Jane Doe 136 vs. Ralph Liebsch,

The question presented by this case is whether the district court abused its

discretion when it excluded evidence of an Alford plea entered during a previous criminal

proceeding regarding the same course of conduct from being considered in a subsequent

civil trial. The civil jury found respondent Ralph Liebsch not liable for sexual assault and

battery against appellant Jane Doe 136. The court of appeals affirmed. Because we

conclude that the district court acted within its discretion, we affirm.

Doe first encountered Liebsch in the summer of 2000, when Doe was 7 years old.

At that time, Liebsch owned a largely unimproved lot on White Bear Lake that was

adjacent to Doe’s childhood home. Doe’s childhood friend and former neighbor testified

that Liebsch spent more time than usual at his lot that summer to repair storm damage to

the roof of his garage. Doe’s friend testified that he saw Liebsch kiss Doe on the lips.

That summer, Doe also told her friend that Liebsch “put his tongue in her mouth and it

was gross.” Four years later, Doe disclosed to two of her cousins that Liebsch “had

touched her vagina and fingered her, used his fingers to touch her and it hurt, and he

kissed her on the lips.” Over the next few years, one of the cousins urged Doe to tell

somebody about the alleged assault. Doe eventually reported the assault to her parents in

2008.



In June 2008 investigators from the White Bear Lake Police Department

questioned Liebsch regarding the alleged sexual assault, and Liebsch denied any

involvement or knowledge. A few months later, Liebsch was charged with first- and

second-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1, 609.343, subd.

1(a) (2014). Liebsch pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. On the second

day of trial, the district court declared a mistrial when Doe’s mother suggested that

Liebsch had previously committed sexual misconduct.

Prior to a second trial, in January 2010, Liebsch pleaded guilty to fifth-degree

criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1 (2014),1 and the State dismissed

the felony criminal sexual conduct charges. As permitted by North Carolina v. Alford,

400 U.S. 25 (1970), Liebsch’s plea did not include an admission of guilt. Instead,

Liebsch admitted that, “if the jury were to believe the witnesses in this case, . . . there’s a

reasonable probability that [he] might be found guilty.” The district court clarified that

Liebsch was “not admitting to the facts” supporting his guilt, but rather was admitting

“there’s a reasonable likelihood that [he] might be found guilty.” The court accepted

Liebsch’s plea “pursuant to the Alford case” and concluded that “the facts . . .

substantiate the case as is required under the Alford case.” Liebsch later stated that he

entered the plea in order to “avoid the risk of significant jail time and a large fine, the

anguish and expense of another trial,” and to obtain “closure on a painful ordeal.”

1 Because Liebsch had no prior convictions for criminal sexual conduct within the previous 7 years, he was convicted of a gross misdemeanor rather than a felony. See Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subds. 2-3 (2014).

4

Doe sued Liebsch in February 2011, alleging that he committed sexual battery and

sexual abuse based on the conduct that gave rise to the criminal charges. The complaint

alleged that Liebsch “pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the 5th degree.” In his

answer, Liebsch admitted entering a guilty plea, but denied all allegations that he

committed sexual abuse. Prior to the start of trial, Liebsch brought a motion in limine to

prevent Doe from introducing evidence of the Alford plea. Doe opposed the motion,

arguing that the court should allow the Alford plea to be introduced into evidence, and

that Liebsch could then explain why he entered the plea.2

The district court granted Liebsch’s motion under Minn. R. Evid. 403. The court

noted that a defendant may have several reasons for pleading guilty while maintaining

innocence, such as “avoid[ing] the possibility of a longer prison sentence” and

“avoid[ing] . . . civil liability.” The court excluded evidence of the Alford plea because it

“contains an admission by [Liebsch] only that a jury might find him guilty,” and

therefore “any mention of the Alford plea would be substantially more prejudicial to

[Liebsch] than probative to [Doe]’s case.”

The civil case proceeded to a jury trial. During his direct examination, Liebsch

testified that he always denied that he sexually abused Doe. Doe’s counsel argued that

this statement “open[ed] the door . . . to talk about the Alford plea.” The district court

concluded that Liebsch’s statement did not contradict his Alford plea because the plea did 2 Doe also argued that Liebsch’s Alford plea should prevent him from denying the sexual abuse under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The district court concluded that collateral estoppel did not apply. Doe did not appeal that decision, and therefore we do not address it.

