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12 Havemeyer Place Company, LLC v. Allan S. Gordon

Date: 04-28-2003

Case Number: AC 22376

Judge: Dupont

Court: Connecitcut Court of Appeals

Plaintiff's Attorney:

Eric D. Grayson, with whom, on the brief, was Juris
V. Zauls
, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Defendant's Attorney:

David W. Rubin, Stamford, Connecticut, for the appellee (defendant).


Gail Sassos, assistant town attorney, filed a brief for
the town of Greenwich as amicus curiae.

Description:

The plaintiff lessor, 12 Havemeyer Place
Company, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial
court rendered in favor of the defendant lessee, Allan
S. Gordon, in this summary process action in which the
plaintiff sought eviction of the defendant lessee on the
ground that their lease was illegal and, therefore, that
the tenancy was void or voidable.1 The basis for the
court's judgment was that the plaintiff was not entitled
to evict the defendant from sixteen leased parking
spaces because the lease of those spaces was legal and
because ‘‘equity abhors forfeiture.''2 The plaintiff claims
on appeal that (1) the lease in question was illegal ab
initio and, therefore, unenforceable, and (2) the court
improperly based its decision on relief from forfeiture
because that was not pleaded as a special defense or
argued at trial. We conclude that the lease was legal and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.3

This dispute relates to the parties' interests in sixteen
parking spaces located in an underground parking
garage, which currently is owned by the plaintiff, at 60
Arch Street in the town of Greenwich.4 The basic facts
underlying the issues of this appeal are not disputed,
and we are presented with questions of law for which
our review is plenary. Feldmann v. Sebastian, 261
Conn. 721, 725, 805 A.2d 713 (2002).

The defendant leases the sixteen parking spaces from
the plaintiff for the benefit of a building owned by the
defendant at 71 Arch Street. The following transactional
history is relevant to our discussion of this appeal. In
1980, John Jay Ginter Development and Construction,
Inc., the then owner of both 60 Arch Street and 71 Arch
Street, filed a site plan for 60 Arch Street with the
town of Greenwich planning and zoning commission
(commission). The commission approved the site plan,
which showed a three story office retail building with
a total of fifty-eight parking spaces. The preliminary site
plan approval application, dated November 12, 1980,
designated forty-eight of the spaces for 60 Arch Street
and ten for 71 Arch Street. This designation, however,
was deleted from the application for final site plan
approval, dated December 8, 1980, which merely proposed
fifty-eight spaces without any reference to 71
Arch Street. In a subsequent site plan, dated December
10, 1980, the designation of forty-eight spaces required
for 60 Arch Street and the ten spaces for 71 Arch
Street reappeared.

By 1988, Greenwich Cove Associates (Greenwich
Cove), a predecessor of both the plaintiff and the defendant,
had acquired both 60 Arch Street and 71 Arch
Street. In August, 1988, Greenwich Cove negotiated the
sale of 60 Arch Street to Skanska, Inc. As a final negotiated
term of the sale, Skanska, Inc., the new owner of
60 Arch Street, leased sixteen of 60 Arch Street's fiftyeight
parking spaces to Greenwich Cove for use by 71
Arch Street, thereby increasing the number of spaces
for 71 Arch Street as described in the site plan by six
spaces.5 This left 60 Arch Street's tenants with the use
of only forty-two parking spaces, six fewer than
required by the site plan. The lease had a term of fifty
years, was renewable thereafter in five year increments
and was recorded in the town of Greenwich land
records. It is this lease, to which neither the defendant
nor the plaintiff originally were parties, which is the
subject of this appeal.

In 1989, the defendant purchased 71 Arch Street from
Greenwich Cove, thus obtaining the benefit of the lease,
as a successor lessee. The defendant testified that the
lease, which provided him with sixteen parking spaces
in the 60 Arch Street garage, for his tenants at 71 Arch
Street, was a major factor for the purchase. In 2000,
the plaintiff, which was fully aware of the recorded lease, purchased 60 Arch Street from Skanska, Inc., and
became the successor lessor. The purchase price paid
by the plaintiff was less than it would have been had
there been forty-eight parking spaces allocated to 60
Arch Street instead of forty-two spaces.

