant amount of work.1
The complaint contained five counts, including a claim
of unjust enrichment. The case was tried to a jury,
which found in favor of the plaintiff on all five counts
and awarded damages in the amount of $328,469.14.
Pursuant to Practice Book § 16-37, the defendant filed
a motion to open the judgment and to set aside the
verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
which the court granted.
The plaintiff appealed from that judgment to the
Appellate Court; pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199
(c) and Practice Book § 65-1, that appeal was transferred
to the Supreme Court. On March 6, 2001, the
Supreme Court decided whether a per se rule precluding
recovery on the basis of quantum meruit or unjust
enrichment, despite the absence of bad faith or client
consent, is appropriate when an attorney fails to put
into writing a contingency fee agreement pursuant to
General Statutes § 52-251c. The court overruled in part
Alan E. Silver, P.C. v. Jacobs, 43 Conn. App. 184, 682
A.2d 551, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 938, 684 A.2d 708
(1996), and held that an attorney who neglects to follow
the dictates of § 52-251c may collect attorney's fees
from a successor attorney after settlement. Gagne v.
Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 408, 766 A.2d 416 (2001). The
judgment of the trial court was reversed in part and
the case was remanded to that court to render judgment
for the plaintiff on the unjust enrichment count. Id., 411.
Subsequently, on May 3, 2001, the plaintiff filed a
motion for the calculation of interest pursuant to General
Statutes § 52-192a and Practice Book § 17-18. One
week later, in response to the plaintiff's application,
the court held a prejudgment remedy hearing. In its
memorandum of decision issued December 10, 2001,
the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to offer
of judgment and postjudgment interest, and costs and
attorney's fees, and rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on the unjust enrichment count in the amount
of $593,302.13. The court also granted the plaintiff's
prejudgment remedy application, but deferred calculation
of the specific amount. The defendant filed a
motion to open and to set aside the judgment, which
was denied by the court on May 8, 2002. On May 28,
2002, the defendant filed this appeal. By order dated
June 21, 2002, the court set the prejudgment remedy
amount.
I
The defendant's first claim on appeal is that the court
improperly denied his motion to open and to set aside
the judgment because an unjust enrichment claim cannot
legally be tried to a jury. In addition, the defendant
contends that the jury's verdict on that claim was rendered
using an erroneous legal standard. We disagree.
‘‘A motion to open and vacate a judgment . . . is
addressed to the [trial] court's discretion, and the action
of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless
it acted unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion.
. . . In determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable
presumption in favor of its action. . . . The
manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not
be disturbed so long as the court could reasonably
conclude as it did.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Gillis v. Gillis, 214 Conn. 336,
340–41, 572 A.2d 323 (1990).
A
The defendant first argues that an unjust enrichment
claim cannot legally be tried to a jury. It is well settled
that there is no right to a jury trial in an equitable action.
United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 44–45,
495 A.2d 1034 (1985). This appeal, however, presents
the issue of whether the court, in exercising its discretion,
may ever submit to the jury an unjust enrichment
claim when both parties consent.
1
We first address the defendant's contention that restitution
is, in every circumstance, an equitable matter.2
The defendant has provided the court no authority for
that assertion. The Restatement of Restitution, how-
ever, takes the opposite view. It delineates six remedies
for a person entitled to restitution, including ‘‘a judgment
at law or decree in equity for the payment of
money . . . .'' Restatement (First), Restitution, Remedies
§ 4 (f), p. 18 (1937).3 The Restatement thus indicates
that an action for restitution may be either equitable
or legal in nature.
Though the Connecticut decisions referring to this
claim as ‘‘equitable'' are numerous, we find only one
that has addressed the dichotomy discussed in the
Restatement (First), supra, Remedies § 4 (f). In Misisco
v. La Maita, 150 Conn. 680, 684, 192 A.2d 891 (1963),
our Supreme Court, consonant with the Restatement
view, explained: ‘‘[An unjust enrichment claim] is an
action in quasi contract, i.e. an obligation, arising by
law, on which the same remedy is given as would be
given if the obligation arose out of contract. . . .
