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State of Oregon v. Paul A. Spieler

Date: 03-18-2015

Case Number: A148904

Judge: Haselton

Court: Oregon Court of Appeal on appeal from the Circuit Court, Malheur County

Plaintiff's Attorney: Jennifer S. Lloyd, Attorney-in-Charge, argued the cause

for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,

Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and

Christina M. Hutchins, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Defendant's Attorney: eorge Kelly argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellant.

Description:
Defendant, who was convicted after a jury trial of

two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427, and

one count of second-degree sodomy, ORS 163.395, appeals.

He asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to suppress evidence, and in denying his motion for a mistrial

made during the prosecutor's closing argument. He

also argues that nonunanimous jury verdicts are unconstitutional.

We reject the latter argument without discussion.

As explained below, we conclude that the trial court

correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress, but erred

in denying his motion for a mistrial. Accordingly, we reverse

and remand.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

We begin with the denial of defendant's motion

to suppress. In particular, as recounted more fully below,

defendant sought to suppress statements that he made

during a police interview, as having been involuntarily

given in response to improper inducement. In reviewing the

trial court's determination as to purported involuntariness,

"we accept the court's findings of fact if there is any evidence

to support them. If findings are not made on such

facts, and there is evidence from which such facts could be

decided more than one way, we will presume that the facts

were decided in a manner consistent with the ultimate

conclusion, e.g., voluntariness or lack thereof, made by the

trial court. Whether the facts found by the trial court are

sufficient to sustain the trial court's ultimate conclusion

regarding voluntariness is a question of law that we review

for legal error.”

State v. Ruiz-Piza, 262 Or App 563, 564, 325 P3d 802 (2014)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The complainant is defendant's biological niece and

adopted daughter, M. In 2008, M, who was then a teenager,

made disclosures that defendant had sexually abused her

when she was younger. M was subsequently interviewed at

an assessment program, the STAR Center. At the request

of Detective Perkins, who arranged for and observed the

STAR Center interview, M made a pretext call to defendant

626 State v. Spieler

during which she asked defendant why he had abused her.

Defendant responded variously that he did not remember,

that he did not want to discuss it over the phone, that his

wife had not been a good wife to him, and that M was, in a

way, taking his wife's place. He also stated that he was "not

proud of it” and "[i]f I could just get it to go away it would be

great.”

Following the pretext call, Perkins obtained a warrant

to search defendant's home for evidence of sexual abuse,

and, in the course of executing the warrant, he encountered

defendant. Perkins informed defendant of M's allegations,

advised him of his Miranda rights, and asked defendant

(who was not under arrest) if he would come to the police

station to be interviewed. Defendant agreed and accompanied

Perkins.

Once at the police station, Perkins confirmed that

defendant remembered the Miranda warning. The ensuing

interview, which was conducted in a small room, lasted

approximately 30 minutes. Defendant initially denied any

sexual contact with M and indicated that he had no memory

of the events she had disclosed. During the interview,

Perkins remarked that it was odd for defendant to say he did

not remember, rather than that it "didn't happen,” and the

following exchanges occurred:

"PERKINS: * * * [T]he way I work I believe, number

one, I believe victims when they talk, okay, unless there's

some extenuating circumstance, you know, like a major

custody battle, that sort of thing, which I don't see in this

case. Uh, it looks like the kids pretty much are separated

the way they want to be separated and there hasn't been a

problem with it.

"Um, but to your benefit, and like I said, we're recording,

it's best to come out with what happened other than, you

know, me having to tell a judge that, you know, it took a half

an hour to—I'm not really into that; I don't really like to sit

here and berate. People have issues, people have problems

that need to get help, and you know, that's what we would

like to see happen. Um, but it doesn't—I just don't want it to

look bad on you that you, you know, you'd lie up and down,

so it's best just to get it out because the truth's going to come

out.

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 627

"[DEFENDANT]: Mmm hmmm.”

(Emphasis added.)

There followed some general discussion of defendant's

activities with M, as well as some discussion of

the allegations that M had made, and then the following

exchange occurred:

"[DEFENDANT]: I know you know more than you're

letting me know, that you think you know, that's kind of a

triple statement there. I did not undress her. I did not put a

vibrator inside her.

"PERKINS: No one said that.

"[DEFENDANT]: Right.

"PERKINS: That would make you a monster, about

putting something inside her. But the thing, your finger,

they didn't say anything else. I think you're a man that

has some issues and I don't know where they come from,

I don't know your family, your past, what happened to you

as a kid; I don't know anything about that. I mean, this is

the first time I've met you. But I do know having done this

for a long time that people have issues and they need to get

help. They need to get past it. I mean you're still young, Paul,

but you need to get this off your chest and you need to get the

help. Do you understand that?

"* * * * *

"PERKINS: Look, you can't get anything by lying,

and not being a man and facing up to, you know, your

responsibilities.

"[DEFENDANT]: No. I know. I'm just * * * I know.”

(Emphasis added.)

Thereafter, Perkins asked defendant, "Why did it

happen?” and defendant responded variously that his relationship

with his wife had been bad, and that M had been

like a friend to him and not like his own biological child, as

she was adopted. Defendant then acknowledged that he had

had sexual contacts with M.

