STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. LAWRENCE SORBINO

We discern the following facts from the record of the

suppression hearing. Defendant was the supervisor of security

for the New Brunswick Parking Authority's (NBPA) parking lots

and garages. In May 2010, the Middlesex County Prosecutor's

Office initiated an investigation after receiving information

that NBPA security guards were taking money from patrons at exit

gates in NBPA garages, pocketing the money, and using their own

employee badges to allow patrons to exit the garages.

Defendant, as one of the supervisors of security, was suspected

of participating in this scheme by allowing the guards to keep

money that patrons paid to exit the garage, and taking a portion

of the money that the guards collected.

On June 23, 2010, during the investigation, defendant

contacted the Prosecutor's Office and expressed his desire to

discuss the investigation. Officer Heck and defendant met there

and discussed certain details of the investigation. The

interview was taped.

A second interview occurred on July 15, 2010. Defendant

was taken to a small, windowless conference room where he met

with Officer Heck, and Lieutenant Delbagno of the Prosecutor's

Office. Heck testified that the purpose of the meeting was to

clarify certain operations procedures that defendant employed as

a supervisor of security for the NBPA, and to clarify

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defendant's knowledge of other employees' activities at the

Parking Authority. Heck testified that he had no intention of

taking a second taped statement from defendant that day.

Defendant nevertheless asked to make a formal statement

after speaking with the officers for approximately an hour.

Officer Heck testified that defendant explained that "there is

information that he wanted to get off his chest[.]" Officer

Heck also testified that he told defendant he was free to leave

at any time, to which defendant replied, "if I'm a smart guy, I

would probably request an attorney, but I don't want one, I want

to talk to you." Officer Heck then testified that defendant

confessed to his role in the scheme and implicated himself while

being recorded.

At the hearing, defendant offered competing testimony.

Defendant asserted that he did not know he was entitled to an

attorney or that he was free to leave. Defendant also testified

that he felt that he had to give a recorded confession to be

permitted to leave. Defendant left the Prosecutor's Office and

was arrested one week later, on July 22, 2010.

After hearing the parties testify to the facts described

above, the trial judge denied defendant's motion to suppress.

The trial judge specifically found that defendant went to the

Prosecutor's Office of his own volition, and that Officer Heck's

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testimony was credible. The trial judge found that Heck told

defendant that he was not under arrest and that he was free to

leave. The trial judge found that defendant was not credible,

and thus found that defendant was not in custody for Miranda1

purposes at the time he confessed. The trial judge also based

his findings upon a recording that Officer Heck conducted

wherein defendant stated his understanding that he was free to

leave at any time. Accordingly, the trial judge denied

defendant's suppression motion on the basis that his statements

were not made in a custodial and interrogative setting, and

therefore the requirements of Miranda did not apply.

We are obliged to conduct a "searching and critical" review

when reviewing a trial court's legal reasoning supporting its

denial of a motion to suppress confession evidence on the basis

of Miranda. See State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16, 43 (App.

Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35 (2003) (citing State v.

Pickles, 46 N.J. 542, 577 (1966)). In reviewing a trial court's

factual conclusions, however, we "generally defer to the fact

findings of the trial court when they are supported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Puryear,

441 N.J. Super. 280, 293 (App. Div. 2015) (citations omitted).

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)

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Such deference is especially due when a trial judge's findings

"are substantially influenced by [the judge's] opportunity to

hear and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case,

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Ibid. (citing State v.

Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 109-10 (2010)).

Defendant asserts that he was not properly Mirandized

before being subject to custodial interrogation. We disagree.

Miranda v. Arizona, supra, provides that criminal suspects

subject to police interrogation must be provided information

pertaining to their Fifth Amendment rights before police may

elicit incriminating evidence from them. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.

Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706. Without procedural safeguards

in place to ensure that an accused speaks to police with

knowledge of his or her Fifth Amendment rights, any statement

obtained during such an interrogation must be suppressed. Id.

at 478-79, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726.

The requirement of Miranda warnings is not triggered,

however, until an accused is in "custody" for Miranda purposes.

State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 406 (citing Oregon v.

Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d

714, 719 (1977)), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 831, 130 S. Ct. 65, 175

L. Ed. 2d (2009). Without being in custody, an accused has no

Miranda protection because there is no police-dominated

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atmosphere, which forms the basis for the United States Supreme

Court's Miranda jurisprudence. Ibid. (citing Beckwith v.

United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 1616, 48 L.

Ed. 2d 1, 7-8 (1976)).

A determination of custody "depends on the objective

circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views

harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person

being questioned." State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 615-16 (2007)

(citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct.

1526, 1529, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 298 (1994)). Although under New

Jersey law, custody is not limited to holding an accused

individual at a police station, we do consider "whether there

has been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of

action based on the objective circumstances, including the time

and place of the interrogation, the status of the interrogator,

the status of the suspect, and other such factors." State v.

P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1994). "Other such factors" are those

that our Supreme Court has included in the "totality of the

circumstances" analysis, and includes (but is not necessarily

limited to): a defendant's "age, education and intelligence,

advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether

the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether

physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved."

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Nyhammer, supra, 197 N.J. at 402 (citing State v. Presha, 163

N.J. 304, 313 (2000)).

In this case, defendant was not in custody of the Middlesex

County Prosecutor's Office at the time he made his confession.

Although he was inside a police station and was being

interviewed by the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office,

presence in a police station is not enough to establish custody

for Miranda purposes. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.

Ct. at 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 719. Defendant came to the

Prosecutor's Office of his own free will in order to answer

questions about the investigation. He was informed that he

could leave at any time, and was not asked to discuss his own

role in the scheme at the NBPA garages. Defendant also

acknowledged that he could have asked for an attorney, but

consciously chose not to do so. The judge found that there was

no compulsion amounting to custody for Miranda purposes here,

and we decline to disturb that finding.

Defendant also argues that, because the Prosecutor's Office

viewed him as a possible suspect at the time the investigation

was made, and because he was a possible focus of the

investigation, he should have nevertheless received Miranda

warnings.

This argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion.