State of Minnesota vs. Leona Rose deLottinville

This case presents the question of whether police, having obtained an arrest warrant,

are required by the United States Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution to obtain a

search warrant to enter a third party’s home to arrest the subject of the arrest warrant.

Because we conclude that a search warrant is not required, we affirm.

In 2015, appellant Leona Rose deLottinville was arrested and charged by complaint

with two felonies: fifth-degree possession of methamphetamine and storing

methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a child. In ordering deLottinville’s

pretrial release, the district court imposed conditions that she not possess or consume

alcoholic beverages or any mood-altering drugs, and that she be subject to random testing.

DeLottinville acknowledged that a violation of the conditions of release could result in her

arrest. When she failed several random tests, the State applied for an arrest warrant. The

district court found probable cause that deLottinville had violated the conditions of her

release and issued a warrant for her arrest. DeLottinville does not challenge the lawfulness

of the arrest warrant.

Five days later, responding to a tip, officers went to the residence of deLottinville’s

boyfriend, D.R., in Grove City. D.R. lived in an apartment in the lower level of his parents’

house. Upon arriving, one officer spoke with D.R.’s mother at the front door while the

other officer walked around to the back door to prevent anyone from fleeing. At the back

of the house, the officer looked through a glass patio door and saw deLottinville. He

opened the unlocked door, went inside, and arrested her.

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While arresting deLottinville, the officer saw marijuana and a bong on a countertop.

There is no dispute that the items were in plain view. Later that day, law enforcement

obtained a search warrant for D.R.’s apartment and discovered marijuana,

methamphetamine, hydrocodone pills, and drug paraphernalia. The State charged

deLottinville with two counts of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance,

Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016); and possession of drug paraphernalia,

Minn. Stat. § 152.092 (2016).

On a motion to suppress, the district court ruled that deLottinville’s arrest was illegal

because the warrant for her arrest did not authorize police to enter D.R.’s apartment. The

district court suppressed all fruits of the arrest and dismissed the charges. The court of

appeals unanimously reversed, adopting the reasoning of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Clifford, which held that a guest in a

home does not have a greater expectation of privacy than the homeowner under the Fourth

Amendment. State v. deLottinville, 877 N.W.2d 199, 204-05 (Minn. App. 2016) (citing

664 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 1981)). We granted review to decide whether either the

United States Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution requires that the evidence be

suppressed.

I.

When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the

district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and its legal

determinations de novo. See State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 483-85 (Minn. 2016).

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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. Fourth Amendment rights are “personal” and “may not be vicariously

asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). As relevant here, standing

to bring a Fourth Amendment claim hinges on whether deLottinville has “a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).

The parties agree that an overnight guest such as deLottinville has a legitimate expectation

of privacy in her host’s home. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990).

The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue in this case, but two of its

decisions set the boundaries of the legal analysis. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573

(1980), the Court announced that police may enter into the “dwelling in which the suspect

lives” to execute an arrest warrant. Id. at 603. The Court reasoned, “If there is sufficient

evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest

is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers

of the law,” even though “an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a

search warrant requirement.” Id. at 602-03. The Court explicitly reserved the question of

whether the same holds true when the subject of an arrest warrant is believed to be present

in another person’s home. Id. at 583.

The question Payton left open was explored, but not answered, in Steagald v. United

States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). In Steagald, armed with an arrest warrant, police entered a

third party’s home to arrest a guest. Id. at 206. While police searched for the guest inside

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the home, they found evidence incriminating the homeowner. Id. at 206-07. The Court

held that, with regard to the homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights, the arrest warrant for

the guest did not justify entry into and search of the home. Id. at 216. The crux of the

Court’s reasoning was that, unlike a search warrant, an arrest warrant does not contain “a

showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a

particular place.” Id. at 213. Thus, the homeowner’s “only protection from an illegal entry

and search was the agent’s personal determination of probable cause.” Id. But the Court

again confined its holding, limiting it to a challenge raised by “a person not named in the

warrant.” Id. at 212.

In a nutshell, Payton describes the Fourth Amendment rights of a homeowner

subject to an arrest warrant, while Steagald explains the rights of a homeowner when police

execute an arrest warrant for a guest. But the Supreme Court has not yet defined the Fourth

Amendment rights of those in deLottinville’s position: guests subject to an arrest warrant.

We conclude that Payton sets the ceiling on a guest’s Fourth Amendment rights. A

guest should not receive any greater Fourth Amendment protection when outside her home

than when inside it. The home is “first among equals” under the Fourth Amendment,

representing the “very core” of a person’s constitutional protections. Florida v. Jardines,

___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States,

365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Yet Payton held that it is

constitutionally reasonable for police to enter a person’s own home when police have an

arrest warrant for that person. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602. Because Fourth Amendment rights

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are at their apex in one’s own home, it necessarily follows that the subject of an arrest

warrant enjoys no greater protection as a guest in another’s home.

In other words, it is a person’s status as the subject of the arrest warrant, not whether

the person is in her own home or the home of another, that is decisive under Payton’s logic.

Here, police lawfully obtained an arrest warrant for deLottinville and entered the home

knowing that she was there, so their entry did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.

Federal circuit courts almost universally agree. Of the ten circuit courts that have

addressed this issue, nine have held that a guest’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated

by police entry into another’s home to arrest a guest under a lawful arrest warrant. See

Clifford, 664 F.2d at 1093; see also United States v. Bohannon, 824 F.3d 242, 250-52 (2d

Cir. 2016); United States v. Hollis, 780 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S.

Ct. 274 (2015); United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 2009); United States

v. Kern, 336 F. App’x 296, 298 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished); United States v. McCarson,

527 F.3d 170, 172-73 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir.

2006); United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v.

Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1983). These decisions repeat a simple maxim:

“A person has no greater right of privacy in another’s home than in his own.” Underwood,

717 F.2d at 484. Only the First Circuit has disagreed, and then only provisionally,

assuming without deciding that a suspect can challenge the search of another’s home during

an arrest. United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 23 n.3 (1st Cir. 2003).

The few state supreme courts that have addressed the issue are in accord with the

heavy weight of federal authority. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court allowed

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entry without a search warrant to arrest a guest under both the Fourth Amendment and

Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, echoing federal circuit courts in

stating that “[i]t would produce an unacceptable paradox to afford the subject of an arrest

warrant greater protection in the home of another than in his or her own home.”

Commonwealth v. Tatum, 992 N.E.2d 987, 992-93 (Mass. 2013) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Supreme courts in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island came to the

same conclusion under the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Stanley, 446 A.2d 583,

586-87 (Pa. 1982); State v. O’Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427 (R.I. 1990). We are aware of no

state supreme court decision to the contrary.

In deciding that a search warrant is not required to enter a third party’s home, we

have not overlooked the argument that such a decision does not fully protect the privacy

rights of the homeowner. We understand that a homeowner might well be surprised and

distressed to learn that police may enter at any time to arrest a guest. See Steagald, 451 U.S.

at 213 (reasoning that an arrest warrant “did absolutely nothing to protect petitioner’s

privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home”). Nor

do we discount Steagald’s warning of a “potential for abuse”: police using arrest warrants

as a pretext to enter homes when they lack probable cause of illegal activity. Id. at 215.

But there is no indication in this case of any such abuse; deLottinville was visible

to the officer before he entered the home. And the question of what rights the homeowner

may have in such a situation is not before us. See Hollis, 780 F.3d at 1068; United States

v. Buckner, 717 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1983) (suggesting a third-party homeowner may

pursue a civil rights claim). This case concerns only a guest’s constitutional rights, and a

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guest in a home cannot “vicariously assert[]” the rights of the homeowner. Alderman, 394

U.S. at 174. Here, law enforcement’s entry and search resulted in charges against only the

guest, not the homeowner.

DeLottinville argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Olson, 495 U.S. at 100,

compels police to obtain both an arrest warrant and a search warrant in these circumstances.

We disagree. In Olson, the defendant sought to suppress a statement he made following

law enforcement’s warrantless entry into another’s home to arrest him. Id. at 94. The

Court held that, as an overnight guest, Olson had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

home. Id. at 98-99. Because law enforcement entered the home without any warrant, the

entry violated Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 93-94.

Unlike in Olson, deLottinville was the subject of an arrest warrant. Olson merely

confirms that deLottinville had an expectation of privacy; it says nothing about the effect

of a lawful arrest warrant. Therefore, we conclude that law enforcement’s entry into

another’s home to arrest deLottinville did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.

II.

DeLottinville contends that even if the Fourth Amendment does not require

suppression, Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution does. We disagree.

The text of Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution mirrors the Fourth

Amendment.1 We are “free to interpret the Minnesota Constitution as affording greater

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the United States Constitution.”



1 We have described the language of Article I, Section 10 and the Fourth Amendment as “textually identical” despite some differences in punctuation between the two provisions. State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 689 n.1 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted).



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State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 361 (Minn. 2004). “[W]hen we reach a clear and

strong conviction that there is a principled basis for greater protection of the individual

civil and political rights of our citizens under the Minnesota Constitution, we will not

hesitate to interpret the constitution to independently safeguard those rights.” Kahn v.

Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005).

When we interpret Article I, Section 10, we consider the Supreme Court’s Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence to be “of persuasive, although not compelling, authority.” In re

Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 577 (Minn. 2003) (citing State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d

90, 97 (Minn. 1999)). We have given independent meaning to Article I, Section 10 when

we have had a principled reason to do so.2

On the subject of whether both an arrest warrant and a search warrant are required

to enter a third party’s home to arrest a guest, we see no principled basis to apply the

Minnesota Constitution to depart from overwhelming federal precedent and unanimous,



2 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 181-82 (Minn. 2007) (holding, in the absence of Supreme Court precedent, that a dog sniff in a hallway outside an apartment constitutes a search requiring a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 212 (Minn. 2005) (holding that a dog sniff of an area outside a storage unit was an unreasonable search under Article I, Section 10, despite being reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, when officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity); Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 362-63 (holding, contrary to Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), that a search or seizure during a traffic stop must be reasonable under Article I, Section 10 even when a minor law has been violated); B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d at 576-77 (holding, in the absence of Supreme Court precedent, that short-term social guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 10); Ascher v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994) (holding, contrary to Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), that roadblocks that indiscriminately stop all drivers in an effort to apprehend drunk drivers violate Article I, Section 10); In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 782-83 (Minn. 1993) (holding, contrary to California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), that a person is seized under Article I, Section 10 when he reasonably concludes he is not free to leave).



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although limited, state supreme court precedent. There is nothing in our constitution’s text

or history, or in our state’s case law3 or tradition, that requires that both types of warrants

be issued to arrest a guest present in another’s home. We decline to adopt a rule that

provides greater protection for a guest than a homeowner in the execution of a lawful arrest

warrant. DeLottinville is correct that, in B.R.K., invoking both constitutions, we

suppressed the fruits of an entry and search involving a short-term social guest. 658

N.W.2d at 580. But in that case, law enforcement had neither a search warrant nor an arrest

warrant, and B.R.K. was found hiding in the home. Id. at 569. In this case, the police had

an arrest warrant and entered the home only after seeing the subject of the warrant.