Defendant was charged with five counts of firstdegree

sexual abuse and one count of second-degree sodomy,

628 State v. Spieler

with the indictment alleging that the conduct occurred

at various times between January 2000 and May 2006.

Defendant moved before trial to suppress his statements

made during the interview, arguing that they were obtained

involuntarily, in violation of Article I, section 12, of the

Oregon Constitution. In particular, defendant argued that

Perkins's statements implied a promise of leniency and suggested

that defendant needed to admit his crimes in order

to obtain help. At the suppression hearing, Perkins acknowledged

that the interrogation had involved a "carrot-and-stick

approach,” whereby a confession could benefit defendant by

allowing him to get help but continued nondisclosure would

"look bad” to the court. Defendant testified that he believed

from his interaction with Perkins that he would receive

psychological help and that he needed to cooperate or "the

penalty would get worse.” The trial court denied defendant's

motion to suppress stating:

"Throughout the tape Detective Perkins used a very, I

would describe it as a very soft, low-toned conversation. At

no time was his voice even raised. At no time did I hear any

threats or promises. He was certainly encouraging [defendant]

to disclose what happened, but I heard nothing that

would suggest he was intimidating, making any improper

promises, or anything—did anything that made the statement

involuntary.”

On appeal, defendant reiterates his arguments,

contending that his admissions were obtained in violation

of Article I, section 12.1 For purposes of Article I, section

12, " 'a confession is initially deemed involuntary. Before

a confession can be received in evidence, the state must

show that it was voluntarily given, that is, made without

inducement through fear or promises, direct or implied.' ”

Ruiz-Piza, 262 Or App at 573 (quoting State v. Mendacino,

288 Or 231, 235, 603 P2d 1376 (1979)). A "simple promise of

treatment does not, by itself, render an admission involuntary.”

State v. Pollard, 132 Or App 538, 543, 888 P2d 1054,

1 Defendant does not make any separate arguments concerning admissibility

under ORS 136.425(1), which limits the admissibility of certain admissions

and confessions. See generally State v. Powell, 352 Or 210, 282 P3d 845 (2012)

(analyzing admissibility of statements made in response to promises by private

investigators that a theft investigation would be handled "in house” rather than

turned over to the police).

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 629

rev den, 321 Or 138 (1995) (citing State v. Neblock, 75 Or App

587, 590, 706 P2d 1020 (1985)); State v. Bounds, 71 Or App

744, 746-48, 694 P2d 566, rev den, 299 Or 732 (1985). An

admission is, however, considered involuntary if a police officer

makes statements that "could be reasonably construed

as an implied promise of treatment instead of incarceration

in return for a confession.” Neblock, 75 Or App at 590.

Defendant relies primarily on Pollard, in which

we reversed a denial of suppression—and which, defendant

asserts, involved directly analogous circumstances. The

state remonstrates that, notwithstanding certain similarities,

Pollard is materially distinguishable and that this case

is more akin to Neblock, in which we sustained a denial of

suppression. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the

state.

We begin with Pollard. There, the defendant was

convicted of murder by abuse of his infant, who had died of

"shaken baby syndrome.” 132 Or App at 540. After the infant

had been hospitalized, but before his death, the defendant,

who was not then under arrest, was interviewed at a police

station for approximately 40 minutes. Id. at 544. During

the interview, a detective suggested to the defendant that

he might have lost his temper with the infant and that the

defendant needed "to be up front with me or I can't help

you.” Id. at 545. The officer indicated that it was normal to

become frustrated caring for an infant and told the defendant,

"let's get it over with. Let's get it done, get it up front

and get on with your life and put your family back together.”

Id. They then discussed the infant's condition, and the officer

again stated that, "if something happened and you want

to get this thing up front,” the officer could help the defendant,

and that, "if you don't, they'll just take it to a Grand

Jury. That's what we will do.” Id. at 546. The officer added,

"If the Grand Jury thinks that you've done this, it makes

it real rough.” Id. The defendant then began to discuss his

family's history of abuse and that he and his wife wanted to

start counseling. The officer indicated that "we have excellent

people here to help with that. They're available. But we

have to get through this portion of it before we can get to

that part.” Id. at 547.

630 State v. Spieler

In determining that the defendant's subsequent

statements were involuntary, we concluded that the officer's

statements, made before the infant died, "make sense

only if [the officer] was promising treatment of [the] defendant's

abusive propensities in lieu of prosecution.” Id. at 548

(emphasis in original). In particular, we noted the "these

things happen” tenor of the conversation, and the statements

that the defendant could "get on with his life” and put

his family back together—along with the statement implying

that the grand jury did not need to be involved if the

defendant confessed—and concluded that there had been an

implicit promise of treatment instead of prosecution. Id. at

548-49.

In so holding in Pollard, we emphasized that the

circumstances there were dispositively different than those

in Neblock. In Neblock, a social worker employed by the

state investigated the defendant after a child made allegations

of sexual abuse. The social worker told the defendant

that there would be a police investigation and that the

police would be contacting him. She specifically indicated

that "treatment and incarceration were options that a court

would consider,” and indicated that the defendant "taking

responsibility” would be a factor in determining appropriate

treatment. 75 Or App at 589. The social worker, however,

made "no promises or guarantees.” Id. As we observed in

Neblock, the defendant acknowledged that there were no

explicit promises:

"Rather, he argues that the social worker presented information

about the way a confession would affect the court's

choice among dispositional options in such a way as to constitute

an implied promise of treatment as opposed to incarceration

and that he had reasonably relied on that implied

promise as an inducement for his confession.”

Id. at 590.

The trial court in Neblock denied suppression of the

defendant's confession, and we affirmed. We concluded that

there was "nothing in the statements made to [the] defendant

that could reasonably be taken as an implied promise

of immunity from prosecution should he confess. Advising

defendant that treatment is an option, or that confession is a

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 631

prerequisite to treatment, is not the same as promising him

immunity from prosecution.” Id. (emphasis added). That distinction

was critical to our consideration in Pollard, where

we explained:

"[The social worker in Neblock] had told defendant that

both treatment and incarceration were among the options

the court would consider and that 'taking responsibility for

one's own behavior' would simply be one variable bearing

on the court's choice among options.' 75 Or App at 589-90.

Here, the detective's promises were contemporaneous with

defendant's confession, and the only reference to 'options'

was the detective's suggestion that if defendant was candid,

'I can help you,' but if he wasn't, 'they'll just take it to a

grand jury.' The quid pro quo was apparent.”

132 Or App at 548-49.

Defendant posits that the present case is fundamentally

similar to Pollard, in that the detective here suggested

that defendant's actions may have been beyond his control

and due to his family history and that defendant needed

help or treatment. Defendant also characterizes Perkins's

comments as implying that "no help could be forthcoming

until the defendant came out with the truth” and that "the

alternative to coming out with the truth and getting help

was going to a judge or the grand jury and criminal sanctions

coming into play.”

We agree that there are some similarities between this

case and Pollard. However, there are also critical differences—

differences that contradict defendant's characterization of

the implications of Perkins's comments to defendant. As

for similarities, certain aspects of the interrogation techniques

used were similar. Both Perkins and the detective

in Pollard suggested that the defendants' actions might

have something to do with issues from their past, that the

defendants needed to discuss what happened to "get past

it,” and that the defendants needed "help,” with the strong

implication being that psychological help was needed. That

is, both officers indicated to both defendants that the defendants

needed to acknowledge what they had done in order

to be "helped.”

632 State v. Spieler

Nevertheless, this case is different from Pollard in

at least one dispositive respect. As noted, in Pollard, the

detective suggested that the defendant had two distinct

alternatives: He could either admit what had occurred and

get it "taken care of” and get "help” or, alternatively, if the

defendant did not do that, the case would be taken "to a

Grand Jury” and it would be "real rough.” 132 Or App at

546. That is, if the defendant cooperated and admitted his

conduct, he could obtain assistance "in lieu of prosecution.”

Id. at 548 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 549 ("The

quid pro quo was apparent.”).

Here, in contrast, there were no suggestions

by Perkins that a confession could, or would, preempt a

prosecution. Rather, Perkins's statements presumed that

there would be a prosecution and pertained to the effect

of defendant's conduct on that prosecution, e.g., references

to "having to tell a judge that, you know, it took a half

an hour to” get defendant to confess, and that Perkins

did not "want it to look bad on you that you, you know,

you'd lie up and down” about what had occurred. See also

Neblock, 75 Or App at 589 (noting that the social worker's

remarks expressed that " 'taking responsibility for one's

own behavior' would simply be one variable bearing on the

court's choice among options”); Bounds, 71 Or App at 747-

48 (officer's statements to a defendant during questioning

that admitting conduct might be the best way to get help,

and that there would be charges but the prosecutor was

not going to "crucify” him, did "not amount to a promise

of immunity from prosecution rendering the confession

involuntary”).

In the totality of the circumstances of this case, that

distinction—the difference between a situation in which an

officer suggests that the results of a prosecution may be

more favorable to a defendant who admits what occurred

and a situation in which an officer suggests that no prosecution

will be commenced if the defendant admits what

occurred—is dispositive. The trial court correctly determined

that defendant's statements to Perkins were voluntary

and, consequently, did not err in denying suppression

of those statements.

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 633

OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING

ARGUMENT AND MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

We proceed to defendant's second assignment of

error, pertaining to the denial of his motion for a mistrial,

which was based on comments by the prosecutor in closing

argument, which, defendant contends, impermissibly shifted

the burden of proof and improperly referred to facts not in

evidence. The procedural circumstances are undisputed.

As noted, 269 Or App at ___, after M made the initial

disclosures of alleged abuse, she was interviewed at the

STAR Center. At trial, the state's case consisted primarily

of recorded evidence of the pretext call and Perkins's interview

of defendant, as well as testimony by M. In his opening

statement, the prosecutor told the jury that the recording of

M's interview at the STAR Center would be in evidence.

During the state's case-in-chief, Perkins testified that

the interview had been recorded. However, the STAR Center

interview recording was never introduced into evidence. Rather,

at trial, defense counsel raised a concern that the recording

was inadmissible hearsay, because the state failed to give adequate

notice of M's statements pursuant to OEC 803(18a)(b).

In response, the prosecutor suggested that the recording was

likely to become admissible as containing prior consistent

statements if defense counsel chose to cross-examine M at trial

about the disclosures—and, thus, that the court did not need

to rule about the admissibility of the recording as hearsay at

that point. The trial court rendered no ruling.

The state did not thereafter seek to introduce the

STAR Center interview recording, and defense counsel ultimately

did not cross-examine M about the disclosures. Thus,

although the jury knew, from the state's opening statement

and Perkins's testimony, that the interview occurred and

had been recorded, the STAR Center recording itself was

never introduced into evidence.

During closing argument, and without the STAR

Center interview recording being in evidence, the prosecutor

made the following statements to the jury:

"I want to talk to you about credibility and what was

said and what was done.

634 State v. Spieler

"[M] took the stand, looked you all in the eye and told

you what happened. The defendant, sitting at that table

over there, ably represented, how many questions did the

defendant ask [M] about the details of the sex abuse? He

asked about maybe she was mad at her dad because he

spied on her. Not a single question did they ask about the

touching or the details of the touching. Not one. And you

can rest assured that if there would've been a discrepancy

between what [M] told you today, or yesterday, and what she

told the STAR interview that was recorded, you would * * *.”

(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel immediately objected

and, with the jury excluded, amplified the objection:

"A couple of things, Your Honor. That is burden shifting.

I don't have to ask her any questions, I don't have to

ask witness[es] anything. The prosecution is not allowed

to shift the burden on to [defendant] or me to do anything,

and that's just what he did right there. You can—if there

was anything, any discrepancies he would have brought it

up. First objection.

"Second objection is earlier in the case, [the prosecutor]

said well [the defense] better not talk about that STAR

Center interview. He got it excluded; he kept it out of evidence,

so he better not bring up the STAR Center interview.

I said, of course, I don't want to talk about the STAR

Center interview, that's the whole reason that I moved to

have it suppressed and that's the whole reason that it was

suppressed. Um, there's a million reasons why that STAR

interview, STAR Center interview, could be suppressed.

There was discrepancies between what was said at the

STAR Center interview and what she said on the stand.

There was discrepancies between what she told the police

and—there were a lot of discrepancies. But whether or not I

choose to bring those up is entirely up to me; he can't shift

that burden onto me and he can't talk about evidence that

Your Honor excluded, and he can't talk about it in closing.”

Defendant moved for a mistrial at that point. The

trial court observed that it had not ruled that the STAR

Center recording was inadmissible, and defense counsel,

while acknowledging that that was correct, remonstrated

that the recording had not been received into evidence and

that parties could not argue about things not received into

evidence:

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 635

"[It] was never received into evidence. When something's

not received into evidence how do you—you don't

get to argue about it. What we get to argue about is the

evidence that's been received and is before the jury. It's not

in evidence * * *.”

The court noted that there had been testimony that a

recording had been made of the victim's interview at the

STAR Center. The prosecutor argued that defense counsel

"made a tactical decision not to use it. I'm—I can comment

on that.”

The trial court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial.

After the court so ruled, the prosecutor, in continuing

his closing argument, did not complete the comment that

was interrupted by defendant's objection. The prosecutor did,

however, later state to the jury, when discussing testimony

by defense witnesses who did not believe that defendant

had committed the alleged crimes, that these witnesses had

formed their opinions without having seen the STAR Center

recording.2 Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of

two counts of first-degree sexual abuse (Counts 4 and 6) and

one count of second-degree sodomy (Count 5), and acquitted

defendant on the remaining three counts of first-degree sexual

abuse.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial,

relying on State v. Wederski, 230 Or 57, 368 P2d 393 (1962).

The state counters that Wederski is materially distinguishable

and that the circumstances here are more akin to those

in State v. Lincoln, 250 Or 426, 443 P2d 178 (1968), State v.

Galloway, 202 Or App 613, 620-21, 123 P3d 352 (2005), vac'd

on other grounds, 345 Or 315, 135 P3d 62 (2008), and State

v. Henderson, 242 Or App 357, 364-65, 255 P3d 661, rev den,

350 Or 571 (2011), in which either the Supreme Court or we

affirmed the denial of motions for mistrial that were based

on a prosecutor's reference to a defendant's failure to present

certain evidence.

2 The prosecutor had, in fact, played portions of the other recordings that

were admitted into evidence for these defense witnesses to hear, but the witnesses

had not altered their testimony that they did not believe defendant committed

the charged offenses.

636 State v. Spieler

The resolution is hardly clear-cut, because—as will

become apparent as we recount them—neither Wederski nor

any of the cases that the state invokes is precisely analogous.

In Wederski, the defendant was charged with having

committed a burglary in which, inter alia, 100 blank checks

had been stolen. Later, several of the checks were forged.

230 Or at 59. At trial, those checks were admitted into evidence,

and one of the defendant's alleged accomplices testified

that they bore the defendant's handwriting. Id. During

the defense closing argument, defense counsel emphasized

that the state had not presented expert testimony substantiating

that the handwriting was, in fact, the defendant's. Id.

at 59-60. The prosecutor then responded in rebuttal closing:

"As to why we don't have a handwriting expert used in the

trial, [defense counsel] did bring that up, and it requires

some comment I am sure.

"You know that there are certain rules of evidence and

certain requirements before we can use an expert witness.