Although the right of recovery is based on equitable
principles, it is nevertheless an action at law, the purpose
of which is to prevent unjust enrichment. . . .
The only remedy is in an award of money damages.
There is no merit to the claim of the defendant that the
plaintiff's only right of action was in equity and that
equitable relief had to be sought.'' (Citations omitted.)
Under Connecticut law, therefore, a claim in restitution
may indeed be legal in nature.
Several jurisdictions have expounded on the distinction
drawn in the Restatement. In Jenkins v. Kaplan,
50 N.J. Super. 274, 141 A.2d 802 (1958), the defendant
asserted that as the claim was equitable in nature, it
was not cognizable by the trial court. The Appellate
Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey dismissed
that argument, explaining that ‘‘[a] money judgment
against the party who has been unjustly enriched is the
traditional restitutional remedy, and this ‘quasi-contractual'
relief has universally been afforded at law.'' Id.,
283. Similarly, the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts in In re Acushnet River &
New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 712 F. Sup. 994, 1003
(D. Mass. 1989), admonished an appellant who
‘‘assumes that, because the [United States} Supreme
Court [in a certain case had] mentioned the Restatement
of Restitution, the remedy it fashioned was an equitable
one. This assumption ignores the fact that the jurisdictions
of law courts and equity courts have always overlapped
with respect to restitution. . . . [M]uch of the
relief we now think of as restitutionary was available
in the English common law courts in an action of
assumpsit.''
In this case, the plaintiff's recovery was through payment
of money; indeed, this entire litigation centers
solely on the division of legal fees. ‘‘[O]rdinarily [a]
money judgment is obtained by an action at law . . . .''
Restatement (First), supra, § 4, comment (e), p. 21. One
court has observed that as a general rule, ‘‘an action is
to be deemed legal in nature, rather than equitable,
where the only relief sought is the collection of money
damages.'' Attebery v. Attebery, 507 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Mo.
App. 1974). We also note that the money payment recovery
in this case falls within none of the ‘‘equitable''
remedies specified in the Restatement.4 ‘‘[I]n many situations
a proceeding in equity is denied because the
remedy at law is adequate. . . .'' Restatement (First),
supra, introductory note, p. 4. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has addressed such a situation: ‘‘The
court below held that this action was cognizable in
equity rather than in law because the equitable principle
of unjust enrichment was involved. This reasoning overlooks
the fact that law courts can and do apply equitable
principles so long as the remedy sought is one within
their power to grant. Since law courts can give the
remedy of money damages, an adequate remedy existed
at law in the form of an action in assumpsit and equity
therefore had no jurisdiction.'' (Emphasis in original.)
Meehan v. Cheltenham Township, 410 Pa. 446, 448–49,
189 A.2d 593 (1963). As the court here found money
damages to be an adequate remedy, and in light of both
the Misisco precedent and the distinction drawn in the
Restatement, we conclude that this particular action
for restitution more aptly is characterized as legal,
rather than equitable, in nature.
2
Even were we to find this claim for restitution to be an
equitable one, such a conclusion would not necessarily
foreclose its submission to the jury. First, the court is
statutorily permitted to submit equitable claims to the
jury in certain circumstances. General Statutes § 52-
218,5 as well as Practice Book § 16-10,6 provides the
court in an equitable action the power to submit issues
of fact to the jury upon the application of a party. The
statute is discretionary, however, and does not create a
right to have issues of fact tried by a jury in an equitable
action. Once a party has requested the trial court to
submit issues of fact to the jury on an equitable claim,
the court has the power under § 52-218 to submit such
issues to the jury. See Meyers v. Cornwell Quality Tools,
Inc., 41 Conn. App. 19, 26, 674 A.2d 444 (1996). Although
no such application was presented in this case, that
procedure nonetheless reflects the ability to involve
juries in equitable matters under certain circumstances.
Second, we note that the ‘‘requirements for recovery
of restitution are purely factual.'' United Coastal Industries,
Inc. v. Clearheart Construction Co., 71 Conn.
