Description:
Appellant Anthony James Cox was found guilty by a Scott County jury of
first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of first-degree intentional felony murder
(burglary and aggravated robbery), and first-degree aggravated robbery. The murder
charges arose out of the death of Aaron Moran on October 22, 2013. Prior to trial, the
district court denied Cox’s motion to suppress a statement he made to the police. The
district court sentenced Cox to life without the possibility of release for the first-degree
premeditated murder conviction and a concurrent 81-month sentence for the first-degree
aggravated robbery conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
In October 2013, Cox and his friend Brooks Kurr decided to rob Aaron Moran at
his home in Shakopee, Minnesota. Although Cox had never met Moran, Kurr knew Moran
quite well. Between September 2012 and September 2013, Kurr and Moran worked
together at Affordable Town Car. Kurr had driven to Moran’s home several times, knew
he often carried cash, and had seen him possess marijuana. Thus, Kurr believed Moran
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was a drug dealer who might have drugs and money at his home. By October 2013, Kurr’s
relationship with Moran had soured because Kurr believed he lost his job at Affordable
Town Car in part due to Moran and that Moran had set him up to be robbed on two prior
occasions. In fact, when the police later asked personnel at Affordable Town Car if they
could think of anyone who might have “a reason to hurt” Moran, they immediately
identified Kurr.
On the night of October 8, 2013, Kurr and Cox organized an attempt to rob Moran.
Kurr drove Cox past Moran’s home, parked a few blocks away, and gave Cox a .38 caliber
handgun “for intimidation purposes and, . . . if necessary, force” to accomplish the robbery.
Because Moran might recognize Kurr, Cox agreed to commit the robbery by himself. Cox
stepped out of the car and walked in the general direction of Moran’s home. As Cox walked
through the neighborhood, he became lost and was unable to locate Moran’s home. He
therefore abandoned the robbery that night.
Sometime between October 8 and October 22, Cox purchased a .357 magnum
revolver. The revolver had the capacity to hold six bullets. Cox would later tell police he
developed “pretty good aim,” and when he went to the gun range he used a two-handed
grip.
On the night of October 22, 2013, Kurr and Cox returned to Moran’s neighborhood.
On this occasion, Cox knew the exact location of Moran’s home. The plan was the same
as on October 8, except that this time Cox brought the fully loaded .357 magnum. Cox
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wore a mismatched pair of gloves. On his right hand, he wore a “pistol grip-type glove.”1
On his left hand he wore a cotton glove. Cox also placed extra bullets in his pocket.
When Cox unlawfully entered Moran’s home, he encountered Moran’s 15-year-old
nephew B.M., who was playing a video game. Cox told B.M. “this is a robbery” and
directed him to pause the video game. After closing the curtains, Cox asked B.M. if anyone
else was present in the home. When B.M. indicated that no one else was present, Cox
asked, “If there [is] someone in the house [is it] okay if I just killed everybody . . . ?”2 Cox
then directed B.M. to take him on a tour of the home.
As B.M. stood up and began walking towards the hallway, Moran walked in the
front door and said, “Whoa.” Cox raised the .357 magnum from his side and pointed it at
Moran. Looking back and forth between Cox and B.M, Moran smiled, apparently
believing that Cox’s presence was some kind of joke. Cox did not tell Moran that this was
a robbery or demand any cash or drugs. Instead, Cox said, “This is the one I’m looking
for.” A few seconds later, Moran’s cell phone began to ring. As Moran reached for the
phone, Cox repeatedly ordered Moran to show his hands. Ignoring Cox’s orders, Moran
pulled the phone completely out of his pocket. B.M. could see that the object in Moran’s
hand was a phone. Cox ordered Moran to “put down the phone.” When Moran ignored
1 A pistol grip glove or “shooter’s glove” is a glove “worn by individuals shooting guns to lessen the recoil shock” and “sold separately rather than in a pair; it is intended to be worn on the trigger hand alone.” U.S. Customs & Border Protection, HQ 083694 (1989).
2 This quote is taken from Cox’s own statement to police. B.M. testified that Cox replied, “If you’re lying, would it be alright if I shoot you?”
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that order, Cox shot Moran in the right thigh, shattering his femur. B.M. turned away and
covered his ears. According to B.M., 40 seconds elapsed between the first order and the
first shot. Cox later told the police that the “[f]irst time I shot him I didn’t just pow pow.”