The dispute involved in this appeal arose when the
plaintiff, as the new owner of 60 Arch Street, inquired
of the town of Greenwich about the recorded lease,
which left 60 Arch Street with forty-two parking spaces,
and about the possible conflict of the lease with the
site plan, which required forty-eight spaces for 60 Arch
Street.6 In the preceding twelve years, no tenant, neighbor
or predecessor in title of either building had complained
to any zoning authority of any site plan violation
as it related to parking.7 The town's zoning enforcement
officer responded to the plaintiff's inquiry by stating that
he believed there was a violation of a zoning regulation.

Thereafter, in January, 2001, the plaintiff rejected the
defendant's tender of rent and informed the defendant
by letter that it was of the opinion that the lease was
void or voidable because it violated the site plan. In
February, 2001, in a separate action, the defendant in
this case instituted an action against the plaintiff in this
case seeking a declaratory judgment as to the enforceability
of the lease, injunctive relief and damages. The
plaintiff also claimed damages for tortious interference
with his leases with his tenants, which leases granted
the tenants the right to use the parking spaces at 60
Arch Street.8 The defendant lessee, the plaintiff in that
case, on the record, withdrew his application for a temporary
restraining order against his lessor in exchange
for the plaintiff's agreement to seek a variance of the
site plan.9 The zoning board of appeals denied the application
for a variance because a hardship was not demonstrated,
but the lessor, the plaintiff in this case, did
not appeal to the Superior Court from the denial.10

After the variance was denied, the zoning enforcement
officer cited the plaintiff for the reduction of onsite
parking as a violation of § 6-16 of the municipal
building code regulations and directed the plaintiff to
restore the forty-eight parking spaces as provided in
the site plan.

Subsequently, the plaintiff served the defendant with
a notice to quit and then brought the summary process
action for immediate possession of the sixteen parking
spaces, which is the subject of this appeal.11 The defendant
asserted three special defenses to the summary
process action. He alleged that the lease was not illegal
or void, that equity barred the plaintiff's claim ‘‘by virtue
of, among other things, the facts set forth at length in
its Complaint dated February 14, 2001, in the action
[Gordon v. 12 Havemeyer Place, Co., LLC, No. CV 01-
0184544S] and the doctrines of equitable estoppel,
laches, unclean hands and unjust enrichment,'' and that
the plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The court rendered judgment in favor of
the defendant.

The precise question we must answer, for which we
could find no appellate decisional authority in Connecticut
or elsewhere, is whether a lessor, on the ground of
illegality, may gain possession of leased premises from
a lessee solely on the ground that the recorded lease
varied the requirements of a site plan, when the lessee
has not breached any covenant of the lease and the
town has not cited the lessee for a violation or ordered
the lessee to take any corrective action.

The plaintiff claims that the lease was illegal ab initio.
Specifically, it argues that the terms of the lease
expressly and illegally violated the site plan and, therefore,
the lease is unenforceable. We disagree.

The following are the relevant portions of the subject
lease of the parties: ‘‘WHEREAS, pursuant to requirements
of the Planning and Zoning Commission of Greenwich,
Connecticut, ten (10) parking spaces at the [60
Arch Street] Premises must be set aside for the use and
benefit of tenants of 71 Arch Street;12 and WHEREAS,
the parties hereto wish to execute this Lease and provide
six additional parking spaces upon the Premises
for the tenants of 71 Arch Street . . . .

‘‘NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as
follows:

‘‘1. Lease of Parking Spaces. Lessor [formerly Swanska,
now the plaintiff] hereby leases to Lessee [formerly
Greenwich Cove, now the defendant] the sixteen (16)
parking spaces at the Premises . . . on the terms and
conditions set forth herein.

* * * *

‘‘4. Use. Lessee shall use and occupy the Parking
Spaces, and have the rights provided for herein with
respect to the Parking Spaces and the Premises, for no
purpose other than parking for the tenants of 71 Arch
Street. Lessee, the tenants of 71 Arch Street and their
agents, employees, or invitees shall comply with all
reasonable rules and regulations provided in writing by
Lessor to Lessee regarding the use of the Parking
Spaces.