Mr. Clair Alderson, if any of you are familiar, sat through

the entire trial and the right situation didn't present itself

so that we could get his testimony on. You recall there was

no denial by [the defendant] that that was his handwriting

or perhaps we might have used our expert witness.”

Id. at 60. Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial,

asserting that the prosecutor's reference had "improperly

(1) invited the jury to consider what a state's witness

might have testified had he been called, and (2) at least indirectly

commented upon the defendant's failure to take the

stand.” Id. The trial court denied that motion, and the jury

convicted the defendant.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding

that the trial court had erred in denying the mistrial

motion:

"Had [the court given a suitable curative instruction],

the presumably harmful effect of the district attorney's

remarks might have been removed and the denial of the

motion for a mistrial might well have been within the permissible

limits of discretion. The instructions, however,

failed to caution the jury that they could not consider the

presence in the courtroom of silent witnesses in aid of the

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 637

state's case. Neither did the court instruct the jury that the

defendant had no duty to prove or disprove anything; that

his plea of not guilty denied everything; and that the jury

could draw no inferences from the defendant's failure to

contradict any evidence in the case. As the court failed to

admonish the jury to disregard the improper argument

of the district attorney, the case went to the jury with the

prejudicial statements approved, so far as the jury knew, by

the court's silence.”

Id. at 60-61 (emphasis added). In rejecting the state's arguments

that the error was harmless, the Supreme Court

observed:

"The state's reference to evidence it might have produced,

but did not, was an open invitation for the jury to

speculate in a manner which has been denounced by this

court on several occasions. The state's reference to the

defendant's failure to deny the forgeries, innocently though

it may have been intended, could not have gone unnoticed

by a jury which had waited in vain through two days of

trial for the defendant to take the stand so they could hear

what he had to say about the case. Article I, § 12, of the

Oregon Constitution guarantees the privilege of the defendant

to remain silent. The privilege is meaningless if the

state may refer to the defendant's silence with impunity.”

Id. at 61-62 (citations omitted).

Thus, the prosecution in Wederski both invited the

jury to rely on facts not in evidence that purportedly would

have bolstered the state's case (viz., Alderson's putative

expert testimony) and referred to the defense's failure to

offer controverting evidence—in the form of the defendant's

own testimony. With respect to the latter, the Supreme

Court referred to the trial court's failure to give a cautionary

instruction that the jury "could draw no inferences from

the defendant's failure to contradict any evidence in the case.”

Id. at 61 (emphasis added).3

3 See also State v. Macomber, 18 Or App 163, 169-70, 524 P2d 574 (1974) (prosecutor's

comments in closing argument urging the jury to "ask [the defendant]

to explain various things” impermissibly commented on the accused's silence,

contrary to Wederski, but trial court's curative instruction remedied that conduct

so that "such harm as there was in the remarks was removed”).

638 State v. Spieler

Read literally, that emphasized proposition could be

understood to preclude prosecutors from ever commenting

on a defendant's failure to present controverting evidence

(beyond the obvious preclusion of commenting on the defendant's

silence). However, Lincoln, Galloway, and Henderson

demonstrate that there is no such categorical preclusion.

In Lincoln, the defendant was charged with the

burglary of a service station, and, at trial, the state called

some, but not all, of the police officers involved in the arrest

and investigation; some of the officers not called were in the

courtroom for trial. 250 Or at 427. In closing, defense counsel

argued to the jury that "the state had not disclosed all of

the information it possessed because all of the officers with

knowledge of the investigation were not called as witnesses.”

Id. In rebuttal, the prosecutor rejoined, "Counsel knows if he

wants to call any officers in the courtroom, he certainly can

do that.” Id. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which was

denied, and the Supreme Court affirmed:

"It is clear that the comment in question in no way

related to defendant's failure to take the witness stand.

There is no rule which prevents the state from commenting

on defendant's failure to call witnesses other than the defendant

which were available to him.”

Id. (emphasis added). In sum, in the context of responding to

defense counsel's statements to the jury that the prosecution

had not offered testimony from certain witnesses, the court

concluded that the state was not precluded from noting that

defendant had the ability to call those witnesses.

The emphasized portion of the statement in Lincoln,

viewed in isolation, could be understood to be in tension with

the similarly categorical proposition from Wederski quoted

above: If the jury cannot draw inferences from "the defendant's

failure to controvert any evidence in the case,” then

why or how can the state comment on a defendant's failure to

present such controverting evidence? Lincoln does not refer

to Wederski. The resolution, we believe, lies in the meaning

of the use of "the defendant” in Wederski. If "the defendant”

is understood to connote, generically, "the defense,” then

Wederski and Lincoln are, indeed, incompatible. If, however,

that reference in Wederski to "the defendant” meant

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 639

the defendant personally—that is, that the jury can draw

no inferences from the defendant's failure to controvert the

state's proof by way of his or her own testimony—then the

cases are not necessarily inconsistent. Given the context of

Wederski, and subject to the amplification we offer below, we

believe that the latter understanding is correct.

Galloway—which relied on Lincoln and distinguished

Wederski—comports with that understanding.

There, the defendant was charged with a variety of serious

offenses related to "two fire-setting incidents.” 202 Or App

at 615. The evidence at trial included testimony from a jail

deputy that, after the defendant had been taken into custody,

the deputy had heard another inmate ask the defendant

if he had an alibi, and the defendant had replied,

"I told my girlfriend what to say to the cops.” Id. at 616.