Instead, Cox offered Moran another opportunity to comply with his orders. When Moran
continued to ignore his commands, Cox fired a second shot, which struck Moran in the
chest, causing Moran to “stumble back towards the door.” As Moran was falling
backwards, Cox fired a “third and fourth [shot] pretty much at the same time.” Moran fell
onto his back and was “having a hard time breathing.” Cox directed B.M. to retrieve
Moran’s wallet, which required that B.M. first roll Moran over on to his stomach. After
Cox went through Moran’s wallet, he said, “Let’s continue,” which B.M. understood as a
command to continue with the tour of the home.
In Moran’s bedroom, Cox directed B.M. to unlock a safe and empty its contents
(paperwork and ammunition) into B.M.’s school backpack. Cox then asked B.M. if he had
any duct tape or rope. When B.M. said that he did not, Cox told B.M. to put his hands on
his head, close his eyes, and count to 120. When B.M. finished counting to 120, Cox was
gone. B.M. immediately called 911.
Upon their arrival, the police found Moran dead on the floor. They also found four
.357 bullets at the scene: one on the foyer floor, one in Moran’s pant leg, one under Moran’s
body, and one lodged in a door leading to a stairway.
The medical examiner performed an autopsy on Moran and concluded that he was
shot four times: once in the right thigh and three times in the chest. One of the bullets in
Moran’s chest traveled in a downward trajectory, and two traveled upward from front to
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back. The medical examiner concluded that the two bullets traveling at an upward angle
were probably fired when Moran was falling backwards or already on the floor.
Witnesses from Affordable Town Car identified Kurr as a potential suspect.
Investigators examined Kurr’s cell phone activity, leading them to identify Cox as a suspect
as well. Investigators then tracked Cox and Kurr via their cell phone activity and 4 days
later arrested Cox in an alley near Moran’s house. Cox was carrying B.M.’s school
backpack, three .357 rounds, and Moran’s cell phone.
Cox arrived at the Shakopee police department around 9:45 p.m., and was
interviewed by Shakopee Detective Cody Horner and BCA Agent Mike Wold. Shakopee
Detective Corey Schneck was present for the final hour of the interview. The interview
began at 11:49 p.m. and lasted almost 5 hours, concluding at 4:45 a.m. Agent Wold began
the interview by informing Cox of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). When asked whether he understood those rights, Cox answered, “Uh huh.”
Agent Wold informed Cox he was not free to leave, told him that the officers “kinda need
to hear [Cox’s] side of the story,” and asked him if he was willing to talk. Cox answered,
“Sure.”
During the interview, Cox asked investigators about the status of a police
investigation into the cause of his brother’s death. Cox stated that his brother, T.T.,
suffered a gunshot wound to the left side of his head in 2011 and that his death was the
reason Cox moved to Minnesota. Cox told the investigators that “they tried to deem [his
death] a suicide at first and I heard forensics came back and reopened the case and then I
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never heard anything else about the situation.” Cox mentioned that he “would love to be
able to [hire] private investigators,” but that he did not have the money.
Later in the interview, Cox initiated a negotiation with the investigators that resulted
in his confession:
AC: I mean this is this is my only negotiation I think it’s pretty fair. You know what I mean. My negotiation is this . . . I’m a go ahead and, and kill myself (Inaudible) what you say, words, right?
MW: Yup
AC: But in exchange I need one favor it’s not a hard favor. All I need is to uhm I would like to know a little bit a information more about if anybody was checking out my brother’s murder. You know what I mean, I like to know if it was you know I mean if they found out that yes this is a murder and you know I mean something.
Agent Wold agreed to “look into” the matter, and Cox subsequently admitted he killed
Moran.
In December 2013, a Scott County grand jury indicted Cox on one count of
first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185, subd. (a)(1) (2014); two counts
of first-degree intentional murder while committing or attempting to commit a felony,
Minn. Stat. § 609.185, subd. (a)(3) (2014); and one count of first-degree aggravated
robbery, Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2014). Cox moved to suppress the statement he
gave to police following his arrest, arguing, among other things, that it was involuntary.
Following a contested omnibus hearing, the district court denied Cox’s motion to suppress
and his case proceeded to trial.
At trial, the State presented evidence that was consistent with the facts outlined
above. On the issue of premeditation, the court instructed the jurors that:
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Premeditation means that the defendant considered, planned, prepared for, or determined to commit the act before the defendant committed it. Premeditation, being a process of the mind is wholly subjective, and hence, not always susceptible to proof by direct evidence. It may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the event. It is not necessary that premeditation exist for any specific length of time. A premeditated decision to kill may be reached in a short period of time. However, an unconsidered or rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditated.3
(Emphasis added.) During closing argument, defense counsel argued Cox’s conduct was
“impulsive.” The jury disagreed, finding Cox guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.
Based on the jury’s verdict, the district court convicted Cox of first-degree premeditated
murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of release. This direct
appeal followed.
I.
Cox argues the district court committed reversible error by denying his motion to
suppress his confession. Specifically, Cox alleges that (1) police promised that in exchange
for his statement they would look into his brother’s death; (2) police assured him they could
influence the county attorney; and (3) police told him that a “small town Scott County jury”
would be more lenient if presented with a full confession.
We review a district court’s legal determination of whether a defendant’s statement
was voluntary de novo. State v. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d 364, 373 (Minn. 2007). But we
accept the underlying factual determinations of the district court regarding the
3 The instruction substantially mirrored the language of the standard jury instruction on premeditation. 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 11.05 (6th ed. 2015).
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circumstances of the interview unless the findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Riley,
568 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Minn. 1997).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the admission into
evidence of a statement that was not voluntarily given. See State v. Biron, 266 Minn. 272,
281, 123 N.W.2d 392, 398 (1963). The State must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that a statement was voluntary. Riley, 568 N.W.2d at 525. We review the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the State met its burden to establish that a
statement was voluntary. State v. Zabawa, 787 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2010).
In determining whether a defendant’s statement was voluntary, we consider the
nature of the interview, including its length, the adequacy of warnings, whether the
defendant’s physical needs were met, and whether the defendant was denied access to
friends. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d at 373; State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333
(Minn. 1991). The ultimate question of voluntariness is, however, whether a defendant’s
will was overborne at the time of his confession. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534
(1963); Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d at 373; Riley, 568 N.W.2d at 525. Put differently, we
must determine whether the police actions, together with other circumstances surrounding
an interview, were so coercive, manipulative, and overpowering that the defendant was
deprived of his ability to make an independent decision to speak. Farnsworth, 738 N.W.2d
at 373; Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 333.
A.
We first consider Cox’s argument that his statement was rendered involuntary when
the police promised that they would look into his brother’s death in exchange for his
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statement. As a general rule, we disfavor law enforcement making implied and express
promises in the course of an interrogation. For example, in State v. Biron we concluded
that a new trial was warranted after police officers persuaded a defendant that he might be
treated as a juvenile offender rather than being exposed to the penalties of a felony murder
charge. 266 Minn. at 282-83, 123 N.W.2d at 399. And in Haynes v. Washington, the
United States Supreme Court concluded a confession was involuntary where it was induced
by the express threat of “incommunicado detention” coupled with the assurance that
defendant could contact his family. 373 U.S. 503, 513-514 (1963). But, a promise—real
or perceived—made by law enforcement during an interrogation does not by itself render
a statement involuntary; rather, it is considered in the totality of the circumstances. Thus,
in State v. Thaggard we concluded that a statement was voluntary even though the
defendant was led to believe he might receive drug treatment as a result, because the totality
of the circumstances indicated he understood his rights and the gravity of the situation.
527 N.W.2d 804, 811-12 (Minn. 1995).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that this case is factually distinguishable
from Biron. About 1 hour and 20 minutes into the interview, Cox raised the possibility of
making a deal with the officers: if they promised to look into his brother’s death, he would
tell the officers what happened. More specifically, Cox stated that he wanted “to know a
little bit a information more about [his] brother’s murder,” and Agent Wold indicated that
he would “certainly look into that.” A few moments later, Cox asked, “[D]o we have
somewhat of a mutual agreement?” Agent Wold responded, “Yah . . . I will look into it.”
Two pages later in the transcript, Cox admitted to shooting Moran.
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The transcript of the statement demonstrates that Cox’s will was not overborne.
