Velvet Claud-Chambers, et al. v. City of West Haven, et al.

This is an appeal from the summary
judgment rendered against the plaintiffs1 and in favor
of the defendants2 in an inverse condemnation proceeding.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that an
unconstitutional taking of their private property
occurred and that the trial court improperly determined
that there were no genuine issues of material
fact.3 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to our resolution of the plaintiffs' appeal. On June 23, 1998, the defendants filed with the court a
statement of compensation for the taking of the plaintiffs'
properties.4 On August 23, 1998, a certificate of
taking was filed.5 No appeal was ever filed by the
plaintiffs.6 In fact, the plaintiffs admit that the defendants
have filed the certificate of compensation with
the Superior Court.

The plaintiffs initiated the present action by filing a
complaint dated September 1, 1999. The plaintiffs
alleged that starting in 1993 and continuing until June
28, 1999, the defendants engaged in a course of conduct
that caused a substantial destruction of the value of
the real estate owned by the plaintiffs. Such conduct
included, inter alia, reducing the police presence in the
neighborhood, publicly labeling the area as ‘‘blighted,''
urging residents to move away from the area and threatening
to take over the area by eminent domain. Those
actions, according to the plaintiffs, formed the basis
for their claim of inverse condemnation.

The defendants each filed a motion for summary judgment.
They argued that due to the completion of the
eminent domain proceedings, the plaintiffs were precluded
from bringing an inverse condemnation action.
In support of their argument, the defendants relied on
Russo v. East Hartford, 4 Conn. App. 271, 493 A.2d 914
(1985). The court granted the defendants' motions and
rendered judgment as a matter of law. This appeal
followed.

At the outset, we set forth the applicable standard
of review and legal principles that govern our resolution
of the plaintiffs' appeal. ‘‘Our standard of review of a
court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment
is well established. Practice Book § 17-49 provides
in relevant part that summary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other
proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. . . .

‘‘On appeal, [w]e must decide whether the trial court
erred in determining that there was no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . Because
the trial court rendered judgment for the [defendant]
as a matter of law, our review is plenary and we must
determine whether the legal conclusions reached by
the trial court are legally and logically correct and
whether they find support in the facts set out in the
memorandum of decision of the trial court.'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ghent v. Meadowhaven Condominium,
Inc., 77 Conn. App. 276, 281–82, 823 A.2d
355 (2003).

An inverse condemnation proceeding is a remedy to
be used only when the governmental authority has not
exercised its right to eminent domain. Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 234 Conn. 221,
249–50 n.15, 662 A.2d 1179 (1995); see also Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 65 L.
Ed. 2d 106 (1980); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253,
255–58, 100 S. Ct. 1127, 63 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1980); 27 Am.
Jur. 2d 344–45, Eminent Domain § 826 (1996). With the
foregoing background in mind, we now address the
specifics of the plaintiffs' appeal.

Simply put, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly
determined, as a matter of law, that they were
precluded from bringing an action for inverse condemnation
after eminent domain proceedings had been concluded.
We disagree and conclude that the court
properly determined that Russo v. East Hartford, supra,
4 Conn. App. 271, controls the present appeal.

In Russo, the plaintiffs claimed that various regulations
affected their land from the date that those regulations
were instituted until the date of the actual
condemnation so as to amount to an unconstitutional
taking. Id., 273. This court, in affirming the judgment
rendered in favor of the defendants, stated: ‘‘Where our
statutes provide an efficacious means for assuring just
compensation, that procedure will be followed. . . .
The statutory procedure under which the plaintiffs [previously]
proceeded . . . General Statutes §§ 8-129 to
8-133 . . . provides an efficient procedure for vindicating
the common law right to compensation for a taking
of property by eminent domain. . . . We see no justification
under the facts of this case for the institution
of an independent action which seeks, in essence, only
to relitigate the issues . . . .'' (Citations omitted;
emphasis added.) Russo v. East Hartford, supra, 274.

In the present case, the plaintiffs received just compensation
through the condemnation proceedings and
chose not to challenge the value assigned to the property
during those proceedings. Furthermore, they failed
to challenge the valuation pursuant to General Statutes
§ 8-132. If the plaintiffs were unsatisfied with the compensation
that they received, an appeal should have
been taken during the compensation process. The plaintiffs'
inverse condemnation claim would serve only to
relitigate the issues that were resolved in the eminent
domain action. We agree with the statement of the
defendants, made in their brief, that ‘‘the fact that the
plaintiffs chose not to pursue their remedies pursuant
to . . . §§ 8-129 to 8-133 is fatal to their claim.'' There
can be no valid inverse condemnation claim when the
property in question already has been taken by eminent
domain. Our holding in Russo v. East Hartford, supra,
4 Conn. App. 271, controls our resolution of the plaintiffs'
appeal.

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