App. 506, 512, 802 A.2d 901 (2002). This litigation concerns
compensation for the plaintiff's services. Our
Supreme Court has ‘‘repeatedly held that courts have
a general knowledge of what would be reasonable compensation
for services which are fairly stated and
described.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shapero
v. Mercede, 262 Conn. 1, 9, 808 A.2d 666 (2002).
Such determinations properly may be made by the jury.
See Presidential Capital Corp. v. Reale, 231 Conn. 500,
510–12, 652 A.2d 489 (1994).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Connecticut
appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed jury verdicts
on unjust enrichment claims. See Fink v. Golenbock,
238 Conn. 183, 210, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996) (‘‘jury found
that both defendants . . . had been unjustly
enriched''); Franks v. Lockwood, 146 Conn. 273, 277–78,
150 A.2d 215 (1959) (‘‘[f]rom the facts, the jury could
have concluded that . . . the enrichment was unjust''
[citations omitted]); Naughton v. Hager, 29 Conn. App.
181, 184, 614 A.2d 852, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 920, 618
A.2d 527 (1992); Burns v. Koellmer, 11 Conn. App. 375,
385, 527 A.2d 1210 (1987) (‘‘The court did not err in so
charging the jury [on unjust enrichment charge]. The
facts which could reasonably have been found by the
jury, based upon the evidence, are sufficient to uphold
the plaintiff's verdict.''); Epstein v. Automatic Enterprises,
6 Conn. App. 484, 485, 506 A.2d 158 (1986)
(affirming jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on unjust
enrichment count); Johnson v. Ivimey, 3 Conn. App.
392, 394, 488 A.2d 1275, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 811,
495 A.2d 279 (1985); see also O'Brien v. Seyer, 183
Conn. 199, 205, 439 A.2d 292 (1981) (case submitted to
jury on quantum meruit basis).
This court has neither been presented with nor found
any authority indicating that submission of an unjust
enrichment claim to the jury is erroneous or impermissible.
To agree with the defendant's assertion that an
unjust enrichment claim ‘‘cannot legally be tried to a
jury'' would be effectively to eviscerate the legitimacy
of those judgments. We decline that invitation. The
court may submit to the jury an unjust enrichment claim
in those circumstances in which it determines that the
matter is one primarily legal in nature.
3
The defendant's challenge to the denial of its motion
to open and to set aside the judgment is fatal for yet
another reason. Irrespective of our determination that
the claim for restitution in this case is a legal one, we
find that the defendant waived the right to object on
the ground that an unjust enrichment claim may never
be tried to a jury.
Waiver is ‘‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege.'' Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938);
McClain v. Manson, 183 Conn. 418, 428, 439 A.2d 430
(1981). ‘‘It involves the idea of assent, and assent is an
act of understanding. . . . The rule is applicable that
no one shall be permitted to deny that he intended the
natural consequences of his acts and conduct.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) MacKay v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 118 Conn. 538, 547–48, 173 A. 783 (1934); Gen-
eral Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Powers, Bolles,
Houlihan & Hartline, Inc., 50 Conn. App. 701, 711–12,
719 A.2d 77 (1998), aff'd, 251 Conn. 56, 738 A.2d 168
(1999). ‘‘In order to waive a claim of law it is not necessary
. . . that a party be certain of the correctness of
the claim and its legal efficacy. It is enough if he knows
of the existence of the claim and of its reasonably possible
efficacy.'' Jenkins v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America, 152 Conn. 249, 257–58, 205 A.2d 780 (1964).
On July 20, 1995, the defendant claimed this matter
to a jury. In neither his request to charge nor his supplemental
request to charge did the defendant object to
the submission of the unjust enrichment claim to the
jury,7 nor did he take exception to the charge as given
by the court, which submitted the issue to the jury.
Moreover, the defendant consented to the interrogatories
presented to the jury without objection. ‘‘Consent
to a jury trial of issues not triable by a jury as a matter
of right need not be express. By merely failing to object
to the submission of such issues to the jury, the parties
agree that the jury's verdict has the same effect as if a
right to a jury trial existed. . . .'' 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury
§ 11 (1995); see also State v. Ramos, 201 Conn. 598,
604, 519 A.2d 9 (1986); State v. Hersey, 78 Conn. App.
