Oddi v. Ford Motor Company

David Oddi was catastrophically injured in a one-vehicle
accident when the truck he was driving struck a guardrail
and a bridge abutment. Thereafter, he filed two separate
product liability actions in state court. He sued Ford Motor
Company, which designed and manufactured the chassis of
the truck, and he brought a separate action against
Grumman Allied Industries, Inc. (then known as Olson
Bodies, Inc), which designed and manufactured thefinished
truck. Ford and Grumman removed the actions to the
district court where they were consolidated. Ford and
Grumman eventually moved for summary judgment based
upon their contention that Oddi could not establish a prima
facie case because his proposed expert testimony failed to
satisfy the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). The district
court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of
Ford and Grumman, and against Oddi. The district court
subsequently denied Oddi's motion for reconsideration, and
this appeal followed.

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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On June 21, 1993, Oddi was driving a bread truck owned
and maintained by Continental Baking Company. He was
proceeding northbound at exit 14 of Interstate 79 near
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, at approximately 55 to 60 miles
an hour when the truck struck a guardrail and bridge
abutment. Oddi's legs were crushed so badly by the force of
the accident that they both had to be amputated. Oddi's left
arm was also permanently injured.

The truck was a 1976 special order Ford M-5000
Stripped Chassis that Continental had ordered through a
Ford dealership for use as a bread delivery truck. When the
truck left Ford's possession and control it was comprised
only of basic component parts such as frame rails, axles,
engine, drive train, wheels and a front bumper. Continental
took delivery of the Stripped Chassis and delivered it to
Grumman for the design and manufacture of the finished
vehicle. Grumman designed and manufactured all
necessary aspects of the vehicle pursuant to Continental's
specifications. This included modifications to the occupant
compartment ("cab") and floor boards. Continental had
used the truck as a bread delivery truck from 1976 through
1993, and it had been driven for hundreds of thousands of
miles in that capacity before this accident occurred.

The suits that Oddi filed after his accident asserted
claims against Ford and Grumman under theories of strict
liability, negligence, breach of warranty and failure to warn.3
Oddi claimed Ford's defective design of the front bumper of
the bread truck allowed the underside of the truck to ride
up or "ramp" onto the guardrail and strike the bridge
abutment.4 He also claimed that after the truck ramped
onto the guardrail, the left front wheel of the truck hooked
over the rail preventing him from steering away from the
bridge abutment. He alleged that defects in the cab
(designed and manufactured by Grumman) had caused the
flooring to bend upon impact with the bridge abutment and
apply such force as to crush both his legs. He also alleged
that the truck rolled over and down an adjacent
embankment after it struck the bridge abutment.

Ford denied any design defects and also denied that the
truck ramped the guardrail. According to Ford, the truck
simply struck the guardrail and rolled over it. Similarly,
Grumman denied that the flooring was deficient or that it
caused any injury at all.

Oddi retained two experts to support his contention that
his injuries were caused by defects in the manufacture and
design of the truck. John N. Noettl, an engineer, was
retained to testify about the defective design, and Leon
Kazarian, a bio-mechanist, was retained to testify about the
process by which Oddi received his injuries.

After deposing both of Oddi's experts, Ford and
Grumman moved for summary judgment. Ford argued that
all of Oddi's claims should be dismissed because Oddi's
proposed expert testimony could not survive the threshold
inquiry required under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), and, therefore,
Oddi could not establish a prima facie case. Grumman did
not initially make a specific challenge under Daubert.
Instead, Grumman initially argued only that Oddi's
evidence was either inadmissible or failed to satisfy Oddi's
burden of proof.

Oddi responded to the summary judgment motions by
filing a brief in opposition, an affidavit of Noettl, and
excerpts of Noettl's deposition testimony. Oddi did not
request an evidentiary hearing or oral argument, nor did he
submit anything else in response to Ford's Daubert
challenge.

After reviewing Oddi's submissions in opposition to the
summary judgment motions, Grumman filed a reply brief in
which it argued that Oddi still could not meet his burden
of showing that the truck was not crashworthy. Grumman
also challenged Oddi's experts under Daubert. Oddi
responded by filing a motion to strike Grumman's reply
brief claiming that the district court had not granted leave
to Grumman to file it. In the alternative, Oddi sought leave
to submit opposing affidavits if needed.

On March 31, 1999, the district court entered a
Memorandum Opinion in which it ruled that Oddi's experts
did not meet Daubert's admissibility standards. Absent the
testimony of those experts, Oddi could not establish a
prima facie case of liability, and the district court therefore
granted summary judgment in favor of Ford and Grumman.

Oddi filed a motion for reconsideration in which his
major argument was that the district court should have
held a hearing on the Daubert challenge before granting
summary judgment. However, the district court disagreed
and on September 2, 1999, denied his motion for
reconsideration. Oddi then sent a letter to the district court
enclosing a copy of our August 2, 1999 decision in Padillas
v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 1999). Oddi
argued that Padillas required that an evidentiary hearing be
held so that he could meet the defendants' Daubert
challenges. However, the district court disagreed and issued
a supplemental Memorandum Opinion in which it held that
Oddi was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

* * *

"The term crashworthiness means the protection that a
motor vehicle affords its passenger against personal injury
or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." Kuptez v.
Deere & Co., Inc., 644 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Pa. Super. 1994).
The doctrine "imposes liability on the manufacturer not for
causing the accident, but rather for failing to minimize the
injuries or even increasing the severity of the injuries
sustained in an accident brought about by a cause other
than the alleged defect." Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co.,
36 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1994)("Habecker III"). "[T]he
crashworthiness doctrine permits a plaintiff to recover for
enhanced injuries, i. e., only for those injuries he can prove
he would not have sustained if he had been riding in a
crashworthy vehicle." Carrasquilla v. Mazda Motor Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 455, 458 (M. D. Pa. 1997)(citations and
internal quotations omitted). "[I]f enhanced injuries cannot
be shown, then no liability exists as to the manufacturer."
Id.

Crashworthiness is a subset of products liability law.6
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet
adopted the crashworthiness doctrine for products liability
cases,7 we have predicted that it would do so in an
appropriate case. See Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 942

F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1991)("Habecker II").8 To establish a
cause of action on a theory of crashworthiness, a plaintiff
must show: (1) the design9 of the product was defective; (2)
an alternative, safer design that was practical existed; (3)
what injuries, if any, the plaintiff would have received had
the alternative design been used; and (4) the defective
design caused or exacerbated specific injuries. 10 Barker v.
Deere and Co., 60 F.3d 158, 161 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995)(citation
omitted).

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Click the case caption above for the full text of the Court's opinion.

Affirmed.

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