State of Minnesota vs. Miguel Angel Vasquez,

Following a bench trial, the district court found Vasquez guilty of the premeditated

murder of Amber Lechuga. Lechuga and Vasquez shared an apartment in Springfield.

They had been romantically involved and have two children together. The State’s theory

was that Vasquez murdered Lechuga because their relationship had deteriorated, and she

was seeing other men. The State contended that Vasquez was angry over Lechuga’s

decision to end their romantic relationship, and that he murdered Lechuga at their

apartment and then attempted to hide her body and destroy evidence of his crimes.

Police found Lechuga’s body on September 25, 2014, when they responded to

Vasquez’s 911 call that he had been assaulted. As they were investigating the scene near

where Vasquez placed his call, police found Lechuga’s body in the back of a burned-out





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van that Vasquez had been driving, and they found Lechuga’s severed head in a black

garbage bag a short distance from the van.

When officers arrived on scene in response to Vasquez’s 911 call, they found

Vasquez walking along the highway about two and a half miles south of Sleepy Eye.

Vasquez reported that after driving south from Sleepy Eye for fifteen minutes, he was

involved in a rear-end collision. He said that he got out of the van, was struck on the head

and knocked out by unknown assailants, and woke up in his burning van doused in

gasoline, with his clothing and the van on fire. He said he was able to call 911 because he

retrieved his cellular phone from the front cup holder in the burning van.

Officers noticed that Vasquez smelled like burnt hair, the hair on his head was

singed, and he had burns and scrapes on his body. Officers did not, however, observe any

signs of a head injury. An emergency medical technician examined Vasquez and found

some scratches, singed hair, burns, and a blister on his abdomen, but no sign of a head

injury. The technician looked for soot in his mouth, nose and ears, but found none. Police

also photographed Vasquez’s burns, the back of his head, singed hair, and lacerations.

Vasquez was then transported to Sleepy Eye Medical Center (SEMC) for treatment, and

later to Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) for further treatment.

In addition to the physical evidence at the scene of the burned van, police also

gathered evidence from the couple’s apartment. Police found a sheathed knife in a

backpack, a .22-caliber Marlin-brand rifle, and a machete, all in a closet. Lechuga’s blood

was on the front sight of the rifle, the muzzle, and just inside the barrel. DNA swabs of the





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grip and trigger of the rifle revealed a DNA profile that matched Vasquez, but police did

not find any fingerprints on the rifle.

In the bedroom where Vasquez and Lechuga slept, police found .22-caliber

ammunition with brass-plated bullets. Testimony at trial showed that the Marlin rifle was

capable of firing this brass-plated ammunition. Testimony also showed that the bullet

fragments recovered from Lechuga’s head were brass-plated and had rifling marks

consistent with a Marlin-brand rifle.

Police also found two other firearms, a Mossberg .22-caliber rifle and a shotgun in

a closet. Investigators found latent fingerprints from Vasquez on the Mossberg rifle but

determined that it could not have fired the fatal shots.

On the bed where Lechuga typically slept, investigators found a large, still-wet

blood stain at the head of the bed. The blood was Lechuga’s and the size of the blood stain

was consistent with the amount of blood expected from a gunshot to the head.

Investigators also found garbage bags in the apartment that were similar to the white

bag found underneath Lechuga’s burned torso and the black bag that contained her head.

Finally, investigators found a box containing several BIC lighters.

As part of their investigation, police also interviewed Vasquez while he was

hospitalized. During these interviews, Vasquez gave different accounts of the van fire. For

example, Vasquez claimed that only the gasoline in the van had been on fire and not his

clothing but then also said that his clothing and the van were on fire. He also told

inconsistent stories about where he was in the van when he regained consciousness. And

Vasquez failed to give a consistent account of how he grabbed his phone from the van—





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first he said he retrieved his phone by reaching into the van, and then later he said he got

his phone by jumping into the driver’s seat of the van.