141, 156, 826 A.2d 1183 (defendant ‘‘implicitly waived
his right to challenge the court's charge''), cert. denied,
266 Conn. 903, 832 A.2d 65 (2003).
At no time during the trial did the defendant object
to the jury's consideration of the unjust enrichment
claim. Following the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
the defendant filed a motion to open the judgment
and to set aside the verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, never asserting as a ground the
claim he now makes that the jury was without authority
to decide the unjust enrichment claim.
On appeal to this court and then to the Supreme
Court, the defendant had ample opportunity to raise
that specific claim. Yet, as the briefs submitted reflect,
he never did so. Perhaps most telling is the fact that
after the Supreme Court issued its decision, the defendant
filed a motion for reconsideration.8 Not a word
addressed his objection. When before the trial court on
remand, the defendant again remained silent as to his
objection. In neither his memorandum of law in support
of his objection to the plaintiff's postjudgment motions
nor his reply memorandum of law did the defendant
raise his objection.9
On December 28, 2001, almost seven years after commencement
of the action, the court found that the plaintiff
was entitled to offer of judgment and postjudgment
interest, and costs and attorney's fees, and rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the unjust enrichment
count of the complaint. The defendant subsequently
filed a motion to open and to set aside that
judgment, arguing for the first time that the jury could
not entertain the unjust enrichment claim. The court
denied the motion.
From the commencement of his action to an audience
before the highest court of our state, the defendant
repeatedly failed to raise his objection. By his failure
to do so, it was waived.10 In Pickel v. Automated Waste
Disposal, Inc., 65 Conn. App. 176, 180, 782 A.2d 231
(2001), we stated that ‘‘[w]e have repeatedly indicated
our disfavor with the failure, whether because of a
mistake of law, inattention or design, to object to errors
occurring in the course of a trial until it is too late for
them to be corrected, and thereafter, if the outcome of
the trial proves unsatisfactory, with the assignment of
such errors as grounds of appeal.'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) The court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the defendant's motion to open and to set
aside the judgment in this instance.
B
The defendant also contends that the jury's verdict
on his claim was rendered using an erroneous legal
standard. In essence, the defendant argues that as the
bad faith finding made by the jury was held unnecessary
by the Supreme Court's decision in Gagne v. Vaccaro,
supra, 255 Conn. 409–11, the presence of that finding
renders the jury's verdict ‘‘unsound and invalid.'' We
disagree.
As the defendant concedes in his brief, the trial court
rejected that finding and set it aside. When the Supreme
Court decided that no bad faith was required for recovery,
it remanded the case to the trial court with direction
to render judgment on the unjust enrichment count.
On remand, the trial court was bound by the law
of the case doctrine.11 That doctrine ‘‘expresses the
practice of judges generally to refuse to reopen what
has been decided and is not a limitation on their power.''
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) S.M.S. Textile
Mills, Inc. v. Brown, Jacobson, Tillinghast, Lahan &
King, P.C., 32 Conn. App. 786, 798, 631 A.2d 340, cert.
denied, 228 Conn. 903, 634 A.2d 296 (1993). ‘‘Where a
matter has previously been ruled upon interlocutorily,
the court in a subsequent proceeding in the case may
treat that decision as the law of the case, if it is of the
opinion that the issue was correctly decided, in the
absence of some new or overriding circumstance.''
Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86, 99, 439 A.2d 1066 (1982).
In Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 259 Conn. 114,
130-31, 788 A.2d 83 (2002), the court stated that ‘‘[a]
judge is not bound to follow the decisions of another
judge made at an earlier stage of the proceedings, and
if the same point is again raised he has the same right
to reconsider the question as if he had himself made
the original decision. . . . [O]ne judge may, in a proper
case, vacate, modify, or depart from an interlocutory
order or ruling of another judge in the same case, upon
a question of law.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
That rule, however, seemingly should apply only to trial
court determinations. Here, the trial court was directed
by the Supreme Court to render judgment for the plaintiff
on the unjust enrichment count. Bound by the law
of the case, the court had no choice but to comply with
that directive. See Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn., 184
Conn. 21, 23, 441 A.2d 49 (1981). There is no abuse
of discretion.