5

not include an admission of the facts that establish guilt. Later, during closing

arguments, Liebsch’s counsel asserted that Doe introduced no evidence that contradicted

Liebsch’s version of the relevant events. The jury found Liebsch not liable for sexual

assault and battery, and the district court denied Doe’s motion for a new trial. The court

of appeals affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

balanced the Alford plea’s limited probative value against its danger of unfair prejudice

and confusion of the issues. Doe v. Liebsch, 856 N.W.2d 699, 703-04 (Minn. App.

2014).

I.

First, we determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it

excluded the use of Liebsch’s Alford plea as substantive evidence under Minn. R. Evid.

403. We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters,

and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion. Peterson v.

BASF Corp., 711 N.W.2d 470, 482 (Minn. 2006). “[B]y their very nature, evidentiary

rules demand a case by case analysis, an analysis best left to the trial judge familiar with

the ‘setting’ of the case.” Benson v. N. Gopher Enters., Inc., 455 N.W.2d 444, 446

(Minn. 1990). But the erroneous exclusion of evidence is grounds for a new trial unless

the exclusion was harmless. See Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 214 (Minn.

2007).

A.

An Alford plea is a plea in which “[a]n individual accused of [a] crime may

voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison

6

sentence” while not admitting guilt. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. An Alford plea is an

appealing resolution for defendants who, despite maintaining their innocence, have

“nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading,” such as avoiding a harsher

sentence. Id. Because an Alford plea does not rely on an admission of guilt, the record

must contain “strong evidence of actual guilt.” Id.; see 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al.,

Criminal Procedure § 21.4(f), at 846-47 (3d ed. 2007) (“[T]he factual basis must be

significantly more certain than will suffice in other circumstances.”).

We formally adopted the use of Alford pleas in State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758,

760 (Minn. 1977), holding that:

“[A] trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused claims he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its interrogation of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, reasonably concludes that there is evidence which would support a jury verdict of guilty and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.”

Because the accuracy of a plea may be at issue when the defendant does not admit guilt,

we have recommended that district courts “have the defendant specifically acknowledge

on the record at the plea hearing that the evidence the State would likely offer against him

is sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard, to find the defendant guilty

of the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649

(Minn. 2007); see Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761 (stating that a district court “should not

cavalierly accept” an Alford plea without verifying that the factual basis for the plea is

strong).

7

A conviction based upon an Alford plea generally carries the same penalties and

collateral consequences as a conventional guilty plea. 5 LaFave et al., supra, § 21.4(f), at

848-49; see, e.g., Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (admitting a

conviction obtained via an Alford plea as evidence of a prior felony conviction under the

federal felon-in-possession statute); Blohm v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir.

1993) (concluding that a conviction for tax evasion based on an Alford plea collaterally

estopped the defendant from denying tax liability); People v. Miller, 694 N.E.2d 61, 64

(N.Y. 1998) (allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant about a previous

Alford plea for impeachment purposes); Armenakes v. State, 821 A.2d 239, 242 (R.I.

2003) (noting that a conviction obtained via an Alford plea “may be used later for any

legitimate purpose, including sentencing factors and enhancement, impeachment, and in

collateral proceedings, such as deportation.”).

B.

The district court excluded the use of Liebsch’s Alford plea as substantive

evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 403, which provides that “evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion

of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,

or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Evidence has probative value “when

it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478 (Minn.

2005). This probative value is balanced against the “unfair advantage that results from

the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” State v. Cermak, 365

N.W.2d 243, 247 n.2 (Minn. 1985) (quoting 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal

8

Practice and Procedure—Evidence § 5215 (1978)); see also State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331,

338 n.3, 246 N.W.2d 48, 53 n.3 (1976) (“ ‘Unfair prejudice’ includes an undue tendency

to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an

emotional one.” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403, advisory comm. note)).

The question of whether evidence of an Alford plea is admissible in a subsequent

trial is a matter of first impression in Minnesota. Courts in other jurisdictions have split

on whether Rule 403 precludes admission of evidence of an Alford plea in a subsequent

criminal trial. Compare United States v. In, No. 2:09CR00070 DS, 2010 WL 2869108, at

*2 (D. Utah July 20, 2010) (admitting evidence of a conviction obtained via an Alford

plea to prove past felony conviction under the felon-in-possession statute), and State v.