Vasquez also gave differing accounts of the accident. Initially, he was unable to

describe the car that hit him, but later he described the car as maroon or black. Vasquez’s

account of the assault also differed over time. He initially described being seated in his

van when he was struck from behind. Later, he described being hit while walking back

toward the other car.

When investigators spoke to Vasquez at the hospital, they suggested that his injuries

were not consistent with his story that he woke up in a van fully engulfed in flames.

Vasquez maintained that the reason for his minor injuries was that he got out quickly,

removed all of his clothing, and took off running. At the end of the interview, investigators

told Vasquez that they had found a body in his van and his story did not add up. Vasquez

denied any knowledge of the body.

Police also asked Vasquez to sign two forms that authorized three listed law

enforcement agents to access Vasquez’s medical information related to the accident from

both HCMC and SEMC. The forms provided that: “Unless otherwise provided by law,

neither here-in named party/agency, etc. will further disclose the information without my

consent.” Vasquez signed the forms. He did not request to have a lawyer’s advice before

signing the forms, nor did Vasquez express any instructions about to whom the information

should or should not be disclosed. The only request Vasquez made was for the agents to

try to find whoever assaulted him.





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To determine the cause of Lechuga’s death, Dr. Butch Huston from the Ramsey

County Medical Examiner’s office performed an autopsy. He concluded that the cause of

death was homicide by way of two gunshots to the head at very close range, and either

gunshot would have been immediately fatal. Dr. Huston opined that the trajectory of the

bullets through Lechuga’s head was consistent with her lying down when she was shot. He

also noted that some of Lechuga’s bones had tool marks on them from being dismembered,

and that those tool marks were consistent with a sharp, thin object like a knife. Finally, he

recovered two bullets and several bullet fragments from within Lechuga’s brain and turned

them over to the BCA.

Based on the investigation, the State charged Vasquez with first-degree

premeditated murder of Lechuga, Minnesota Statutes § 609.185(a)(1) (2016), second

degree intentional murder, Minnesota Statutes § 609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2016), second

degree murder while committing assault in the second degree, Minnesota Statutes,

§ 609.19, subdivision 2(1) (2016), and arson in the second degree, Minnesota Statutes

§ 609.562 (2016).

Before trial, each side made motions relevant to this appeal. First, in a motion filed

in April 2015, Vasquez moved to suppress statements taken at SEMC and HCMC. He

argued that those statements were taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights based

on his medical distress and the lack of a Miranda warning. Vasquez also moved to suppress

his medical records on the theory that those records were illegally seized. Vasquez did not

invoke his medical privilege.





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The district court denied Vasquez’s motion to suppress. The district court

concluded that the statements taken from Vasquez did not violate Miranda. The court also

concluded, based on the evidence presented at the omnibus hearing, that the “consents were

given knowingly and voluntarily.”

Second, in October 2016, the State moved the district court for a determination that

Vasquez had waived his medical privilege, either by signing the forms or by placing his

condition at issue in the case. The record does not show that Vasquez filed a response.

In support of its motion, the State argued that, by signing the forms and disclosing

the information to the BCA, Vasquez effectively waived the confidentiality of the records,

and thus any claim of privilege. The State also asserted that Vasquez’s medical condition

was at issue in the trial. The State contended that the only way for it to rebut Vasquez’s

account of the night of the murder was for the district court to conclude that, by putting his

medical condition at issue, Vasquez waived his medical privilege.

The court then engaged in a colloquy with Vasquez’s counsel:

[Counsel for Vasquez]: Judge, our position is that the waiver, if applicable at all, for the trial would only be applicable to the, the injuries that were suffered.

THE COURT: I don’t – I didn’t hear the State asking to go into medical records beyond the injuries that were addressed by Sleepy Eye and Hennepin County on this – the night in question; is that right?

[Counsel for the State]: Yeah, that’s correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

There was no further discussion of the medical privilege at the motion hearing, and

Vasquez’s counsel did not otherwise respond or try to invoke the privilege.





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Four days later, the district court issued an order and memorandum granting the

State’s motion. The court found no dispute that Vasquez signed the forms. The court

noted that Vasquez’s only objection was that any waiver of privilege must be limited in

scope and confined only to the dates covered by the forms, and that the State did not seek

to introduce any medical information not covered by the forms. Accordingly, the court

found that Vasquez partially waived his medical privilege for information covered by the

forms.1

The case then proceeded to trial to the district court. At trial, the State offered the

physical evidence described above. The State also offered evidence intended to show that

Vasquez attempted to cover up his crimes. This evidence included Vasquez’s effort to

make it appear as though Lechuga was still alive after he had killed her. Specifically, the

State offered testimony from a woman who was dating Lechuga’s father. She testified

that Vasquez told her that Lechuga was gone and that someone must have stopped by in

the night to pick her up and take her to St. James.2 Vasquez also told the woman that he

suspected that Lechuga had taken some money he had given her to pay utility bills.

Vasquez then asked the woman to call Lechuga because all of his calls to Lechuga went

straight to voicemail. The woman tried, but her call went straight to voicemail as well.



1 The district court’s finding of waiver was based solely on Vasquez signing the forms. The court did not address the State’s argument that Vasquez waived his medical privilege by placing his medical condition at issue. Because the district court did not reach this alternative basis, we do not consider this theory further.



2 St. James is approximately 40 miles southeast of Springfield and 25 miles south of Sleepy Eye.





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The State also offered testimony from Lechuga’s father, who said that he received

a text message purportedly from Lechuga, telling him that she had left town for a bit to

clear her head. He testified that the content of the message did not seem like something

she would typically send, and he had doubts that she had written it. Lechuga’s sister agreed

that the way the message was written was uncharacteristic of Lechuga. Other testimony

showed, based on cell phone records, that this message was sent from Sleepy Eye and that

Vasquez’s cell phone was also present in Sleepy Eye when the message was sent.

Lechuga’s father sent a message back to Lechuga, asking what would happen to her

children and received a response. Testimony showed that Lechuga’s phone was still in

Sleepy Eye when it sent a response saying that Vasquez could take the children to a friend’s

house.

The State also offered evidence of two text messages that Vasquez purportedly

received from Lechuga later that same evening. The first asked him to pick her up in

St. James. The second asked what he was driving. Vasquez responded that he would be

driving the van. He then sent another message saying, “Why can’t you get a ride over here

you can leave but now you want me to pick you up what the f***[.]” Testimony at trial

showed that all four messages were sent from Sleepy Eye, and that Lechuga’s phone was

not in St. James, which is where Vasquez had claimed that Lechuga was. Police did not

find Lechuga’s phone, but the State’s theory was that Vasquez used Lechuga’s phone to

send these messages to himself.

The State also offered testimony at trial to counter the explanation Vasquez gave to

police for his condition and the condition of the van when police responded to Vasquez’s





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911 call. A state trooper and an auto body technician testified that they did not see van

damage consistent with a rear-end collision. An EMT who examined Vasquez found no

signs of a head injury consistent with being knocked out. Two other law enforcement

agents were similarly unable to find any sign of a head injury consistent with being struck

on the head. A deputy state fire marshal testified that a person exposed to gasoline flames

would be immediately burned. He opined that a cellular phone exposed to those

temperatures would likely be partially melted and he observed no melting on Vasquez’s

phone. The fire marshal also testified that it was impossible to reach the cup holder from

which Vasquez claimed to have grabbed his cell phone through the open window. A law

enforcement officer testified that a person waking up in a burning vehicle would suffer

burns over the whole body rather than the localized burns that Vasquez sustained. And

there was testimony from law enforcement officers and the fire marshal that Vasquez’s

burns appeared to be caused by “blow back fire,” which occurs when gasoline vapors are

lit.