‘‘5. Requirements of Law. The manner of use of the
Parking Spaces by Lessee, the tenants of 71 Arch Street
and their agents, employees, or invitees shall comply
with, and Lessor, in other respects, shall comply with,
all statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, regulations and
requirements of the federal, state and city government
and of any and all other departments and bureaus applicable
to the Parking Spaces.13

* * *


‘‘16. This lease may not be terminated without the
written consent of both Lessor and Lessee.''

The lease, thus, does not facially provide that any
parking spaces in excess of ten violates the Greenwich
zoning regulations. It provides that the lessor is responsible
for compliance with regulations of government
and it provides that the lease may not be terminated
without the consent of both parties.

In rendering our decision, we are mindful of the well
recognized principle that ‘‘no court will lend its assistance
in any way toward carrying out the terms of a
contract, the inherent purpose of which is to violate
the law.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Solomon
v. Gilmore, 248 Conn. 769, 785, 731 A.2d 280 (1999). It
is also true that ‘‘[t]he principle that agreements contrary
to public policy are [unenforceable] should be
applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the
reasons on which that doctrine rests . . . .'' (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 790. It is a general rule
that contracts entered into voluntarily by competent
persons should be held valid and enforceable in the
courts. Collins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 164 Conn. 369,
377, 321 A.2d 444 (1973). Thus, ‘‘[t]he impropriety injurious
to the interests of society which will relieve a party
from the obligation he has assumed must be clear and
certain before the contract will be found void and unenforceable.''
Id.

To support its claim of illegality, the plaintiff primarily
relies on Sippin v. Ellam, 24 Conn. App. 385, 588
A.2d 660 (1991). The defendant argues that Sippin is
distinguishable from the present case. In Sippin, this
court was asked to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's finding that
a lease was illegal, and that, therefore, the plaintiff
lessor could not recover for rent or for the fair rental
value for use and occupancy because ‘‘[a] lease
agreement entered into in violation of the law creates
no rights in the wrongdoer.'' Id., 392.

The lease in Sippin specifically provided that ‘‘the
premises were to be occupied only for offices for conducting
any and all operations as they relate to a real
estate operation.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 387 n.1. The plaintiff lessor's deed to the leased real
estate contained a restrictive covenant prohibiting any
commercial use, but the defendant tenant was unaware
of that restriction in the plaintiff's deed. Id., 387.
Approximately one year after the execution of the lease,
the local zoning enforcement agency ordered the defendant
tenant14 ‘‘to cease and desist the operation of his
business because the premises were located in a residential
zone.'' Id. The defendant subsequently vacated
the premises and the plaintiff initiated suit to recover
rent arising from a breach of the covenant to pay rent,
or, in the alternative, the fair rental value of the premises,
as well as damages for repairs and waste.15 Id.,
387–88.

In Sippin, ‘‘[t]he trial court specifically found that
‘‘[t]here is no question but that the lease was illegal
pursuant to the restrictive covenant against any commercial
use. It is therefore clear that such an undertaking
is illegal and voids the agreement. [The plaintiff] is
therefore not entitled to recover rent under the lease.''
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 389 n.4. The court, in discussing the plaintiff's claim
in quantum meruit to obtain the fair rental value for
use and occupancy concluded that the ‘‘[t]hing to be
done here and which was prohibited by the covenant,
was the suffering of the premises in question to be used
for commercial purposes.'' (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 390. Thus, the trial court
rested its judgment, which was affirmed by us, on the
plaintiff's violation of the restrictive covenant rather
than on any violation of the zoning laws.16

Although we noted in Sippin that ‘‘[t]here is absolutely
no question here that the lease was being illegally
maintained because of both the operative zoning laws
and the restrictive covenant contained in the warranty
deed''; id., 388; our holding was not dependent on any
illegality arising from the violation of a zoning regulation.
Thus, the holding in Sippin is not determinative
of the holding in this case.

We are not, nor was the Sippin court, concerned
with a town's admitted right to enact zoning regulations
and enforce them, but rather with whether an illegality
existed at the time the lease was executed.17 The most
significant distinction between Sippin and this case is
that the former involved the illegality of a lease that
nullified a recorded restrictive covenant in a deed and
the latter involves the alleged illegality of a lease that
nullified a zoning regulation. A restrictive covenant in
a deed runs with the land and restrains the use to which
land may be put in the future, as well as the present,
and may affect its value. Dick v. Sears-Roebuck & Co.,
115 Conn. 122, 125, 160 A. 432 (1932). Unlike a zoning
regulation, for which there is a procedure for a variance
from the regulation, the covenant, if not against public
policy, remains in effect, indefinitely, in accordance
with its terms. In Sippin, the covenant trumped the
terms of the lease. In our case, the question is whether
the site plan trumps the lease. Other differences in
Sippin and our analysis of other cases, lead us to a
different conclusion than that of Sippin.

Sippin concerned a breach of lease and was a case
in which the lessor argued that the lease was legal in
order to obtain rent. In our case, there is no breach of
any covenant of the lease by the lessee, and the lessor
argues that the lease was illegal in order to obtain possession.
In Sippin, the lessee was ordered by the town
to stop using the premises for business purposes,
whereas in our case, it was the lessor that was cited
by the town. In Sippin, no argument was made that the violation was curable, whereas in the present case,
the defendant lessee argues that it was curable, by
among other things, the obtaining of a variance. In Sippin,
the lease required the lessee to conform to rules
and regulations; in the present case, the lease required
the lessor to comply with all ordinances of the city
government, without any requirement on the part of
the lessee to do so.

The parties in this case do not dispute that the lease
increases the number of parking spaces for the defendant,
as provided by the site plan or the zoning regulations.
The plaintiff claims that the decrease in parking
for its tenants renders the lease illegal and equates
that deficiency with the use of premises for a business
purpose in a residential zone.

Generally, agreements contrary to public policy, that
is those that negate laws enacted for the common good,
are illegal and therefore unenforceable. Contractual
rights arising from agreements are subject to the fair
exercise of the power of the state to secure health,
safety, comfort or the general welfare of the community.
Elida, Inc. v. Harmor Realty, Corp., 177 Conn. 218,
223, 413 A.2d 1226 (1979). The question to be resolved
is whether the site plan in this case is a zoning regulation
involving the common good or a regulation that has
as its overriding purpose a private goal that does not
contravene the common good.

There are gradations of violations of statutes ranging
from per se violations, that is, those manifestly in total
derogation of a particular statute, to those that affect
fewer persons in limited circumstances; see id., 228–31;
or which are minor in nature. Minor violations of zoning
do not lead to a conclusion that the violation causes a
lease to be invalid. See Diamond Housing Corp. v.
Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1969); see also Rowe v.
Wells Fargo Realty Services, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 310,
212 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1985); Bennett v. Waffle House, Inc.,
771 So. 2d 370 (Miss. 2000); Kearns v. Barney's Clothes,
Inc., 38 Misc. 2d 787, 239 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1963).

Claims that contracts are void because of a violation
of public policy as embodied in a statute are considered
against the backdrop of the particular statute. See, e.g.,
Burkle v. Car & Truck Leasing Co., 1 Conn. App. 54,
57–58, 467 A.2d 1255 (1983). The particular facts
involved in the claim that a contract is against public
policy also temper the conclusion as to whether illegality
exists. See Williams v. Vista Vestra, Inc., 178 Conn.
323, 328, 422 A.2d 274 (1979).

The basic purpose of zoning is to restrict certain
classes of buildings and uses to certain localities within
the community. See Weyls v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
161 Conn. 516, 519, 290 A.2d 350 (1971). Zoning divides a
community into geographical zones, such as residential,
business and industrial, to ensure that the uses on the individual properties within the zones are compatible
with each other. A site plan, on the other hand, is a
plan for the proposed use of a particular site, indicating
all of the information required by the regulations for
that site. SSM Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Plan &
Zoning Commission, 15 Conn. App. 561, 566 n.4, 545
A.2d 602 (1988), aff'd, 211 Conn. 331, 559 A.2d 196
(1989). A site plan may be modified at the discretion
of a planning and zoning commission to provide for
a lesser number of parking spaces than the number
required by the zoning regulations. See McCrann v.
Town Plan&Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 65, 71–72,
282 A.2d 900 (1971).

