STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. KASSEY BENJAMIN

We must determine whether a defendant seeking a waiver of

the mandatory minimum sentence under the Graves Act is entitled

to discovery of the prosecutor’s files from cases in which other

defendants were granted waivers of the mandatory minimum

penalty.

The Graves Act prescribes a minimum term of incarceration

for certain firearm-related offenses. For some first-time

offenders, the statute contains a provision that allows the

assignment judge, upon motion of the prosecutor or request of

the sentencing judge with the prosecutor’s approval, to waive

the mandatory minimum sentence and impose either probation or a

reduced mandatory custodial term. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2 (section

6.2).

In this case, defendant was charged with various firearm

related offenses under the Graves Act. After the prosecutor

denied defendant’s request for a waiver of the mandatory

penalty, defendant sought discovery of documents from recent

cases in which the prosecutor had approved waivers for other

first-time offenders. According to defendant, this would allow

him to demonstrate the arbitrariness of the prosecutor’s

decision. The prosecutor declined to provide the requested

files.

Ultimately, defendant pled guilty to possession of a weapon

for an unlawful purpose. The Appellate Division vacated

defendant’s conviction, remanded the matter to the trial court,

ordered the prosecutor to provide defendant with a written

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statement of reasons for denying the waiver, and allowed

defendant to renew his request for discovery of previously

granted waivers. We granted certification limited to the

discovery issue.

We agree with the Appellate Division that, when denying a

Graves Act waiver, the prosecutor must provide the defendant

with a statement of reasons. However, we hold that defendants

are not entitled to discovery of the prosecution’s files for

cases in which Graves Act waivers have been granted to other

defendants. We therefore affirm but modify the judgment of the

Appellate Division.

I.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural

history. In July 2011, defendant and a few friends stood in the

“drive-thru” lane of a McDonald’s restaurant in Edison, New

Jersey, blocking cars from passing. A vehicle approached, and

one of its occupants yelled for the men to move. A verbal

altercation ensued, and defendant brandished a firearm.

Although defendant did not point the handgun at anyone, he

threatened to fire it.

Defendant and his friends ended the confrontation by

leaving the McDonald’s. Subsequently, the occupants of the

vehicle called the police. Responding officers observed

defendant walking with a group of people in close proximity to

4



the McDonald’s. Because defendant was carrying a gun and

matched the description of one of the suspects, officers

approached and ordered defendant to drop the weapon. Defendant

threw the handgun behind a nearby motor home, but officers were

able to recover a 32-caliber revolver after they placed

defendant under arrest. The weapon was unloaded and had the

serial number scratched off.

Defendant was charged with various firearm-related

offenses, including second-degree possession of a weapon for an

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a), which is subject to the

mandatory minimum sentence under the Graves Act. When defendant

was charged in 2011, the mandatory minimum term was three years.1

At the time of his offense, defendant was an eighteen-year-old

full-time college student with no juvenile or adult criminal

history. Thus, as a first-time offender, defendant was eligible

for a waiver of the mandatory term of incarceration under

section 6.2.

Initially, defense counsel tried to persuade the prosecutor

to file a motion recommending that the assignment judge waive

the three-year mandatory minimum sentence, but the prosecutor

did “not believe that the interests of justice dictate[d] a

1 An amendment to the Graves Act was adopted in August 2013, increasing the mandatory minimum sentence from three years to forty-two months. L. 2013, c. 113, § 2 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6).

5



waiver” in defendant’s case. Defendant then filed a motion

asking the trial court to refer his case to the assignment judge

with the hope that the prosecutor would consent to a waiver.

Attached to his motion were numerous documents attesting to

defendant’s moral character and academic success.

The prosecutor opposed defendant’s motion as procedurally

improper because under section 6.2 a sentencing court, not the

trial court, is authorized to refer the case to the assignment

judge. The prosecutor also argued that the matter could be

referred to the assignment judge only with the prosecutor’s

approval. Up until that point, the prosecutor had not provided

a written statement of reasons for his refusal to seek a waiver;

the prosecutor only stated, “[a]s has been indicated in the

past, the State does not believe that the interests of justice

dictate a waiver . . . in this case.”