Apparently in reference to that testimony, in closing argument,

the prosecutor commented, "In this trial, you folks

haven't heard a single thing about alibi.” Id. at 620. Defense

counsel subsequently unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial,

and we affirmed:

"We find Wederski to be inapplicable here. In that case,

the prosecutor referred specifically to the defendant's failure

to deny the handwriting as his own. The prosecutor's

arguments to the jurors in the present case that they had

heard no testimony regarding alibi was not a comment on

defendant's decision to remain silent, but rather to alert the

jury that the defense had not put on any evidence regarding

an alibi. 'There is no rule which prevents the state from

commenting on defendant's failure to call witnesses other

than the defendant which were available to him.' [Lincoln,

250 Or at 427.] Moreover, the court instructed the jury in

this case not to place any weight on defendant's decision not

to testify. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's

motion for mistrial.”

Id. (emphasis in original).

Thus, in Galloway, in the context of responding to

evidence concerning a possible alibi, the prosecutor was

not precluded from commenting on the defense's failure to

present the putative alibi witness. See also State v. Wright,

12 Or App 73, 77-78, 504 P2d 1065 (1973) (affirming denial

of mistrial based on prosecutor's comment relating to the

640 State v. Spieler

defendant's failure to call a witness in support of his alibi

defense); State v. Goodin, 8 Or App 15, 23, 492 P2d 287

(1972) (affirming denial of mistrial based on prosecutor's

comment that the defendant had failed to call a witness who

had been brought from the state penitentiary to testify at

the defendant's request).

Finally, in Henderson, the defendant, who was

charged with murder, raised a defense of extreme emotional

disturbance, on which he bore the burden of proof. ORS

163.135(1). The focus in that case was on the defendant's state

of mind when he crashed a vehicle into the wall of his garage,

killing his wife. Henderson, 242 Or App at 359. Defense counsel

cross-examined an investigating officer, Burdick, about

damage to the garage wall, eliciting testimony that Burdick

had not taken certain measurements. On redirect, the prosecutor

elicited further testimony from Burdick that neither

the state nor the defense had asked the officer to take such

measurements. Defendant objected and moved for a mistrial,

arguing that the question improperly shifted the burden to

gather evidence onto defendant. Id. at 363.

The trial court denied the motion, noting that, in

light of the defense burden to establish the extreme emotional

disturbance defense "and given that by its questions

of this [witness] it has suggested that there would be evidence

available that is not otherwise available due to the

inadequacies of the state's investigation, this court considers

it to be appropriate rebuttal.” Id.

On appeal, referring to both Lincoln and Galloway,

we affirmed. We concluded:

"Although Lincoln involved a prosecutor's comment on a

defendant's ability to call witnesses, its reasoning applies

equally to the issue in this case, that is, defendant's ability

to procure the measurements of the damage to the garage

wall that was caused by his vehicle. The prosecutor's question

to Burdick on redirect examination * * * alerted the

jury to the fact that defendant could have procured the evidence

that defendant had faulted the police for not gathering.

The prosecutor was entitled to rebut defendant's

implication that the state had failed to gather potentially

exculpatory evidence because the investigating officers had

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 641

jumped to the conclusion that defendant had intentionally

murdered the victim. The prosecutor's narrow question to

Burdick directly rebutted that implication.”

Id.

Wederski and Lincoln and their progeny are not easily

susceptible to principled extension and application, not

the least because the baseline precedents simply announced

categorical propositions without circumstantial nuance or

limitation. Further, there are material procedural variations

among the cases. Still, upon careful consideration of

those cases, we conclude that they reasonably yield several

not-inconsistent principles.

First, one fundamental aspect of Wederski is not

qualified by any of the subsequent case law: The prosecutor

cannot either implicitly or explicitly invite the factfinder to

consider nonadmitted evidence "in aid of the state's case.”

Wederski, 230 Or at 61. That is, to the extent that the prosecution

either fails to, or is unable to, present testimony (e.g.,

the handwriting expert, Alderson, in Wederski) or other evidence,

the prosecutor cannot refer to such putative evidence

in an effort to bolster the state's case.

Second, another fundamental principle of Wederski

is that, in most circumstances, see 269 Or App at ___ n 6,

references to the defendant's silence or failure to testify are

impermissible.

Third, read in light of Lincoln and its progeny,

Wederski limits the circumstances in which a prosecutor can

comment on the defendant's failure to present or contradict

evidence, but does not categorically prohibit such comments.

In Wederski, the court recognized that certain comments

about a defendant's failure to present evidence may reasonably

cause the factfinder to misapprehend and misallocate

the burden of proof.4 However, a wholesale prohibition on all

4 For examples of other impermissible prosecutorial argument pertaining to

the burden of proof, see, e.g., State v. Sanchez-Jacobo, 250 Or App 621, 632-35,

282 P3d 880 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 280 (2013) (prosecutor began closing argument

with the statement "at this point in trial, the presumption of innocence will

evaporate”); State v. Worth, 231 Or App 69, 72-73, 218 P3d 166 (2009), rev den,

347 Or 718 (2010) (the prosecutor made several statements to the effect that "the

presumption of innocence is over”).