‘‘Whether a contract is unlawful is usually determined
as of the time of its making and is not affected by
subsequent changes of facts.'' 17A C.J.S., Contracts
§ 197 (1999). The preponderance of the cases make it
clear that, if a variance is possible, a lease is not necessarily
void and unenforceable. See annot., Rights
Between Landlord and Tenant as Affected by Zoning
Regulations Restricting Contemplated Use of Premises,
37 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1971). A lease is not necessarily void
if, reasonably, the prohibition can be made legal through
administrative or judicial action. Id., 1044. A lease does
not have an unlawful purpose if the zoning laws incorporate
a procedure by which a variance from the letter
of the law may be obtained. Entrepreneur, Ltd. v.
Yasuna, 498 A.2d 1151 (D.C. 1985).

‘‘Parties may bind themselves to a contract that calls
on its face for a use of property that violates the zoning
laws because, due to the possibility of obtaining a variance,
such a bargain is not against public policy or
public morals.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
1158; see also McNally v. Moser, 210 Md. 127, 135, 122
A.2d 555 (1956); Verschell v. Pike, 85 App. Div. 2d 690,
691, 445 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1981); 37 A.L.R.3d 1018, 1039–44.
‘‘A lease providing for a use of premises which is prohibited
by the zoning law is not necessarily illegal where
it appears that an appeals board has the authority to
permit a variance.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Entrepreneur, Ltd. v. Yasuna, supra, 498 A.2d 1159 n.5;
see also Young v. Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206, 209, 331
P.2d 1099 (1958).

The parties to the lease in this case contemplated
that the number of parking spaces for 71 Arch Street
would be sixteen. The zoning laws at the time of the
execution, and at the present time, incorporate a procedure
by which variances from the letter of the zoning
law may be obtained.

In this case, the plaintiff, pursuant to its agreement
with the defendant in open court, applied to the zoning
board for a variance, which admittedly was not wanted
by the plaintiff and which was denied. The denial of
the variance has not yet been tested by the courts
because the plaintiff did not appeal.18 The plaintiff cannot rely on the alleged illegality at the time of the execution
of the lease because the lease could have been
made legal reasonably at the time of its execution
through administrative or judicial action. We do not
know the contents of the plaintiff's application for a
variance or the specific reasons for the denial, other
than the terse phrase, ‘‘lack of a hardship.'' We cannot
predict, therefore, whether a second application for a
variance is possible, or if so, whether it would be
granted. ‘‘[T]he construction of a statute on an issue that
has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny is
a question of law on which an administrative ruling is
not entitled to special deference.'' Schlumberger Technology
Corp. v. Dubno, 202 Conn. 412, 423, 521 A.2d
569 (1987). We cannot conclude, therefore, with any
certainty, without a judicial determination, whether the
variance should have been granted.

On the particular facts of this case, the plaintiff is
not entitled to possession because we hold that the
violation of the zoning laws with regard to the parking
required by the site plan was not sufficient to render
the lease illegal as against public policy.

* * *

Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.

Outcome:
The judgment is affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Unknown
Defendant's Experts:
Unknown
Comments:
Reported by Kent Morlan

About This Case

What was the outcome of 12 Havemeyer Place Company, LLC v. Allan S. Gordon?

The outcome was: The judgment is affirmed.

Which court heard 12 Havemeyer Place Company, LLC v. Allan S. Gordon?

This case was heard in Connecitcut Court of Appeals, CT. The presiding judge was Dupont.

Who were the attorneys in 12 Havemeyer Place Company, LLC v. Allan S. Gordon?

Plaintiff's attorney: Eric D. Grayson, with whom, on the brief, was Juris V. Zauls, for the appellant (plaintiff).. Defendant's attorney: David W. Rubin, Stamford, Connecticut, for the appellee (defendant). Gail Sassos, assistant town attorney, filed a brief for the town of Greenwich as amicus curiae..

When was 12 Havemeyer Place Company, LLC v. Allan S. Gordon decided?

This case was decided on April 28, 2003.