Around this time, defendant filed a request under the Open

Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, for various

documents, including police reports, indictments, and plea forms

for all Graves Act cases between 2010 and 2012 in which waivers

were granted. According to defendant, the only way to prove

that the prosecutor abused his discretion in denying a waiver

was to compare the facts of defendant’s case to the facts of

other similar cases in which waivers were granted. The

Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office denied his request, stating

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that there was “no single document offering a list of defendants

who fall into this category and, under OPRA, we are not

permitted to conduct research for requestors, or create

documents that do not already exist.”

After his failed attempts to obtain the prosecutor’s

consent to a waiver, defendant pled guilty to second-degree

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39

4(a); the State agreed to recommend that defendant be sentenced

as a third-degree offender. At sentencing, defense counsel

informed the court that the OPRA request to obtain information

about other Graves Act waiver cases was unsuccessful. The court

instructed the prosecutor to state on the record the reasons for

refusing to move for a waiver. The prosecutor responded that

his decision was “anything but arbitrary and capricious” because

defendant’s actions went beyond mere possession of a firearm,

and that brandishing a weapon during an altercation is exactly

the type of conduct the Graves Act seeks to deter.

The court acknowledged that this case differs from the

“[w]aiver cases that the [c]ourt normally gets,” where a person

from out-of-state is caught in New Jersey carrying a firearm

that he or she legally owns. The sentencing judge recognized

that brandishing a gun was merely a “very silly, stupid mistake”

on defendant’s part, but concluded that the prosecutor’s

decision was not “arbitrary and capricious, or even quite

7



frankly, respectfully, in error” because the firearm had been

brandished.

The court identified the “clearly significant mitigating

factors here,” such as defendant’s family status, young age, and

lack of a prior criminal record. “[R]egardless of the fact that

the mitigating factors substantially outweigh . . . any

aggravating factors,” the court sentenced defendant in

accordance with the plea agreement to three years’ imprisonment

with a mandatory three-year parole disqualifier pursuant to the

Graves Act.

The Appellate Division vacated defendant’s guilty plea in

the interest of “fundamental fairness.” State v. Benjamin, 442

N.J. Super. 258, 260 (App. Div. 2015). The panel remanded the

case for proceedings consistent with State v. Alvarez, 246 N.J.

Super. 137, 146-49 (App. Div. 1991), which allows defendants to

appeal the denial of a waiver to the assignment judge upon a

showing of patent and gross abuse of discretion by the

prosecutor. Benjamin, supra, 442 N.J. Super. at 264-67.

Additionally, the appellate panel interpreted the

Attorney General’s Directive to Ensure Uniform Enforcement of

the “Graves Act” (Oct. 23, 2008, as corrected Nov. 25, 2008)

(Directive) as requiring prosecutors to memorialize their

reasons for denying a Graves Act waiver “as a means to ensure

8



that waiver decisions are not disparate.” Benjamin, supra, 442

N.J. Super. at 266. Thus, the panel observed that,

without knowing what aggravating or mitigating factors the prosecutor considered (required by the Directive), without a written explanation for the denial (other than the opposition to the motion), and without provision of other waiver case files (required by the Directive), defendant was severely disadvantaged in meeting his Alvarez burden. Moreover, given these circumstances, no informed judicial determination of the motion could be made.



[Ibid.]

Accordingly, the panel instructed the prosecutor on remand to

give defendant a written statement of reasons for the denial and

allowed defendant to renew his request for discovery of files

related to Graves Act waiver decisions by the prosecutor. Id.

at 267.

After the Appellate Division’s ruling, the Attorney General

superseded the Middlesex County Prosecutor and petitioned this

Court for review. We granted certification limited to the issue

of “whether a defendant seeking a waiver of a mandatory sentence

under the Graves Act has the right to discovery of the

prosecutor’s files on previous applications for Graves Act

waivers.” 224 N.J. 119 (2016). Soon thereafter, the Office of

the Public Defender assumed representation of defendant. We

granted amicus curiae status to the American Civil Liberties

Union of New Jersey (ACLU).

9



II.

A.

In the State’s view, uniform application of the Graves Act

does not require identical application to all defendants. The

State warns that allowing discovery of other waiver cases would

inappropriately shift the focus of judicial review from

individual assessments of defendants to comparisons with other

defendants in prior waiver cases.