Indeed, Cox initiated the negotiation that led to Agent Wold’s agreement and Cox’s
inculpatory statement, which distinguishes this case from Biron, 266 Minn. at 282-83, 123
N.W.2d at 394. Cox’s role in opening the negotiation also distances this case from Haynes.
There, the defendant repeatedly refused to confess, and only relented after the threat of
indefinite, isolated detention coupled with a promise that he could contact his family.
Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513-14. Rather, Cox, like the defendant in Thaggard, “nam[ed] his
own terms for confession.” 527 N.W.2d at 811 (“The spectacle of [defendant] naming his
own terms for confession, deciding for himself with whom he would negotiate, getting
what he wanted as a consideration for telling what he knew, reduces to absurdity his present
claim that he was coerced into confession.” (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156,
185-86 (1953))). Moreover, the evidence indicates that Cox understood his rights and the
gravity of the situation. Far from having his will overborne, we conclude that the transcript
demonstrates that Cox intentionally attempted to strike a deal in return for his confession.
B.
We next consider Cox’s argument that the statements of Agent Wold and Detective
Horner suggesting a full confession would be viewed favorably by a prosecutor were
coercive. A suggestion by the police that they can influence prosecutors in favor of a
defendant is improper. When police make such questionable statements, we consider
whether—taken in context—such statements amount to “psychological coercion which
would render defendant’s confession involuntary.” State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107,
112 (Minn. 1990). Further, it is permissible for officers to inform defendants of potential
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charges to encourage them to speak. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 335 (Minn.
2007); State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 107-08 (Minn. 1978). In State v. Slowinski, we
concluded that police statements to the defendant that they would tell the county attorney
the defendant needed psychiatric help were improper. 450 N.W.2d at 112. However, we
ultimately concluded the statements in that case were not coercive. Id. And in State v.
Beckman, we upheld the admission of a confession despite an officer’s statement that
defendant’s cooperation would be brought to the district court’s attention. 354 N.W.2d
432, 437 (Minn. 1984).
Cox points to several statements investigators made during his interview before he
confessed as evidence of coercion. For example, police officers stated:
• I wanna know that information so that we can go and tell our bosses that tonight Anthony was very truthful . . . .
• It looks so much better that when the attorneys when they pull all of our reports together and they review your statement or review the recording of this interview tonight and they go wow here is a young man who at least said what he did he’s sorry for what he did and he didn’t mean it for it to go down that way and he was cooperative and filled in all of the other pieces all I can tell you Anthony is that people that do that (Inaudible) better I think everybody involved in the whole system just go wow . . . .
We conclude that the police statements Cox challenges were not improper in the
context in which they were given. The officers stated that a full confession would be
impressive and that defendants who make a full confession generally do better in the
criminal justice system. But the officers did not promise that if Cox confessed, they would
attempt to obtain favorable treatment for him from the prosecutors. Consequently, the
police statements in this case are significantly different than the statements we have
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deemed improper in the past.4 See Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d at 112 (deeming improper
officers’ statement that led a defendant to believe he would be given psychiatric help);
Biron, 266 Minn. at 276-80, 123 N.W.2d at 395-97 (deeming improper officers’ statement
that led a defendant to believe he would be tried as a juvenile).
C.
Cox further argues his confession was rendered involuntary by the police officers’
statements that Scott County juries have a “small town” outlook and are more likely to look
favorably on a full confession. He suggests the officers “played on the societal fear of
urban crime committed by young black men and how that [is] perceived in small towns.”
These statements were all made to pressure Cox into implicating Kurr, which ultimately
proved fruitless. We conclude that the police statements were not unduly coercive. The
statement of how a jury may view certain evidence is simply a prediction.
In sum, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances do not support Cox’s
argument that his confession to police was involuntary.5 To the contrary, a review of the
4 Cox also relies on statements made after his confession, all of which were made in an effort to persuade Cox to inculpate Kurr. Cox’s argument that these statements overwhelmed his will and caused him to incriminate himself lacks merit for two reasons. First, these statements were made by officers after Cox confessed to shooting Moran. And second, all of these statements were made in an effort to persuade Cox to inculpate Kurr. Thus, logically, none of the statements could have had any bearing on Cox’s confession that he killed Moran. 5 Cox also points to other factors that he believes lead to the conclusion that his confession was involuntary. These include Cox’s age, the length of the interview, the fact that he was in custody and did not initiate the interview, and the fact that he made a confession. These arguments are without merit. Cox was not a minor when he made his confession; he was 21 years old and had previous contacts with the criminal justice system.