II
The defendant next claims the court improperly
awarded the plaintiff offer of judgment interest. Specifically,
he contends that as unjust enrichment is an
‘‘ ‘equitable remedy not available at law,' '' offer of judgment
interest is not available under § 52-192a.12 The
defendant's claim raises an issue of statutory interpretation,
which ‘‘involves a question of law and, thus, our
review is plenary.'' Poirier v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
75 Conn. App. 289, 294, 815 A.2d 716, cert. denied, 263
Conn. 912, 821 A.2d 766 (2003).
Offer of judgment interest may be awarded pursuant
to § 52-192a (a) in ‘‘any civil action based upon contract
or seeking the recovery of money damages . . . .''
Thus, the plaintiff here must recover money damages
to implicate that statute. The defendant argues that the
plaintiff was awarded the equitable remedy of restitution
and not money damages.13 We disagree.
We already have determined that the plaintiff's unjust
enrichment claim was legal, not equitable, in nature.14
In discussing available remedies, the Restatement of
Restitution provides that ‘‘a claimant has an election
to obtain money damages at law or to obtain specific
restitution in equity . . . .'' (Emphasis added.)
Restatement (First), supra, introductory note, p. 10. In
Monarch Accounting Supplies, Inc. v. Prezioso, 170
Conn. 659, 666, 368 A.2d 6 (1976), the court, citing
the Restatement, concluded that ‘‘[a showing of unjust
enrichment] entitles the plaintiff to an award of money
damages.'' See also Misisco v. La Maita, supra, 150
Conn. 684 (awarding money damages on unjust enrichment
claim); United Coastal Industries v. Clearheart
Construction Co., supra, 71 Conn. App. 512 (unjust
enrichment a doctrine ‘‘allowing damages for restitution'').
The defendant's reliance on Lakeview Associates v.
Woodlake Master Condominium Assn., Inc., 239 Conn.
769, 687 A.2d 1270 (1997), is misplaced, for in that case,
the trial court ‘‘acknowledged that its judgment was in
the form of an injunction . . . .'' (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 783. Likewise, the plaintiff in Ravitch
v. Stollman Poultry Farms, Inc., 162 Conn. 26,
27, 291 A.2d 213 (1971), sought, in addition to money
damages, a decree that the land and buildings be impressed
with a trust for the benefit of the plaintiff. No such
additional relief is present in this case. Rather, the plaintiff
sought and was awarded a money recovery. In Dinapoli
v. Cooke, 43 Conn. App. 419, 427, 682 A.2d 603,
cert. denied, 239 Conn. 951, 686 A.2d 124 (1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S. Ct. 1699, 137 L. Ed. 2d 825
(1997), we stated that the word ‘‘damages'' means ‘‘a
compensation in money for a loss or damage. . . .''
That is precisely what the plaintiff recovered in this
case. The court properly awarded the plaintiff offer of
judgment interest on those money damages.
III
The defendant's final claim is that the court improperly
granted the plaintiff's prejudgment remedy of
attachment. The issue before us is whether, once an
appeal has been filed, final judgment has been rendered.
The defendant's claim raises an issue of statutory interpretation,
which ‘‘involves a question of law and, thus,
our review is plenary.'' Poirier v. Zoning Board of
Appeals, supra, 75 Conn. App. 294.
General Statutes § 52-278a (d) defines a prejudgment
remedy as ‘‘any remedy or combination of remedies
that enables a person by way of attachment, foreign
attachment, garnishment or replevin to deprive the
defendant in a civil action of, or affect the use, possession
or enjoyment by such defendant of, his property
prior to final judgment but shall not include a temporary
restraining order.'' Following the Supreme Court's
remand, the plaintiff filed a prejudgment remedy application
with the trial court and a hearing was held. Judgment
was rendered for the plaintiff on December 28,
2001. In its memorandum of decision, the court deferred
resolution of the prejudgment remedy issue until after
the conclusion of a special proceeding. On May 28, 2002,
the defendant filed this appeal. By order dated June 21,
2002, the court set the prejudgment remedy amount.