The State concedes that the prosecutor should provide

defendants with a written statement of reasons at the time a

Graves Act waiver is denied. The State argues, however, that

defendants are not entitled to “forage” through unrelated files

to substantiate an allegation of disparate treatment by the

prosecutor. The State asserts that permitting discovery of such

files would require prosecutors to turn over confidential work

product and sensitive information pertaining to trial that would

violate the privacy rights of other defendants. Relatedly, the

State notes that criminal discovery materials, such as pre-trial

intervention (PTI)2 records, are excluded from public access.

The State maintains that numerous safeguards exist to

ensure fair application of section 6.2, such as the Directive,

2 PTI is a diversionary program that provides qualifying criminal defendants with rehabilitative services while sparing them both the stigma of prosecution and the consequences of conviction. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12.

10



which contains standards and procedures to guide waiver

decisions and, according to the State, sufficiently cabins

prosecutorial discretion. Finally, the State stresses that

because all waiver applications, including the one in this case,

pass through the assignment judge, that judge is in the “best

position” to identify discriminatory practices.

B.

Defendant claims that a written statement of reasons

explaining the prosecutor’s denial of a Graves Act waiver is

insufficient on its own to allow defendant to meet his Alvarez

burden. Defendant asserts that the only way to determine

whether the relevant sentencing factors were appropriately

considered by the prosecutor, without discrimination, would be

to compare all cases in which a waiver was granted. Defendant

further cautions that to require the assignment judge or his or

her designee3 to rely solely on experience to identify

discriminatory conduct, rather than on cases for comparison,

would deprive the Appellate Division of a sufficient record.

Because sentencing is a judicial function, defendant argues

that judicial oversight of Graves Act waiver decisions is

3 Assignment judges may delegate the responsibility of hearing Graves Act waiver motions to the Criminal Presiding Judge. Administrative Office of the Courts, Memorandum, Motions in Graves Act Cases – Delegable by Assignment Judge to Criminal Presiding Judge (Nov. 21, 2008); see also R. 1:33-6(a).

11



required. Defendant highlights this Court’s precedent requiring

meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial decisions that

result in mandatory sentences. Defendant therefore asks the

Court to require: (1) prosecutors to supply defendants with the

case-specific memorializations described in the Directive as an

explanation of their Graves Act waiver decisions; (2)

prosecutors to provide access to the memorializations of their

waiver decisions in the cumulative files that are required by

the Directive; and (3) the Attorney General to make relevant

statewide records available, in order to prevent inter-county

disparities.

C.

Amicus ACLU concedes that in some instances, a statement of

reasons alone is sufficient to demonstrate a prosecutor’s

arbitrary conduct. Nonetheless, the ACLU maintains that

discovery is often necessary to demonstrate arbitrary or

discriminatory Graves Act waiver decisions. The ACLU suggests

that, in addition to the statement of reasons in a defendant’s

own case, a defendant should receive police reports and the

prosecutor’s statements of reasons from cases in which the

prosecutor approved Graves Act waivers. Such information, the

ACLU asserts, will enable defendants and judges to determine how

prosecutors identify and balance the aggravating and mitigating

factors with different defendants. Echoing defendant, the ACLU

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stresses that the Directive requires prosecutors to maintain a

cumulative file of Graves Act waiver cases, which defendants

should be able to access, because the responsibility to “ferret

out” arbitrary or discriminatory action should not belong to the

assignment judge or designee.

III.

A.

“The [Graves] Act makes the use or possession of a firearm

during the commission, attempted commission, or flight from the

commission of certain designated offenses a sentencing factor

that triggers the imposition of a mandatory term of

imprisonment.” State v. Franklin, 184 N.J. 516, 529 (2005).

For example, at the time defendant was charged, the Graves Act

required that those convicted of possession of a weapon for an

unlawful purpose serve a minimum custodial sentence “at, or

between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the

court or three years, whichever is greater.” N.J.S.A. 2C:43

6(c) (2008).