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relevant facts, and the transcript, reveals a discussion that cannot be characterized as hostile
or coercive. Instead, Cox did not implicate Kurr in the killing of Moran during the
interview despite repeated appeals from the police officers that he do so. Consequently,
the district court did not commit reversible error when it denied Cox’s motion to suppress
his confession.
II.
Cox challenges his conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, arguing the
circumstances proved support a rational inference that he shot Moran in a rash impulse,
and therefore the State presented insufficient evidence to prove the element of
premeditation. Essentially, Cox admits the murder was intentional, but asserts that it was
not premeditated. The question is therefore whether there is sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s verdict that Cox committed premeditated murder.
When the State relies entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the
offense, we use a two-step test to determine whether the State presented sufficient evidence
to prove the element. State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 241 (Minn. 2010); see also State
v. McAllister, 862 N.W.2d 49, 53-55 (Minn. 2015). First, we identify the circumstances
Cox was presented with a Miranda warning, and he indicated that he understood his rights and wished to proceed with the interview. Cox concedes that he was “given access to food, water and a bathroom” during the interview, that the tone of the interview was “not on balance hostile,” and that those factors ought to be considered when assessing whether his subsequent statement was voluntary. Cox’s argument that the interview was overlong is misleading because while it lasted nearly 5 hours, he confessed after less than an hour and a half. See Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 330, 333 (stating a 2-hour interview is fairly short).
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proved and, in doing so, defer to the fact-finder’s acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of conflicting evidence. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594,
598-99 (Minn. 2013). Second, we examine the reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the circumstances proved. State v. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d 629, 636 (Minn. 2011).
We give no deference to the fact-finder’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from the circumstances proved must be consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.
State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 332 (Minn. 2010) (citing State v. Curtis, 295 N.W.2d
253, 258 (Minn. 1980)). When applying this test, we view the circumstances proved as a
whole and not as discrete and isolated facts. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 635-36; see also
State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011). We will not overturn a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture. State v. Lahue,
585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn. 1998).
A person who “causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of
that person or another, but without premeditation” is guilty of second-degree murder.
Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2014). In contrast, a person who “causes the death of a
human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of
another” is guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. Minn. Stat. § 609.185, subd. (a)(1).
“Premeditation” means “to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit,
the act referred to prior to its commission.” Minn. Stat. § 609.18 (2014). Premeditation
does not require proof of extensive planning or preparation, nor does it demand that a
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specific time period elapse for deliberation. State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 180
(Minn. 1997). Instead, the State must simply establish that there was some appreciable
passage of time between a defendant’s formation of the intent to kill and the act of killing,
and that during this time defendant deliberated about the act. State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d
312, 319 (Minn. 2005). Premeditation is a state of mind “generally proven through
circumstantial evidence.” State v. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn. 2008) (quoting
Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 319).
We have previously observed that an inference of premeditation may be supported
by several categories of evidence, including planning activity, motive, the nature of the
killing, and a defendant’s actions following the killing. State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356,
363 (Minn. 2016) (identifying planning activity, motive, and the nature of the killing as
relevant to premeditation); State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 89 (Minn. 2014) (same); Leake,
699 N.W.2d at 321 (identifying the defendant’s actions before and after the murder as
relevant to premeditation). While evidence of motive is relevant, it is unnecessary to a
finding of premeditation. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d at 735. Because the State does not discuss
motive on appeal, our analysis focuses on Cox’s planning activity, the nature of the killing,
and Cox’s actions following the killing. We consider each of these categories in turn.
A.
Planning activity relates to “facts about how and what the defendant did prior to the
actual killing which show he was engaged in activity directed toward the killing.” Hughes,
749 N.W.2d at 313 (quoting Moore, 481 N.W.2d at 361). Planning activity can consist of
“prior possession of the murder weapon by the defendant.” Palmer, 803 N.W.2d at 734
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(quoting Hughes, 749 N.W.2d at 313). We have observed that “arming oneself prior to a
robbery expecting to kill if need be anyone obstructing the plans would be sufficient to
come within the definition [of premeditation] even though it may be hoped and anticipated
that the need for killing would not occur.” State v. Kirch, 322 N.W.2d 770, 773
(Minn. 1982) (quoting Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.18 (West 1964) (advisory comm. cmt.)).