The defendant argues that the prejudgment remedy statute
is inapplicable because § 52-278a (d) allows a prejudgment
remedy only ‘‘prior to final judgment . . . .''
The seminal trial court decision of Brookfield v.
Greenridge, Inc., 35 Conn. Sup. 49, 393 A.2d 1316 (1977),
confronted that very argument. The court stated that
the legislature in 1975 ‘‘enacted § 52-278h which states
that an application for prejudgment remedy may be
filed ‘at any time after the institution of the action,
and the forms and procedures provided therein shall
be adapted accordingly.' . . . By that provision the legislature
intended a broad expansion of the time in which
a prejudgment remedy could be used.'' (Emphasis in
original.) Id., 51.
The purpose of the prejudgment remedy statute is
‘‘to secure the defendants' assets, forestalling the dissipation
thereof, while awaiting a final judgment.'' Cahaly
v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co., 73 Conn.
App. 267, 277, 812 A.2d 1, cert. granted on other grounds,
262 Conn. 925, 814 A.2d 378 (2002). The term ‘‘final
judgment'' is not plain and unambiguous. Capalbo v.
Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 208 Conn. 480,
486, 547 A.2d 528 (1988). As the court in Brookfield
explained: ‘‘To ascertain the intended meaning of ‘final
judgment' as it is used in the prejudgment remedy context
the court must look to the purpose of the statute.
. . . The purpose of the statute is to allow a plaintiff
who can show probable cause that he will eventually
succeed on the merits to encumber property of the
defendant to protect himself from obtaining a judgment
which cannot be satisfied. At the same time the statute
seeks to protect the defendant from unreasonable
encumbrances. It is as necessary to protect a plaintiff
who has won at the trial level, when the final disposition
of the case awaits appellate proceedings, as it is to
protect that same plaintiff before trial. There is no reason
to assume that the legislature intended, by using
the phrase ‘final judgment,' to deprive a plaintiff, who
awaits final disposition of the case, of the protection
afforded by this statute. . . . The court is of the opinion
that a prejudgment remedy is available to a plaintiff
who has won at the trial level and whose case is on
appeal.'' (Citations omitted.) Brookfield v. Greenridge,
Inc., supra, 35 Conn. Sup. 51–52. For more than twentyfive
years, Connecticut trial courts have agreed, consistently
holding that a prejudgment remedy is available
to a party who has won at the trial level and whose
case is on appeal.15
Moreover, the only Connecticut appellate decision to
consider that issue cites favorably to Brookfield. InEast
Lyme v. Wood, 54 Conn. App. 394, 400, 735 A.2d 843
(1999), the defendants claimed that because the underlying
injunction action was not pending, the matter at
issue was a postjudgment remedy, not a prejudgment
remedy. We flatly rejected such a contention: ‘‘This
claim has no merit. The case is still in court, and the
town is seeking a determination of the amount that
the defendants owe for property clearing. Until that
determination is made, the town is entitled to a prejudgment
attachment to secure any monetary order that
may be rendered.'' Id. The present case was still in court
and the plaintiff was still seeking a recovery of the
amount the defendant owed when the application for
the prejudgment remedy was filed. We therefore hold
that a prejudgment remedy is available to a party who
has prevailed at the trial level and whose case is on
appeal.
About This Case
What was the outcome of J. William Cagne, Jr. v. Enrico Vaccaro?
The outcome was: The judgment is affirmed.
Which court heard J. William Cagne, Jr. v. Enrico Vaccaro?
This case was heard in Court of Appeals of Connecticut, CT. The presiding judge was McLachlan.
Who were the attorneys in J. William Cagne, Jr. v. Enrico Vaccaro?
Plaintiff's attorney: P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellee (plaintiff).. Defendant's attorney: Felix Esposito, with whom was Enrico Vaccaro, pro se, for the appellant (defendant)..
When was J. William Cagne, Jr. v. Enrico Vaccaro decided?
This case was decided on December 9, 2003.