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On August 12, 2015, Webster submitted 14 requests to Hennepin County for public

government data under the Data Practices Act. Among Webster’s requests was one asking

that Hennepin County perform a computer-aided search of its stored e-mails using

20 separate search terms. Eventually, Hennepin County responded to all of Webster’s

requests except for the e-mail search request. Hennepin County asserted that the search

request was “too burdensome with which to comply.”

Webster filed an expedited data-practices complaint alleging that Hennepin County

had violated the Data Practices Act by failing to promptly and substantively respond to his

data requests. After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ concluded that Hennepin County had

violated the Data Practices Act. The ALJ ordered Hennepin County to, among other things,

(1) implement a procedure by June 1, 2016, to ensure that electronically stored public data,

including e-mail, is organized for easy access and use by the public; and (2) begin

production of the requested data on a rolling basis, including e-mails, to Webster by May 2,

2016, with all requested data to be produced by June 3, 2016.

Hennepin County gathered the relevant e-mails and began producing data on a

weekly basis. Webster was able to inspect some of the relevant e-mails on May 2 and 9,

2016.

On May 3, 2016, by petition for a writ of certiorari, Hennepin County appealed the

ALJ’s order to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The next day, Hennepin County asked the

ALJ to issue a partial stay pending appeal. Hennepin County argued that, absent a stay, its

“right to appellate review will be eclipsed because it will be forced to act, including

performing the e-mail term search that Respondents believe is not required by the Data

Practices Act.”

The ALJ granted Hennepin County’s motion on May 18, 2016. The ALJ relied on

two cases discussing the standard for granting a stay pending appeal: State v. Northern

Pacific Railway Co., 22 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1946), and DRJ, Inc. v. City of St. Paul,

741 N.W.2d 141 (Minn. App. 2007). The ALJ cited Northern Pacific Railway for the

proposition that a stay may be granted “to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction” and to

“avoid a multiplicity of suits.” See N. Pac. Ry., 22 N.W.2d at 574-75. The ALJ cited DRJ

for the proposition that the court “must balance the appealing party’s interest in preserving

the status quo, so that effective relief will be available if the appeal succeeds, against the

interests of the public or the prevailing party in enforcing the decision and ensuring they

will remain ‘secure in victory’ while the appeal is pending.” See DRJ, 741 N.W.2d at 144

(quoting 3 Eric J. Magnuson & David F. Herr, Minnesota Practice—Appellate Rules Ann.

§ 108.1, at 446 (2007)). Applying the law from these two cases, the ALJ stated:

While it is clear that the purpose of the [Act] is to ensure timely access to requested public data, this important provision will only be temporarily delayed by granting the requested stay. Complainant, and the public, will not be denied access to the requested public government data. The right to prompt access must be balanced, here, with preserving the jurisdiction of the Minnesota Court of Appeals. If the order is not stayed there may be no live controversy for the Court to consider.



The ALJ also stated that the stay should be granted “to help ensure minimal future litigation”

regarding the Data Practices Act.

Webster filed a motion in the court of appeals to lift the stay, arguing that the standard

from DRJ—and the ALJ’s application of that standard—deviated from our standard

announced in Northern Pacific Railway. The court of appeals denied Webster’s motion,

stating that DRJ was “consistent” with Northern Pacific Railway. Webster v. Hennepin

Cty., No. A16-0736, Order at 3 (Minn. App. filed July 5, 2016).



ANALYSIS



A stay pending appeal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See N. Pac. Ry.,

22 N.W.2d at 573. Webster argues that DRJ’s balancing test is “fundamentally inadequate”

because it omits factors that must be analyzed under Northern Pacific Railway: whether

the appellant is likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal, and whether a stay is necessary

to protect the appellant from irreparable injury. Hennepin County responds that Northern

Pacific Railway sets forth a comprehensive test consistent with the trial court’s broad

discretion, and that the ALJ sufficiently analyzed the factors relevant to the case.