642 State v. Spieler

such comments would unfairly impair prosecutors' ability to

counter certain matters raised or implicated by the defense.

Thus, when the defense raises matters, such as alibi as in

Galloway or Wright, on which, as a practical matter, the

defendant bears the initial burden of production, but fails

to present any evidence, the prosecution can comment on

that deficiency. Similarly, when an affirmative defense has

been raised, as in Henderson, the prosecutor is permitted to

respond, by commenting on a defendant's failure to meet the

burden of production or persuasion.5

Further, it is clear from Lincoln and Henderson

that, when the defense makes an argument that the state

has failed to present certain evidence—with the implication

that such evidence would have supported the defense

or undermined the state's case—the prosecutor can respond

by noting that the defense has the ability to produce it. That

principle, indeed, is the obverse of the first principle derived

from Wederski noted above: Just as the prosecutor cannot

invite the factfinder to consider nonadmitted evidence in aid

of the state's case, if defense counsel invites the factfinder to

consider nonadmitted evidence as undermining the state's

case, the prosecutor is entitled to respond, again, so long

as that response comports with the proper allocation of the

burden of proof.6

We turn to the application of those principles in this

case. Here, the prosecutor's comment—"And you can rest

5 When an affirmative defense is raised, the defendant bears the burden of

proof on that defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See ORS 161.055(2).

With respect to other defenses, including alibi defenses, the state bears the burden

of disproving them beyond a reasonable doubt. ORS 161.055(1). However,

even if the state bears the burden of proof to disprove a defense, it nonetheless

must be raised by the defendant, either by notice in writing by the defendant

before trial, or by way of evidence presented at trial. ORS 161.055(3).

6 Of course, as we know from Wederski, the prosecutor nonetheless generally

cannot respond by commenting on the defendant's failure to testify or an invocation

of the right to remain silent. 230 Or at 60. Compare State v. Guritz, 134

Or App 262, 268-69, 894 P2d 1235, rev den, 321 Or 560 (1995) (defense counsel

"opened the door” to comment about the defendant's termination of police interview

by invocation of his right to remain silent by "criticizing the lack of depth of

the interview”), with State v. Reineke, 266 Or App 299, 309, 337 P3d 941 (2014)

("[E]ven if a defendant opens the door to evidence of the defendant's silence, a

prosecutor cannot argue that the defendant is guilty because he or she invoked

the right to remain silent.”).

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 643

assured that if there would have been a discrepancy between

what [M] told you today or yesterday, and what she told the

STAR interview, that was recorded, you'd * * *”—referred to

defendant's failure to present potentially controverting evidence

that the complainant had made prior inconsistent statements.

An implication—perhaps an inescapable implication—

is that M's account had remained consistent throughout. The

question thus narrows: Was the prosecutor's statement an

impermissible comment under the first Wederski principle

described above, or a permissible one under the third principle,

as derived from the Lincoln line of cases?

We conclude that the prosecutor's remarks violated

the first principle and did not comport with the third. As

described above, the prosecutor referred to the STAR Center

recording in his opening statement, but then, after defendant

raised the potential inadmissibility of the recording

because of an inadequate OEC 803(18a)(b) notice, the state

discontinued its efforts to offer the recording into evidence.

Most significantly, at no point did defense counsel ever argue

about the STAR Center recording to the jury, or suggest in

any way that it would have undermined the state's case or

enhanced the defense.7

Given those circumstances, we conclude that the

prosecutor's reference to the STAR Center recording was

not fair comment in response to a defense argument as to

the state's purported failure to present certain evidence;

nor was it a permissible comment on the defense's failure

to present certain evidence on a matter on which defendant

bore the initial burden of production or the ultimate burden

of proof. Rather, the remarks here were analogous to the

prosecutor's reference to the nontestifying handwriting analyst

in the courtroom in Wederski: It was "an open invitation

for the jury to speculate,” Wederski, 230 Or at 60, that unadmitted

evidence was favorable to the state as confirming

7 In fact, after defendant objected to the admission of the interview recording

and the prosecutor agreed not to offer it in evidence, see 269 Or App at ___,

the prosecutor told the court, "If in argument defense counsel says [']where's the

tape[?'], that would be a serious problem.” Defense counsel agreed that he would

not do that, and the court stated that, if defense counsel "raises that in argument[,]

I'll give the jury an instruction that [defense counsel] objected to the

admission of the tape.”

644 State v. Spieler

the historical consistency of the complainant's accounts.

Further, as in Wederski, the trial court here "failed to caution

the jury that they could not consider the presence in the

courtroom of silent witnesses in aid of the state's case.” Id.

at 61.8 Accordingly, the trial court erred in overruling defendant's

objection to the prosecutor's remarks.