Although we have never discussed whether putting a pistol grip glove on one’s trigger hand
supports a finding of premeditation, the California Court of Appeal has said “the fact
defendant wore a glove on one hand, his shooting hand, support[s] a reasonable inference
defendant killed as a result of deliberation and premeditation” because “[w]earing the one
glove shows defendant intended to use the gun.” People v. Diaz, No. G046207, 2013 WL
286275, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2013). While Diaz does not provide controlling legal
precedent, we find its reasoning persuasive. A person who does not intend to fire a gun
has no need to wear a specialized glove that improves performance and cushions the
shooting hand.
The circumstances proved regarding Cox’s planning activity are as follows. Kurr
and Cox planned the armed robbery of Moran’s home because Kurr believed that Moran
was the reason Kurr was fired from his job, and that Moran had money and drugs at his
home. Before the robbery, Cox armed himself with a fully loaded .357 magnum handgun
and placed extra bullets in his pocket. He wore a pistol grip glove on his shooting hand,
and a mismatched cotton glove on his other hand. Prior to the night of the shooting, Cox
practiced shooting the handgun. While he awaited Moran’s arrival, Cox told B.M. he might
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“just kill everybody” if B.M. was lying to him. When Moran arrived, Cox said, “This is
the one I’m looking for.”
The circumstances proved, as a whole, support a rational inference that Cox
premeditated the murder of Moran. It is reasonable to infer that Cox planned an armed
robbery and killing if necessary to accomplish his criminal objective. Like the defendant
in Kirch, 322 N.W.2d at 773, Cox armed himself with a handgun in anticipation that the
robbery might require him to use it against the occupants of Moran’s home. Cox practiced
shooting the handgun so that he would be prepared to shoot the occupants of the home.
Cox also wore a pistol grip glove designed to cushion a person’s hand when a gun is fired
and placed additional bullets in his pocket, both of which support an inference that he
contemplated firing the gun before he entered Moran’s home. Further, even before Moran
arrived, Cox told B.M. that he might kill everybody in the home. When Moran arrived,
Cox identified him as “the one” he was looking for, which supports a reasonable inference
that Cox did not simply intend to steal items from Moran’s home but instead intended to
rob Moran at gunpoint and, if necessary, kill Moran to accomplish his criminal objective.
Moreover, these circumstances are inconsistent with a rational inference that Cox’s
killing of Moran was the product of a rash impulse. It is true that the circumstances proved
support a rational inference that Cox’s initial criminal objective might not have been kill
Moran, but rather to rob Moran at gunpoint. Cox’s plan plainly focused on the armed
robbery of Moran. But it is unreasonable to infer that Cox did not plan to kill the
individuals in the home if necessary to accomplish this initial criminal objective. We
therefore conclude that the circumstances proved as a whole regarding Cox’s planning
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activity are consistent with a rational inference that Cox considered killing Moran ahead
of time and inconsistent with a rational inference that Cox’s murder of Moran was a rash
impulse.
B.
We next turn to the nature of the killing. Previously, we have concluded that
evidence of even a short pause between shots may support an inference of premeditation.
State v. Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d 542, 548 (Minn. 1988) (“[W]here first shots are followed
by a pause and second shots, an inference of premeditation is proper.”). Also, evidence
showing that the defendant inflicted wounds to the victim’s vital organs may support an
inference of premeditation. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 101 (Minn. 2012). Moreover,
the fact that the defendant fired additional shots from a handgun after the victim was
incapacitated may support an inference of premeditation. See Palmer, 803 N.W.2d at
736-37 (reasoning evidence showing that the defendant “stood over [the victim] and
finished him off,” including the downward trajectories of some of the bullets, supported
the jury’s finding of premeditation); State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d 412, 423 (Minn. 2007)
(reasoning evidence showing that the fatal second wound was inflicted while the victim
was lying on the floor supported the jury’s finding of premeditation).