We addressed the standard governing whether to grant a stay pending appeal in

Northern Pacific Railway, 22 N.W.2d at 574-75. At the outset of that analysis, we

emphasized the “discretionary powers” of a court considering such a motion. Id. at 574.

We then quoted Corpus Juris Secundum as follows:

As a rule a supersedeas or stay should be granted, if the court has the power to grant it, whenever it appears that without it the objects of the appeal or writ of error may be defeated, or that it is reasonably necessary to protect appellant or plaintiff in error from irreparable or serious injury in case of a reversal, and it does not appear that appellee or defendant in error will sustain irreparable or disproportionate injury in case of affirmance. It should be granted where . . . the loss or damage occasioned by the stay can be met by a money award, where important questions of law are raised, which, if decided in favor of appellant or plaintiff in error, will require a reversal, to avoid a multiplicity of suits, or to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction.



Id. at 574-75 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 4 C.J.S. Appeal and

Error § 636 (1937)). We stated that the quoted material “express[ed] the general rules

applicable herein.” Id. at 575. From among the “general rules,” we expressly analyzed

one: avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Id. On that basis, we concluded the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in granting a stay. Id.

Northern Pacific Railway demonstrates that a trial court has broad discretion in

deciding which of the various factors are relevant in each case, and that a court need only

analyze the relevant factors. See id. at 574-75; see also Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770,

776-78 (1987) (noting that a stay motion “contemplate[s] individualized judgments in each

case,” meaning that “the formula cannot be reduced to a set of rigid rules”). Among the

factors that may be relevant are: whether the appeal raises substantial issues; injury to one

or more parties absent a stay; and the public interest, which includes the effective

administration of justice. Effective administration includes protecting appellate

jurisdiction, avoiding multiple lawsuits, and preventing the defeat of “the objects of the

appeal or writ of error.” N. Pac. Ry., 22 N.W.2d at 574-75 (quoting 4 C.J.S., supra).2

Here, the ALJ conducted at least as much analysis as we did in Northern Pacific

Railway. The ALJ noted that there might not be a live controversy in the absence of a stay

if Hennepin County were required to produce all the requested e-mails before the court of

appeals could rule. Thus, issuing a stay would preserve the court of appeals’ jurisdiction

by preventing a significant legal issue from becoming moot during appeal. The ALJ

correctly identified this as the most important factor to consider. The ALJ then balanced

this factor against Webster’s and the public’s interests in gaining prompt access to the

requested data. The ALJ also noted that granting the stay would reduce future litigation

regarding Data Practices Act requests. Only after conducting this additional analysis did

the ALJ grant Hennepin County’s motion for a partial stay pending appeal.

The fact that the ALJ did not expressly analyze every factor listed in Northern

Pacific Railway was not an abuse of discretion. Depending on the circumstances, a court

could abuse its discretion by failing to consider a relevant factor. But a critical omission

did not occur here. The ALJ considered the factors relevant to this case.

Webster also takes issue with DRJ’s statement that a trial court “must balance” the

interests of the parties and the public. See DRJ, 741 N.W.2d at 144. But that is what the

trial court should do: identify the relevant factors, weight each factor, and then balance

them, applying the court’s sound discretion. See Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch

Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953) (discussing “the balance of hardships”); Town of

North Kingstown v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651, 65 A.3d 480, 481 (R.I. 2013)

(stating that the various factors are “ ‘interrelated considerations that must be balanced

together’ ” (quoting Service Emps. Int’l Union Local 1 v. Husted, 698 F.3d 341, 343 (6th

Cir. 2012))); 20 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 308.21 (3d ed. 2016)

(stating that “the district court should balance the parties’ potential harms”); 16A Charles

Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Catherine T. Struve, Federal Practice

& Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3954 (4th ed. 2008) (stating that the “factors should be

balanced”). That is what the ALJ did here.



Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision to issue a stay pending appeal was

not an abuse of discretion.