Our inquiry reduces to whether, given that error,

coupled with the failure to give any curative instruction of

the sort mandated by Wederski, the trial court was obligated

to grant the motion for mistrial. Or, more precisely, with

reference to the applicable standard of review, did the trial

court's denial of a mistrial in these circumstances constitute

an abuse of discretion? See, e.g., State v. Worth, 231 Or App

69, 74, 218 P3d 166 (2009), rev den, 347 Or 718 (2010) ("We

review a trial court's decision to deny a mistrial due to a prosecutor's

conduct for abuse of discretion.”). The touchstone of

the trial court's discretion, and of our review, is an assessment

of the likelihood that the prosecutor's uncorrected comments

so affected the jury's consideration as to "deny [defendant]

a fair trial.” State v. Davis, 345 Or 551, 583, 201 P3d

185 (2008); see also State v. Farokhrany, 259 Or App 132, 137-

38, 312 P3d 584 (2013) ("If an objectionable remark, properly

challenged, is likely to influence the jury, the trial court's failure

to correct it may be a ground for reversal.”).

Here, the state's only harmless error argument is

that the jury was properly instructed not to draw a negative

inference from defendant's failure to testify and to base its

verdicts on the evidence, and that the lawyers' statements

were not evidence.9 The jury was also properly instructed

8 Given the trial court's overruling of defendant's objection to the prosecutor's

comment, it was not incumbent on defense counsel to seek a curative instruction,

because such a request would have been futile. See Worth, 231 Or App 77 n 4

("Here, given the court's ruling that the prosecutor's * * * statements constituted

permissible argument, we conclude that a request for further curative instructions

would have been futile.”).

9 The state does not argue that the evidence of defendant's purported guilt,

including his broadly inculpatory statements during the pretext call and during

the police interview, was so overwhelming as to render the prosecutor's comments

harmless. In that regard, we note that the jury acquitted defendant on

three counts (each charging first-degree sexual abuse), that defendant was convicted

by 10-2 verdicts on the remaining counts, and that that result was reached

only after the jury twice attempted to return a verdict that revealed that, in fact,

there was significant disagreement on the jury as to most of the counts.

Cite as 269 Or App 623 (2015) 645

on the burden of proof and that it needed to determine guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. We are unpersuaded that such

generic instructions meaningfully remedied the prejudicial

impact of the prosecutor's comments. Specifically, nothing

in the generic instructions given by the court in this case

addressed the problem of the jury being invited—without

contradiction from the court—to speculate on, and draw

inferences negative to the defense about, the contents of the

STAR Center recording. That is, the jury instructions here

did not mitigate the "presumably harmful effect” of the prosecutor's

statements. Accord Worth, 231 Or App at 79 (noting

that "[t]he overruling of [the defendant's] objection gave the

jury reason to think that the prosecutor's statement was,

in fact, a correct statement of the law” and concluding that

the trial court's generic instructions as to the presumption

of innocence "did not provide guidance as to the longevity

of the presumption of innocence, such as to remove confusion

about whether the presumption of innocence extended

through jury deliberations”).

Nor did the prosecutor's improper argument pertain

to some incidental or collateral matter. Rather, the complainant's

credibility, including with respect to the accuracy

of her account as to the timing of certain events—which was

material to whether she was under 14 at the time of each of

the charged offenses, as charged in each count—was critical

to the prosecution's case.10 The prosecutor's effort to bolster

the complainant's credibility by reference to the unadmitted

evidence, as implicitly confirming the consistency of the

complainant's account, bore directly on that issue. Compare

State v. Moller, 217 Or App 49, 174 P3d 1063 (2007) (erroneously

admitted evidence of the defendant's refusal to consent

to a search was not harmless "in light of the fact that it

was central to the state's case and in light of the close jury

vote by which he was convicted”), with State v. Dalby, 251

Or App 674, 284 P3d 585 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 209 (2013)

(testimony was erroneously admitted that the defendant

10 Although defendant, in the police interview, acknowledged that certain

sexual contacts with the complainant had occurred, he indicated that he believed

they occurred when the complainant was 14 or 15 years old. The complainant, for

her part, testified that incidents of abuse had occurred over a significantly longer

time period.

646 State v. Spieler

had invoked his right to counsel, but the error was harmless

because it had little to do with the only seriously disputed

factual issue in the case). Finally, the prejudicial impact of

the error was compounded by the prosecutor's additional

reference to the unadmitted STAR Center recording when,

in closing argument, the prosecutor stated that certain witnesses

who testified on defendant's behalf had never seen

the STAR Center recording. See 269 Or App at ___, necessarily

implying that, if they had, the content of the recording

would have altered their testimony.

Given the totality of the foregoing circumstances,

we conclude that "the effect of the prosecutor's conduct

was to deny [defendant] a fair trial.” Davis, 345 Or at 583.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant's

motion for mistrial.
Outcome:
Convictions on Counts 4, 5, and 6 reversed and

remanded; otherwise affirmed.
Plaintiff's Experts:
Defendant's Experts:
Comments:

About This Case

What was the outcome of State of Oregon v. Paul A. Spieler?

The outcome was: Convictions on Counts 4, 5, and 6 reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.

Which court heard State of Oregon v. Paul A. Spieler?

This case was heard in Oregon Court of Appeal on appeal from the Circuit Court, Malheur County, OR. The presiding judge was Haselton.

Who were the attorneys in State of Oregon v. Paul A. Spieler?

Plaintiff's attorney: Jennifer S. Lloyd, Attorney-in-Charge, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Christina M. Hutchins, Senior Assistant Attorney General.. Defendant's attorney: eorge Kelly argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant..

When was State of Oregon v. Paul A. Spieler decided?

This case was decided on March 18, 2015.