Barkley, 551 S.E.2d 131, 137 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (admitting evidence of an Alford plea

to prove commission of similar crime), with United States v. Elizondo, 277 F. Supp. 2d

691, 701-03 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (excluding evidence of an Alford plea because it lacked

probative value as to whether the defendant had knowledge of the facts establishing

guilt), and United States v. Hawley, 562 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1054 (N.D. Iowa 2008)

(concluding that Alford pleas of co-conspirators lacked probative value under the residual

hearsay exception, Fed. R. Evid. 807, because the pleas were “not necessarily admissions

of guilt or admissions to certain facts, only admissions that the government can prove

certain facts”). We are unaware of any case in which a party sought admission of an

Alford plea in a subsequent civil trial based on the same course of conduct as the criminal

matter.

9

The district court found that evidence of Liebsch’s Alford plea contained little, if

any, probative value. The court noted that “the only real admission by [Liebsch] is that a

jury might find him guilty if [it] chose to find credible the testimony of witnesses which

was never presented to [it].” A conventional guilty plea, by contrast, requires a defendant

to admit the conduct to which he or she is accused of committing. See Goulette, 258

N.W.2d at 760; see also 30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure—

Evidence § 7017, at 178 (3d interim ed. 2000) (“The plea of guilty is offered not to prove

that essential facts have been previously found to exist but rather to prove that the

offender admitted facts constituting guilt.”). Moreover, Doe could—and did—present

testimony regarding the facts surrounding Liebsch’s alleged conduct; the court excluded

only Liebsch’s admission that the facts were sufficient to support a guilty verdict.

The district court also found that evidence of Liebsch’s Alford plea had the

capacity to “persuade by illegitimate means.” See Cermak, 365 N.W.2d at 247 n.2. The

court stated that “any mention of the Alford plea would be substantially more prejudicial

to [Liebsch] than probative to [Doe]’s case,” because Liebsch admitted only that “a jury

might find him guilty,” and the jury in Doe’s civil case would likely fail to understand the

difference between conventional and Alford guilty pleas.

Doe argues that evidence of Liebsch’s Alford plea would not result in prejudice

because Liebsch knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered the plea, and he did so

after consultation with counsel. Liebsch’s mental state when he entered the plea is

irrelevant, however, for determining whether evidence of the Alford plea would unfairly

prejudice Leibsch under Rule 403. Instead, among other things, we look to whether the

10

“evidence will be used by the jury for an improper purpose.” State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d

191, 197 (Minn. 1995). Evidence that Liebsch entered an Alford plea may confuse and

distract the jury,3 thereby causing undue prejudice, regardless of whether Liebsch entered

the plea deliberately and with advice from counsel.

Doe further argues that excluding evidence of an Alford plea under Rule 403

ignores a 100-year-old practice of admitting evidence of a guilty plea in a subsequent

civil case. We have held that evidence that a party has entered a guilty plea is generally

admissible in a subsequent civil trial regarding the same course of conduct. See, e.g.,

Glens Falls Grp. Ins. Corp. v. Hoium, 294 Minn. 247, 251, 200 N.W.2d 189, 191-92;

Jankowski v. Clausen, 167 Minn. 437, 440, 209 N.W. 317, 318 (1926); Wischstadt v.

Wischstadt, 47 Minn. 358, 359, 50 N.W. 225, 225 (1891).4 But we have never stated that

a district court must admit a guilty plea as evidence in a subsequent civil matter. In

3 The dissent takes particular issue with this point, arguing that we routinely ask Minnesota juries to consider complex and difficult questions. Although the dissent is no doubt correct, deciding which facts or issues could confuse the jury—and whether that risk of confusion is necessary to the adjudication of the case—is a function that rests soundly within the discretion of the trial court. In this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that evidence of Liebsch’s Alford plea would create a significant risk of jury confusion and prejudice while providing little probative value.

4 A guilty plea is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., it is hearsay). Prior to our adoption of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, we allowed evidence of a guilty plea as an “admission against interest.” Hoium, 294 Minn. at 251, 200 N.W.2d at 192. But see Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (providing that an out-of-court statement against interest is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable). Evidence of a guilty plea entered by a party opponent is now admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).

11

Wischstadt, the district court admitted evidence of a guilty plea for larceny in a

subsequent slander suit based on the same conduct. 47 Minn. at 359, 50 N.W. at 225.

We affirmed, stating that the guilty plea “was an admission that defendant spoke the

words charged in the warrant.” Id. By contrast, the district court found that Liebsch’s

Alford plea included no admission of facts establishing guilt, and therefore it lacked the

probative value typically found in a conventional guilty plea.