Underlying this statute is a legislative intent to deter

individuals from committing firearm-related crimes by calling

for a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for those convicted

of Graves Act offenses. State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 71

(1983). Thus, even if the trial court finds that the mitigating

factors of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) outweigh the aggravating factors

13



listed in subsection (b) of that statute, the court must still

impose the minimum term of incarceration. State v. Towey, 114

N.J. 69, 82 (1989).

To mitigate the undue severity that might accompany the

otherwise automatic application of the mandatory minimum

sentence under the Graves Act, the Legislature included section

6.2, a limited exception that allows certain first-time

offenders to receive a reduced penalty if the imposition of a

mandatory term would not serve the interests of justice.

Section 6.2 provides:

On a motion by the prosecutor made to the assignment judge that the imposition of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under [the Graves Act] for a defendant who has not previously been convicted of [a Graves Act] offense . . . does not serve the interests of justice, the assignment judge shall place the defendant on probation pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2)] or reduce to one year the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment during which the defendant will be ineligible for parole. The sentencing court may also refer a case of a defendant who has not previously been convicted of an offense under that subsection to the assignment judge, with the approval of the prosecutor, if the sentencing court believes that the interests of justice would not be served by the imposition of a mandatory minimum term.



[N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2.]



In other words, an eligible defendant may be sentenced to either

probation or a one-year custodial term during which he or she is

disqualified from being paroled. Ibid. The relief that section

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6.2 affords can arise in two ways: either the prosecutor makes

a motion to the assignment judge for a waiver of the mandatory

minimum penalty, or the sentencing judge refers the matter to

the assignment judge if the prosecutor approves the referral.

Ibid. In either scenario, the prosecutor must approve the

waiver before the assignment judge or his or her designee

imposes one of the two reduced penalties. Ibid.

B.

In 2008, the New Jersey Attorney General issued a directive

“to ensure statewide uniformity in the exercise of prosecutorial

discretion in implementing” the Graves Act. Directive, supra,

at 10. The Directive instructs a prosecutor contemplating a

waiver to “consider all relevant circumstances concerning the

offense conduct and the offender,” such as applicable

aggravating and mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 and

the likelihood of the defendant’s conviction at trial. Id. at

12. Once a prosecutor moves for or consents to a waiver, the

Directive requires the prosecutor to specify which reduced

penalty would best serve the “interests of justice”: either a

mandatory minimum one-year period of incarceration or a

probationary term. Id. at 14.4 If a prosecutor seeks probation,

4 The prosecutor’s recommendation is not binding upon the court: “[a]lthough the prosecutor . . . may argue in favor of a probationary term or a custodial sentence with a one-year period of ineligibility, nothing in the statute suggests that the

15



he or she must explain why imposition of a one-year custodial

term would constitute a serious injustice. Id. at 13-14.

The Directive also contains specific record-keeping

requirements.

The prosecuting agency shall document in the case files its analysis of all of the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, whether or not the agency moves for or approves a waiver or reduction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.2. Furthermore, where the prosecuting agency is seeking or approving a probationary sentence, the memorialization of reasons must explain why the imposition of a one-year term of imprisonment and parole ineligibility would constitute a serious injustice that overrides the need to deter others from unlawfully possessing firearms. A copy of all case-specific memorializations required by this Section shall also be maintained in a separate cumulative file in order to facilitate such audits as the Attorney General may from time-to-time direct to ensure the proper and uniform implementation of this Directive. The case file and cumulative audit file shall also document the information sources consulted to determine whether the defendant might be subject to the aggravating sentencing factor set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(5) (substantial likelihood that the defendant is involved in organized criminal activity).



[Ibid.]



assignment judge or designee must accept the prosecutor’s recommendation.” State v. Nance, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op. at 17). Indeed, “the authority to elect one of the two sentences set forth in section 6.2 is clearly vested in the assignment judge, or, by administrative directive, the presiding judge acting as the assignment judge’s designee.” Ibid.

16



Therefore, whether or not a prosecutor moves for a waiver, his

or her analysis of all aggravating and mitigating factors is

recorded. Id. at 13. The cumulative file facilitates periodic

audits by the Attorney General to “ensure the proper and uniform

implementation of this Directive.” Id. at 14. Finally, on a

quarterly basis, prosecutors must report to the Attorney General

the number of pre- and post-indictment pleas in which the

prosecutor moved for, or consented to, a Graves Act waiver.