The State also offered the testimony of Vasquez’s treating physicians and a burn

expert. The physicians testified that they found only first and second-degree burns on

Vasquez, along with some singed hair and the smell of gasoline about his person—injuries

consistent with a flash burn, and inconsistent with the account Vasquez gave to police.

Vasquez’s physicians noted a lack of third and fourth-degree burns to his body and

in particular his hands. They testified that those injuries would be expected where a person

was set on fire or removed burning clothing. Also absent were evidence of a head injury





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and signs of a smoke inhalation injury, the latter of which would be expected if Vasquez

was unconscious in a fire.

The State did not offer Vasquez’s medical records into evidence, but the State did

ask a burn expert to review those records before trial. This expert consulted medical

records from SEMC and HCMC, as well as photographs police took at the scene and law

enforcement reports. The expert testified that Vasquez’s injuries were inconsistent with

the account that Vasquez gave to police and the relative lack of injury to his left side further

discredited his account of the fire. He opined that Vasquez should have had some degree

of smoke inhalation injury and multiple third-degree burns. He also testified, based on

photographs shown to him at trial, that Vasquez’s nearly uniform first-degree burn was

more consistent with a flash burn, caused by a sudden burst of flame, than with the story

Vasquez told police.

The expert further opined that if Vasquez had grabbed his cell phone from the

burning van, as Vasquez claimed, Vasquez would have suffered third-degree burns to his

hand, but Vasquez had no such injury. He also opined that Vasquez’s injuries were

consistent with a right-handed person, such as Vasquez, lighting gasoline fumes with a

lighter.

At the conclusion of the trial, the district court made findings of fact and conclusions

of law and found Vasquez guilty of all four charges. The court found that the evidence

established that Vasquez’s “story of being rear-ended by another vehicle was demonstrably

false.” On the first-degree premediated murder count, which is the only charge relevant to

this appeal, the court found that Vasquez’s actions in retrieving a firearm and loading,





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aiming, and firing it demonstrated premeditation. The court also found evidence of

premeditation in Vasquez’s elaborate efforts to conceal his crime. The court sentenced

Vasquez to life in prison without the possibility of release. This appeal follows.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Vasquez argues that the district court erred by admitting privileged

medical information into evidence. Specifically, Vasquez argues that the admission of

information from his medical records3 and the testimony from his treating physicians, was

erroneous. He contends that this evidence was prejudicial because the only factual

information about the nature of his injuries in the district court’s findings of fact came from

Vasquez’s treating physicians.

We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016). A court abuses its discretion when it

reaches a “ ‘clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record.’ ”

State v. Williams, 842 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Moylan v. Moylan,

384 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Minn. 1986)). Before turning to the merits of the evidentiary issue

that Vasquez raises, we must determine whether, as the State argues, Vasquez has waived

review of this issue.4



3 The State did not offer Vasquez’s medical records into evidence. But Vasquez argues that the testimony of his treating physicians and the testimony of the State’s burn expert was based in part on those witnesses’ review of his medical records, records that Vasquez contends his medical privilege protects.



4 The State characterizes the issue as one of waiver rather than forfeiture. “Waiver” is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. See, e.g., State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d





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I.

We have recognized that a “ ‘constitutional right, or a right of any other sort, may

be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the

right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.’ ” State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d

275, 278 (Minn. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 731 (1993)). Appellate review of an evidentiary issue is forfeited when a defendant

fails to object to the admission of evidence. State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 684 (Minn.

2001).5 A defendant may preserve a claim of evidentiary error by making a pretrial motion

to exclude the challenged evidence or by objecting at trial when the evidence is introduced.

State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 183 (Minn. 2002). A defendant’s objection to the

admission of evidence preserves review only for the stated basis for the objection or a basis

apparent from the context of the objection. State v. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d 609, 617–18

(Minn. 2014).