Moreover, none of the cases cited by Doe involved Minn. R. Evid. 403, and we

have never held that evidence of a guilty plea is exempt from Rule 403’s balancing test.5

The district court enjoys broad discretion to determine whether to admit evidence under

5 At oral argument, Doe’s counsel urged us to consider cases in which a defendant who entered an Alford plea was subject to the same consequences as though he had entered a conventional guilty plea. See State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2014); Northwest v. LaFleur, 583 N.W.2d 589 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 1998). But these cases merely demonstrate that an Alford plea carries the same consequences as a conventional guilty plea when calculating the defendant’s sentence or determining treatment requirements during imprisonment. They do not inform the decision of whether to admit evidence of an Alford plea under Minn. R. Evid. 403.

Amicus curiae National Center for Victims of Crime also cites three cases in which evidence of an Alford plea was admitted into evidence. See Blohm v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 1542, 1554 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the defendant’s conviction for tax evasion based on an Alford plea collaterally estopped the defendant from denying tax liability); Harden v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 605 S.E.2d 37, 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that Alford plea created a rebuttable presumption that an insurance company had no duty to provide coverage or defend in a subsequent civil suit); People v. Miller, 694 N.E.2d 61, 64 (N.Y. 1998) (allowing impeachment of the defendant based on a previous conviction based on an Alford plea). In none of the cases did the court examine whether the probative value of the Alford plea was outweighed substantially by its danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. Further, none of the cases involved a private civil action based on the same course of conduct, so evidence of the Alford plea may have been less prejudicial. The proffered cases are therefore unpersuasive.

12

Rule 403. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d at 477. That discretion may extend to a decision to

exclude evidence of a conventional guilty plea, if the probative value of the plea is

“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id. at 478 (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 403). Here, the

district court found that Liebsch’s Alford plea contained little if any probative value.

Simultaneously, the district court found that there was a significant risk that the jury

would be confused and Liebsch would be prejudiced if evidence of the Alford plea was

admitted. On this record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by

declining to admit Liebsch’s Alford plea under Rule 403.6

II.

Next, Doe argues that the district court should have admitted Liebsch’s answer to

the complaint, in which he admitted to entering a guilty plea, to impeach Liebsch’s

testimony that he has always denied sexually abusing Doe. A party generally may

impeach a witness with a prior contradictory statement. O’Neill v. Minneapolis St. Ry.

Co., 213 Minn. 514, 520, 7 N.W.2d 665, 669 (1942); see also Bowe v. Fredlund, 295

Minn. 103, 105, 203 N.W.2d 327, 329 (1972) (“[A]llegations in a pleading which are in

the nature of admissions are admissible for impeachment purposes where they tend to

contradict the testimony of a party.”). These statements are admitted for impeachment

purposes, notwithstanding their inadmissibility for other purposes, because “the witness’ 6 We leave for another day consideration of admission of Alford pleas under other circumstances.

13

prior version shows that he spoke erroneously either when he gave the prior statement or

when he testified.” O'Neill, 213 Minn. at 520, 7 N.W.2d at 669.

But impeachment evidence, like substantive evidence, is subject to the

requirements of Minn. R. Evid. 403. King v. All-Am., Inc., 309 N.W.2d 62, 63 (Minn.

1981) (citing 11 Peter N. Thompson, Minnesota Practice—Evidence § 607.01, at 432

(1979)). As in other contexts, the district court has broad discretion when deciding

whether to exclude impeachment evidence under Rule 403. See generally Peterson v.

BASF Corp., 711 N.W.2d 470, 482 (Minn. 2006) (stating that the district court has broad

discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters). We must therefore determine whether

evidence of Liebsch’s Alford plea has additional probative value, or would cause less

prejudice, when admitted to impeach Liebsch’s testimony such that the district court’s

decision to exclude the evidence amounted to an abuse of discretion.

Liebsch testified that he has denied allegations of sexual abuse “any time anybody

has asked [him].” During closing argument, Liebsch’s counsel stated that Doe presented

no evidence “that called into question any of the things that are at issue in this case” or

refuted Liebsch’s version of the relevant events. Doe argues that these statements

contradict Liebsch’s admission that he entered a guilty plea, and therefore she should

have been permitted to introduce the admission as impeachment evidence.

The district court noted that Liebsch’s admission in the answer, like Liebsch’s

Alford plea, “[does] not constitute an admission of the underlying facts of this matter.” The court therefore concluded that the admission was consistent with Liebsch’s

testimony, which “did still deny that he committed the acts.” Importantly, Liebsch

never denied that he entered an Alford plea. Consistent with his Alford plea, Leibsch

only denied the facts establishing guilt. We therefore conclude that the district court

acted within its discretion when it did not allow Liebsch’s Alford plea to be admitted for impeachment purposes.

Affirmed.