Ibid.

IV.

Before addressing the issue raised in this appeal, we must

first determine whether sufficient procedural safeguards are in

place to protect a defendant’s right to challenge the denial of

a Graves Act waiver.

A.

Our analysis is aided by examining challenges to the

statutory delegation of sentencing discretion to prosecutors in

the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (CDRA), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 to

36A-1. The CDRA was enacted to aggressively battle drug abuse

and drug-related crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1(c). Like the Graves

Act, the CDRA was designed to “provide for the strict

punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most culpable

and dangerous drug offenders,” ibid., and therefore mandates

parole ineligibility periods for certain drug-related crimes.

17



In 1992, this Court decided State v. Lagares, which

involved the constitutionality of the prosecutor’s power under

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) to seek a mandatory extended term5 for repeat

offenders of the CDRA, even though “extended terms are

ordinarily discretionary with the court.” 127 N.J. 20, 23

(1992). In the same year, this Court also decided State v.

Vasquez, where the defendant challenged N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, which

vests the prosecutor with discretion to waive the CDRA’s

mandatory minimum term of incarceration through a negotiated

plea or post-conviction agreement. 129 N.J. 189, 196 (1992).

In both cases, we upheld the statutory delegation of sentencing

discretion to prosecutors, provided that (1) the Attorney

General promulgated guidelines to help prosecutors uniformly

apply the statute; (2) prosecutors stated on the record the

reasons supporting their decision in order to enable judicial

review and ensure compliance with the guidelines; and (3) a

court could review and overturn the prosecutor’s decision if a

defendant demonstrates that the prosecutor acted arbitrarily and

5 New Jersey’s Criminal Code “provides for ordinary sentences [] as well as extended-term sentences that carry greater punishment for the same crime.” State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 606-07 (2014) (citing State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 161 (2006)). For example, a second-time Graves Act offender may face an extended term between five and ten years, if convicted of a third-degree offense; ten and twenty years, if convicted of a second-degree offense; or thirty years and life imprisonment, if convicted of a first-degree offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.

18



capriciously. Lagares, supra, 127 N.J. at 28-33; Vasquez,

supra, 129 N.J. at 195-96; see also State v. Brimage, 153 N.J.

1, 24 (1997) (rejecting Attorney General’s guidelines for

formalizing disparity throughout state).

B.

We now consider whether the Graves Act provides the

procedural safeguards required by this Court in Lagares and

Vasquez.

First, written guidelines exist to channel prosecutorial

discretion. See Vasquez, supra, 129 N.J. at 196. The Directive

instructs prosecutors how to uniformly apply the Graves Act and

section 6.2. Directive, supra, at 3. Not only does the

Directive set forth general rules for prosecutors when

considering charges, dismissals, and extended terms, id. at 5-7,

but it also provides clear parameters for prosecutors

contemplating a waiver, id. at 10-15. The Directive ensures

even application throughout the state by requiring all

prosecutors to consider the same factors and adhere to the same

plea procedures. While the possibility exists that, in similar

circumstances, prosecutors in different counties may reach

different Graves Act waiver conclusions, we have recognized that

some disparity in sentencing is inevitable. Brimage, supra, 153

N.J. at 22.

19



Second, the Directive requires prosecutors to “document in

the case file [their] analysis of all the relevant aggravating

and mitigating circumstances,” even if a Graves Act waiver is

not being sought. Directive, supra, at 13. The Appellate

Division concluded in this case that under this provision of the

Directive, the prosecutor was obligated to provide defendant

with “written reasons for withholding [his] consent to a waiver”

at the time the prosecutor made that decision. Benjamin, supra,

442 N.J. Super. at 265. The State concedes that this is

appropriate to facilitate judicial review for the arbitrary or

discriminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

Third, since the Appellate Division’s 1991 decision in

Alvarez, upholding section 6.2, defendants have been able to

seek judicial review of prosecutors’ waiver decisions. In order

to do so, a defendant must, by motion to the assignment judge,

demonstrate “arbitrariness constituting an unconstitutional

discrimination or denial of equal protection” in the

prosecutor’s decision. Alvarez, supra, 246 N.J. Super. at 148;

