STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. THEORDORE COPELAND, a/k/a THEODORE J. COPELAND, and JAMES W. WATERS

On October 3, 2012, New Jersey State Troopers Stec,

Bartelt, and Lochetto were on patrol in an unmarked car in

Camden where they observed Christopher Robb walk southbound

towards a house on Eutaw Street and approach defendant who was

on the porch of a house. There were between three and five

people on the porch. The Troopers had the window down in the

idling car, and observed that the weather was a "misty rain."

The Troopers heard defendant ask Robb what he wanted. Robb

requested "one red," and subsequently walked up the steps onto

the porch of the house. Based on his training and experience,

Trooper Stec knew that "one red" was street slang for crack

cocaine. Stec observed Robb reach into his pocket and hand

defendant currency, and in response, defendant handed Robb a

small blue plastic bag. Robb walked down from the porch and

began to walk away. Believing that they had observed a hand-to

hand drug transaction, Stec exited the patrol car, arrested and

searched defendant. The Troopers recovered four bags of crack

cocaine, a loaded handgun, and currency. Bartelt arrested Robb.1

The Trooper did not find CDS when they searched Robb.

1 Robb's charges were dismissed. Stec testified that he believed Robb had swallowed the CDS, but the record does not establish (continued)

A-2984-14T2 3

Defendant was subsequently indicted for third-degree

possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1); third-degree

possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35

5b(3); third-degree possession of CDS within 500 feet of a

school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1; second-degree possession with intent

to distribute within 500 feet of public property, N.J.S.A.

2C:35-7.1 and 2C:35-5a; second-degree unlawful possession of a

handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b; second-degree possession of a

firearm during a drug offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1; and third-

degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7. Defendant

moved to suppress the evidence, which the judge denied on July

10, 2014 after hearing testimony from one witness, Trooper Stec.

On September 16, 2014, defendant pled guilty to possession

of CDS with intent to distribute in a school zone, and unlawful

possession of a weapon. He was sentenced in accordance with the

plea agreement to a five-year term of imprisonment with a three

year period of parole ineligibility. This appeal followed.

Defendant raises the following argument on appeal:

POINT I

THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT TROOPER STEC HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AND SEARCH COPELAND WITHOUT A WARRANT.

(continued) why the charges were dismissed. Like the motion judge, we draw no conclusions regarding the dismissal of Robb's charges.

A-2984-14T2 4

A. There Was Not Sufficient Credible Evidence In The Record To Support The Trial Court's Finding of Probable Cause.

B. Even If Stec's Testimony is Credited In Its Entirety, Stec's Observations Did Not Furnish Him With Probable Cause to Arrest Copeland.

When reviewing a motion to suppress, we "must uphold the

factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long

as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence

on the record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013)

(quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). "Those

findings warrant particular deference when they are

'substantially influenced by [the motion judge's] opportunity to

hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case,

which the reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting

Robinson, supra, 200 N.J. at 15). "To the extent that the trial

court's determination rests upon a legal conclusion, we conduct

a de novo, plenary review." Ibid. (citing State v. J.D., 211

N.J. 344, 354 (2012); State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176

(2010)).

Here, the motion judge found Stec to be credible. The

judge also made very specific findings based on Stec's

testimony, and rejected defendant's arguments that the Trooper

could not have heard or seen what he testified about. The

A-2984-14T2 5

motion judge considered the totality of the circumstances and

concluded that the Trooper had probable cause to arrest

defendant based upon the Trooper's observation of the direct

hand-to-hand drug transaction, his training and experience, and

the location in which the transaction occurred, which the

Trooper knew to be a drug crime area. The motion judge rejected

defendant's argument that the Trooper's entry onto the porch, as

curtilage to the house, violated defendant's Fourth Amendment

rights pursuant to Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __, __, 133 S.

Ct. 1409, 1414, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495, 501 (2013). The judge found

that the porch was curtilage and subject to a diminished

expectation of privacy and the Officers had, from a lawful

vantage point, observed the transaction in plain view on an open

porch and had a valid basis to proceed without a warrant.

Areas of a property open to the public are subject to a

diminished expectation of privacy. See State v. Johnson, 171

N.J. 192, 209 (2002). "What a person knowingly exposes to the

public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of

Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 209 (alteration omitted)

(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct.

507, 511, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582 (1967)). Thus, a front porch

open to full view from the street is not "part of the curtilage

. . . protected by the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 208. As there

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is no reasonable expectation of privacy on an open front porch,

it is a "public place" in which a person may be arrested without

a warrant so long as the police have probable cause to believe a

felony has been committed. See State v. Nikola, 359 N.J. Super.

573, 582-83 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 30 (2003).

Defendant asserts that Stec's testimony failed to establish

probable cause because the State could not explain why no CDS

was discovered in Robb's possession immediately following the

alleged transaction on the porch. Defendant accordingly asserts

that it was impossible to credit Stec's testimony that defendant

handed Robb CDS. We disagree. The motion judge based his

findings upon Stec's testimony that he observed a complete hand

to-hand drug transaction on the porch, found probable cause

based on that testimony, and indicated that the unexplained

dismissal of charges against Robb was not necessarily

inconsistent with the State's version of events.

Defendant also asserts that the transaction Stec witnessed,

although suspicious, did not have a sufficient "tenor of

illegality" and the arrest was premature. However, based upon

our review of the record, particularly Stec's testimony about

the details of the transaction he observed, as well as his

training, experience, and his familiarity with what was a high

crime area involving narcotics distribution and weapons

possession.