Here, Vasquez did not move to suppress medical information on the basis that the

medical privilege applied. He moved to suppress his medical information on only a theory

of defective consent. The district court denied Vasquez’s motion. Vasquez does not appeal

this ruling.



275, 278 n.3 (2015). “Forfeiture,” on the other hand is the failure to make a timely assertion of a right. Id.



5 Our prior cases have often used the word “waived” when describing a defendant’s failure to make a timely objection to an evidentiary error in the trial court. See State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 684 (Minn. 2001). The more appropriate characterization of that failure to timely object is as a forfeiture. See Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d at 278 n.3.





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This appeal instead relates to the subject of the State’s pretrial motion. Before trial,

the State moved for a determination that Vasquez had waived his medical privilege. At the

hearing on the State’s motion, Vasquez did not contest the introduction of evidence about

his treatment during the period covered by the forms he signed or offer any other objection

to the admission of that information. Vasquez expressed concern only about the

introduction of medical information that was not covered by the form: “Judge, our position

is that the waiver, if applicable at all, for the trial would only be applicable to the, the

injuries that were suffered.”

In response to Vasquez’s position, the district court confirmed that the State had no

intention of introducing records or testimony that were not covered by the form: “I don’t

– I didn’t hear the State asking to go into medical records beyond the injuries that were

addressed by Sleepy Eye and Hennepin County on this – the night in question; is that

right?” The State confirmed that intention: “Yeah, that’s correct, Your Honor.” Vasquez’s

counsel made no further comments or other objection. The district court then ruled that

Vasquez waived his privilege for the medical information covered by the forms. At trial,

Vasquez did not object to the introduction of medical information on the basis of privilege

or coerced consent.

The medical evidence that Vasquez challenges on appeal falls within the scope of

the forms that Vasquez signed. Because Vasquez did not make a timely claim of privilege

in the district court to prevent the introduction of this evidence, we conclude that he has

forfeited review of the district court’s determination that he waived his medical privilege

as to that evidence.





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II.

Our conclusion that Vasquez forfeited review of the admission of the medical

information is not the end of the analysis. This is so because we review forfeited issues for

plain error. Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02; Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d at 279. A defendant is entitled

to relief from a plain error if “(1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the

error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804

(Minn. 2016) (citing State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)). If the three

prongs of the plain error test are met, we then consider “ ‘whether [we] should address the

error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.’ ” Id. at 804–05

(alteration in original) (quoting Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740).

We need not determine in this case if the district court’s admission of the medical

information was error that was plain because even if it was plain error, Vasquez has not

demonstrated that the admission of the challenged evidence affected his substantial rights.

Erroneously introduced evidence affects the defendant’s substantial rights if it significantly

influences the verdict by going to a critical issue at the trial or is central to the prosecution’s

case. Rossberg, 851 N.W.2d at 618; Litzau, 650 N.W.2d at 184.

Vasquez argues that the medical information significantly affected the verdict

because the district court’s findings of fact relied on medical information for the conclusion

that Vasquez’s story to police was “demonstrably false.” The court did rely on testimony

from Vasquez’s medical providers when discussing the nature of injuries Vasquez suffered

as compared to the injuries one would expect if the accident had occurred as Vasquez

contended it had to police. But the court also specifically concluded that “the physical





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evidence contradicts the Defendant’s story,” referencing the fact that “[t]here was no

damage to the van caused by [the] alleged high-speed collision.”

Contrary to Vasquez’s argument, our careful consideration of the record convinces

us that the medical evidence Vasquez challenges did not substantially influence the verdict.

The medical evidence was largely cumulative of other evidence. The State used the

medical information to confirm the falsity of the story that Vasquez told police.

Specifically, the State relied on testimony from Vasquez’s physician to establish that

Vasquez’s account of an accident and assault did not align with the injuries that he actually

sustained. But testimony from law enforcement officers, a deputy State fire marshal, an

auto body technician, as well as an EMT also support the conclusion that the injuries they

observed and the condition of the van were inconsistent with Vasquez’s story.