The circumstances proved regarding the nature of Cox’s killing of Moran are that
Moran walked in the front door and Cox, who was standing across the room from him,
raised the .357 magnum from his side and aimed it at Moran. Surprised by Cox’s presence,
Moran said, “Whoa.” Looking back and forth between Cox and B.M, Moran smiled,
apparently believing that Cox’s presence was some kind of joke. Upon Moran’s arrival,
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Cox did not immediately shoot Moran four times in rapid succession. Cox also did not tell
Moran that this was a robbery or demand any cash or drugs. Instead, Cox focused upon
Moran by saying, “This is the one I’m looking for.” Moran’s cell phone began to ring. In
spite of Cox’s order to show his hands, Moran reached into his pocket and pulled the phone
out of his pocket. B.M. could see that the object in Moran’s hand was a phone. Cox
ordered Moran to “put down the phone.” When Moran ignored that order, Cox shot Moran
in the right thigh, shattering his femur. B.M. turned away and covered his ears. Forty
seconds elapsed between the first order and the first shot. After the first shot, Cox offered
Moran another opportunity to comply with his orders. When Moran continued to ignore
him, Cox fired a second shot that struck Moran in the chest, causing Moran to “stumble
back towards the door.” As Moran fell backwards, Cox fired a “third and fourth [shot]
pretty much at the same time.”
The circumstances proved, when considered as a whole, support a rational inference
that Cox premeditated the murder of Moran. Cox paused between the first, second, and
third shots. See Buchanan, 431 N.W.2d at 548. The first shot incapacitated Moran when
it shattered his femur. See Palmer, 803 N.W.2d at 736-37. The remaining shots struck
Moran in the chest, damaging vital organs. See Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 101. Cox used a
.357 magnum to kill Moran, a semiautomatic weapon that fires one bullet per pull of the
trigger. These circumstances are all consistent with a rational inference of premeditation
and inconsistent with a rational inference that Cox shot Moran in a rash impulse.
21
C.
We also consider a defendant’s actions following a killing when determining
whether there was premeditation. See Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 321; Kirch, 322 N.W.2d at
774. Removing valuables from the body after killing the victim is considered evidence of
premeditation. See Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 336. The failure to administer any aid to a
victim who does not die instantaneously also supports an inference of premeditation. See
Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 242-43. And laughter following a murder is “inconsistent with
having acted on a rash impulse that arguably should lead to quick regret.” State v. Johnson,
616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The circumstances proved regarding Cox’s actions after he shot Moran include the
following. The first words Cox uttered after he stopped shooting were, “Now I only have
two [bullets] left.” Cox made B.M. roll Moran over and retrieve Moran’s wallet from his
pocket. Cox made no effort to aid Moran. Instead, after examining the contents of Moran’s
wallet, Cox said, “Let’s continue,” which B.M. understood as a command to continue the
tour of the home. Before he left, Cox asked B.M. if he had any duct tape or rope. When
B.M. said he didn’t have any, Cox told him to put his hands on his head and count to 120.
Later that night, Cox was laughing and showing his gun to others in a Minneapolis
recording studio. On the following day, Cox laughed when Kurr discovered Moran was
dead, and said, “I always wanted to kill a white boy ever since a white boy killed my
brother.”
The circumstances proved, when taken as a whole, support a rational inference that
Cox premeditated the murder of Moran. As Moran lay on the ground struggling to breathe,
22
Cox stole his wallet. See Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 336. Cox failed to render aid to Moran
and considered restraining B.M. with duct tape or rope, which would have prevented B.M.
from calling 911 to obtain emergency assistance for Moran. See Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at
242-43. Cox laughed when Kurr discovered Moran was dead, and said “I always wanted
to kill a white boy ever since a white boy killed my brother.” See Johnson, 616 N.W.2d at
726. These circumstances, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with a rational inference
of premeditation and inconsistent with a rational inference that Cox shot Moran in a rash
impulse.
Cox and the dissent separately analyze and parse each fact to argue the murder was
the product of a rash impulse and not premeditated. This argument is flawed. Our
circumstantial evidence standard requires that we examine the circumstances proved as a
whole and not piecemeal. Matthews, 800 N.W.2d at 635-36. Here, the circumstances
proved, examined as a whole, support a reasonable inference that Cox premeditated the
murder of Moran and are inconsistent with a reasonable inference that his conduct was the
result of a rash impulse.6