Watson, supra, 346 N.J. Super. at 535 (explaining defendant must

show “prosecutor’s refusal [was] a patent and gross abuse of

discretion”). Once a defendant makes this threshold showing,

the defendant can obtain a hearing to review the prosecutor’s

decision if the assignment judge concludes that the “interests

of justice” so require. Alvarez, supra, 246 N.J. Super. at 148

20



49. This judicial backstop ensures that prosecutorial

discretion is not unchecked because the assignment judge retains

“ultimate authority” to review the prosecutor’s waiver decisions

for arbitrariness and discrimination. Id. at 146-47.

Therefore, prosecutors are guided by standards, inform

defendants of the basis for their decisions, and are subject to

judicial oversight. Accordingly, we conclude that the Graves

Act affords meaningful judicial review of a prosecutor’s

decision to deny a Graves Act waiver.

V.

We now turn to the question posed in this appeal: whether

defendants are entitled to discovery of the Directive-mandated

“case-specific memorializations” and cumulative files of

prosecutorial decisions to recommend waivers for cases other

than their own.

Defendant and the ACLU submit that the only way for

defendant to know if the prosecutor fairly ascribed and weighed

the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors is to compare

defendant’s case to those of similarly situated defendants.

Defendant claims that this information is contained in the

“case-specific memorializations” and “cumulative files.” See

Directive, supra, at 13-14.

All case-specific files should contain a statement of

reasons which, upon a defendant’s Alvarez motion, the assignment

21



judge may consider in assessing the prosecutor’s conduct, as the

statement will show the prosecutor’s reasons not to grant a

waiver for a particular defendant. Conversely, additional case

specific information is contained in case and cumulative files

for administrative reasons because those files function as

internal documents, the primary purpose of which is to allow

prosecutors to assess the case and the Attorney General to

conduct audits to ensure compliance with the Directive. Id. at

14. Due to the administrative nature of the case and cumulative

files, we do not find that any case-specific information beyond

a statement of reasons was intended to be accessed by a Graves

Act defendant seeking to demonstrate that the prosecutor acted

arbitrarily.

Moreover, this Court has never mandated discovery to aid

defendants in demonstrating arbitrary and capricious conduct or

disparate treatment without a preliminary showing. As stated in

Alvarez, supra, a defendant may obtain a hearing to review the

prosecutor’s decision only after he or she has demonstrated in a

motion that the prosecutor abused his or her discretion. 246

N.J. Super. at 148-49. In State v. Sutton, when a defendant

challenged the prosecutor’s denial of PTI, this Court held that

the defendant could not prevail merely because she could show

that the prosecutor approved PTI for others “charged with

similar offenses.” 80 N.J. 110, 120 (1979). Rather, the

22



defendant needed to prove that she received “less favorable

treatment than identically situated individuals.” Ibid. The

Court remanded the case to give the defendant the opportunity to

show that the prosecutor relied on “irrelevant or inappropriate

factors,” thereby abusing his discretion in rejecting the

defendant’s PTI application. Id. at 119, 121. Importantly, the

Court clarified that its “holding . . . should not be read as

granting PTI applicants a license to subpoena prosecutorial

files.” Id. at 120. Nor would this Court allow defendants to

“interrogate prosecutors under oath” to substantiate allegations

of “less favorable treatment than other similarly situated

individuals.” Ibid. To the contrary, we repeatedly stated that

defendants must support their claims by “independently secured

evidence.” Ibid.

While Rule 3:13-3 provides that “a defendant has a right to

automatic and broad discovery of the evidence the State has

gathered in support of its charges,” State v. Scoles, 214 N.J.

236, 252 (2013), it does not require the prosecutor to furnish a

defendant with files from cases other than his or her own. See

R. 3:13-3; cf. State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451 (2016). We

therefore conclude that defendants are not entitled to discovery

of a prosecutor’s case-specific memorializations and cumulative

files when challenging the denial of a Graves Act waiver in an

Alvarez motion because there are sufficient procedural

23



safeguards in place for meaningful judicial review of a

prosecutor’s waiver decision.