Moreover, the challenged evidence was a small part of the State’s case, and the other

evidence that Vasquez murdered Lechuga in their apartment, dismembered her body and

then attempted to destroy the evidence of his crime is strong. See, e.g., State v. Jackson,

770 N.W.2d 470, 483 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that erroneous admission of evidence did

not substantially influence the verdict because the erroneously-admitted evidence was

cumulative to other evidence and there was “strong evidence” of the defendant’s guilt).

Vasquez’s own account of the accident ties him to the van, where police found Lechuga’s

body. Physical evidence police found in the apartment Vasquez shared with Lechuga ties

him to the murder and the disposal of the body in the van. Vasquez’s DNA and Lechuga’s

blood were found on the murder weapon—the Marlin rifle. The bullet fragments found in

Lechuga’s skull were consistent with ammunition found in Vasquez’s apartment and had





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rifling marks on them consistent with the Marlin rifle. A blood stain found in Vasquez’s

apartment was consistent with the amount of blood expected from a gunshot wound to the

head and matched Lechuga’s DNA. The garbage bags found at Vasquez’s apartment were

also similar to those found with Lechuga’s body and severed head.

In addition, the evidence of premeditation was strong. Evidence regarding motive

is relevant to premeditation. See State v. Hurd, 819 N.W.2d 591, 600 (Minn. 2012) (“[I]f

motive is present, ‘it can help strengthen a finding that the defendant deliberated about the

killing.’ ” (quoting State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 242 (Minn. 2010))). Here, the

State demonstrated that Vasquez was angry because Lechuga decided to end their romantic

relationship, providing a motive to kill. See State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Minn.

2014) (“The anger sparked by the deterioration of the couple’s relationship and [the

defendant]’s jealousy provided a motive to kill, which supports the Jury’s premeditation

determination.”). In assessing premeditation, we also examine the nature of the killing.

See State v. Vang, 774 N.W.2d 566, 583 (Minn. 2009) (recognizing that the nature of the

killing is relevant to an inference of premeditation). As the medical examiner explained,

Lechuga was killed when she was shot in the head at close range, while she was lying down

in her bed. See State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 413 (Minn. 2016) (“[E]vidence showing

that the defendant inflicted wounds to the victim’s vital organs may support an inference

of premeditation.”). To commit the murder, Vasquez had to collect the Marlin rifle from

the front closet, load it, go to the bedroom where Lechuga was lying, aim the rifle at her

head, and then fire it twice. See State v. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 2008) (“We

have recognized in several cases that procurement of a weapon constitutes evidence of





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premeditation.”); Bangert v. State, 282 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Minn. 1979) (concluding that the

jury’s finding of premeditation was reasonable where defendant retrieved a rifle, walked

to the bedroom, raised the rifle, aimed the rifle, and fired the rifle three times). Finally,

Vasquez’s efforts to convince Lechuga’s family that she had left town are relevant to

premeditation, as are his dismembering of Lechuga’s body and his attempt to dispose of

the body by setting the van on fire. See State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 101 (Minn. 2012)

(concluding that cleaning up and disposing of evidence were efforts to evade detection and

supported a finding of premeditation); State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Minn. 2005)

(concluding that burning evidence supported finding of premeditation); State v.

Lodermeier, 539 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Minn. 1995) (noting that a defendant’s “words and

actions before, during and after the killing” can support an inference of premeditation).

Because the medical evidence was not central to the case, it was duplicative of other

testimony, and the evidence of Vasquez’s guilt was otherwise strong, we conclude that the

admission of the medical evidence did not substantially influence the verdict. Accordingly,

even if the district court plainly erred by admitting the medical evidence, we hold that

Vasquez is not entitled to relief under the plain error standard.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.



Affirmed.